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  Based on the observation that “interdisciplinarity” is the essential nature of C. S. 
Lewis’s religious narratives created by twofold enterprise—imaginative writing and 
Christian apologetics, this thesis aims to undertake a comprehensive reception of 
Lewis’s works by considering carefully the inter-mixture of literary art and Christian 
apologetics within the texts and the relevance of the reader’s role to the textual 
experience.    In other words, the whole study is oriented to combine literary analysis, 
apologetic reading and “hermeneutical” reflection upon the encounter between reader 
and text.  The purpose in general is to demonstrate that Lewis’s literary world 
remains artistically engaging, religiously meaningful and existentially significant to 
the readers beyond his time.       
 
The main part of the thesis presents a practice of close reading and multi-faceted 
discussion of five texts of Lewis, including: The Pilgrim’s Regress (an allegorical 
account of a modern man’s conversion), The Screwtape Letters and The Great 
Divorce (theological fantasies concerning interaction between subjective being and 
objective reality), Till We Have Faces (a mythic novel about the correlation between 
self-knowledge and religious experience), and A Grief Observed (a first-person 
narrative of an inward journey of coming to terms with grief and faith).  Varied in 
literary modes of expression, these texts are read in terms of one common theme 
about the inter-related problem of faith and self.  More specifically, they are treated 
as works of “literary apologetics”—written to manifest and tackle in an 
“existentialist” manner the alienated or disrupted relationship between the human self 
and religious / Christian faith.     
 
In the concluding section, the discussion is moved from interpreting the texts to 
revisiting C. S. Lewis’s mind and rethinking the proper mindset for Lewis’s readers.   
This part of the discussion is intended firstly to re-estimate the enterprise of C. S. 
Lewis as a Christian thinker and literary writer through connecting and comparing his 
ways of thinking and reading with contemporary theologians and hermeneutical 
thinkers, particularly Rudolf Bultmann, Paul Ricoeur, and Hans-Georg Gadamer.  
Such association between Lewis and the contemporary trends of hermeneutics leads 
to the conclusion that C. S. Lewis is indeed an intellectually defensible thinker as well 
as literary figure in and even beyond his time.  Moreover, it helps to fulfill the 
second objective of this final discussion, which is also the chief goal of the whole thesis, namely, to shed light on an appropriate  way  of  reading  C.  S.  Lewis.       
 
Methodologically, this research is done on a cross-disciplinary basis in terms of a 
multiplicity of theoretical ideas concerning such topics as literary tropes, figures of 
speech, the psychology of religion, literary theory and (Kierkegaard’s) existentialist 
philosophy of irony, and hermeneutics.  Illuminated by these miscellaneous tools of 
interpretation, the whole research looks to attest to the claim that the genuine 
experience of Lewis’s texts is not gained through simply appreciating the art of 
expression or digging out the underlying ideas of Christian apologetics, nor does it 
rest upon the response of the reader alone, but must rely on the co-working and 
interplay of all these three aspects of experience.   
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With all his scholarly expertise in the pre-modern period of literature, the 
Renaissance and the medieval age in particular, C. S. Lewis’s literary outputs are, 
however, products of the modern time.  Deeply concerned with the relationship 
between (human) being and (Christian) faith, Lewis’s religious narratives, on the one 
hand, are distinctly marked by traditional Christian views, such as belief in the 
supernatural, the redemption of human soul, and the transformation of the self via 
re-union and reconciliation with the divine other, i.e. God.  On the other hand, they 
are also invested with symbols, dramas, and sometimes realistic portrayals of the 
“pilgrimage” that is typically “modern” in the sense of acquiring faith not simply 
through the acceptance of divine grace but even more importantly via the exercise of 
understanding as well as human freedom (i.e. the will to believe).  Therefore, 
“traditionalist” as the religious import may be, Lewis’s narratives are to a 
considerable extent reflective of and related to the modern spirit of thinking on one’s 
own, although equally true is Lewis’s suspicion of the reliability of the rational self of 
human being, especially when it comes to religious truth or even the self-knowledge 
of the human subject him- or herself.         
In his 1784 essay, “What is Enlightenment?” Kant, the most prominent modern 
thinker of eighteenth century Europe, proclaims that he who dares “to use [his] own 
understanding” (to grow “mature”) is a true child of the age of Enlightenment.
1   
Such a spirit of relying on the confidence of the human self as an independent thinker 
rather than “the guidance” from outside, whether tradition, political authority, church, 
or whatsoever, is described by Gadamer, the renowned German philosopher in the 
                                                 
1  Kant, “What is Enlightenment?” Kant’s Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1970, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H. G. Nisbet), p. 54. 
  1twentieth century, as “the radicality of the Enlightenment which grew out of 
Christianity.”
2  In addition, Gadamer makes the following statement, which gives 
pertinent expression to the modern mindset of abandoning religious belief for a new 
belief in the self: “For the first time in the history of mankind, religion itself is 
declared to be redundant and denounced as an act of betrayal or self-betrayal” 
(emphasis added).
3   Gadamer’s judicious remark very keenly and subtly touches 
upon the “existentialist” trait of modernity.  To put it in another way, in the modern 
age, religion has broadly lost its status as the very imperative for leading a fulfilling 
human life; thus, turning or returning to religious belief could mean contradiction to, 
at least something incompatible with, the integrity and subjectivity of the human self.     
Basically, this modern revision of the meaning of religion to the human life / self 
speaks for the cultural context, specifically the intellectual and spiritual “climate” of 
the modern western world, in which C. S. Lewis undertook his joint 
enterprise—imaginative writing and Christian apologetics.   Focused on several texts 
representative of Lewis’s twofold and intermingled enterprise, this study aims to 
explore Lewis’s “answer,” articulated by his literary texts, to the particular “situation 
of modern culture,”
4 namely, a prevalent problem, even loss, of faith that besets 
human souls, as evidenced in the modern self’s severed relationship with the 
supernatural, divine being of the Creator and Redeemer.    The texts selected for close 
reading include an allegory of conversion (The Pilgrim’s Regress), two theological 
                                                 
2  This description and the statement quoted below appear in the conclusion of Gadamer’s article, 
“Aesthetic and religious experience,” in which Gadamer argues that poetic speech can be a viable 
medium to communicate religious truth and that art and religion are compatible rather than 
oppositional, even if there are fundamental dissimilarities between them.    The Relevance of the 
Beautiful and Other Essays (London: Cambridge University Press, 1986, trans. Nicholas Walker), p. 
153.  “Aesthetic  and  religious  experience.”  Pp.  140-153.  
3  Gadamer, Ibid, p. 153. 
4  This phrase is borrowed from Paul Ricoeur, who in “Conclusion: The Symbol Gives Rise to 
Thought,” the concluding chapter of his book, Symbolism of Evil (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969, c1967, 
trans. from the French by Emerson Buchanan), symbolic language, such as found in myths, carries in 
itself the capacity for giving an “answer to a certain situation of modern culture,” meaning the culture 
of ceasing to believe in God.    P. 348. 
  2fantasies (The Screwtape Letters and The Great Divorce), a mythic novel (Till We 
Have Faces) and finally an “autobiographical” fiction (A Grief Observed).  These 
five works are all characterized not just by the religious concern with the problem of 
acquiring faith but also by their focus upon the individual self’s existential struggle 
with believing or not believing.  Therefore, through interpreting each of them, we 
may detect the apologetic vision of C. S. Lewis—articulated through a literary 
approach, namely, via his imaginative writing—about how the alienated or disrupted 
relationship between human existence and religious / Christian faith could or ought to 
be tackled.   
But, this does not mean that Lewis writes these narratives simply to propagate 
Christian faith—how it is lost and can be found again.  Neither is this research 
concerned with the religious meaning of Lewis’s works only.  In fact, this study 
argues that the first and foremost principle to approach the texts of Lewis’s religious 
narratives is to treat them essentially as literary art rather than “religious propaganda.” 
Based on this understanding, this study purports to demonstrate a valid reading of C. 
S. Lewis—in accordance with the most distinctive, also un-dismissible, quality of his 
texts, that is, interdisciplinarity.  Why is this critical principle, namely, an 
interdisciplinary approach, of primary importance to the reception of C. S. Lewis’s 
religious narratives?  In addition to pursuing a valid act of reading, to underscore 
such an essential feature of Lewis’s texts is also for the purpose of rectifying the 
unfair and “reductionist” misjudgment that tends to hold Lewis’ literary enterprise as 
nothing but a sort of adjunct apologetics.    Some critics may deliberately overlook the 
fact that these religious fictions are works of literature simply because of their 
personal antagonism toward the Christian ideas within Lewis’s texts.     
The noted American literary scholar, Harold Bloom, is one such example.  In 
his introduction to C. S. Lewis’s The Chronicles of Narnia (2006), a critical collection 
  3edited by him, Bloom makes the following derogatory remarks, with the obvious 
intention of discrediting the value of C. S. Lewis as a writer of (children’s) literature.  
However, Bloom’s critical disaffirmation is not in the least made on any literary 
ground but clearly based on the steadfast dogmatism of Lewis’s Christian faith, which 
Bloom cannot but feel repelled and also “amazed” by:   
 
 
One could say that Lewis by far transcended St. Paul’s definition of faith.  
For the author of the Narnia books, faith was the substance of things 
already possessed, the evidence of things perpetually seen.  If C. S. Lewis 
had one singular originality, it was that he was the most dogmatic human 
being ever to exist.  I say this not to malign Lewis, but I am now three 
quarters of a century old and have read non-stop all my life.    Never have I 
encountered any other writer so dogmatic in temperament and in conviction 
as C. S. Lewis.  Compared to him, John Calvin and Martin Luther were 
relatively tolerant spirits.
5      
 
 
If these disparaging words were spoken not from a literary critic but from some 
“spiritual appraiser,” they might be taken, at their face value, as a compliment to 
Lewis.    Yet, the antipathy Bloom expresses here appears rather out of place, for it is 
aimed at repudiating the “originality” of Lewis as a literary writer—by exaggerating 
the “level” of Lewis’s faith or faithfulness.  In other words, without bothering to 
consider Lewis’s fantasy writing (i.e. The Chronicles of Narnia) according to their 
aesthetic merits or demerits, Bloom, with all his long-term scholarship in literature, 
simply and quite curiously devalues the “originality” of Lewis by referring 
sarcastically to his opinion about how incredibly dogmatic a Christian C. S. Lewis is.   
Of course, Bloom’s antipathetic attitude is understandable, if we take into account the 
observations of Wayne C. Booth that it is impossible to demand total “objectivity” in 
                                                 
5  See Harold Bloom’s “Introduction.”    C. S. Lewis’s The Chronicles of Narnia (New York, N.Y.: 
Chelsea House Publishers, 2006), p. 2-3. 
  4the reader and that the “incompatibility of beliefs” between the reader and the author 
(as emerged from the literary text) must “fundamentally affect [the] literary 
responses” of the former.
6   Bloom, in the same introduction, indeed acknowledges 
that his own “Gnostic convictions” as well as his “manifesto,” that is, The Marriage 
of Heaven and Hell of William Blake, (of whom Bloom claims himself as “a 
disciple”), are in direct contrast with the belief of Lewis, the author of The Great 
Divorce.    Yet, if we think more thoroughly about the question of belief in the reading 
of literature, it is highly suspicious whether one can justifiably judge a piece of 
literature simply in terms of the author’s religious faith, or take literary works as 
nothing but the propaganda of the author’s belief.   
In fact, it is exactly Bloom’s failure, more exactly, his refusal, to read Lewis in 
literary terms that renders his depreciation of Lewis’s literary authorship (not just of 
The Chronicles of Narnia) unacceptably fallacious.  Besides his sarcastic and not 
really convincing denigration of Lewis’s literary originality quoted above, Bloom’s 
insistently “unprofessional” treatment of Lewis’s literary works as something like 
religious “propaganda” can also be discerned in the following comments: “I am a 
touch remorseful at being ungrateful to a major scholar who dismissed questions and 
heroically affirmed that he had all the answers, both as to this world and the next.”
7  
In response to Bloom’s commentary, two questions could be raised: Is it true that the 
textual worlds created by C. S. Lewis’s literary imagination provide no literary 
experience but merely outspoken “answers” manipulated by Lewis’s personal faith in 
Christianity?  And, is it justifiable or merely preposterous for a literary reader, who 
is supposed to genuinely interact with or confront the text concerned, to reach the 
conclusion that the author possesses “all the answers”?    These two questions actually 
                                                 
6  Wayne C. Booth’s The Rhetoric of Fiction (London: Penguin Book, c1991), p. 139, 140. 
7  Bloom, Ibid, p. 2. 
  5are closely related to the main concern of the present research, that is, how to receive 
C. S. Lewis’s imaginative works, or, “literary apologetics.”  With the recognition of  
“interdisciplinarity” as the predominant feature of Lewis’s religious narratives, this 
study maintains that the valid and indispensable approach to Lewis’s texts should be 
interdisciplinary—concerning not only religious but also literary aspects.  In this 
sense, the negative and yet completely unliterary criticism of Harold Bloom, shown in 
his tendency to put mono-concern with religion and reject a literary author like C. S. 
Lewis in terms of non-literary issues, is just a perfect example of the bad kind of 
reception the present study means to disclaim.    In spite of his long-term devoted and 
celebrated profession as a literary critic, Bloom in his critique of Lewis the author of 
the  Narnia tales actually exemplifies a completely un-professional approach to 
literature, which ultimately discredits not the literary work or its author (i.e. Lewis) 
but the literary critic himself.     
To counter the reductive and simplistic sort of reception, or rejection, of C. S. 
Lewis’s literary outputs, the critical objective of this C. S. Lewis study is to 
demonstrate a comprehensive and in-depth interpretation of his texts and examine the 
value and meaningfulness of his Christianity-imbued literature to us contemporary 
readers, whether Christian or non-Christian.      To put it in another way, this research 
aims to testify as to why the religiously “dogmatic”
8 and, in a sense, “anachronistic” 
Lewis is still worth reading and his literary worlds are profoundly engaging.    For the 
purpose of getting engaged with Lewis’s literary texts themselves (instead of paying 
indiscreet attention to Lewis the person or his faith), the following discussions on his 
five narratives are oriented to probe into not only the Logos (i.e. religious meaning) of 
                                                 
8  In his essay, “ Answers to Questions on Christianity,” C. S. Lewis himself acknowledges that “in all 
the things which I have written and thought I have always stuck to traditional, dogmatic positions.”    C. 
S. Lewis Essay Collections: Faith, Christianity and the Church (London: HarperCollinsPublishers, 
2000, ed. Lesley Walmsley), p. 327. 
  6each text but also the Poiema, that is the artful texture of interweaving religious 
themes with specific vehicles of communication.  The terms and concepts of these 
two important aspects of literary works are derived from C. S. Lewis’s book on 
literary criticism, An Experiment in Criticism, in which Lewis expounds what the two 
essential elements play in the art of literature as follows: 
 
 
A work of literary art can be considered in two lights.    It both means and is.  
It is both Logos  (something said) and Poiema  (something made).  As 
Logos it tells a story, or expresses an emotion, or exhorts or pleads or 
describes or rebukes or excites laughter.  As Poiema, by its aural beauties 
and also by the balance and contrast and the unified multiplicity of its 





Intended to examine both what is said and how it is made, the discussion on each of 
Lewis’s texts is divided into an introductory chapter / section concerned primarily 
with analyzing the expressive mode or rhetorical tool that is employed for effective 
conveyance of certain “Logos” and then a new chapter or further discussion focused 
on thematic explorations.     
More specifically, when looking at the allegorical text, The Pilgrim’s Regress, the 
“literariness” of the text is examined through a theoretical analysis of the suitability of 
“allegory” for Lewis to embody a most immaterial experience of transcendence.  
Next, in the introduction for the two texts of Lewis’s theological fantasies, textual 
analyses are concerning the elements of “the fantastic” and “the ironic” as meaningful 
vehicles of communicating Lewis’s theological imagination of the encounter between 
the supernatural and the subjective.  Then, when it comes to the myth-rewritten 
                                                 
9 Lewis,  An Experiment in Criticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), p. 132. 
  7novel, Till We Have Faces, appreciation of the mythopoeic quality of Lewis’s text is 
connected with how Lewis tactfully penetrates into and lays bare the (psychological) 
truth about the interplay between the development of personality and the growth of 
spirituality.  At last, the study of A Grief Observed highlights self-reflective / 
“autobiographical” writing as a tremendously informative device to facilitate the 
“readerly experience” of a “landscape of grief” and the internal and ultimately 
victorious journey through a “crisis of faith.”    As regards the critical avenues for the 
service of this interdisciplinary study, a multiplicity of theoretical ideas is applied.  
Generally speaking, they are related to literary tropes, figures of speech, Jungian 
depth-psychology, the psychology of religion or mysticism, literary theory and 
Kierkegaard’s existentialist philosophy of irony and last but not least (literary, 
theological, philosophical) hermeneutics.  These miscellaneous tools offer 
illuminating “points of reference” for different interpretative contexts in accordance 
with the variety of forms of expression as well as the multi-disciplinary nature of 
Lewis’s texts.  Through the textual criticism and the exploration of religious themes 
as outlined above, this C. S. Lewis study looks to testify to the importance of 
experiencing not only the profundity of the religiousness but also the artful richness of 
the literariness displayed in the textual world of Lewis’s religious literature.   
Furthermore, in addition to demonstrating a comprehensive reading of Lewis’s 
works, namely, looking into their literary and religious aspects, the task of interpreting 
these texts also includes some significant reflections upon the act of interpretation 
itself.  That  is  to  say,  the research topics cover not only the theme of religion, what is 
“said” about the existential problem of faith, and the texture of the whole expression, 
how the accommodation of religious meaning within literary space is “made,” but also 
the domain of literary hermeneutics.    In fact, this last but not least topic—concerning 
good readership and the act of interpretation—in a sense, plays the most crucial role 
  8in the undertaking of interdisciplinary research like this.  After all, as informed by 
hermeneutic theories, it is only through interpretation that a text can speak to its 
audience.  Moreover, to approach the kind of literature like Lewis’s “literary 
apologetics,” when literary reception must be coordinated with understanding of 
religious meaning, which means that interpretation may involve the experience of 
being “confronted” by Christian ideas, how to read thus becomes an issue of special 
importance and deserves considerable reflection.  However, to this critical domain, 
namely, the significance of “hermeneutics” to the reception of Lewis’s literature, very 
few critics give serious and sufficient consideration.    None of them has indeed drawn 
any association between modern hermeneutic theories and the criticism of Lewis’s 
literary works or the critical ideas established by Lewis.  But, there is, in fact, a 
tremendously noteworthy and important connection between C. S. Lewis and the 
modern hermeneutic tradition.  It is far from impertinent to observe that as Lewis’s 
“literary apologetics” may still speak to the readers up to now persuasively, so does 
his literary criticism impart sophisticated insights which not only provide valuable 
and sustainable ideas to literary readers, including the readers of his own literature, 
but also serve to mark him out as an intellectually defensible contemporary thinker as 
well  as  literary  figure.      
Basically, the reason why talking about C. S. Lewis and his literature in terms of 
hermeneutics can be related to literary criticism in a general sense and to the special 
“hermeneutics” that the reception of C. S. Lewis’s Christian literature
10 may be 
concerned with.  About the general guidelines of literary reception, we can indeed 
learn much from Lewis’s celebrated scholarship in literary criticism.    In fact, in some 
                                                 
10  The meaning of “Christian literature” in this study of Lewis’s religious narratives is based on the 
definition Lewis gives in his article, “Christianity and Literature:” “Christian Literature proprement 
dite--, that is, of writing which is intended to affect us as literature, by its appeal to imagination.”    C. S. 
Lewis Essay Collection: Literature, Philosophy and Short Stories (London: HarperCollinsPublishers, 
2000, ed. Lesley Walmsley), p. 4.     
  9of the following chapters, Lewis’s insightful viewpoints, such as those on allegory, 
metaphor, religious language and myth, are often revisited and used as theoretical and 
critical references of great value.  In addition to these literary categories, Lewis’s 
keen observation about the interaction between reader and text    is particularly 
instructive to the present study which intends to exercise “good reading” of Lewis’s 
literary texts.  C. S. Lewis, no doubt, has something to offer, not just about how 
modern people can believe again but also about how readers ought to meet a literary 
text. 
To be more specific, the very conception that “the primary literary experience” is 
“the all-important conjunction (Reader Meets Text),”
11 which Lewis proclaims as the 
paramount principle for the “literary mode of reading,” provides both an important 
guideline for his readers and definite evidence of the link between Lewis and modern 
hermeneutics.    Even though Lewis himself might not know it (or perhaps would not 
care about it), his attempt to pay significant attention to “the act of reading” made in 
Experiment on Criticism (1961), his last critical treatise, is in close parallel with the 
dominant trend of hermeneutics upheld by his contemporaries, such as the 
pre-eminent hermeneutic philosophers, Paul Ricoeur (1913-2005) and Hans-Georg 
Gadamer (1900-2002).  The “experiment” Lewis proposes in this treatise is about a 
“shift” of literary judgment.  Lewis recommends that literary evaluation be turned 
around from judging the reader’s taste according to good or bad literature being read 
to deciding the value of literature by the quality of how  it  is  read.   From  this  inverse 
model of criticism, Lewis draws his conclusion that “[w]hatever the value of literature 
may be, it is actually only when and where good readers read.”
12   Later  in  the  same 
book, Lewis uses the case of appreciating the “Poiema” to further expound the active 
                                                 
11 Lewis,  An Experiment in Criticism, p. 128-129. 
12  Lewis, Ibid, p. 104. 
  10role of a reader in the experience of (the shape of) a text: “The parts of the Poiema are 
things we ourselves do; we entertain various imagination, imagined feelings, and 
thoughts in an order, and at a tempo, prescribed by the poet.”
13  In this well-made 
explanation, Lewis most insightfully exemplifies the imperative of the reader’s 
engagement  with  the  text.      
Noticeably, Lewis’s proposal of moving the emphasis as well as the attention 
from author’s work (i.e. whether the text is good or not) to the reader’s exercise (i.e. 
what good reading is) is rather akin to modern reader-response criticism, although 
Lewis did not use this theoretical term.    Moreover, Lewis’s idea of reading is not just 
sophisticated but even in a sense “advanced” in that it indeed anticipates what Ricoeur 
later names the “hermeneutical shift” in the wake of structuralism.
14    As we can see 
in the quotation below, Ricoeur explicates and promotes a preferable “hermeneutic 
model” based on the “shift” of the site of meaning from subjectivity of either the 
author or the reader to the inherent “objectivity” of the text that awaits “co-operating” 
with the “horizon” of the reader so as to become meaningful:  
   
 
The kind of hermeneutics which I now favour starts from the recognition of 
the objective meaning of the text as distinct from the subjective intention of 
the author.  This objective meaning is not something hidden behind the 
text.  Rather it is a requirement addressed to the reader.  The 
interpretation accordingly is a kind of obedience to this injunction starting 
from the text.  The concept of ‘hermeneutical circle’  . . . does not 
proceed so much from in intersubjective relation linking the subjectivity of 
the author and the subjectivity of the reader as from a connection between 
two discourses, the discourse of the text and the discourse of the 
                                                 
13  Lewis, Ibid, p. 133.   
14  In “Conclusion: The Symbol Gives Rise to Thought,” Ricoeur provides a succinct account of what a 
text is according to “structuralism”: “For structuralism, language does not refer to anything outside of 
itself, it constitutes a world for itself.    Not only the reference of the text to an external world, but also 
its connections to an author who intended it and to a reader who interprets it are excluded by 
structuralism.    This twofold reference to a subject of the text, whether author or reader, is rejected as 
psychologism or ‘subjectivism.”    The Symbolism of Evil, p. 319.   
  11interpretation.  This connection means that what has to be interpreted in a 
text is what it says and what it speaks about, i.e., the kind of world which it 
opens up or discloses; and the final act of ‘appropriation’ is less the 
projection of one’s own prejudices into the text than the ‘fusion of 
horizons’—to speak like Hans-Georg Gadamer—which occurs when the 
world of the reader and the world of the text merge into one another.
15    
 
 
From this astute exposition of Ricoeur’s on the transformation of hermeneutic 
theories “from a ‘romanticist’ trend to a more ‘objectivist’ trend,” it is observable that 
C. S. Lewis’s critical leaning is basically in line with the “post-structuralist” 
development of hermeneutics, even if Lewis himself never made such a connection, 
nor did he reflect upon reading or text-understanding in any philosophical terms as 
Ricoeur or Gadamer did.  Still, it is not far-fetched or impossible at all to link 
Lewis’s stance in literary criticism or even his literary creation with the theory of 
interpretation informed by contemporary hermeneutics.  In  fact,  some  hermeneutical 
insights offered by Lewis’s contemporary thinkers are evidently resonant with Lewis’s 
critical outlook and also may serve as useful references for the reception of Lewis’s 
literary  texts.    
In addition to the notion of reading (or understanding) as an “event” of 
“dialogic” interplay between text and reader, a hermeneutic principle that Ricoeur 
rightly holds identifiable with Gadamer’s idea of the “fusion of horizons,”
16 some 
hermeneutic thoughts, particularly those concerning the phenomenology of religion, 
are of illuminating value to the present study.  Indeed, the profound reflections over 
                                                 
15  Ricoeur, Ibid. p. 319. 
16  The idea of interpretation as an “event” is derived from Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, in 
Truth and Method (London: Sheed and Ward, 1975, trans. & ed. Garrett Barden and John Cumming), p. 
429.    Gadamer’s hermeneutics is well expounded and appropriated by the German theorist of literary 
hermeneutics Hans Robert Jauss, who follows Gadamer, especially the latter’s insight on the 
“historicity of understanding,” to highlight the “dialogic character” of “literary communication.”    See 
H. R. Jauss.    “Horizon Structure and Dialogicity,” Question and Answer: Forms of Dialogic 
Understanding (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989, ed. & trans. Michael Hays), pp. 
197-231. 
  12the relation between literary art / criticism and religion / belief obtained from 
hermeneutic philosophers or theologians, such as Gadamer, Ricoeur and David Tracy, 
are called upon from time to time throughout this research.  They are treated as 
references of no subordinate order but of guiding importance.  For instance, 
Ricoeur’s following pronouncement is of special relevance to the overall objective of 
this interpretation of Lewis’s religious narratives: “The symbol gives rise to 
thought . . . it wishes to answer to a certain situation of modern culture.”
17  Taken  as 
“symbolic” rather than merely “rhetoric” conveyance of the real  situation of the 
intertwined problem of faith and the self in modern time or beyond, Lewis’s Christian 
literature must entertain such a wish as Ricoeur states.  But, how can we possibly 
hear the “answer” it “wishes” to give?  To this question, Ricoeur, again, offers a 
most promising guideline to us readers, or critics; he later proclaims: “we modern 
men, aim at a second naiveté in and through criticism.    In short, it is by interpreting 
that we can hear again.”
18  
In fact, the underlying purpose this study pursues is importantly inspired by this 
famous proclamation of Ricoeur’s.  That is to say, through the practice of 
interpretation, e.g. “structural [or textual] analysis” and also “existential 
appropriation,”
19 of Lewis’s Christian literature, this research looks to show that 
embedded within Lewis’s texts is some “apologetic answer” for us to “hear,” that is, 
some corrective key to the disunion between human existence and faith in God.    It is 
worth reiterating here that this study at the same time argues that the “Christian 
apologetics” indicated in Lewis’s imaginative writing are intermingled with the 
literary art of Lewis’s works.    Furthermore, the interplay going on within the making 
                                                 
17  Ricoeur, “Conclusion: The Symbol Gives Rise to Thought,” The Symbolism of Evil, p. 348. 
18  Ricoeur, Ibid. p. 351. 
19  Ricoeur’s phrases, derived from his book, The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-disciplinary Studies of the 
Creation of Meaning in Language (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, c1977, trans. Robert 
Czerny with Kathleen McLaughlin and John Costello), p. 321. 
  13or reception of these texts is not between the literary and the religious only.    It must 
involve also the “hermeneutic.”    As both Lewis and Ricoeur have taught us, without 
good reading or even the mere act of interpretation, texts cannot really speak to us.  
Likewise, until all these essential parts of understanding, i.e. literary art, religious / 
“apologetic” meaning and “hermeneutics,” are taken into perspective, the “Logos” or 
“answer” of Lewis’s religious literature could not emerge to become our “window.”
20  
Through it, our existential reflection upon our being might be deepened and our 
perception of the supernatural truth about the divine re-awakened.  But we cannot 
use such a window without receiving the whole world of which the window is only a 
part.  After his literary world is well received and its “truth-revealing” window is 
properly used, then, to us (post-) modern readers of C. S. Lewis, the will not to 
power
21 but to believe, i.e. “the second naiveté,” could possibly become the 
“fundamental self”
22 within each of us.     
Ultimately, the attainment of such a self, that is, possessing “post-critical” 
naiveté to believe, even just open to an apologetic voice / overtone within literature, 
would signify a possible meeting of the two contradictory patterns of mind noted by 
Gadamer—“the claim of the Christian message” that “we cannot achieve” without 
faith and “the radicality of the Enlightenment,” the opposite claim that we can and 
must make our own achievement, e.g., do our own understanding.
23      
                                                 
20  Cf. Lewis’s words, “Literature as Logos is a series of windows, even of doors.”    An Experiment in 
Criticism, p. 138. 
21  The idea “power” here is used in Nietzsche’s sense, which has a anti-religious / anti-Christian 
connotation of the self-dependence or self-sufficiency of mankind.     
22  This phrase is quoted from Austin Farrer’s article, “The Christian Apologist,” collected in the book, 
Light on C. S. Lewis (London: Bles, 1965, ed. Jocelyn Gibb), published in remembrance of C. S. Lewis.     
Farrer remarks there: “The very thing that reconversion does is to persuade a man to take a believing 
self as his fundamental self.    We may say at the best that belief is a real (if smothered) attitude in such 
minds; and it is this that offers an opening to the apologetic approach.”    See p. 24.   
23  In the conclusion of his essay, “Aesthetic and Religious Experience,” Gadamer suggests the 
confliction or contradiction between Christian message which claims the incapacity of human beings to 
achieve what faith will achieve for them and the Enlightenment mindset of believing in and relying on 
one’s self to do the thinking for oneself.    The quotation of Gadamer’s words can be seen on page 153.   
See also Kant’s essay, “What is Enlightenment?” especially the opening paragraph.     




    Despite the proclaimed objective to generalize
24  through allegorical 
imagination, or representation, of an individual’s pilgrimage, C. S. Lewis’s allegory 
and apologia—The Pilgrim’s Regress—is most truly based on his personal history of 
conversion, which is largely intellectually engaged, as can be seen in its full account 
of the dialectic of Lewis’s own philosophical progress, and more subtly and 
significantly involved with his subjective experience of the “dialectic of desire.”
25  
On the other hand, The Pilgrim’s Regress is far from simply an autobiographical 
account or, as it were, a “virgin” and “disguised” version of the explicitly 
autobiographical and completely subjective book, Surprised by Joy, appearing about 
twenty years later but in tremendous parallel with this first apologetic allegory in the 
context of his conversion.  Instead, this allegorized and intentionally generalized 
account is substantially a work of art, even if it may be arguable to decide how artistic 
it is.    To solve this textual issue, perhaps the sensible idea is to apply what Lewis the 
literary critic suggests in The Allegory of Love that “life and letters are inextricably 
intermixed”
26 to the reading of his own allegorical text, which attempts to “embody” 
(rather than to “disguise”) his intellectual, psychic and spiritual experiences with the 
imaginative, precisely allegorical, mode of expression.    Accordingly, it is legitimate, 
even necessary, to put the “twofold textuality,” brought forth by the intermixture of 
the element of literariness and that of autobiography, into consideration of Lewis’s 
                                                 
24  In his “Afterword to Third Edition,” Lewis concludes by the claim that “I was attempting to 
generalize, not to tell people about my own life.” The Pilgrim’s Regress (London: Bles Ltd., [1933] 
1992), p. 209. 
25  Lewis, Ibid, p. 205. 
26  In the first chapter of The Allegory of Love: A Study in Medieval Tradition (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1958) on “Courtly Love,” C. S. Lewis also recommends: “we avoid that fatal 
dichotomy which makes every poem either an autobiographical document or a ‘literary exercise’—as if 
any poem worth writing were either the one or the other” (22).    This critical assertion sounds valid 
and supportive of my approach to his allegorical text. 
  15only allegorical and first post-conversion apologetic book.     
  However, to clarify the critical position underlying the following discussion, it 
should be emphasized that the recognition of “double textuality,” the textual nature 
derived from the combination of life and art, does not lead to a “joint criticism” of 
The Pilgrim’s Regress, that is, a criticism engaged in the double venture into literary 
and biographical criticism.  Rather, centered on Lewis’s text of the allegory of a 
modern self’s conversion, this study maintains that the whole text per se be treated as 
a work of art, not a general autobiography.  Yet, this does not mean to overlook the 
relevance of the biographical context of Lewis’s “adventure of faith.”  After all, 
there is undeniable correspondence between Lewis’s own journey and the pilgrimage 
delineated in the allegory.    The biographical context can thus be the valuable point of 
reference to help unravel the elusiveness yielded particularly by the autobiographical 
element, e.g., the mystery of Lewis’s experience of “Joy” and the complexity of his 
mental development which is to a great extent philosophically charted and culminates 
in conversion to Christian faith.  Nevertheless, the autobiographical element ought 
not to be overemphasized in the criticism of the allegory.    One can be reminded that 
Lewis himself, in the expository “Afterword,” referred oftentimes to his 
life-experiences, particularly of the desire called “Joy,” and acknowledged the 
“subjectivism” of his allegory about such a particular experience which is indeed full 
of his own testimony of various cheats in the identification of its unnamable “object.” 
However, he did also insist that his writing was not intended to be a personally 
subjective account but really a “generalized” allegory.   Basically, the following 
reading of The Pilgrim’s Regress, with all biographical association, would take up the 
authorial intent on “aesthetic objectivity” as the starting point of critical evaluation.     
Meanwhile, it is worth making clear in the beginning that the framework of the 
following analysis as a whole is not simply aesthetics-concerned.  In fact, as the 
  16outline below would show, this discussion of The Pilgrim’s Regress means to 
comprehend both its literary form (allegory) and its content (the narrative of “Joy” 
and “conversion,” which are, in a sense, no less “intermixed” than the art and life of 
the artist.)   Such a, so to speak, “juxtaposed study” is based upon a simple critical 
standpoint that a comprehensive study of this apologetic allegory, or allegorical 
apology, of Lewis’s cannot evade the double task of considering both its formal 
texture of being an allegory and the religious themes treated in the allegorical text.     
Starting with Lewis’s literary enterprise, the discussion, in the first part, attempts 
to grapple with the fundamental question about what “allegory” is, at least for Lewis, 
and then to relate the understanding of Lewis’s idea of allegory with the two 
significant textual elements of his apologetic allegory, i.e., “generality” (intermixed 
with individuality) and “interdisciplinarity” (religious literature).  The  chief  aim  here 
is to examine theoretically the kind of literary enterprise Lewis is undertaking in The 
Pilgrim’s Regress so as to pave the way for further  content-interpretation.   When it 
comes to the thematic aspect, the critical analysis, in the following chapter, is mainly 
concerned with interpreting the allegorical pilgrimage, including its “dialectical” 
nature and religious meaning (the theme of conversion) and its relationship with the 
modern context and Lewis’s apologetic concerns.  In this multi-layered discussion 
about the religious themes, one of the key tasks is to probe into the problem of 
“modernity” represented and “interpreted” and “lived through” in Lewis’s allegorical 
pilgrimage, which is understood in this analysis as a modern self’s inquiry into 
religious faith.   From the perspective that Lewis’s representation of the modern 
pilgrimage is laden with his “critical interpretation” of modernity, Lewis’s apologetic 
confrontation with the modern problem of “faith” in the allegory will thus be regarded 
as attributable to his “hermeneutic” enterprise.    Following this hermeneutical reading 
of Lewis’s critique and representation of modernity, the last part of the discussion 
  17seeks to re-estimate Lewis’s apologetic enterprise “to date” through correlating it with 
(David Tracy’s) “postmodern” hermeneutical thinking  about  apologetics.   
It is noticeable that this study of The Pilgrim’s Regress, on the whole, is of 
multiple concerns—basically with literariness, religiousness and its historical 
preoccupation.  These three critical categories are, in effect, inter-related elements 
within Lewis’s text.  Through these three elements and their interplay, it can be 
demonstrated that the “textuality” of Lewis’s allegory is indeed full of the 
intermixtures of art and life, literature and religion.  Moreover, they can be 
associated with three kinds of enterprise undertaken by Lewis as a modern apologetic 
allegorist, including the literary enterprise, apologetic enterprise and even 
hermeneutical enterprise.  Through such a triple enterprise, the readers of The 
Pilgrim’s Regress are presented not merely with Lewis’s distinctive vision of the 
problem of faith within the modern soul but also a multi-faceted picture of the 
possible way to become a convert in the modern age of unbelief.               
Concerning the “textuality” of The Pilgrim’s Regress, the first inquiry is about 
the quality of Lewis’s allegorical writing in which “life” is mediated by and 
amalgamated with “art.”  In what sense and by what means is Lewis’s allegory a 
“generalized” account of the absolutely subjective journey of a particular individual?  
This question, in another word, is concerned with how the two extremely distinct 
elements, objectivity / generality and subjectivity / individuality, are co-existent in the 
allegorical text.  In one sense, it is a literary investigation into the style of writing, 
looking specifically at the aesthetic manner in which Lewis manages to allegorize the 
“lived  experience.”  According  to  David  Tracy, a contemporary hermeneutic thinker, 
style criticism is not “an exercise of biographical criticism” but “an explanation of 
how individual meanings are produced through peculiar strategies of stylistic 
  18refiguration.”
27  In addition to the rhetorical devices and effects, criticism of style 
also involves inspecting what “individuating way of envisioning the world” is 
begotten by some “distinctive style,” as further suggested by Tracy.  In light of this 
definition of style, there remains notably a close relation between style and 
“individuality,” which again can be associated with the “inner life” of the text in 
which “art” is “inextricably intermixed” with “life” (or mind of the artist).     
Before embarking on such “style criticism,” which, in Tracy’s terms, actually 
involves considerations of both art and theme and therefore will be taken more 
seriously in the later discussion, the main topic concerning “style” for now is the 
distinctive “tool” or “mode of expression” through which Lewis represents the 
individual-pilgrim’s “inward experiences,” or “inner conflict” prior  to  faith.  In  other 
words, the question of “style” is shifted to the literary inquiry into “allegory” as a 
special way of “talking”—how it functions in the pseudo-autobiographical, 
tremendously subjective and yet “artistically objectified” text.  After all, “allegory” 
is the very means of “refiguration” Lewis chose to generalize the experience of taking 
a psychic and spiritual journey to faith, which originally belongs to himself, then 
allegorically to the pilgrim-hero, John, and suggestively even to everyman.  The 
question is: How “allegory” (or the allegorist) manages to make it—to mingle 
generality with individuality, or objectivity with subjectivity, and thus form the 
special, indeed mixed textuality for a text like The Pilgrim’s Regress?  
To answer this question, perhaps we need to listen first to Lewis’s definition of 
allegory in his scholarly magnum opus, The Allegory of Love,
28 which established 
him as a well-known and authoritative theorist of allegory.    At the very beginning of 
                                                 
27 David  Tracy,  Plurality and Ambiguity: Hermeneutics, Religion, Hope (London: SCM Press, 1988), p. 
45. 
28  Interestingly, there is only a short time difference between the writing of The Pilgrim’s Regress in 
1932 and the publication of The Allegory of Love (1936), which, though not necessarily promises the 
compatibility between practice and theory, indeed adds to the impression that Lewis when writing as an 
allegorist must have possessed an outstanding awareness of what allegory is up to. 
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is in rather strikingly general terms.    He says, “Allegory, in some sense, belongs not 
to medieval man but to man, or even to mind, in general.  It is of the very nature of 
thought and language to represent what is immaterial in picturable terms.”
29  What  is 
striking and also illuminating in this remark is Lewis’s suggestion that allegory can 
stand for the most indispensable element in human expression and thinking, which, 
Lewis explains, depends on “a kind of psycho-physical parallelism in the universe,” a 
phrase coined by Lewis in his essay on “metaphor,” “Bluspels and Flalansferes.”
30  
To put in another way, Lewis is proclaiming that the allegorical exercise is equivalent 
to the exercise of the human mind; linguistically, both are in some degree 
fundamentally metaphorical.  Besides, according to Lewis in the same essay, good 
metaphors are our significant way to acquire “truth,” or truthful meaning, because the 
metaphorical is the fundamental quality of language itself.     
If “truth” sometimes must be conveyed metaphorically, certainly the truth of our 
“interior reality” is necessarily so.    It is based on this point that Lewis relates the role 
of metaphor in thinking to the function of allegory.    He puts in The Allegory of Love 
that “[w]e cannot speak, perhaps we can hardly think, of an ‘inner conflict’ without a 
metaphor; and every metaphor is an allegory in little.”
31  The equivalence between 
metaphor and allegory leads to the observation that in terms of Lewis, the significance 
of allegory is not restricted to the technical level of being merely a rhetorical “copy 
machine,” as commonly but “unfairly” attributed to allegory.    Instead, allegory, even 
just for personification or reification, is treated as a “truth-revealing” vehicle, because 
it is, in essence, metaphorical language.   Like all good, that is, not “fossilized,” 
                                                 
29 Lewis,  The Allegory of Love, p. 44. 
30  Lewis, “Bluspels and Flalansferes,” Rehabilitations and Other Essays (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1939), p. 158. 
31 Lewis,  The Allegory of Love, p. 60. 
  20metaphor, good allegory, in nature, involves the free play of the imagination, and 
“imagination is the organ of meaning,”
32 according to Lewis.  To some extent, this 
positive idea about what allegory is (up to) may illuminate the connection between the 
allegorical element and the “generality” of Lewis’s allegorical text of the extremely 
subjective and individual life-experience.      Firstly, because of its innate capacity for 
“embodying” the invisible interiority of human mind, allegory becomes a totally 
justifiable means of expression for Lewis to convey the subjectively and internally 
experienced sense of desire or longing, i.e., the most abstract and mysterious feeling 
of “Joy.”    Moreover, simply through embodying the immateriality of the felt mystery 
(of Joy), allegory, as a literary “conveyor,” is capable of pointing, not directly but 
suggestively, to the “truth” beyond the subjective experience of feeling itself and even 
beyond the feeling subject too.   
In the context of The Pilgrim’s Regress, we have, on the one hand, the vivified 
portrayal of the subjective experience of “Joy,” evoked by glimpses of “an island” or 
mistakenly by sensuous impulse or temptingly by other substitutes of ideas, literary or 
philosophical.    On the other hand, we are ultimately presented with the vision of the 
“authentic” object of that desire, which is of religious signification and significance. 
That is to say, however it can be aroused or associated, the very experience of “Joy” 
represents an unnamable desire of every soul,
33 which is a mystical experience of 
religious order.  In other words, the essentially religious experience of “Joy” does 
not belong to a single individual only but is actually the general reality of human soul.   
Besides, in literary terms, the allegorized pilgrim is imbued with the “textual 
metaphoricity” to such an extent that he is no longer easily identifiable with any 
specific individual, no matter how much autobiographical element can be traced in the 
                                                 
32  Lewis, “Bluspels and Flalansferes,” p. 157. 
33  This is a paraphrase of Plato’s thought appearing in the epigraph for Book one of The Pilgrim’s 
Regress, p. 1. 
  21central experience of the pilgrim’s inner life.    In other words, the pilgrim’s journey to 
seek out the irresistible but indiscernible “object” of some mysterious yearning is 
“aesthetically objectified.”  This “aesthetic objectivity” can be sensed by the 
allegorical representation of the individual-pilgrim’s inward experiences, which are 
turned into outward adventures, and ultimately, the “physical” journey is, so to speak, 
turned around to be suggestive of a spiritual pilgrimage in “faith.”  From this 
perspective, we may infer that in the allegorical text of The Pilgrim’s Regress, 
“allegory” is indeed a useful “comprehensive” tool for representing not just 
“subjectivity”  but  also,  as  it  were,  “generalized  subjectivity.”                
Furthermore, to better appreciate Lewis’s own allegory, it is worthwhile to go 
deeper into Lewis’s “defence” for allegory.  Considering Lewis’s far from restricted 
but profound understanding of allegory, we could find it totally fallacious to see it as 
“derived uncritically from the negative . . . and unsympathetic Romantic definition of 
allegory,”
34 as asserted by William Gray in his critical book, C. S. Lewis  (1998).  In 
the largely informing chapter, “Telling it Slant: The Allegorical Imperative,” Gray 
points out a “fundamental inconsistency” between Lewis’s critical reading of 
medieval allegory and his theoretical commitment to the Romanticist (particularly 
Coleridge’s) “restrictive definition of allegory”
35 in The Allegory of Love.  Although 
the question of “consistency” between Lewis’s criticism and theory is not the concern 
of the present discussion, it seems very incredible that the tremendously, if not 
perfectly, logical Lewis can be “fundamentally inconsistent” in this way and in his 
academic masterpiece.   The relevant question here lies in Gray’s observation that 
Lewis’s theory of allegory “deeply” follows the “Romantic privileging of the vibrant, 
                                                 
34  William Gray’s chapter essay, “Telling it Slant: The Allegorical Imperative,” C. S. Lewis (Plymouth: 
Northcote House, 1998), p. 28. 
35  Gray, Ibid, p. 29. 
  22revelatory symbol over sterile and pedantic allegory.”
36    This is really a questionable 
observation because it is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of Lewis’s idea of 
allegory and also of Lewis’s demarcation between allegory and symbol.  Gray’s 
quotation of Lewis’s thought in The Allegory of Love remains consultable: 
 
 
But there is another way . . . which is almost the opposite of allegory, and 
which I would call sacramentalism or symbolism.  If our passions, being 
immaterial, can be copied by material inventions, then it is possible that our 
material world in its turn is the copy of an invisible world.    The attempt to 
read through its sensible imitations, to see the archetype in the copy, is what 
I mean by symbolism . . . The allegorist leaves the given—his own 
passions—to talk of that which is confessedly less real, which is a fiction.  
The symbolist leaves the given to find another that is more real.    To put the 
difference in another way, for the symbolist it is we who are the allegory.
37 
              ( E m p h a s i s   a d d e d )  
 
 
Evidently, Lewis here contrasts allegory with symbolism and appears to line up with 
the Romantics in holding that symbol is the true representative of “the real,” or 
immaterial reality, whereas allegory is but “the copy”—the fictively materialized 
imitation of the real.  Moreover, Lewis indeed echoes Coleridge in making sharp 
distinction between symbol and allegory,
38 which leaves the impression that he also 
                                                 
36  The original complete sentence of Gray is: “Romantic privileging of the vibrant, revelatory symbol 
over sterile and pedantic allegory was a not unjustified reaction to what allegory had become by the 
eighteenth century” (Gray, 28).    As far as Romantic negative reaction to the development of allegory 
is concerned, Gray’s remark is reasonable.    Yet, it does not mean that the unsympathetic Romantic 
view of allegory can represent Lewis’s idea of allegory, including its essential quality and function. 
37 Lewis,  The Allegory of Love, p. 45. 
38  Unlike Lewis, who attempts to define allegory by contrasting it with symbol, Coleridge, before him, 
did it the other way around.    In his own words: “The symbolical cannot, perhaps, be better defined in 
distinction from the Allegorical.”    See Coleridge’s Miscellaneous Criticism (London” Constable and 
Co. Ltd, 1936, ed. T. M. Raysor), p.99.    In his Lay Sermons (30-1), Coleridge defines the two 
categories in contrasted terms: “an Allegory is but a translation of abstract notions into a 
picture-language which is itself nothing but an abstraction from objects of the senses … On the other 
hand a Symbol is characterized by …the translucence of the Eternal through and in the Temporal.    It 
always partakes of the Reality which it renders intelligible; and while it enunciates the whole, abides 
itself as a living part in that Unity, of which it is the representative.”    Quoted from Coleridge’s 
  23“parrots” Coleridge’s Romantic “privileging” symbol over allegory.  However, does 
Lewis really take the theoretical position of Romanticists to devalue allegory as 
opposed to symbol because only the latter can be the genuine instrument of 
imagination or the (aesthetic) mediator between nature and thought, as claimed by 
Coleridge the most prominent Romantic thinker?
39  This  surely  is  not  the  case.  As 
a literary historian himself, when he is looking at the issue about the difference 
between allegory and symbolism, especially in the context of medieval literature, 
Lewis’s approach is far from dominated or prejudiced by the viewpoint of the 
romantics.  Instead, the historical scope of his understanding is much wider indeed.  
From his wide awareness of the literary roots of either allegory or symbolism in the 
Middle Ages, which, according to Lewis, can be traced separately back to the mode of 
“the personifications in classical Latin poetry”
40 and the “diffused Platonism” of the 
early Christian writers,
41 it is clearly demonstrated that Lewis’s judgment of the two 
literary modes is one of sophistication rather than “provincialism,” i.e., confined by a 
merely  Romanticist  perspective.     
Reading carefully Lewis’s exposition, we would see that Lewis, much unlike the 
romantics, actually takes no stance of “favoritism” toward either allegory or symbol 
in his demarcation of them.  To Lewis, their difference does not necessarily have 
anything to do with “value.”      Right before his passage quoted above, Lewis at first 
explains that allegory and symbolism are “two ways” in which our mind makes use of 
the “fundamental equivalence between the immaterial and the material.”  It means 
                                                                                                                                            
Writings vol. 3 on language (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1998, ed. A.C. Goodson), p. 80.       
39  This conception of Coleridge’s about “symbol” is noted in R. L. Brett’s book about Coleridge, 
Fancy and Imagination (London: Methuen, 1969).    In one chapter, “Symbol and Concept,” Brett puts: 
“For [Coleridge], a work of art is a symbol which mediates between the world of nature and the world 
of thought” (Brett, 54). 
40 Lewis,  The Allegory of Love, p. 48. 
41  Lewis, Ibid, p. 45-46.    These writers, mentioned by Lewis, include Augustine, the 
pseudo-Dionysius, Macrobius, and “the divine popularizer Boethius” (p. 46).     
  24that we can see such “pairs of sensibles and insensibles”
42 as good and the sun, evil 
and dark, in either allegory or symbol.  That is to say, allegory and symbol are both 
related to the mind’s employment of what Lewis terms “psycho-physical parallelism,” 
i.e., metaphorical language.    In this sense, they are not absolute “opposites” after all 
but can be, in effect, of “congeniality” to some extent.  Besides, in the passage 
quoted above, what Lewis underlines is their different function and purpose from the 
angle of their users or “makers,” namely, allegorist and symbolist.  According to 
Lewis, the allegorist is basically concerned with the “speech-act” itself—how to “talk 
of” the invisible or the abstract, such as passions.    As for the symbolist, it is what can 
be “perceived” beyond the “literal” speech that  matters.  Regarding  the  fundamental 
distinction between allegory and symbolism (not symbol), Lewis later sums up his 
viewpoints in a pithy remark: “Symbolism is a mode of thought, but allegory is a 
mode of expression.”
43  In terms of Lewis’s functional demarcation between 
symbolism and allegory as well as his affirmation of the congenial quality in symbol 
and allegory, can Lewis be really counted as an “uncritical” follower of “Romantic 
privileging” of symbol over allegory  as  William  Gray  assumes?    
Intriguingly, Gray’s misunderstanding of Lewis’s ideas of allegory, which he 
mistakenly equates with the Romantic “prejudice” against allegory, is probably due to 
the confusion caused by the fact that when it comes to “imaginative writing,” be it 
symbolic or allegorical or simply metaphorical or even mythic, Lewis actually blurs 
the demarcation between these “figurative” categories.  The awareness of this is 
particularly important when we approach his allegorical writing—The Pilgrim’s 
Regress.  In other words, Lewis is an unrestrictive allegorist not only in theory but 
also in practice.  The tendency of Lewis (the imaginative writer) to “intermix” 
                                                 
42 Lewis,  Allegory of Love, p. 44. 
43  Lewis, Ibid, p. 48. 
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My headline is there only because my allegory failed—partly through my 
own fault (I am now heartily ashamed of the preposterous allegorical 
filigree on p.90), and partly because modern readers are unfamiliar with the 
method.    But it remains true that wherever the symbols are best, the key is 
least  adequate.  For  when  allegory is at its best, it approaches myth, which 
must be grasped with the imagination, not with the intellect.  If, as I still 
sometimes hope, my North and South and my Mr. Sensible have some touch 
of mystical life, then no amount of ‘explanation’ will quite catch up with 
their  meaning.                            (208,  emphasis  added) 
   
 
In this brief “literary apology,” it is noticeable that Lewis indeed expects his 
allegorical text to be the “combination” of the allegorical and the symbolic as well as 
the mythic.
44  This “textual” quality is of course not a result of what William Gray 
asserts—“Lewis’s leaky vessels of allegory and myth / symbolism” or that “Lewis is 
working with …an impoverished concept of allegory.”
45    As a matter of fact, though 
underscoring the distinction between allegory and symbol in The Allegory of Love, 
Lewis at the same time notes that “the two things [are] closely intertwined”
46 
(emphasis  added).   
Apparently different from William Gray’s perspective, Doris T. Myers, in the 
essay entitled “The Context of Metaphor,”
47 offers an insightful study of Lewis’s 
                                                 
44  Actually, the same passage is, again, misinterpreted by William Gray in his essay “The Allegorical 
Imperatives” wherein he comments that Lewis is contradictory as a theorist of allegory and a creative 
writer because, according to Gray, “for [Lewis’s] allegory to succeed as a story, it must turn into which 
is defined as being its opposite—that is, myth or symbolism” (Gray, 30). 
45  Gray, Ibid, p. 30.   
46 Lewis,  The Allegory of Love, p. 45. 
47  The essay is one of the chapters in Myers’s C. S. Lewis in Context (1994). 
  26metaphors by the allegorical text of The Pilgrim’s Regress.  In her interpretation, 
Myers recognizes that there is indeed some combination of and “interplay” between 
“symbol” and “allegory.”  Such recognition is indicated in Myers’s central idea of 
interpreting Lewis’s allegory as “structured” by the “interplay” between two types of 
metaphors— “archetypal metaphors that are just ‘there’ and individually created 
metaphors.”
48  Myers’s categorization of the two kinds of metaphor is clearly 
borrowing Owen Barfield’s distinction between “the unitive metaphor” and “the 
analytic metaphor,”
49 developed in Poetic Diction, which is also the book Myers 
claims profoundly influences Lewis, at least in the context of metaphor.  What is 
noteworthy in Myers’s metaphorical reading of The Pilgrim’s Regress is that she 
actually identifies the usage of “the archetypal metaphors,” held to be one of 
Regress’s predominant allegorical “structures,” with what Lewis defines as 
“sacramentalism or symbolism.”  Such identification may sound somewhat 
confusing; one cannot but wonder: how come Lewis’s allegorical use of metaphor can 
be equal to what Lewis claims is opposite to allegory, that is, the symbolical.  
Paradoxically, the confusion may be exactly the reinforcement of the critical 
perspective that in Lewis’s allegory the allegorical and the symbolical can be 
“intermixed” to such an extent that one is inseparable from the other.  Moreover, 
Myers’s reading out of The Pilgrim’s Regress the “intermixture” of elements of 
allegory and symbol, or to put in another way, the combination of the “individual 
invention” and “the archetype,” serves to back up my observation about the 
“textuality” of Lewis’s allegory—the intermingling of the individual and the general 
(or  universal).   
                                                 
48 Doris  T.  Myers,  C. S. Lewis in Context (Kent, Oh.; London: Kent State University Press, c1994), 
p.12. 
49  Myers quotes Barfield to explain that “the unitive metaphor, ‘given, as it were, by Nature,’ and the 
analytic metaphor, in which an individual ‘register[s] as thought’ a perceived relationship (102-103)” 
(Myers, 12).    Myers’s “archetypal metaphor” is modeling on the first kind, “individual metaphor,” the 
second.  See  C. S. Lewis in Context, p. 12. 
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treatment of the distinction between allegory and symbol—opposing the two 
rhetorical categories on the one hand and exposing the possibility of their 
“interpenetration” on the other—testifies to the sophistication and “objectiveness” of 
Lewis’s perception of “allegory” in both literary criticism and creative writing.  
Lewis can be held “objective” precisely in the sense that Romantic as he is 
theoretically and imaginatively inclined to be, his understanding of the nature and 
function of allegory, however, is not in blind commitment to the Romanticist 
disaffirmation of allegory.  Seen from the angle of their functions, it is absolutely 
valid to hold the view that the allegorical and the symbolical are in some co-operative 
relationship, particularly in the literary text concerned with  religion.  From  this  point 
of view, Lewis’s literary notion and exercise of allegory are to a great extent 
correspondent with the hermeneutical ideas about the difference and similarity 
between allegory and symbol stated by the modern, also Lewis’s contemporary, 
German hermeneutic philosopher, Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002).     
In his essay entitled “The relevance of the beautiful: Art as play, symbol, and 
festival” (1977), Gadamer attempts to return to the “original,” i.e., classical, definition 
of allegory and its distinction from symbol with an indication of the need to do 
“justice” to the former in spite of its functional contrast to the latter: 
 
 
[A]t least in the classical use of the term . . . “allegory” means that what we 
actually say is different from what we mean, . . .  As a result of the 
classicist conception of the symbol, which does not refer to something other 
than itself in this way, allegory has unfairly come to be regarded as 
something cold and unartistic.
50  
                     
                                                 
50  Gadamer, “The relevance of the beautiful: Art as play, symbol, and festival,” The Relevance of the 
Beautiful and Other Essays, p.32. 
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As asserted here by Gadamer, despite the contrast between allegory and symbol, it 
remains “unfair” to deprive the allegorical of its “artistic” quality.    In other words, no 
less than symbol, allegory can be practice of art as well and therefore also the very 
mediator of religious meaning, instead of being merely its “manifestation,” because 
Gadamer in this essay makes clear that “art achieves more than the mere 
manifestation of meaning.”
51  Furthermore, Gadamer’s hermeneutical viewpoints 
about the “common ground” between allegory and symbol stated in his masterpiece, 
Truth and Method, as quoted below, may serve to justify Lewis’s insight about the 
combination and “co-operation” of the allegorical and the symbolical, the “two ways” 
of approaching the immaterial reality, such as religious truth:   
 
 
Allegory originally belonged to the sphere of talk, of the logos, and is 
therefore a rhetorical or hermeneutical figure.  Instead of what is actually 
meant, something else, more tangible, is said, but in such a way as to 
suggest the other.  Symbol, however, is not limited to the sphere of the 
logos, for a symbol is not related by its meaning to another meaning, but its 
own sensuous nature has ‘meaning’.    .  .  .  [Allegory  and  symbol]  both 
find their chief application in the religious sphere.  .  .  .   The 
allegorical procedure of interpretation and the symbolical procedure of 
knowledge have the same justification: it is not possible to know the divine 
in any other way than by starting form the world of the senses.
52                         
 
 
In this informing exposition, Gadamer obviously holds a “favorable” view to both 
allegory and symbol as equally significant and “applicable” though functionally 
different [allegory for “interpreting” purpose; symbol for “knowing” purpose] 
conveyors of religious meaning.  In terms of this as well as the emphasis on the 
                                                 
51  Gadamer, Ibid, p. 34.   
52 Gadamer,  Truth and Method, p. 65-66.   
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of transcendental reality, Gadamer indeed echoes Lewis the theorist and allegorist.     
In addition, Gadamer’s notion of allegory, as being as good as symbol, to be a 
qualified and applicable tool especially for the religious text confirms the “validity” of 
Lewis’s employing allegory (containing the symbolical element) to concretize and 
generalize the pilgrim’s “inner conflicts,” which ultimately become the mental and 
spiritual struggles with faith in transcendence.    In line with Gadamer’s points of view, 
Lewis’s ideas in The Allegory of Love also provide the theoretical “justification” for 
his allegorical writing of the “romantically” and spiritually adventurous pilgrimage:   
 
 
The function of allegory is not to hide but to reveal, and it is properly used 
only for that which cannot be said, or so well said, in literal speech.  The 
inner life, and specially the life of love, religion, and spiritual adventure, has 
therefore always been the field of true allegory; for here there are 
intangibles which only allegory can fix and reticences which only allegory 
can overcome.
53  
                             
 
It is noticeable that both Gadamer and the theorist Lewis notify the propriety of the 
“marriage” between allegory and religion.  Their agreement in this respect is 
meaningful to the reading of The Pilgrim’s Regress, which is not a mere allegory after 
all but an allegorical text intermingled with significant religious meaning.  To put it 
in another way, the ineradicable truth about Lewis’s allegorical text is that it is not just 
a text of literature but also a work for Christian apologetics.    Based on the awareness 
of its twofold “textuality,” or in another words, its “interdisciplinarity,” it is perfectly 
reasonable to hold that the criticism of The Pilgrim’s Regress demands a double 
critical undertaking—not only of literary analysis but also of religious study.   In 
                                                 
53 Lewis,  The Allegory of Love, p. 166. 
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inquiries about literariness and about religious meaning conveyed or embedded within 
the literary text.  Such an inter-disciplinary research is exactly what this study of 
Lewis’s allegory means to do.     
Following the theoretical discussion about “allegory” and the investigation 
focused on the literary facet of the text, the subject matter of the next chapter is 
shifted to the religious facet to look closely at Lewis’s apologetic enterprise in The 
Pilgrim’s Regress.  Before embarking on the new critical task, it needs to be 
reiterated that the allegorical and the religious are not two “separate” and unrelated 
elements of the text.    In effect, they together form the unity, or “integrity,” of the text.   
Therefore, the religious study of Lewis’s apologetic allegory could be seen as a 
continuing or extended inquiry into the “artfulness” and function of “allegory,” now 
only more concerned with an added dimension, namely, the religiousness of the 













  31Ch. II.    The Pilgrim’s Regress: A Modern Self’s Pilgrimage toward Conversion 
 
 
“Be sure it is not for nothing that the Landlord has knit our hearts so closely to time   
and place—to one friend rather than another and one shire more than all the land.”     




This chapter is focused on the religious aspect of The Pilgrim’s Regress by 
associating the allegorical pilgrimage with Lewis’s apologetic enterprise, particularly 
in terms of the text’s “historical preoccupation,” that is, its close relationship with the 
modern context.  Regarding the theme of religion and apologetics, what is the 
primary concern of Lewis’s allegory?  Generally speaking, it is mainly about the 
“modern phenomena of conversion” manifested in an individual’s pilgrimage, or, to 
be more specific, about the crucial factors, subjective and objective, that lead a 
“modern” pilgrim toward or distract him from conversion.  In view of this, to probe 
into the “religiousness” of Lewis’s apologetic allegory, there are at least two critical 
issues of tremendous importance: firstly, the nature and meaning of the modern 
pilgrimage; secondly, the theme of conversion.   It is through exploring these two 
topics that the following discussion looks to grasp the quality and efficacy of the 
“apologetic enterprise” Lewis ventures on in The Pilgrim’s Regress.  
To understand the particular pilgrimage of the allegory, the proposed 
interpretation is to put it in “context.”  Such a “contextual” reading is based on the 
perspective that the whole allegorical pilgrimage is located within both the particular / 
subjective context of the individual self’s inward life and the general / objective 
context of the “intellectual climate” or “spiritual phenomena” of modern  time.  To  be 
sure, the two qualities—the “particularity” of an individual’s inner self and the 
“generality” derived from the outer / historical situation—are not just juxtaposed but 
  32coalesced in the modern  pilgrimage concerned.  Moreover, the very “interaction” 
between the two contexts, personal (self) and historical (situation) can be proved to be 
most significant in the nature of the pilgrimage represented in Lewis’s allegory.   
But, here comes a further question—in what sense do these two co-existent contexts 
interact with each other?       
To cope with this question, some insights of the contemporary hermeneutic 
theologian, David Tracy, on the correlation between self and other are especially 
informative and helpful.  For instance, the subjective and objective contexts can be 
associated with the socio-scientific terms David Tracy employs, namely, “the 
microstructure of our individual psyches” and “the macrostructure affecting us all.”
54  
To put in another way, the two contexts in question can be understood by the 
conceptions of “microstructure,” referred to the “individual interiority,” and 
“macrostructure,” speaking of the “historical situatedness,” (or “tradition” in Tracy’s 
term).  These two conceptions come from Tracy’s theory about  “correlation” 
between “situation” and “tradition.”  Certainly the significance of Tracy’s 
“correlational theory” does not lie in the mere terminology he offers.    Speaking as a 
proponent of pluralistic dialogue in religion, Tracy most significantly appeals to a 
hermeneutic conversation which demands what he calls “constant self-exposure to the 
other” in order that the “focal meaning” of one’s own particularity and the “focal 
meaning” of different traditions of thinking (or believing) will be correlated and that 
“the development of ordered relationships for self, world and the ultimate reality will 
occur.”
55  Such an appeal of Tracy together with his stress upon the necessity of the 
interaction between “microstructure” (self) and “macrostructure” (tradition, world, or 
the ultimate reality) through “conversational” or “hermeneutical” correlation may 
                                                 
54 David  Tracy,  The Analogical Imagination (London: SCM Press, 1981), p. 340. 
55  Tracy, Ibid, p. 449. 
  33serve to illuminate the inter-relationship between the internal and external 
predicaments of John, the allegorical “modern” pilgrim in Lewis’s allegory, The 
Pilgrim’s Regress.   
Besides understanding the allegorical pilgrimage in terms of its twofold 
context—the selfhood of the pilgrim and the historical situatedness of the pilgrimage, 
another relevant, even more fundamental, question about the pilgrimage is the sense 
of “modernity” indicated in both of the contexts.  How are we to define the 
“modernity” of the pilgrim’s inner world and of the outer world wherein he is situated 
and also of the “interaction” between the two worlds in his pilgrimage toward 
conversion?    To tackle such an inquiry about the text’s preoccupation with modernity, 
the autobiographical element can be a good starting point, since John’s pilgrimage is 
basically modeled on Lewis’s own journey.    The biographical background concerned 
is, above all, a gripping and yet elusive kind of experience of an “intense longing” 
which Lewis coins as “the dialectic of Desire,” or “Joy.”   The strong and unusual 
sense of “bitter sweetness” it arouses gives rise to its “dialectical nature,” which 
according to Lewis is sadness and excitement at the same time because to “have it is, 
by definition, a want; to want it . . . is to have it” (“Afterword,” 203).    As proclaimed 
by Lewis himself, this peculiar experience is the very “psychic event” dominating his 
childhood and adolescence.  Without doubt, it is also the “central theme” that 
predominates in the inner life of the allegorical pilgrim as well as his particular 
pilgrimage.  In other words, the very motive / motif underlying the pilgrimage of 
John (or Lewis) is this painful yet also most desirable sense of yearning for some 
unnamable “object,” which can “never be fully given” by anything or anyone in this 
world, or to use Lewis’s words, “in our present mode of subjective and 
spatio-temporal experience” (“Afterword,” 205).  Therefore, it is basically because 
of the obscure and unattainable quality of its “object” that this desire is mysteriously 
  34peculiar as well as dialectical.       
In the allegory of The Pilgrim’s Regress, the peculiar mystery of the “object” is 
imparted by a fantastical vision coming to John when he is “awakened” for the first 
time to “Sweet Desire” in the childhood.  It is, in a glimpse, materialized as “an 
island” with some god-like, unearthly inhabitants on it in the midst of a misty and 
“calm sea.”    With all the enchanting view like this, somehow even little John feels a 
sense of suspicion toward his memory of the envisioned “island” to such an extent 
that he cannot but tell himself that “what had befallen him was not seeing at all” (8).  
This suspense between seeing and yet not seeing, or disclosure and in the mean time 
concealment, bespeaks the elusiveness about what is the source of the Desire.  It 
seems that the “object” simply evades any visual embodiment, even in an allegorical 
space or state of mind, as suggested by John’s bafflement and suspicion.   
Nonetheless, years later, after repeatedly turning to the wrong resource (having sex 
with a “brown girl” in the wood) for satisfying his intense and persistent longing for 
retrieving the experience of the Desire, John decides to embark on the journey in 
search of “the island.”  In fact, his whole journey becomes a “pilgrimage” for 
pursuing the truth about the mystery of the “object” in the hope that the Desire can be 
really fulfilled someday, in some way. 
The significance of the mysterious “object” of this Desire cannot be overstated, 
for the nature and meaning of not only the Desire itself but also the whole pilgrimage 
of the allegory depends on how this unnamable object is to be understood.  Indeed, 
the allegorical pilgrimage can be viewed as, so to speak, a journey to find out the 
“authentic” key to the riddle about the knowledge of it.  Is it just the out-dated, 
irrational belief of the “backward villagers” as Mr. Enlightenment (the 
nineteenth-century worldly Rationalist) assumes?  Is it equal to the aesthetic “thrill” 
or romantic “eroticism” to be found in the beautiful music and tender daughter of Mr. 
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for the sake of “wish-fulfillment,” “the pretence  . . . put up to conceal [one’s] own 
lusts from [oneself]” (46), according to the theory of Mr. Sigismund Enlightenment 
(Psychology of Sigmund Freud)?  Does it mean nothing but, if one likes, an 
“accessory” to good life in terms of Mr. Sensible, whose supreme principle of 
judgment is not reason but “good sense”?    Is it true that as agreed by the three “pale” 
sons of Mr. Enlightenment senior, the counter-Romanticist brothers (Classicism, 
Humanism and Catholicism), the vision together with the picturing experience ought 
not to be taken seriously at all because there is no solid or valid ground for it?  Or, 
should it be dismissed as “a childish thing” and put behind like what the “advanced” 
Mr. Broad (modernized Church, friend of the world) has done and urged John to do?  
Evidently, these different opinions about what the “object” is or is like either 
contradict or conflict with each other.  Apart from these mutually opposing 
responses to John’s quest, is there still any other way for John the pilgrim to take and 
see beyond all these countervailing views so that he may carry on his pilgrimage to 
seek out, or perhaps “live out,” the answer for himself? 
In fact, contrary to those really misleading “paths” of thinking, there are some 
alternative ways of seeing and going which can counterbalance the impacts of those 
dismissive opinions John receives from “the world” and support or enlighten John in 
his search for “the island.”    One of the relatively positive ways is offered by Reason, 
who is figured as a tall, Titaness-like woman.  Playing the role of a giant slayer, 
Reason rescues John from his captivation by “Spirit of the Age,” who can turn anyone 
caught by his penetrating eye to look “transparent” and get imprisoned in the terror of 
the ugly reality of his own self.    More than releasing John from physical bondage set 
by “Spirit of the Age,” Reason manages to set him free from the giant’s control of his 
mind through “deconstructing” the giant’s power of penetration as good for nothing 
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John’s inquiry about “the island,” Reason, instead of giving John a straight answer, 
leads him to “reason” against the “pseudo-scientific” attempt of the “modern” age to 
explain away both the belief in the Landlord (God) and John’s Desire as merely man’s 
wishful speculations.  Reason thus helps correct the misleading theories about both 
the Landlord and the human self that “Spirit of the Age” and his subjects try to impose 
on John.    The corrective argumentation of Reason is based on the evidence that their 
disbelief is grounded on false induction, which can prove no truth but only their own 
“wish-fulfillment dream” (64).  Moreover, Reason advises John that to remain 
agnostic is even better than to rush to the wishful conclusion of those disbelievers 
who ignorantly reject the consultation of Philosophy and Theology (Reason’s two 
younger sisters) for one thing and don’t really have evidence for their disbelief for 
another.  “Fatiguing” as it is to follow Reason, John, however, is encouraged to 
resume his journey of seeking after “truth,” by getting back to the “main road.”   
   In terms of the “spiritual topography” within the allegory, Reason’s suggestion 
for John to keep his way on the main road is tremendously meaningful.      To remain 
on the main road, in one sense, means to keep away from the “by-roads,” that is, the 
wrong ways leading to either the northward locales occupied by the “over-wise men 
of rigid systems” (such as the big family of Mr. Enlightenment), or the southward 
habitats of the “over-foolish men” who are engaged with “the smudging of all 
frontiers” or “the relaxation of all resistances” (“Afterword,” 206) (like Mr. Broad, 
representing the “modernizing religion,” associating with the world and making no 
pilgrimage).    Symbolized as “two equal and opposite evils” for pilgrimage, the north 
and the south, therefore, ought to be avoided not just by John the sole pilgrim in the 
allegory but indeed also by every man.  Just as Lewis states in “Afterword,” 
“between them the Road on which alone mankind can safely walk” (206) because “we 
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once rational and animal” (207).    Also, the suggestion of the Main Road in between 
as the only right way that can avoid extremes can be associated with Oriental wisdom, 
e.g., the axiom of Confucianism, which goes, “safety lies in the middle course.”  
Therefore, the symbol of the Main Road, in another sense, is connotative of a certain 
universal appropriateness, which may remind us of the idea of “the Way,” or the Tao.   
In The Abolition of Man, Lewis puts much emphasis on the existence of the 
Tao
56 because without this universal Law or “doctrine of objective value”
57 humanity 
and the universe as well would become void of meaning.   In association with the 
Tao, this Main Road in the allegorical pilgrimage accordingly carries the significance 
of being not just a safe “midway” but also the only right way connected with “the 
Way”—the “Natural Law,” which is not simply relevant to the material world but is 
essentially the revealing element of the Ultimate Reality.  To put it in another way, 
the meaningfulness of the connection between the Main Road and the Way lies in the 
implication that the pilgrim, firstly, needs to discover, or at least recognize, the 
existence of Reality beyond the visible as well as his subjective world, for only in the 
Way, that is, the objective truth, can he find out the genuine “object” of his Desire.  
That is to say, the very vision of “the island in the west” might not to be found in the 
material world, and John’s subjective experience of the “dialectic of desire” may need 
to be understood as a kind of “metaphysics of desire.”
58  
The “metaphysical” nature of the Desire has never really and so clearly come to 
John until he encounters Mr. Wisdom, the spokesman of Idealist Philosophy. Unlike 
                                                 
56 In  The Abolition of Man, Lewis explains also that what he calls the Tao can be referred to all forms 
of the same conception—“Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic, Christian, and Oriental alike.”    P. 28-29. 
57  Lewis, Ibid, p. 18. 
58  This convincing idea of “the metaphysics of desire” is borrowed from William Gray’s commentary 
in his article, “The Quest for Joy”: “The Pilgrim’s Regress, one of the “three main texts where [Lewis] 
explicitly articulates what we might call his metaphysics of desire.”    See Gray’s book, C. S. Lewis, p. 
5.  
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romantic or anti-romantic), of John’s glimpse of “the Transcendent,” Mr. Wisdom 
confirms the authenticity and significance of John’s mystical Desire, even though he 
both denies any “hope” of “its fruition” and rejects its connection with religion.    The 
most striking instruction of this exoteric sage, concerning John’s experience of the 
extraordinary and incomprehensible desire, is his proclamation to John that “what you 
desire is no state of yourself at all, but something … Other and Outer” (123).  This 
unusual viewpoint to a great extent enlightens John to see his Desire with a new 
perspective, one that has little to do with his subjectivity but has explicit relevance to 
some “objective truth.”    This enlightenment from Mr. Wisdom about the “otherness” 
and “objectivity” in the nature of John’s Desire could be held as a significant 
“milestone” in John’s pilgrimage.  For John, who has already “tasted” but not really 
understood the “transcendental” Desire, Mr. Wisdom’s metaphysical explanation of it 
seems to make good sense of the mysterious experience.     
However, the comprehensive doctrine of “the Absolute Mind” Mr. Wisdom 
introduces to John is a quasi-religious belief in the (impersonal) Transcendence of all 
“appearances,” including not only “the island” of the Desire but also John’s (finite) 
feeling self, and indeed the whole world, sensual, rational and imaginative.   
According to Mr. Wisdom’s philosophy, the acknowledgement of the Absolute is 
based on a metaphysical standpoint that recognizes the co-existence of “the 
Phenomenal” and “the Noumenal.”  In the context of John’s pilgrimage, this 
metaphysical standpoint, in some sense, means a crucial “turning point” to John’s 
mental and spiritual development; henceforth, his pilgrimage starts to move into a 
double “progress” both into self-understanding and toward the awareness of the 
Divine  Other.    
In addition to referring the Desire to the Absolute Mind, Mr. Wisdom also lays 
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According to Mr. Wisdom, the mystery of the dialectic of desire can be unraveled if 
we grasp the ambiguity of “I” (human selfhood) yielded by its “double nature” of soul 
(mortal and apparent self) and Spirit (the real and eternal self).   He makes his 
observation about their correlation as follows: “The Island is nothing else than that 
perfection and immortality which I possess as Spirit eternal, and vainly crave as 
mortal soul” (128-129).   That is to say, in terms of Mr. Wisdom’s Idealist 
philosophy, the inherent “metaphysics” in the experience of the dialectic of desire 
actually reflects  some “ontological” truth of the experienced self.  From this 
(Kantian) perspective, it thus follows that metaphysics and ontology are 
indistinguishable.    To put in another way, John’s metaphysical quest for “the Island,” 
prompted by an ecstatic glimpse of the Transcendent, would be, in itself, a journey of 
“self-discovery,” on account of the ontological relationship between the Desire and 
his self.    In this sense, the allegorical pilgrimage turns out to signify something more 
than the pilgrim originally expects it to be.  Now, more than ever, his 
Desire-prompted journey seems to be a real “pilgrimage,” coming to the threshold of 
encountering with the Reality of the Transcendence, with which not only his Desire 
but also his self is involved. 
So far, the so-called “religiousness” could not yet be ascribed to the allegorical 
pilgrimage, at least not “literally,” under the supposition that the pilgrim’s pursuit of 
the “transcendental” object of desire cannot be fully satisfied except in the religion of 
“the Landlord,” instead of in any aesthetic or intellectual exercises, still less in sexual 
practices.  Traveling northward or southward, John has indeed undergone many 
“adventures” among different cultural, intellectual and even spiritual phenomena, 
none of which, however, really serves to turn his quest or journey into a “religious” 
pilgrimage.  Quite on the contrary.  Most of John’s encounters in these “worldly” 
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Landlord” or dissuade him from believing that there is any link between his Desire 
and the Landlord.  Reason is of course one of the few exceptions.  But, even “she” 
would not provide a definite answer to John’s perplexity about the relation between 
his mysterious experience and the Landlord, or even to the question about the mere 
existence of the Landlord.  It is because the personified Reason, though being 
“infinite” and “immortal” as she is the daughter of eternal “Truth,” cannot but speak 
according to what John’s “natural” reason can comprehend, unless his finite reason 
can be united with what Mr. Wisdom would call the “cosmic Logos.”  The very 
mentor who instructs John in the idea of the “cosmic Truth and Spirit,” Mr. Wisdom, 
however, takes his side with “unbelief” too, refusing to pin down the Ultimate Reality 
as “limited” and “specific” as a religion (such as the Landlord), although it is true that 
his Idealist doctrine of the Absolute plays a crucial part in bringing John closer than 
ever to the metaphysical and religious meaning of his pursuit.  Indeed, owing to the 
enlightenment given by philosophical wisdom, the pilgrimage of John begins to be 
transformed into one involving profound “self-consciousness” and the consciousness 
of the transcendental “Outer and Other,” the two “indispensable” elements for the 
pilgrimage to progress as a pilgrimage of “conversion.”   
Therefore, it is discernible that the allegorical pilgrimage should, for the most 
part, be described as “unreligious,” in the restricted sense of “religion,” namely, 
identifying the vision of “the Island” with the existence of “the Landlord” (God).   
To diagnose the hidden meaning behind this, namely, the indication of the 
“un-religious” character of the pilgrim’s “adventures of faith,” we might treat the 
pre-conversion “un-religiousness” of the pilgrimage as preparation for the ultimate 
culmination of the pilgrim’s religious faith.    Yet, this is only a superficial reading of 
the scenario of conversion in the allegory.    To go deeper into the “under text” of the 
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perhaps more importantly, what the “un-religious pretext” signifies in the allegorical 
pilgrimage of conversion.   Besides, we should also keep in mind that this allegory 
of conversion is also an “apologetic” text with certain autobiographical touches.  It 
means that the allegorist, in his post-conversion retrospection, must attempt to reflect 
upon what used to preoccupy his mind and soul that could be meaningful not simply 
in terms of the documentation of his personal history but for some good “use,” or 
reference, of others, the later potential converts.  In other words, instead of a 
“confessional” posture for the sake of autobiography,
59 the allegorist delineation of 
the mental or intellectual process that keeps “deviating” from the divine Reality is 
really for the purpose of showing a kind of “anti-proof” against the “spiritual 
phenomena” that are in “enmity to ‘immortal longings” (“Afterword,” 205) and 
ultimately against the “unbelief” in the “objective truth” of God.     
Therefore, it is definitely right to hold that the “unreligious” quality that 
characterizes most of the hero’s “pilgrimage” in the allegory is, on one level, 
indispensable because of the “autobiographical” demand of faithfulness.    On another 
level, it should be thought of as significant “constituent” for the allegorist-apologist 
who aims not just to map out but, more importantly, to confront the problematic 
situations disadvantageous or even hostile to the progress of pilgrimage.  This, in 
some sense, is another way of looking at the “double textuality” of the allegory—the 
intermixture of subjectivity and objectivity, only that the element of objectivity is here 
specifically related with the storyteller’s attempt to speak—not for himself but to 
general readers.  Concerning the problem of the readers’ reception of his allegorical 
                                                 
59  Some critics of The Pilgrim’s Regress, such as William Gray and Manlove, hold it to be 
“confessional,” a way of reading which, in my opinion, is not necessary, especially in terms of Lewis’s 
intent on writing out his journey in the form of “apologetic allegory.”    Besides, even his 
autobiography, Surprised by Joy, is not a “confessional” text, according to Lewis himself.   
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readers, most of whom can be unfamiliar with or indifferent to the history of ideas 
which Lewis’s own intellectual development is involved with.  In the beginning of 
the “Afterword,” Lewis remarks,   
 
 
On the intellectual side my own progress had been from ‘popular realism’ to 
Philosophical Idealism; from Idealism to Pantheism; from Pantheism to 
Theism; and from Theism to Christianity.  I still think this a very natural 
road, but I now know that it is a road very rarely trodden.  In the early 
thirties I did not know this.    If I had had any notion of my own isolation, I 
should either have kept silent about my journey or else endeavoured to 
describe it with more consideration for the reader’s difficulties.   
                                             ( “ A f t e r w o r d , ”   2 0 0 )   
 
 
In this authorial commentary on the “weakness” yet also “authenticity” of his own 
work, we could read, on the one hand, Lewis’s “subjective” justification for 
representing a distinctive pilgrimage in his allegory, which is simply copying his own 
intellectual and spiritual journey.  More than that, Lewis’s remark is definitely 
pointing to his “writer’s” concern as well.  It is evident that “subjective” as his 
allegorical pilgrimage is, and however “out-of-place” his and his hero’s philosophical 
journey may seem to a modern reader, Lewis indeed puts his readers in mind, even if 
he finds he failed to do so more seriously as he wrote the allegory.    From the critic’s 
point of view, we should then wonder: how can Lewis’s allegorical pilgrimage speak 
to other “modern” readers?  Does it speak as well to those who have a so-called 
“post-modern” mentality—to an extent eager to re-embrace religion while unwilling 
or unable to make real commitments to a religion, such as Christianity?         
  To grapple with such a critical question, we need to return to the problem of 
“modernity” that is embedded within the allegorical representation of a particular 
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confrontation within Lewis’s allegorical apologetics.  Evidently, the modern 
pilgrimage concerned is predominated by what Lewis calls “characteristic illusions” 
of the modern age, experienced by Lewis himself and manifested within his 
allegorical text.  One of these “illusions” is coined by Lewis in Surprised by Joy, as 
“chronological snobbery,” a kind of “modern” state of mind that he confesses he used 
to possess.  According to Lewis, through Owen Barfield
60, one of his best friends 
(and also debating partners) in Oxford, he comes to realize the fallacy of holding a 
favorable and uncritical stance toward “the intellectual climate common to our own 
[modern] age” and assuming that “whatever has gone out of date is on that account 
discredited.”
61  Opposite to such wrong-headed “chronological snobbery” is a 
changed viewpoint that “our own age is also ‘a period’, and certainly has, like all 
periods, its own characteristic illusion.”
62   
This altered, that is, “neutralized” and relatively objective, view about the 
contemporary fashions of thinking is actually only the starting point for Lewis to 
detach himself from his old commitment to the modern age.  Henceforth, he enters 
into a certain (dialectical) process of philosophical contemplation which eventually 
leads him to think beyond modernity, i.e., the modern adherence to its representative 
dogmatism, namely, Realism or Empiricism, and later the equally fashionable and 
seemingly more valid philosophy of Idealism, especially its doctrine of the 
impersonality of the “Universal Spirit.”  After conversion to the definitely dogmatic 
and indeed totally out-of-fashion belief of Christianity, Lewis’s neutral attitude toward 
modern preoccupations, i.e., with Realism, scientism, Freudianism, religious 
                                                 
60  In this context, Lewis is referring to the Great War between him and Barfield, whose belief in 
Anthroposophy was once held by Lewis as “medieval-fashioned” and thus unconvincing.    See 
Surprised by Joy: The Shape of My Early Life (London: HarperCollinsPublishers, [1955] 2002, p. 
239-241. 
61  Lewis, Ibid, p. 241. 
62  Lewis, Ibid, p. 241. 
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reflective but pointedly critical.  Considering his own experience of journeying 
through various misleading “ways” dominated by the intellectual or spiritual 
“climate” of modern times, there is no wonder that the post-conversion allegorist 
would set out to expose the inadequacy in each of them and on that account voice his 
critique  of  modernity,  the  matrix  of  them  all.          
From this perspective, it seems justifiable to underscore Lewis’s critique of 
modernity as the core of his apologetic enterprise within the allegory of modern 
pilgrimage.  To put in another way, we may say that Lewis’s representation of the 
modern pilgrimage in the allegory, which is also a modern tale of conversion, is an 
allegorical expression of his critical interpretation of modernity.  Moreover, the 
particular sense of modernity interpreted or criticized by the allegorist and apologetic 
Lewis can be understood on different levels.  First of all, the modern 
misinterpretations of the pilgrim’s transcendental experience are demonstrated in the 
allegorical pilgrimage to be various sorts of illusions and wrong ways of thinking.  
As pointed out above, none of those dismissive or misleading or missing-the-target 
answers derived out of modern ideas serves to facilitate the pilgrimage—to guide the 
pilgrim to reach “the Island,” that is, the prospective fruition of his Desire.  
Obviously, “modernity” in this sense is pointed at the pilgrim’s exterior journey into 
the world, which involves encounters with different thoughts of the modern age and 
thus also pertains to the pilgrim’s intellectual progress.   Indeed, in The Pilgrim’s 
Regress as well as in Surprised by Joy, the “outward journey” is portrayed on an 
intellectual basis.  It is, generally speaking, a dialectic process of moving with and 
against the various tides of  modern  thought.   
Nevertheless, the journey within the allegory or the autobiographical book of 
Surprised by Joy is not simply involved with intellectual development.  More 
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concerned with John (and Lewis’s) dialectic of desire.    To dig out the deeper sense of 
modernity in the allegorical apology, it is worthwhile to reiterate that the modern 
pilgrimage in question is not only dominated by the external world of ideas but also, 
more centrally, preoccupied with the pilgrim’s internal world of the imagination.  In 
fact, the two phenomena of the pilgrimage are in association with each other.  
Noticeably, a large proportion of the modern pilgrimage is about the on-going 
interaction between the macrostructure or tradition of modern thinking and the 
microstructure of the modern self’s psychic and imaginative event.  It can be 
demonstrated that the pilgrim’s experience of the dialectic of desire and his no less 
dialectical adventures through the mutually conflicting modes of thinking in modern 
times are both prominent to his ultimate experience of conversion.   The close 
relationship between his experience of conversion and the two dialectical 
life-experiences, inward and outward, imaginative and intellectual, is suggested in the 
following statement of Lewis: 
 
 
The dialectic of Desire, faithfully followed, would retrieve all mistakes, 
head you off from all false paths, and force you not to propound, but to live 
through, a sort of ontological proof.  This lived dialectic, and the merely 
dialectic of my philosophical progress, seemed to have converged on one 
goal; accordingly I tried to put them both into my allegory which thus 
became a defence of Romanticism (in my peculiar sense) as well as of 
Reason  and  Christianity.         (“Afterword,”  205) 
 
 
In these self-explanatory remarks, Lewis definitely underlines the importance of “the 
dialectic of Desire,” which, when “lived through,” plays the crucial role of mediating 
the dialectical development of the thinking mind and even the ultimate growth in 
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between the felt or imagined desire and the dialectics of thinking and the experience 
of conversion naturally entails his apologetic concerns in the allegory—with 
“Romanticism,” Reason and Christianity.  To the present discussion about Lewis’s 
apologetic enterprise within the allegorical text of modern pilgrimage, these three 
categories of defense are tremendously intriguing topics for investigation.  How are 
they related to Lewis’s critique of modernity in his apologetic allegory?     
  In effect, probing into the three aspects of defense prescribed by Lewis himself 
would help clarify, to a great extent, the many-layered sense of modernity criticized 
and interpreted in Lewis’s allegory.    To put in another way, through these apologetic 
concerns of Lewis’s, we may discern keenly his “distinctive style of envisioning” of 
the modern situatedness of pilgrimage and find out more clearly his approaches to 
tackling modern man’s problem of faith.   Furthermore, the investigation into 
Lewis’s allegorical defenses of the three categories might enable us to envisage with 
Lewis, a modern believer and Christian apologist, the hope of becoming a convert in 
the modern age of doubt.    Apologetically, Lewis’s “prescription” for the unbelieving 
phenomenon of modern time is, above all, that the modern self, like the allegorical 
pilgrim, needs to re-cognize the existence of the objective truth of Reality before he or 
she can know “what” or “who” to identify with the tasting of the transcendental, if 
being tasted at all.    This is correspondent with the marrow of Lewis’s thinking in The 
Abolition of Man.  Similarly, in his essay, “The Poison of Subjectivism,” Lewis in a 
prophetic tone urges that “[u]nless we return to the crude and nursery-like belief in 
objective values, we perish.”
63  In  fact,  the  acknowledgement or “preunderstanding” 
of the objectivity of either the logic “behind” thinking or the “object” of 
                                                 
63 See  C. S. Lewis Essay Collection: Literature, Philosophy and Short Stories, p. 257.    The essay 
originally appeared in Religion in Life, Volume XII (Summer 1943). 
  47transcendental imagination is also the underlying principle in Lewis’s defenses of 
“Romanticism,” Reason and Christianity.  In the context of the allegorical 
pilgrimage, the modern pilgrim, indeed, has to firstly encounter with Mr. Wisdom’s 
philosophy of “the Absolute Mind / Spirit,” which then becomes the important pretext 
for his later conversion and discovery that his unknowable vision of the Island is 
really the picture sent by the Landlord, who alone can bring ultimate fruition of his 
D e s i r e .        
Yet, the distinctive quality of the whole pilgrimage does not, at least not simply, 
lie in the hero’s acquisition of transcendental knowledge or acknowledgement.  The 
real pretext of the pilgrim’s ultimate conversion, even prior to the pretext of the 
enlightenment of Idealist philosophy, is actually his experience of Joy, which can also 
be counted as an experience of transcendental imagination or “Romantic”
64 longing.  
It is unquestionable that allegorically the whole pilgrimage is characterized by this 
imaginative or Romantic experience of immortal longing, or, in Lewis’s word, 
“Romanticism.”  On the other hand, it is a journey characteristic of the dialectic 
progress in the pilgrim’s rational self or philosophical mind.   The allegorical focus 
on the dialectic of desire and the juxtaposition of imagination and rationality bring 
forth some interesting inquiries.  Why is Romantic imagination such a central 
element within the allegory of modern pilgrimage?  And, what makes this allegory 
inevitably become some “defenses” for “Romanticism” and Reason as well?  How 
do the elements of “Romanticism” and Reason coordinate with each other in the 
allegory of conversion?    Finally, what is the allegorist apologist’s vision and revision 
of modernity on account of his defenses of both?   
  To figure out these important questions about the particular sense of modernity 
                                                 
64  According to Lewis, the experience is termed “Romantic” simply because it is evoked by things like 
“inanimate nature and marvelous literature” (“Afterword,” 202). 
  48reflected in the allegorical apologetics, we may listen to some of Lewis’s diagnostic 
and apologetic viewpoints about “modernity” made in the article, “Modern Man and 
His Categories of Thought.”
65    In the beginning, Lewis observes that modern people 
are difficult to convert particularly because they have lost the predispositions of 
pre-moderns, such as the belief in the supernatural, consciousness of sin and fear of 
divine judgment, and even the prevalent “Pagan reverence for heroes, ancestors, and 
ancient lawgivers.”
66   Then, he points out several causes of the altered mind of 
modern man, some of which are exactly in line with his allegorical portrayal of the 
modern problem of faith.    For example, the removal of the reverence for tradition in 
modern education brings about the intellectual Provincialism, which is similar to the 
disease of Chronological Snobbery preoccupying the old self of Lewis (before his 
conversion).  In The Pilgrim’s Regress, by the mouth of History the Hermit, the 
personification of the history of human thoughts, those unbelievers who attempt to 
divert or annihilate the pilgrim’s other-world longing are called “stay-at-homes,” 
whose mind is full of blunders because “they seldom travel.”       
In addition to “Provincialism,” modern man is also narrow-minded because of 
the disease of “practicality,” or “irrationality.”  Speaking of his difficulty of 
approaching the un-converted, Lewis puts: “In lecturing to popular audiences I have 
repeatedly found it almost impossible to make them understand that I recommended 
Christianity because I thought its affirmation to be objectively true.”
67  Relevant to 
this “unhuman practicality,” Lewis adds, is modern man’s “indifference to, and 
contempt of, dogma.”
68  This un-dogmatic or even anti-dogmatic attitude toward 
religion is manifestly compatible with the allegorical depiction of the pilgrim’s 
                                                 
65  Written in 1946, this essay was requested by Bishop Stephen Neill for the World Council of 
Churches Assembly, Commission II materials on “God’s Design and Man’s Witness.”    See C. S. Lewis 
Essay Collection: Literature, Philosophy and Short Stories, p. 208-212.     
66  Lewis, Ibid, p. 208. 
67  Lewis, Ibid, p. 211. 
68  Lewis, Ibid, p. 211. 
  49readiness to discard his childhood belief in the Landlord and His rules and also to 
shun Mother Kirk (the traditional Church of Christianity).   Last but not least, 
prevalent to the modern mind is the phenomenon of “Scepticism about Reason,” an 
irrational belief that “reasoning proves nothing and that all thought is conditioned by 
irrational process.”
69  In “Modern Man and His Categories of Thought,” Lewis 
associates this theory of human illusions with modern thinkers, like Freud.  The 
allegorical representative of such an intellectual phenomenon is definitely Sigismund 
Enlightenment, the descendent of Nineteenth-century Rationalism and the personified 
Freudism.  Moreover, in the allegory, even if irrationality is epidemic, there is the 
personified figure of Reason, who plays the role of fighting against the Spirit of the 
age.  It is she who urges the pilgrim from the beginning to follow the imperative of 
keeping his way on the Main Road.    When conversion is imminent, it is also Reason 
who appears in his dream (the medium of contemplation) and becomes his inner light 
that guides him all the way to the gate of the Landlord’s castle.  Ultimately, at the 
moment when John is struggling not to move on, it is Reason who holds his hand and 
does not allow him to turn away.   
  From the illustrations given above, it is obvious that the apologetic vision 
embedded within the allegorical delineation of modern pilgrimage matches the 
perception of Lewis the modern Christian apologist / evangelist.  Above all, both 
convey the key idea that the literary or the apologetic Lewis maintains in his 
miscellaneous writings: to tackle with the modern problem of faith, it is a requisite to 
have “the buried (but not dead) human appetite for the objective truth”
70 re-awakened.   
Strategically, Lewis suggests that it may be even necessary to “re-convert men to real 
Paganism as a preliminary to converting them to Christianity.”
71  Interestingly, his 
                                                 
69  Lewis, Ibid, p. 211. 
70  Lewis, Ibid, p. 212. 
71  Lewis, Ibid, p. 211. 
  50allegorical pilgrim is just following an “un-Christian” process into conversion.  
Before his journey finally leads him (back) to the religious belief in the Landlord, i.e., 
God, John’s pilgrimage is essentially driven by his “Romantic desire” that is basically 
evoked by literary imagination, sometimes even kindled by erotic fantasy, and 
perhaps associated with philosophical notion but never really defined or identified as 
a religious, not to mention Christian, sentiment.   If what is un-Christian can be 
ascribed to Paganism, certainly the allegorical pilgrimage is more Paganism-based 
than  Christianity-oriented.   
  Yet, un-Christian as it is, the modern pilgrimage presented in Lewis’s allegory 
does promise the ultimate hope of conversion, which accordingly discloses the truth 
that the essence of the pilgrimage is, in reality, “religious” and even the pilgrim’s 
imaginative experience of the Desire is transcendental in itself.  The contributors to 
the realization of this hope, subjectively speaking, are, as it were, the imaginative self 
and the rational self within the pilgrim.    In other words, it is imagination and reason, 
in confliction or better in union, that ultimately mediate the pilgrimage to be 
transferred from Paganism to Christianity.  To put in another way, without being 
triggered and sustained by the power of imagination (the Desire) and being justly 
guided by Reason, there will be either no pilgrimage at all or no possibility of a 
pilgrimage of conversion.  Besides, like another pair in the inward drama of the 
pilgrimage, namely, passion (John) and conscience (Vertue / the moral self of John), 
the pilgrim’s imaginative and rational parts can be in bad companionship, namely, 
confliction.  However, as long as they are in good coordination, even union, with 
each other, they become the joint strength that causes the pilgrim’s spiritual progress.   
More specifically, only when John follows both his imaginative impulse / intuition 
and the inference as well as the protection of Reason from deviating forces of the 
outside world, can he arrive at not simply the unity of his selfhood but also his union 
  51with the Transcendent God.  This can explain why Lewis the allegorist apologist 
must juxtapose the double enterprise—defenses of both “Romanticism” and 
Reason—in his allegory about the making of a Christian convert. 
In fact, for Lewis, imagination and reason do not necessarily conflict with or 
contradict each other.    On the contrary, they can both serve as mediums or aids to the 
attainment of “truth.”   In “Bluspels and Flalansferes,” Lewis makes it very clear 
that the “cooperation” of the two faculties is elemental to pursuing truth: “I am a 
rationalist.    For me, reason is the natural organ of truth; but imagination is the organ 
of meaning.  Imagination, producing new metaphors or revivifying old, is not the 
cause of truth, but its condition.”
72  As to the relationship between imagination and 
(his) religious faith, the following post-conversion retrospective remarks from 
Surprised by Joy, provide a revealing explanation: 
 
 
I do not think the resemblance between the Christian and the merely 
imaginative experience is accidental.  I think that all things, in their way, 
reflect heavenly truth, the imagination not  least.  ‘Reflect’  is  the  important 
word.  This lower life of the imagination is not a beginning of nor a step 




In the footnote, Lewis adds that the relevance of imagination (or “art” in Gadamer’s 
term) to belief is actually initiated by the divine, for it is God who “can cause [human 
imagination] to be such a beginning,” a beginning to approach beyond the reality of 
the senses to the reality of “the spirit.”    What is suggested here is the double edge of 
imagination: it can be spiritual and non-spiritual.   The divine can make the 
materials of imagination or imagination itself spiritual.  But imagination cannot 
                                                 
72  Lewis, “Bluspels and Flalansferes,” p. 157. 
73 Lewis,  Surprised by Joy, p. 193-194. 
  52cause its object to become spiritual, although it can mistakenly claim to achieve such 
an impossible goal, which is typically Romanticist thinking.  That is why, although 
Lewis proclaims part of his allegory to be a defense of “Romanticism” (in his private 
definition), on the other hand, he also treats Romanticism (represented by Mr. 
Halfway’s art of music) allegorically as “cheat,” “Ectype,” not “Archetype.”   
Therefore, History the Hermit, who is also the mouthpiece of Lewis, indicates in the 
quotation below that human imagination (or “picture”) still needs one’s “lived 
experience” to check out whether or not the imaginative event really participates in 
the revelation of the (divine) truth:     
 
 
The Landlord sends pictures of many different kinds.    What is universal is 
not the particular picture, but the arrival of some message, not perfectly 
intelligible, which wakes this desire and sets men longing for something 
East or West of the world; something possessed, if at all, only in the act of 
desiring it, and lost so quickly that the craving itself becomes craved; 
something that tends inevitably to be confused with common or even with 
vile satisfactions lying close to hand, yet which is able, if any man faithfully 
live through the dialectic of its successive births and deaths, to lead him at 
last where true joys are to be found.    (151) 
 
 
As suggested here by the Hermit, the experience of longing, or imagination, can be 
easily misunderstood; either the longing may become an absolutely subjective 
experience of longing for longing’s sake, or the wrong objects can be mistaken for the 
real one of the longing.  This is exactly what John has gone through in his 
pilgrimage.  To clear out all his confusion and misunderstanding, what John has to 
do is to recognize the universal and supernatural quality of the object of his Desire.  
Moreover, it is through the faithfully lived dialectics of the desire, including the 
dialectical process of pursuing the meaning of its object, that John, or any pilgrim, can 
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Also, in living through the dialectics both of Desire and of the process of finding 
out its true goal and meaning, reason has definitely an important part to play.  
Without the exercise of reason, the knowing faculty of the feeling pilgrim, the 
experience of Joy could possibly be merely a tasting of some “aestheticized truth.”
74  
As “the natural organ of truth,” in terms of the “rationalist” Lewis, reason is not only 
the fundamental avenue to knowledge but also an indispensable element in the 
journey of conversion.  So far as the “religious” meaning of Joy is concerned, it 
depends less on imagination but more on reason to make distinction between the fake 
objects and the only real one and to ascertain the supernatural existence that is both in 
and beyond Joy, because, according to Lewis, “reason is not a part of Nature but 
evidence for a Supernature,” as Stephen Thorson rightly phrases in the essay, 
“‘Knowledge’ in C. S. Lewis’s Post-conversion Thought: His Epistemological 
Method.”    In this sophisticated and comprehensive essay, Thorson correctly sums up 
Lewis’s epistemological methods as a “three-fold path to knowledge—via reason, 
experience, and authority.”
75  Noticeably, these three paths are also the pilgrim’s 
seeking out or living through the religious meaning, and transcendental significance, 
of his pilgrimage.    Apart from his subjective experience of imagination / Desire and 
participation of his reason / intellect, John might still fail to reach “the Island,” namely, 
the truth of his Desire / God Himself, if he does not obtain any divine help—the 
Church of Christ (e.g., Mother Kirk) and even Christ Himself.  Does this mean that 
reason, as a knowing tool, is not reliable?    The answer could be yes and  no.      
After all, the epistemological usefulness or necessity of reason does not 
                                                 
74  This notion is borrowed from William Gray.    In “The Allegorical Imperative,” Gray puts “The Joy 
which, as Lewis amply illustrates in Surprised by Joy, is a tasting, if not a knowing, of reality.    In a 
deeply Romantic gesture, Lewis thus aestheticizes “truth” (Gray, 34). 
75  Stephen Thorson, “’Knowledge’ in C.S. Lewis’s Post-conversion Thought: His Epistemological 
Method,” Seven: An Anglo-American Literary Review, vol. IX (Marion E. Wade Center of Wheaton 
College and Bookmakers Guild, Inc., 1988), p. 92.    Pp. 91-116. 
  54absolutely promise the arrival at knowledge, especially the knowledge of the 
supernatural.    On the topic of faith and reason, Austin Farrer rings very true when he 
asserts that “[r]easoning is not a source of knowledge but an instrument to clarify 
apprehension.”
76  Similarly, despite his appeal to rationality, if not rationalism, 
Lewis also holds that mere human reason is inadequate and that its “imperfections” 
need to be “corrected” by “total Reason—cosmic or super-cosmic Reason.”
77  S t .  
Thomas Aquinas too, the medieval scholastic theologian noted for approaching faith 
on rational ground, disclaims the absolute value of reason.  For example, in Faith, 
reason and theology,
78 he talks about the ethics of reason from a perspective very 
close to Lewis’s idea to the effect that human reason is double-edged—both good and 
defective; therefore, we should live both “according to” and “apart from” reason, and 
the latter is especially valid when we are in need of being “led by divine grace to what 
is above reason,” such as in knowing about “the truths of faith.”
79    In other words, St. 
Aquinas, on the one hand, holds the principle that natural reason and faith are 
compatible, for the former can bring us to the latter.  On the other hand, he also 
emphasizes the necessity of divine grace for rational inquiry into religious faith, as 
noted in these words: “the will cannot will rightly unless helped by divine grace, as 
Augustine says.  Therefore, neither can the intellect understand the truth unless it is 
illumined by the divine light.”
80    St. Aquinas’s notion about the relationship between 
reason, faith and divine grace sounds remarkably illuminating for the discussion of 
the pilgrim’s conversion in Lewis’s allegory. 
Indeed, before receiving the help of the Holy One, the pilgrim’s will and intellect 
                                                 
76  Austin Farrer, “Faith and Reason,” Reflective Faith: Essays in Philosophical Theology (London: S.P. 
C.K.1972, ed. Charles C. Conti.), p. 50. 
77  See Lewis’s essay “De Futilitate,” in C. S. Lewis Essay Collection: Literature, Philosophy and Short 
Stories, p. 270. 
78 Thomas  Aquinas,  Faith, reason and theology: questions I-IV of his commentary on the De Trinitate 
of Boethius (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1987).   
79  Aquinas, Ibid, p. 68-69.     
80  Aquinas, Ibid, p. 15. 
  55both fall short of sustaining his mere journey, not to mention his pilgrimage (of a 
religious order).  When finding himself unable to climb up and “overcome” the 
towering cliff on one side of the Grand Canyon (symbol of Chasm between human 
sinners and God), the pilgrim, in “a confusion of shame and sorrow and 
bewilderment” (136), can think of nothing but giving it up and going back to his old 
way (of life) with the intention to “live out the rest of [his] life as best as [he] can” 
(136).  On the edge of turning back, he is suddenly called by some man (Christ 
Himself) and offered a hand to accomplish the impossible steep and rocky climb 
“right up to the top.”  In such a desperate predicament of the pilgrim, this help is 
absolutely the only way up and seems too good to be refused.  Besides, to accept it 
or not is like an imminent call—the Man said, “It’s now or never” (137).  Thus, the 
Christ’s offer of help, in another sense, appears to be a kind of intervention forcing the 
self-dependent but desperately helpless pilgrim to carry on his pilgrimage, even at 
such a disillusioning point where the pilgrim must realize that his imaginative passion 
or intellectual judgment or moral determination can all fail him.       
Furthermore, what is even more dramatic in the pilgrim’s process of becoming a 
convert is his inward battle between faith and his reason.    As the pilgrimage goes on, 
we see the pilgrim’s encounter with divine grace, in reality, does not lead to 
immediate conversion.  The practical experience of transcendence indeed brings the 
pilgrim into a voluntary and almost spontaneous response to divine existence—with a 
not so conscious act of praying.   However, the religious response just causes to a 
gripping sense of existential anxiety in his mind; the pilgrim cannot help falling into a 
mental struggle, trying to explain away his transcendental encounter as well as his 
religious act of praying in purely literary terms, as shown in the touching narration 
quoted  below:     
 
  56 
John sprang up as he saw what he had done.    ‘I have been praying,’ he said.   
‘It is the Landlord under a new name.  … And I am caught.’  … he said 
that he had only fallen into a metaphor.  Even Mr. Wisdom had confessed 
that Mother Kirk and the Stewards gave an account of the truth in picture 
writing.  And one must use metaphors.  The feelings and the imagination 
needed that support.    “The great thing,” said John, “is to keep the intellect 
from them: to remember that they are metaphors.  (138)                               
 
 
The gesture of praying certainly can be regarded as an attestation of some growth in 
the pilgrim’s spirit and faith.    Yet, as shown in this passage, it is evident that he is not 
really a voluntary believer, at least not consciously voluntary.    In his conscious mind, 
he refuses to let his reason / intellect get involved with the whole experience of the 
divine grace.  Instead, he willfully insists upon interpreting the lived experience of 
intercourse between him and the divine as having nothing to do with faith but only 
metaphor:  fiction,  not  reality.   Considering  the efficacy of reason in man’s assent to 
faith, it is tremendously intriguing to see how the pilgrim could (subconsciously) 
discern the danger of his rational potentiality when his conversion seems imminent.  
On the other hand, Lewis’s delicate treatment of the mental phenomena of conversion 
in his allegorical pilgrim does attest to the observation that without the intervention of 
divine grace, mere reason or imagination cannot bring about conversion.   
Returning to the question about how the issue of modernity is intertwined with 
Lewis’s affirmation of the inter-relationship between imagination, reason and faith, 
we must take into consideration both the apologetic element and the literary (not 
simply the allegorical) aspect of Lewis’s allegory.    Apologetically speaking, Lewis’s 
defenses of both “Romantic” imagination / Desire and rational (logical or 
philosophical) thinking can be treated as demonstrating his distinctive strategies of 
tackling the problem of faith prevalent in the modern, unbelieving and “irrational,” 
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strategies is a rationalistic type, attempting to bring the modern states of mind / 
movements of thinking antagonistic to faith into dialogue with the authentic reason of 
humanity and even with “religious Reason” from the Divine.  One of the best 
allegorical instances for such a dialogue can be found in the scene of John’s preparing 
himself to dive into the pool as Mother Kirk directs him to do (to be baptized).  At 
that moment, the wraiths of all those modern mindsets he has journeyed through 
suddenly reappear to trouble his mind, endeavouring to dissuade him from jumping 
and stopping being an “advanced,” “wiser” and more “liberal” modern man.  
Following the scene, after John has done his dive which leads him to arrive at the 
blissful land beyond the Canyon, there is still Mr. Wisdom who also shows up to 
convince John once again that his spiritual adventure is un-reality and nothing but 
mythology.  Then comes the divine declaration to de-construct such a philosophical 
speculation and disclose to John the truth behind all the mysteries:   
 
 
Child, if you will, it is mythology.  It is but truth, not fact; an image, not 
the very real.  But then it is My mythology.  The words of Wisdom are 
also myth and metaphor    . . . But this is My inventing, this is the veil under 
which I have chosen to appear even from the first until now.    For this end I 
made your senses and for this end your imagination, that you might see My 
face and live    . . . (169)   
 
 
What is inspiring in these truth-revelatory remarks of the Divine, besides the 
truthfulness of “the divine mythology” and the real myth of human wisdom, is the 
affirmation of the connection between the pilgrim’s Pagan or Romanticist experience 
of the Desire and the ultimate Reality (the Christian faith). 
 This link between John’s whole pilgrimage out of Joy and its destination of 
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with the modern problem of faith—the appeal to “Romanticism.”  Through his 
allegorical representation of a modern pilgrimage, Lewis manifests articulately the 
value and potentiality of “Romantic imagination” to serve as the countervailing agent 
neutralizing the inherent arrogance or ignorance of human wisdom.  Moreover, 
Lewis makes still another appeal to the indispensable medium of divine grace, which 
not only initiates the imaginative journey but also plays the ultimate part in 
re-orienting the pilgrim’s mind from the illusion and irrationality of the modern 
mindsets toward the truth of the Divine-invented mythology and thereby restoring the 
modern pilgrim back to his abandoned faith.    In view of this, it is discernible that the 
apologetic resorts suggested in Lewis’s allegory of modern pilgrimage include not just 
the paradoxical double strategies of the rationalistic and the Romantic but also the 
intervention offered by the Divine Himself. 
 In literary terms, Lewis’s representation of a modern pilgrimage is featured by 
the juxtaposition of portraying the “extrinsic” aura of unbelieving “modernity” and 
dramatizing the “intrinsic” world of the life of a prospective modern convert.  The 
significance of such an allegorical juxtaposition, which is also the inter-mingling of 
the outside world of the modern age and the inner life of the modern self, can be 
associated with the efficacy of Lewis’s apologetic allegory of exemplifying the 
prospect of conversion in the modern situation.  E. F. O’Doherty, the author of 
Religion and Psychology, proclaims that modern men, being in the milieu designated 
by loss of faith and under the influence of the rationalist and scientific frames of 
thinking, are in fact having an even better opportunity to embrace a “free choice of 
faith without subjective certainty or felt state of conviction, [which] is in itself a more 
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81  This view, though seeming optimistic, indeed 
points out the paradoxical predicament of modern man having both the difficulty of 
the rational mind in believing and the chance of making a “pure” act of choosing faith.   
O’Doherty’s description of the “pure act of choice” can be applied to the ultimate 
conversion of John, the agnostic and passionate seeker of truth yet also a pilgrim 
inescapably liable to go astray or fall into confusion in the unbelieving world, an age 
extremely “hostile to immortal longing.”     
But, the point of making a choice is not the whole mark of the modern situation 
for a prospective convert that Lewis the apologist strives to hit.  Rather, Lewis’s 
concern is largely with the whole dialectical process of pilgrimage.  Lewis’s 
allegorical pilgrimage is such that it proceeds in a multi-voiced outside world whose 
characteristic spirit is expressed through a medley of competing, or compelling, and 
essentially self-contradictory modes of thinking and being.  Besides, it 
simultaneously takes place within a warring heart that is void of the naiveté of faith 
and full of the rivalry or tension between reason and passion, between unreliable and 
impulsive feeling and strong-willed though not really self-sufficient conscience, and 
finally between belief and unbelief.  In other words, Lewis’s apologetic vision is 
comprehensively concerned with both the macrostructure of the modern spirit and the 
microstructure of the modern pilgrim’s interior reality.  Such a comprehensive 
approach to the modern predicament of pilgrimage is definitely of great efficacy 
pertaining to both the apologetic and the literary enterprises of the allegorist Lewis. 
Furthermore, Lewis’s allegory, articulating his defenses of Reason, “Romantic” 
imagination and Christian faith, involves not simply the double ventures of literature 
and apologetics but also Lewis’s critique of modernity—his critical interpretation of 
the modern situation characterized by the spirit of un-reason  and  unbelief.   In  other 
                                                 
81 E.  F.  O’Doherty,  Religion and Psychology (New York: Alba House, c1978), p. 71. 
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namely, a “hermeneutical” enterprise.  In fact, Lewis’s allegorical and apologetic 
prescription of the necessity to restore the lost “predisposition” in the modern mind 
through the exercise of imagination and the participation of reason, or better, of 
“religious Reason,” can be associated with the insight of the hermeneutic philosophers, 
such as Gadamer and Ricoeur, who hold that hermeneutics can be a “modern 
pathway” to re-link human understanding and belief.    In  “The  Symbol  Gives  Rise 
to Thought,” the concluding chapter of Ricoeur’s book, The Symbolism of Evil, 
Ricoeur attempts to designate the interpretation of “symbol” as “the ‘modern’ mode of 
belief.”
82  Speaking of the relationship between hermeneutics and modern man’s 
problem of faith, Ricoeur makes an illuminating remark that “we modern men, aim at 
a second naiveté in and through criticism.”
83  This notion of the hermeneutical 
attainment of the “second immediacy of belief” is remarkably correspondent with 
what is presented and prescribed in Lewis’s apologetic allegory, namely, the 
imperative of exercising the modern pilgrim’s imagination and critical reason for 
acquiring his “second naiveté.”  The pilgrim’s conversion after the whole journey 
through imaginative and intellectual dialectics parallels the recovery of his belief in 
the supernatural and his mental capacity of identifying the transcendental Desire with 
the faith of the Christian God.     
In addition, Ricoeur draws an association between the hermeneutical circle of 
symbol and criticism (“the symbol gives and criticism interprets”) and the “living and 
stimulating circle” of believing and understanding (“We must understand in order to 
believe, but we must believe in order to understand”).
84  Again, it can be evidenced 
that Lewis’s allegory of modern pilgrimage echoes Ricoeur’s association.  Full of 
                                                 
82  Paul Ricoeur, “Conclusion: The Symbol Gives Rise to Thought,” p. 347-357. 
83  Ricoeur, Ibid, p. 352.   
84  Ricoeur, Ibid, p. 351. 
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hermeneutical circle Ricoeur ascribes to modern “interpreters” and “believers.”    This 
can be illustrated by the pilgrim’s outer and inner predicaments.  Externally, the 
modern pilgrim is situated within the intellectual, cultural and spiritual phenomena 
that can distract or thwart or simply oppose his religious sentiment and pursuit.    That 
is to say, the outside environment for the pilgrimage is characteristic of its tendency to 
misinterpret the symbol of the pilgrim’s Desire on account of its spirit of unbelief.  
As for the pilgrim’s inside world, his psychic life goes through the “living circle” of 
struggling to understand so as to believe, that is, to acquire faith, and gaining 
perception through belief to understand, namely, to perceive the truth and meaning of 
his pursuit.  Whether dealing with the external reality that is good only for 
misinterpretation and misunderstanding or with the internal reality of the 
hermeneutical circle that a modern individual tends to undergo, Lewis’s manifestation 
of modernity demonstrates vividly the hermeneutics of tension between understanding 
and belief.    This further evidences the joint enterprise in Lewis’s apologetic allegory, 
which consists of not merely allegorical imagination and apologetic confrontation but 
also hermeneutical implication of the modern situation of faith.     
With these analyses of re-visiting Lewis’s critique of modernity within the 
apologetic allegory in hermeneutical terms, we may further wonder whether it is 
possible to re-think Lewis’s allegorical, apologetic and hermeneutical vision and 
revision of the modern problem of faith in a “postmodern” context.  In relation to 
such a critical inquiry, some intriguing questions may include: How do Lewis’s 
interpretations, or critiques, of the intellectual and spiritual situations of modern time 
answer postmodern concerns with “otherness” and “difference”?  And, can Lewis’s 
critique of modernity presented through the combination of his apologetic enterprise 
and allegorical imagination be correlated with postmodern hermeneutics, such as the 
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David Tracy’s hermeneutic theory is distinctively illuminating for a postmodern 
rethinking of Lewis’s critique of modernity mainly because it is, in itself, a 
religious-based theory of interpretation.  Besides, Tracy’s hermeneutic thinking is 
very much concerned with the challenges and tasks that contemporary apologetics are 
supposed  to  involve.   
Regarding the meaning of postmodernity, Tracy gives his insightful definition 
from a hermeneutic point of view, in the article entitled “The Uneasy Alliance 
Reconceived: Catholic Theological Method, Modernity and Postmodernity.” 
 
 
To argue that our age is better characterized as postmodern than as 
modern . . . is to acknowledge that radical plurality and a heightened sense 
of ambiguity, so typical of all postmodern movements of thought with their 
refusal of premature closure and their focus upon the categories of the 




According to Tracy’s suggestion here, the postmodern spirit of criticism is a spirit of 
open-mindedness toward difference and otherness and of readiness to accept plurality 
or ambiguity in the pursuit of meaning and truth.  In terms of this hermeneutical 
understanding of postmodernity, we can discern that there is some postmodern touch 
in Lewis’s literary and critical interpretation of the modern situated-ness of 
conversion.   It is noticeable that throughout the journey in search of the ultimate 
truth of his Desire, Lewis’s allegorical pilgrim must live with a strong sense of 
hermeneutical plurality and ambiguity, which is manifested by the pilgrim’s 
encounters with the multi-voiced and mostly conflicting modern states of mind.  
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hermeneutical conversation between (the pilgrim’s) self and other(s) (the modern 
world of ideas), a kind of conversation that consists of argumentation between 
contraries and negotiation between  suspension  and  belief.     
   In effect, it is this phenomenon of negotiation between self and other, 
subjectivity and objectivity, or in Tracy’s term, interaction between “microstructure” 
and “macrostructure,” that not only gives the whole pilgrimage its profoundly 
dialectical inner life but also manifests the nature of inquiry within Lewis’s critique 
and revision of modern problem of faith.    Furthermore, the allegorical display of the 
hermeneutical conversation between unbelief and belief could be seen as reflecting 
the allegorist apologist’s hermeneutical position toward modernity.  Like his pilgrim 
who endeavours to think both in and against modernity, Lewis also posits himself as a 
critic engaged and disengaged with modern movements of thinking, particularly 
regarding religious faith.    This paradoxical and dialectical position together with the 
dialectics and hermeneutics within the allegorical pilgrimage bespeaks the evidence 
that the allegory of The Pilgrim’s Regress is indeed a piece of 
hermeneutical-apologetic work permeated with a postmodern aura of meaning, 
namely, understanding and belief through conversation  and  criticism.     
In the allegory, the pilgrim ends up becoming a convert.    This can speak for the 
ultimate vision, if not a postmodern vision, of Lewis, the interpreter and critic of 
modernity, that to believe, a modern pilgrim may need to embrace his imagination, 





  64Ch. III.    Fantasy, Irony and Christian Existentialism in The Screwtape Letters 




Already in his very first trying of literary apologetic—his attempt at allegorizing 
a personalized journey toward conversion to Christian faith, a particular pilgrimage 
centered on the theme of Sehnsucht, which is a mixed experience of existential, 
romantic and transcendental longing, the interplay between subjectivity and 
objectivity is significantly manifested, or suggested, by C. S. Lewis.  As the former 
chapter on The Pilgrim’s Regress has underlined,  it is precisely with subjective 
experience, namely, the so-called “individual situatedness,” that Lewis puts his focal 
concern while endeavouring to tackle the (modern) problem of faith.    In other words, 
Lewis the allegorist is, as it were, playing the literary as well as apologetic “spotlight” 
upon the relationship between the individual self and ultimate reality, or in other 
words, between the inward life of the human person and the supernatural reality of the 
divine.    The highlighting of such a relationship, or interaction, is, generally speaking, 
a predominant feature of Lewis’s religious narratives in which the literary world 
incorporates some Christian “apologetic” vision. 
  In view of this, it would be simply unfair and off the mark to ascribe an 
impertinent overemphasis upon “traditional supernaturalism, with its tendency to 
demean the natural and the merely human,” to Lewis’s imaginative and religious texts, 
as Gunnar Urang does in his criticism of C. S Lewis’s writing of religion and 
fantasy.
86    Such a critical viewpoint, kind of naïve and reductive, actually reflects the 
critic’s ignorance of the fact that the textuality of Lewis’s religious fantasy is 
comprised not just of its significant preoccupation with the otherness of supernatural 
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  65reality but also of the special attention to the truth about human selfhood.  In effect, 
far from focusing exclusively on the supernatural at the expense of the value and 
significance of the natural and the human, Lewis in his religious narratives tends to 
put important concerns with exploring spiritual reality through allegorical or 
fantastical or mythical lens to envisage the inter-relationship between the objective / 
metaphysical  and the subjective / personal.  This enriched textuality can be 
evidenced, for example, by Lewis’s two texts of “theological fantasy,” The Screwtape 
Letters  (1942) and The Great Divorce (1946), which, in this respect, are 
correspondent with the text of The Pilgrim’s Regress (1933), the allegorical 
manifestation of the innermost being of human self possessed by the heightened sense 
of “romantic” longing / Joy—the central theme in Lewis’s life and most of his works.       
 Thematically,  unlike  The Pilgrim’s Regress, neither The Screwtape Letters nor 
The Great Divorce is dealing with a pilgrimage predominated by the experience of Joy, 
whether concerning its origin (from the divine) or its impact upon the inwardness or 
spirituality of human existence.  Nonetheless, these two shorter but absolutely no 
less powerful (in terms of imagination, intellect or even theology) texts also present, 
respectively and fantastically, the pilgrimage in which the close relationship between 
supernaturality and subjectivity is even more realistically lived  out.  The  paradoxical 
combination of both the fantastic and the realistic in the delineation of pilgrimage is 
shown in both The Screwtape Letters, with letters about how a human soul’s daily 
journey of faith can be, particularly psychologically, under the rein of diabolical 
temptation, and The Great Divorce, through dream-vision contemplating from the 
perspective of eternity the reality of the human choice of heaven or hell happening in 
the mundane realities of life, such as habits of mind or ways of thinking or problems 
of human relationship.  Also, it is perceivable that C. S. Lewis’s fantastic 
imagination is most conspicuously and profoundly devoted to depicting the 
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tremendously akin to the Platonic philosophical conception of “human life as a 
pilgrimage from appearance to reality,”
87 to use the informing phrase of Iris Murdoch.   
Basically, the following study of these two fantastical texts will be centered on the 
theme of the truth about selfhood disclosed through the spiritual journey into reality 
of a metaphysical / religious order, in both the Platonic and Christian sense. 
  Following the previous criticism on The Pilgrim’s Regress, undertaken from 
literary and religious perspectives, the investigation of this chapter of The Screwtape 
Letters and The Great Divorce into such issues as “selfhood” and “reality” or 
existential and religious truth, again, aims to inspect closely both form, i.e. mode of 
expression (literary enterprise) and moral (apologetic enterprise).    Also, the efficacy 
of Lewis’s literary apologetics is to be assessed, as done previously, according to how 
well the artistic form and the moral themes / apologetic concerns are intermingled.  
In other words, the relevance of art to the religious truth that the artistic / literary work 
means to convey or embody remains the intended critical target.  Such a target 
certainly needs to be specified in the contexts of the apologetic / theological fantasies 
concerned.  Prior to a specific examination regarding how art and religion, or, 
literature and theology, are fantastically coalesced, it is worthwhile and also necessary 
to clarify first, even if only generally, the meanings of fantasy and those central issues 
this criticism attempts to examine—selfhood and reality. 
  About the definition of fantasy as a special form of creative writing, Lewis in the 
essay entitled “The Meanings of ‘Fantasy’” offers a brief aesthetic and hermeneutic 
explanation: “A story which introduces the marvellous, the fantastic, says to him [the 
reader] by implication ‘I am merely a work of art.    You must take me as such—must 
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88  
In this concise statement addressed directly to the reader, not only is the artistic nature 
of fantasy underscored, but also the reader is clearly guided about how to enjoy it.  
This brief reading map provided by Lewis the literary critic, who is at the same time a 
fantasy maker, is certainly useful to the readers of Lewis’s own fantasies.  In  fact,  in 
this study, the separate discussions about The Screwtape Letters and  The Great 
Divorce below will basically follow this “fantasist” invitation—to enter into the 
imaginative world for the fantastic experiences it entertains and to interpret their 
implications, or “imaginative supposals,” in aesthetic, rhetoric (ironic) and textual 
terms.    Moreover, seeing that Lewis’s fantastical and imaginative world is definitely 
one inhabiting a “divine universe,” as coined by Lewis’s literary and spiritual mentor, 
George MacDonald, it is therefore appropriate to term his fantastic narratives, The 
Screwtape Letters and The Great Divorce included, “fantasies of theology,” and 
accordingly a religious or even theological (in a broad sense) perspective is valid and 
even indispensable. 
   To makes clearer how “fantasy of theology” can be understood, another 
idea—“theology of romance”—noted by C. S. Lewis’s scholar, Colin Duriez,
89 and 
Lewis himself, when speaking of Charles William’s versatile enterprise, can be 
informatively helpful.  According to Lewis’s exposition, which Colin Duriez quotes 
from Lewis’s “Preface” to Essays Presented to Charles Williams and rightly thinks 
applicable to Lewis’s own works, “a romantic theologian” is someone “who considers 
the theological implications of those experiences which are called romance.”
90  
Indeed, Lewis’s keen observation about what the theology of romance means is 
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theological fantasy.  Just as the practitioner of theological romance is not romantic 
about theology but theological about romance, so is the theological fantasist, who, we 
might follow Lewis to say, is not fantastic about theology but theological about 
fantasy.  In another word, “fantasy of theology,” by the same token as “theological 
romance,” is absolutely not about the undertaking of theology per se but really the 
practice of the fantastical imagination endowed with theological implications.  
Furthermore, as far as the two texts of fantasy treated here are concerned, although 
much less adventurous and dramatic than Lewis’s scientific trilogy or his popular 
Chronicles of Narnia and unlike the “romantic” journey for Joy allegorized in The 
Pilgrim’s Regress, they are still in their own ways full of a romantic “mixture of the 
familiar and the unfamiliar”
91 as well as spiritual battles that engage not only the 
supernatural / divine but also the natural / human. 
  In terms of literary (certainly not theological) history, Lewis’s theological 
fantasies undoubtedly pertain to the tradition of “modern Christian fantasy,” or 
“post-Romantic fantasy,” as held by C. N. Manlove in his excellent book— Christian 
Fantasy.
92  This is a tradition, according to Manlove’s clear and deep account, 
marked by its “struggle against” the modern trend of “demythologizing” and 
“desupernaturalizing” modes of thinking and by its appeal to the revelatory 
experience of imagination through which the immanence of the divine in the universe 
can be intuited or contemplated.  In Manlove’s explanation of the “contemplative” 
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93 perhaps what is most noteworthy and 
relevant to this study is his shrewd observation that “it always seeks [through its 
narratives] to portray a state of being”
94 (emphasis added).  Such a tendency to 
represent or reflect on human selfhood is evidently correspondent with what Manlove 
points out—“a general shift over the centuries, through the Renaissance via the 
Enlightenment to Romanticism, from a God-centred to a much more man-oriented 
Christian view of the universe.”
95  But, on the other hand, this phenomenon of 
putting considerable concern with the subjective realm of human being can actually 
be traced as far back as in the writings of early Christian “humanists,” such as 
Augustine;
96 even St. Paul’s messages touch upon the issue of the conflicting self in 
the struggle of living out Christian faith (Cf. Romans, 7: 21-23).  C. S. Lewis, in 
some sense, like the other nineteenth- and twentieth century writers of Christian 
fantasy, inherits this early, or traditional, Christian “humanist” approach to the 
problem of religious faith and tends to scrutinize the individual being’s subjective 
consciousness or state of mind in the (modern) context of encounter or tension or 
alienation between faith and self, between ultimate reality and subjective experience. 
  Therefore, in such sophisticated criticism of Lewis’s fantasy as that of C. N. 
Manlove, there is an unmistakable recognition of “double movement”—outward 
toward  reality and inward toward selfhood.  For instance, in his analysis of The 
Great Divorce, Manlove pointedly and profoundly remarks: “the true sin is the 
orientation towards self—self-advancement and self-protection—that lies under an 
                                                 
93  Aside from “immanentism,” another feature of modern Christian fantasy, according to Manlove, is 
its contemplative nature: “This concern with contemplation of the divine as it is manifested in the 
universe distinguishes nineteenth- and twentieth-century fantasy from that written since Dante” 
(Manlove, 159). 
94  Manlove, Ibid, p. 159. 
95  Manlove, Ibid, p. 157. 
96  Cf. Doris T. Myers’s “The Context of Christian Humanism,” the fourth chapter of her book, C. S. 
Lewis in Context.     
  70evasion of reality”
97 (emphases added).  This association between self-orientation 
and (his / her) estrangement from reality is indeed wisely drawn from Lewis’s 
delineation of the situation of those “self-willed” souls who are destined by their own 
choices of either refusing or entering into reality / heaven in The Great Divorce.  In 
fact, it can also be applied to Lewis’s representation of an individual human’s life- and 
faith-journey in The Screwtape Letters, in which it is manifested that the self, if 
captivated by his own selfhood, can be just easily falling prey to the hellish 
temptation of which the foremost task is to enact the alienation of the human self from 
what is real / true.  Basically in tune with Manlove’s reading, the following 
interpretations of the two fantastic texts of Lewis aim to contemplate the relationship 
between self and reality—a relationship that is to some extent underwritten by the 
operation of temptation and in some sense determined by the problematic “selfhood” 
in the individual person’s journey into either faith / heaven or temptation / hell. 
 Apparently  standing  in incompatible contrast with “reality,” which in terms of 
philosophy of religion or Christian faith, denotes an objective and transcendent order 
of truth, “selfhood” (to be examined in Lewis’s texts) signifies a totally subjective 
state of being or mind that is prone to confine oneself within subjective consciousness 
and lead a way of “living out of one’s interiority” and “autonomy”
98 rather than living 
in (Christian) faith, in genuine “communion” with “reality” and with other persons, 
human and divine.  In the discussions below, firstly on The Screwtape Letters and 
then on The Great Divorce, such a conflicting but not impossible to become 
harmonized relationship between self and reality, self and other, will be put into close 
inspection.      Meanwhile, in dealing with this subject of investigation, the significant 
                                                 
97  Manlove, Ibid, p. 108.   
98  Cf. John F. Crosby’s book, The Selfhood of the Human Person (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic 
University of America Press, c1996), in which the author explains “variation on the theme of 
selfhood,” such as “the theme of independence, autonomy,    . . . living out of one’s interiority, acting 
through oneself, determining oneself” and so on.    P. 1. 
  71place of the power of temptation enacted within or upon the selfhood should never be 
overlooked.  It can be demonstrated in both of Lewis’s Christian fantasies that 
“temptation,” whether activated by the supernatural force from Hell or originated 
from the natural weakness in human selfhood, plays an active and nasty role of 
carrying tension and disunion (or “divorce”) in the relationship between self and 
reality into “remarkable” effect.     
The eternal joining between the subjective state of being (self) and the objective 
order of truth (reality)—is what the devil, the  tempter in The Screwtape Letters 
endeavours to cause a human soul to avoid and the angel (or Bright Spirit) in The 
Great Divorce looks to help him / her to enter into.  But ultimately it is really 
dependent on every existential self who is responsible for the eternally divergent 
consequence of either renouncing or choosing faith and heaven, that is, the difference 
of becoming, as it were, “the devil’s delight” in Hell or the angel’s party taking 
heavenly delight in (ultimate) reality.    That is to say, being a free subject, the human 
self can make his own decision of and accordingly must take responsibility for what it 
is to be.  From this perspective, we may infer that Lewis’s practice of “fantasizing” 
the inter-relationships between selfhood and temptation and between self and reality is 
not simply impregnated with theological sense but also has, to a great extent, a 
(Christian) existentialist touch.    In light of this, it seems not far-fetched at all to draw 
association between C. S. Lewis the modern Christian fantasist and Søren 
Kierkegaard (1813-1855), “the most important figure” of Christian existentialism.
99   
In fact, Kierkegaard’s philosophical contemplation of the “relationship between 
existence and Christianity” bears notable congeniality to Lewis’s treatment of the 
problem of faith inter-related with human selfhood.    For instance, in one of his 
                                                 
99  Cf. David E. Roberts, Existentialism and Religious Belief    (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1957).    Chapter II & III “Kierkegaard.”    Pp. 61-144.     
  72“edifying discourses,” Kierkegaard instructs that “the expectation of faith is victory,” 
meaning that as “eternal power in man,”
100 faith will bring man into spiritual victory 
in eternity, that is, to be justified in Christ (cf. Galatians, 3:24).    However, this great 
expectation of faith may be overshadowed by the problem of self, who, once “snared” 
by doubt, becomes no longer free as a spiritual being and as a result becomes unable 
to “appropriate” things that belong to “the spiritual world,” for “all things spiritual are 
appropriated only in freedom,” according to Kierkegaard.  Thus, it follows that “the 
more the object of contemplation belongs to the spiritual world, the more important 
becomes the question of what the observer is in his inmost being.”
101  In  other  words, 
within his discourse on the issue of faith, what Kierkegaard the religious philosopher 
is underscoring, rather like how Lewis tends to deal with the problem of faith in his 
fantastic world, is the significance of the inner nature of self, especially the self being 
tempted by the “cunning passion of doubt.” 
Besides their similarity in connecting the matter of faith with the question of 
selfhood, or personal existence, another connection between Kierkegaard’s 
religious-based philosophy and Lewis’s apologetics-oriented fantasy can be made in 
terms of the rhetorical mode of irony, which for both, albeit more explicitly in 
Kierkegaard’s thoughts than in Lewis’s texts, “is essentially and inherently a spiritual 
phenomenon.”
102  With his noted treatise—The Concept of Irony, Kierkegaard is 
admittedly a strenuous and profound analyst of irony, more precisely, of the relation 
between irony and modern existence.  As well paraphrased by Harvie Ferguson, in 
Kierkegaard’s terms, the ironic form—“the indirect communication of the hidden 
truth of inwardness”— embodies “the very superficiality and deceptive ease of 
                                                 
100 Kierkegaard,  Edifying Discourses (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1943-1946, trans. 
David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson), p. 34. 
101  Kierkegaard, Ibid, p. 68. 
102 Harvie  Ferguson,  Melancholy and The Critique of Modernity: Søren Kierkegaard’s Religious 
Psychology (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 49. 
  73modern life.”
103    It is clearly discernible that Kierkegaard combines his discourse on 
the ironic with his primary concern with the truth about the existential.  A fruitful 
and convincing combination it surely is in the development of Kierkegaard’s religious 
philosophy.    His existentialist approach to irony to some extent brings about some of 
his incipient but profound reflections, not merely philosophical but also religious, 
upon the distance and incongruity between truth / reality and self-consciousness / 
self-understanding  (or  self-deception).   
A veritable “modern Socrates,” Kierkegaard, rather like the essential Socrates, is 
characteristic of a religious endeavour to pursue knowledge of (ultimate) reality and 
the epistemic insistence that such a pursuit be premised upon a (dialectical) 
self-knowing process.  The ingenious association Kierkegaard makes between irony 
and Socratic critique of selfhood (false or deceptive self-awareness) is significantly 
relevant to Lewis’s ironical representation of the problematic relations between ego 
and reality.  The following interpretation of Lewis’s two fantastical texts intends to 
argue, through Kierkegaard’s as well as other theorists’ (such as Paul de Man’s) 
discourses on irony, that the problematic self-knowledge or self-understanding or 
self-consciousness manifested through the negating force of irony signifies a 
self-alienating state of being, or, mode of existence.  This “negative” signification 
about the truth of human existence by means of irony has, at the same time, certain 
“positive” conveyance, which again is inherent within irony itself, of the spirituality 
or religiosity of human selfhood, as indicated in Kierkegaard’s treatise, in which the 
emergence of irony is linked with the classical source of irony—in Socrates.     
In Kierkegaard’s understanding, the double-edged function of irony, i.e., the 
twofold tendency of negating self-claimed authenticity of understanding and of 
                                                 
103  Ferguson, Ibid, p. 38. 
 
  74affirming the transcendental being of the self (the knowing subject) has its historical 
origin in the dialectical venture of Socrates.
104      Counted or configured as a classical 
“ironist,” Socrates represents a prototypical interrogator who notoriously enjoys and 
insists on the perpetual negation of the self’s claim to knowledge-acquisition in order 
for the genuine and presumably endless pursuit of knowledge that pertains to the truth 
about reality and essentially transcends the limitation of human experience, 
cognitively and existentially.  That is to say, from the Socratic ironic way of life 
(through dialectical thinking and reasoning), or the “way of self-knowledge,”
105 
emerges the recognition of the religiosity of (human) existence—that we are, in nature, 
religious or spiritual beings in the sense that we are inclined to inquire into the 
(transcendent) Idea, “which is the discovery of” our selves.  In other words, the 
understanding of our selfhood must be related to the knowledge of transcendent 
reality.   The interpretations of both The Screwtape Letters and The Great Divorce 
provided below intend to show that embedded within Lewis’s texts—his fantastical 
and “apologetic” manifestation of the relationship between faith and self—is such a 
dialectical force of irony that serves to expose both the actual alienation and the 
potential integration between selfhood and reality, both of which in this context are 
religiously defined.  Moreover, by probing into the textuality, or to use Professor 
David Jasper’s intriguing term—“intratextuality” (“the text within the text”)
106 related 
                                                 
104  Cf. Davie Ferguson’s exposition about the connection between Kierkegaard’s religious ideation of 
irony and his religious reading of Socrates’ “ironic way of life in the sub-section entitled “The 
Religious Tendency of Irony” of the chapter, “Irony: the romance of distance.”    Pp. 45-48.   
105  The phrase is cited from Lee M. Capel, who translates Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Irony (London: 
Collins, 1966). In “Historical Introduction” written for the version of his translation, mentioning “the 
Gillileie Journal” of Kierkegaard at his young age, Capel quotes from Kierkegaard’s journal and notes: 
“[Kierkegaard’s] proper vocation is the Socratic way of self-knowledge, the need for ‘a truth which is 
truth for me, the Idea for which I am willing to live and die’, the search for ‘the Idea which is the 
discovery of myself’, of that ‘individuality’ with ‘its own style’ which he likens to ‘the worship of the 
unknown god’” (Capel, 19).       
106  See David Jasper’s Rhetoric, Power and Community (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1993), 
Ch. 8 “Modernism, Rhetoric and Irony: Another Modest Proposal,” in which Prof. Jasper advises the 
use of the term—“intratextuality”—to manifest the double nature of irony, which according to Jasper, 
“inherently unstable and destabilizing, happily works against its own narrative discourse and against its 
  75with the dialectics of irony, this study means to demonstrate that C. S Lewis’s texture 
of writing is not as “flat” as some critics suggest but is actually dialectical in a 
significant  sense.   
  Apparently, this criticism of Lewis’s fantastical texts puts much stress on 
analyzing Lewis’s employment of ironical expression, in textual and religious terms.  
Nevertheless, it is at the same time engaged in reading beyond the art and meaning of 
irony—into the transcendental vision both of the objective existence of reality and of 
the interaction between human self and reality underlying the mere rhetorical 
performances (of the “surface texts”).    This mixed vision of transcendent reality and 
its relationship with the human self (as religious being) ought to be understood as a 
vision, an implicitly apologetic one, of Lewis’s that is essentially beyond the 
subjectivity of human selfhood and definitely beyond the category of rhetoric (i.e., 
irony).  Concerning how the efficacy of rhetoric as a literary means may serve both 
artistic and apologetic ends in C. S. Lewis’s works, for instance, when he writes as a 
practitioner of irony, or ironic rhetorician, the following illuminating remarks of 
Bruce L. Edwards are tremendously informative:   
 
 
Lewis understood “rhetoric” in its traditional, classical sense—a 
compendium of tools that equipped an artist or essayist with strategies to 
communicate truth more memorably, to express difficult ideas more 
accessibly, to appeal to the imagination with greater aplomb and delight, 
and, certainly, to make confrontation with the deeper facthood of 




                                                                                                                                            
own textuality” (Jasper, 128-129).    The later discussion of the textuality of Lewis’s ironic fantasies 
will get back to this intriguing notion of Jasper’s. 
107  Quoted from Bruce L. Edwards, an admirable scholar of C. S. Lewis’s studies, also the author of A 
Rhetoric of Reading: C. S. Lewis’s Defense of Western Literacy (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University 
Press, 1985), who writes for the entry on “Language / Rhetoric,” in The C. S. Lewis Readers’ 
Encyclopedia (Michigan: Zondervan Publishing House, 1998).    P. 231-232. 
  76As Professor Edwards’ sophisticated observation manifests here, rhetoric, when well 
utilized, can function as a remarkably pleasing and heuristic “channel” of what is 
“true” and “transcendentally real.”  This understanding of what rhetoric can achieve 
in writing (not just of literary imagination) must make sense to Lewis not simply at 
the theoretical level.    In fact, it can be demonstrated, for instance, by the texts of The 
Screwtape Letters and The Great Divorce, that C. S. Lewis as a creative writer is also 
adept at imparting such transcendental categories as “truth” and “reality” to some 
“fantastic” effect through using rhetorical tools, like irony.   
Centered upon interpreting Lewis’s rhetorical as well as “imaginative supposal” 
(Lewis’s phrase) of transcendent reality and its interaction with human existence, this 
study of the two fantasies remains, as in the former chapter, oriented toward 
investigating into Lewis’s inter-mingled enterprises of the literary / rhetorical, the 
(Christian) apologetic and the “hermeneutical” in Lewis’s treatment of such a 
“supposal.”   In  another  word,  this  will  be a study involving multi-faceted topics for 
investigation, including (1) the suggestions yielded by fantastical imagination and 
rhetorical expression, (2) Lewis’s sustained apologetic concern within his fantasies 
and, last but not the least, (3) certain hermeneutical signification to be inferred from 
the distinctive “texture” of Lewis’s literary apologetics.  The criticism as a whole 
looks to echo Paul Ricoeur’s observation concerning the “possibility that 
metaphorical discourse [like poem, or narrative or essay] says something about 
reality,” as made in his multi-disciplinary book, The Rule of Metaphor.  In  Ricoeur’s 




the  reference of the metaphorical statement as the power to ‘redescribe 
reality . . . to refer to a reality outside of  language.  Accordingly,  metaphor 
  77presents itself as a strategy of discourse that, while preserving and 
developing the creative power of language, preserves and develops the 




This profound and insightful theory of what Ricoeur calls “the metaphoric reference” 
could actually be taken as a valuable “reference point” for approaching the two 
fantasies concerned in the present study.  As for why Ricoeur’s theory can be an 
importantly enlightening “reference” for the present criticism, it is basically because 
Lewis’s imaginative texts are, in themselves, imbued with a strong sense of 
metaphorical “truth” about human selfhood and about transcendent reality, the 
twofold main concern of this study.  In fact, as pointed out in the former discussion 
on “allegory,” Lewis himself underlines the truth-revealing quality of metaphorical 
language, a quality that seems notably in parallel with Ricoeur’s notion of its 
reality-designating power.  In addition, Ricoeur’s insight about the metaphoric is 
particularly noteworthy because of the link existent between the attention given in this 
discussion to rhetorical expression as some transcendental pointer and Ricoeur’s idea 
about the capacity of “metaphoric discourse” to give description or reference to a 
signifier “outside of language,” namely, the metaphoric “power to redescribe reality.”   
Furthermore, it will become clearly observable that Ricoeur’s hermeneutic notion 
about metaphor fits well the ultimate purpose of this criticism—to demonstrate that 
the texts of Lewis’s fantastical apologetics are not merely fantastically creative and 
rhetorically strategic but also abundant with “heuristic power” that serves for the 
apologetic fantasist, for his readers too, to envision beyond the language of the 
rhetoric the supernatural and “trans-mortal” reality. 
 
                                                 
108 Ricoeur,  The Rule of Metaphor, p. 6. 
  78Ch. IV.    The Screwtape Letters: Ironic Discourse and the “Triangle” of 
Human, Devil and God 
 
 
“The mind is its own place, and in itself / Can make a Heav’n of Hell, a Hell of Heav’n.”   




A true lover of literature himself, with multiple and devoted literary engagements 
in criticism, creative writing or merely wide reading, C. S Lewis maintains, in quite 
an imperative voice, that a literary piece ought to be taken, above all, as a work of art 
rather than “a mere vehicle for truth” and not to be confused with “a religion, a 
philosophy, a school of ethics, a psychotherapy, a sociology.”
109   In the essay, “On 




continual awareness that it not only means, but is.  It is not merely logos 
(something said) but poiema (something made).  .  .  .    They are 
complex and carefully made objects.    Attention to the very objects they are 
is our first step.  To value them chiefly for reflections which they may 
suggest to us or morals we may draw from them, is a flagrant instance of 




Obviously, Lewis is putting significant emphasis on the aesthetic status of a literary 
work.  Later in the same article, he uses the example of sculpture to support the 
sense in which it is imperative to prioritize the appreciation of the “shape” of art, 
                                                 
109  According to Lewis, in “On Misreading by the Literary,” such confusion is the very kind of 
misreading that “is unfortunately encouraged by the increasing importance of ‘English Literature’ as an 
academic disciple.”    Lewis’s own position is definitely against such a critical trend.    See An 
Experiment in Criticism, p. 86. 
110 Lewis,  An Experiment in Criticism, p. 82-83. 
  79before appropriating or thinking about the ideas it conveys (i.e., “the sculptor’s view 
of life”).    After all, it is “by the shape that it is a statue.    Only because it is a statue 
do we come to be mentioning the sculptor’s view of life at all.”
111  For the present 
criticism on the text of Lewis’s theological fantasy, The Screwtape Letters and even 
for this thesis as a whole about the literary apologetics in Lewis’s religious narratives, 
this reading guideline sounds tremendously important and meaningful.     
For one thing, it can be regarded as the same rationale underlying the present 
discussion as well as the whole thesis that actually deals firstly with the “literariness,” 
namely, the aesthetic and formal aspect, of Lewis’s imaginative and religious 
narratives, before moving to further interpretations of the apologetic concerns and 
hermeneutical indications embedded within his literary texts.  For another, Lewis’s 
disapproval of the kind of reading that tends to “mistake art either for life or for 
philosophy” or certain “patterns of belief ideas” provides a persuasive “reference 
point” for verifying the misreading of some critics who are apt to devalue Lewis’s 
literary works on account of their too heavy investments with traditional Christian 
theism.
112  Gunnar Urang, at least in some of his critique of C. S. Lewis’s 
fantasy-writing, is just a good example of such a critical leaning that insistently reads 
Lewis’s imaginative works, i.e., his fantasies, as but “instruments,” or means, used, or 
worse exploited, by Lewis to serve his apologetic and didactic ends.
113  However, 
such didacticism-oriented judgment actually fails to do justice to the literary practice 
of C. S. Lewis.  Perhaps, it is ironically true that the critic is undertaking the 
problematic exercise of reading through exploiting, or in Lewis’s words, “using 
                                                 
111  Lewis, Ibid, p. 84. 
112  Among those “hostile” readers, Harold Bloom can be a representative of “the literary figure” who 
posits himself as a reader of C. S. Lewis not approaching Lewis’s works in literary terms but basing his 
dismissive criticism on the fact that Lewis is a Christian writer.   
113  See Gunnar Urang, Shadows of Heaven: Religion and Fantasy in the Writing of C. S. Lewis, 
Charles Williams, and J. R. R. Tolkien (London: SCM Press Ltd, 1971).    Ch. 1 “C. S. Lewis: Fantasy 
and the Metaphysics of Faith.”    Pp.5-50. 
  80instead of receiving,” the object of criticism—essentially a work of literature, i.e. a 
piece of art. 
  After paying attention to the construction or the shape of the literary work, a 
good reader, of course, also needs to mind what is meant or conveyed within the text.   
After all, in an exquisitely designed literary text, form and content must be 
inseparably woven together, or in other words, artfully textualized.    On this account, 
although the valid reading of literature relies on following the foremost principle of 
“art for art’s sake,” it is equally an imperative for a sensible reader of literature to 
immerse his or her whole class of reading experience in not only the word play or 
rhetoric performance or formative construction but also the sense and meaning 
implanted between the lines, or voiced by the text itself.  Regarding how to enter 
into the thematic aspect of the textual space, that is, the realm of meaning invested in 
the author’s point of view, Lewis gives a relevant suggestion to the effect that the 
reader sometimes just has to suspend “his disbelief and (what is harder) his belief”
114 
so that he can prepare himself to “give the highest marks to the telling, felicitous and 
well-documented expositions of views”
115 which the author puts into the text.  That 
is to say, according to Lewis, the “literarily correct” reading should have nothing to do 
with the “problem of belief”
116 but have much to do with the question of the 
intermingling of meaning and the artistry  of  its  conveyance.         
Based on these imperatives for good readers of literature suggested by Lewis, the 
following investigation into the literary enterprise of Lewis the fantasist within his 
text of The Screwtape Letters is aimed at a temporary suspension of the issue of belief 
in the first place for the purpose of receiving and probing into not just what 
                                                 
114 Lewis,  An Experiment in Criticism, p. 68. 
115  Lewis, “On Misreading by the Literary,” An Experiment in Criticism, p. 86. 
116  In the same essay, “On Misreading by the Literary,” Lewis pronounces that “[i]n good reading there 
ought to be no’ problem of belief.”    Lewis, Ibid, p. 86.   
  81imaginative supposal is presented but also, more importantly, how it is textually and 
rhetorically packaged.    As far as the textuality of The Screwtape Letters is concerned, 
although this discussion intends to put much stress on the rhetoric of irony, 
presumably the most conspicuous rhetorical device of the text, yet it does not mean to 
approach the fantasy without recognizing other significant components of its textual 
shape.  By and large, Lewis’s writing of this fantasy is featured by its particular 
texture of the intermingling of the elements of the fantastic and the realistic in the 
delineation basically of the faith journey—on its daily basis—of an individual 
Christian, indeed a new convert, who is unconsciously, or, whose consciousness is, 
under malign and tactical manoeuvre of a diabolic tempter, the character of, so to 
speak, an under-worldly supernatural soul-minder.  Noticeably, the fantastical 
element is referred to the presence of the supernatural existence of the devils and their 
dark business—contending for human souls.  Besides, in this text on diabolical 
temptation, Lewis’s fantastical imagination is most significantly oriented toward 
disclosing fictively the spiritual reality of temptation to such an effect that certain 
metaphysical truth not only about the existence of the devil but also about the identity 
of human being and even about the reality of the Divine is given expression or alluded 
to.   
But, in Lewis’s fictional and fantastical world of temptation, the metaphysical 
realm of truth does not stand alone in representation or signification.  It is, in fact, 
inter-mixed with the truth, especially in psychological aspect, that pertains to the 
mundane realities of the human existence, specifically, the real life of faith an 
ordinary human person leads in the temporal world.  In other words, the element of 
the fantastic, manifested through the presence of the supernatural and the significance 
of metaphysics, is set against the element of the realistic.  The notion of realism 
brought forth here to counter-balance the textual element of supernaturalism that 
  82Lewis’s fantasy is invested with requires further explanation.  To clarify what the 
realistic means, we can, again, turn to the viewpoints of Lewis the literary critic.   In 
“On Realism,” another essay included in An Experiment in Criticism, Lewis 
distinguishes two senses of realism as a literary term—“realism of presentation” and 
“realism of content.”    Firstly, he disapproves both of the demand of modern taste for 
“superficial realism,” using “truth to life,” in a literal and superficial sense, as the 
criteria of fiction, and of the related tendency to disparage such pre-modern literary 
categories as “the romantic, the idyllic, and the fantastic.”  This double objection is 
followed by his assertion that the criteria of so-called “truth to life” do not rely on the 
fact that the content has everything that is possible to happen in real life.  As for 
what can be justly named “truth to life” in good fiction, Lewis’s own claim is made in 
the following description: 
 
 
For those who tell the story and those    . . . who receive it    . . . [a]ttention 
is fixed on something concrete and individual; on the more than ordinary 
terror, splendour, wonder, pity, or absurdity of  a  particular  case.  .  .  .     
   When such stories are well done we usually get what may be called 
hypothetical probability—what would be probable if the initial situation 
occurred.
117  
   
 
From this passage, we may infer that to Lewis, the synonym of just and sound realism 
in fiction is the “hypothetical probability” manifested by the fictional context that has 
particularity as its character.    This theory about realism in fiction, in fact, is fittingly 
applicable to the realistic element of the text of The Screwtape Letters.  Focused 
upon an individual human’s practical life, including both external (involving other 
persons or worldly affairs, such as the Second World War) and internal (psychological 
                                                 
117 Lewis,  An Experiment in Criticism, p. 64-65.   
  83and spiritual) activities, Lewis’s fantasy indeed represents certain truthful situations 
regarding a particular self’s religious experiences set in the backdrop of his everyday 
life and the mundane world.       
Moreover, related with the realistic respect of this fantastical text is another 
textual characteristic, namely, the double vision of reality—of the supernatural and of 
the self.  As will be further illustrated in the later part of this analysis, this twofold 
reality is manifested by a sort of inter-personal relationship involving the human 
creature, whose state of mind or subjective consciousness is, in reality though 
unknowingly, under certain impact of the temptation of the devil that is engaged in 
perpetual conflict with its supreme Adversary, the Creator, over the human soul.    The 
scenario of such an inter-relationship, or as it were, the triangle of the human self, the 
devil and God, bespeaks a dynamic, instead of static, picture of spiritual reality.      In 
view of the interactive relationship between the supernatural and the individual person, 
it can be held that the double vision of reality, in effect, imbues the texutality of the 
narrative with a sense of dynamism.  As once commented by Chad Walsh, a 
dedicated critic and admirer of C. S. Lewis’s works, within Lewis’s “as if worlds,” 
that is, the literarily hypothetical worlds made up through his fantastical or “magical” 
imagination, “[w]hat had been a static faith [i.e. traditional truth] becomes a dynamic 
one.”
118   In fact, not just the textuality of faith-related narratives (not the mere 
doctrine of faith) but also the textuality of faith per se, especially in terms of its 
epistemology or empirical applicability, ought to be of dynamism.      After all, in the 
real world, the reality of faith cannot be separated from the subjective and existential 
experience of the particular individual.    The element of the realistic together with the 
interaction between objective reality and subjective reality in the text of Lewis’s 
fantasy bespeaks the fact that Lewis’s fantastical imagination is, on the one hand, 
                                                 
118  Chad Walsh, “C. S. Lewis: Critic, Creator and Cult Figure,” p. 79. 
  84fundamentally concerned with traditional belief in transcendental reality out there, 
and on the other hand, it is significantly oriented to the reality existentially 
experienced here and now within the self.     
As regards the textual shape of Lewis’s fantasy of temptation in terms of rhetoric, 
the present examination aims to scrutinize a texture of intricacy related with the 
discourse of irony.  Concerning the relevance of ironic discourse to Lewis’s 
fantastical supposal of the reality of temptation, the question could be tackled in 
various  respects.  Structurally, the text of The Screwtape Letters is apparently written 
in the epistolary form characteristic of its ironic inversion of representing the 
“psychology of temptation”
119 from the point of view of the devil—the Hellish 
tempter of human soul—whose agency is predicated on its antagonistic position 
against God, the Enemy of the devil and yet the loving Creator of the human.  
Textually speaking, the rhetorical form of irony gives rise to a literary discourse (on 
temptation, on the spiritual triangle and on identity or subjectivity) far more 
complicated than the reversed perspective and expression of the spiritual reality of 
temptation.  The ironically inversed account of temptation—how it actually works 
and spiritually means from the evil tempter’s eye and mouth—certainly holds up a 
useful and revealing mirror for reflecting the weak, dark and even absurd sides of 
human selfhood in an objective way.  Just as pronounced by Lewis himself in his 
new “Preface” for the 1961 edition of the book, the purpose of writing these demonic 
epistles is “to throw light from a new angle on the life of man.”    However, it can be 
evidenced that within Lewis’s text the ironic plays a more significant role in the 
structure of meaning, much deeper and subtler than a mere rhetorical means of 
                                                 
119  In a letter written to his brother, Warren Lewis, dated 20 July 1940 and cited in C. S Lewis: A 
Biography by Roger Lancelyn Green and Walter Hooper (Glasgow: William Collins Sons & Co Ltd, 
1974), Lewis told of the ideas he came up with which became the gist and intent of his writing of The 
Screwtape Letters: “I was struck by an idea for a book which I think might be both useful and 
entertaining.    It would be called ‘As one Devil to another’    . . . The idea would be to give all the 
psychology of temptation from the other point of view.”    P. 191.   
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fantastical invention of these diabolic writings on the art of temptation textually 
complex in that the whole text is thereby endowed with multi-layered meanings.     
Comprising by a series of the infernal correspondence written single-handedly 
by Screwtape, a retired senior devil, to exhort and sometimes admonish his young 
nephew, a tyro tempter, the ironically-inversed demon-dominated narrative could be 
treated textually and rhetorically as a text of ironic discourse, which is, in itself, 
meaningful at many levels.    To wrestle with the manifold signification of the rhetoric 
of irony or the ironic discourse within Lewis’s fantasy-narrative, the most prominent 
issue, also one of the primary concerns of this study, is the question of subjectivity.  
It is generally held that subjectivity is a question inherent in the act of irony.  
Kierkegaard, for instance, approaches the rhetoric of irony in terms of its relationship 
with the speaking subject.  In The Concept of Irony, he defines irony as a 
“determination of subjectivity,”
120 which according to Kierkegaard is a determination 
of the subject to be “negatively free” by meaning not or the opposite of what is said so 
as to retain the subject’s independence of any “actuality,” including the “relation to 
others” and the relation to one’s self.  Noticeably, in Kierkegaard’s conception, 
emerging from the performance of irony is the disjunction not simply between 
“phenomenon” (words) and “essence” (meaning) but also between the rhetoric (irony) 
and the existential (the self) and even reality (actuality).   Basically correspondent 
with Kierkegaard’s existentialist thinking about irony, Paul de Man proclaims in his 
noted essay, “The Rhetoric of Temporality,” that irony is essentially “a problem that 
exists within the self.”
121  Similarly, to an extent echoing both Kierkegaard and de 
Man, David Jasper in Rhetoric, Power and Community describes irony as “[e]ndlessly 
                                                 
120 Kierkegaard,  The Concept of Irony, p. 279. 
121  Paul de Man, “The Rhetoric of Temporality,” Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of 
Contemporary Criticism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, [1971] 1983), p. 211. 
  86self-reflexive, engag[ing] in perpetual redescription of established beliefs and 
assumptions in order to break free from their power.”
122    In this rigorous description, 
perhaps it is the very notion of “established beliefs” that could distinguish Jasper’s 
ideation from the theories of the other two, especially de Man’s purely literary 
perspective.  Jasper actually speaks of irony in the context of the tradition of 
Christian theology; therefore, we could infer that the Kierkegaardian notion of 
“actuality,” in Jasper’s understanding, is referred, even more directly than 
Kierkegaard, to the belief system of Christianity.    Associated with religious meaning 
or not, the three thinkers of the rhetoric of irony all underscore the connection 
between irony and the problem of self, despite their different stresses—with 
Kierkegaard putting on existential truth, de Man on the question of “temporality” and 
Jasper on the inquiry into “textuality.”  Therefore, their insights on irony in relation 
to the self / subjectivity are all valuable conceptual references to the present 
investigation into the discourse of irony within the text(s) of Lewis’s theological 
fantasy. 
Regarding how the self / subject is related to the manifold meanings of the 
ironical form of Lewis’s exploring the supernatural and existential reality of 
temptation and also his manifesting the spiritual triangle—the interpersonal 
relationship between the human, the devil and God, the very important and intriguing 
question to consider would be: who is ironic at all and by virtue of which subject’s 
standard?  This is actually a question not only of the rhetoric but also of theological 
investment and of interpretation.  The rest of this investigation is oriented toward 
dealing with such a comprehensive inquiry.  It is mainly because the question is 
relevant to and indeed crucial to fulfill the threefold purposes of the present study: to 
                                                 
122  Jasper, “Postmodernism, Rhetoric and Irony: Another Modest Proposal,” Rhetoric, Power and 
Community, p. 126. 
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fantasy; to receive the conveyance of Lewis’s theological or apologetic ideas through 
the ironic form of expression; finally, to reflect on the kind of hermeneutical 
enterprise that the apologetic fantasist may engage in himself or presuppose his 
readers to engage in the ironical negotiation between supernatural reality and 
existential self, between art and religion.     
As far as the text of those Screwtape’s epistles are concerned, it is definitely 
dominated by the devil’s point of view from which human beings, represented by the 
individual target of temptation concerned, are marked by their physical, mental and 
spiritual defectiveness and weakness, all the contemptible and vulnerable traits to be 
exploited for temptation and damnation.    In the demonic tempter’s eye, the tendency 
of what they call “human animals” or “earth-born vermins” to fall short of true 
knowledge of either them selves or of supernatural reality is caused by their being 
psychologically maneuverable and spiritually blind and as a result ridiculously prone 
to turn their mind to vicious trivialities while bypassing the point of living out a 
fruitful life out of (Christian) faith.   It can thus be inferred that from the perspective 
of the devil, the human self exists in an ironical state in the sense that human creatures 
may think they are leading a life truthful to their existence, but in reality the opposite 
is often true.   Ultimately, it is this ironical state of being of human life that the 
inverted point of view of the whole text of fantasy, belonging exclusively to the devil, 
is looking at, or worse, making fun of.      Indeed, the tactics of temptation Screwtape 
admonishes to his inexperienced nephew are based on their human patient’s too little 
understanding (compared with the knowledge of devils, the “pure spirits”) of who he 
really is to build sound relationships with others, including their fellow creatures and 
their divine Creator, who, according to the knowledgeable Screwtape as well as the 
revelation of (Christian) faith, is unreasonably loving to the humans.     
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ironical fear of death.    For the devil, this human phenomenon—the prevalent fear of 
death—is ridiculously ironical because it evidences the fact that humans are foolish 
enough to be cheated, indeed tempted, to believe that death is intimidating and 
thereby become pathetically fearful and unaware that they are created not just as 
mortals but spiritually as eternal beings as well.  The reality that the devil can see 
while human “amphibians” (“half spirit and half animal”) (44) fail to perceive is 
actually quite opposite to the mortal’s conception or imagination.    According to what 
Screwtape points out to his junior apprentice, from a spiritual perspective, “to Him 
[the Enemy, i.e. God] human birth is important chiefly as the qualification for human 
death, and death solely as the gate to that other kind of life” (145).  Compared with 
the human’s deficient and fallacious understanding of the genuine nature or destiny of 
their being, the devil, therefore, seems not incorrectly conscious of their perceptional 
superiority and also of the fact that they stand in a vantage point to blind the human 
mind to a greater extent and undermine their faith, if applicable, by taking the 
advantage of the human “amphibian’s” contemptibly insufficient and untruthful 
knowledge about what they (humans) are (up to) in terms of either the spiritual truth 
grasped by the devils or the religious faith as revealed to the humans.     
In addition to the temptation of fearfulness toward death, humans are, to 
Screwtape, amusingly susceptible to many other psychological pitfalls, some of which 
are emotional vices, such as cowardice, hatred or despair.  To the infernal tempters, 
whose “real business” is “undermining faith and preventing the formation of virtues” 
(30), human vices of this kind, that is, psychological weakness and temptability, are 
certainly to be made good use of, or in Screwtape’s words, to be guided “into the right 
channels” (147).  For instance, in Letter XXIX, Screwtape instructs his nephew 
Wormwood that the preferable policy to tempt the English “patient” when he is 
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Germans is to damn his emotional self.  To put in another way, the scheme of 
demonic temptation for such a wartime situation is to deprave the human patient’s 
selfhood through manipulating his psychology, which, according to Screwtape, is to 
be done at the least cost of evoking the patient’s conscience or self-awareness.  
Based on this principle, Screwtape advises his nephew to handle the English man’s 
natural feeling of “hatred of the Germans” as effectively as possible.  Besides, to 
achieve the best effect from manipulating the emotion of hatred is to mix it with fear, 
e.g. doing away with courage and becoming a coward.  In Screwtape’s following 
account of such emotion-mixed tactics of temptation, it is strongly indicated that the 
human self can just be easily victimized psychologically and spiritually as well under 
the devil’s shrewd scrutiny and manipulation of their feeling hearts: 
  
  
    But hatred is best combined with Fear.    Cowardice, alone for all the vices,   
is purely painful—horrible to anticipate, horrible to feel, horrible to 
remember; Hatred has its pleasures.    It is therefore often the compensation    
by which a frightened man reimburses himself for the miseries of Fear.  
The More he fears, the more he will hate.  And Hatred is also a great 
anodyne for shame.  To make a deep wound in his charity, you should 
therefore first defeat his courage. 
   Now this is a ticklish business.  We have made men proud of most 
vices, but not of cowardice.    Whenever we have almost succeeded in doing 
so, the Enemy permits a war or an earthquake or some other calamity, and at 
once courage becomes so obviously lovely and important even in human 
eyes that all our work is undone, . . . The danger of inducing cowardice in 
our patients, therefore, is lest we produce real self-knowledge and 
self-loathing with consequent repentance and humility.    And in fact, in the 
last war, thousands of humans by discovering their own cowardice 
discovered the whole moral world for the first time.      .    .    . 
      It is therefore possible to lose as much as we gain by making your man a 
coward; he may learn too much about himself!    There is, of course, always 
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producing Despair.  This would be a great triumph.  … But I fear you 
have already let him get too far in the Enemy’s school, and he knows that 
Despair is a greater sin than any of the  sins  which  provoke  it.    (148-149)  
 
 
Noticeably, in this letter full of subtle understanding of the human mind together with 
cunning plans to manoeuvre it, a demonstration of Screwtape’s tremendous mastery of 
the psychology of temptation, the human self, specifically its psyche, seems to be 
reduced by the master-tempter as merely a psychological “plaything” to be 
manipulated, de-moralized and thereby turned “ungodly.”    It is also made very plain 
that from the devil’s point of view, the collective impact of the worldly warfare upon 
the human world counts nothing except on the individual soul’s psychic and faithful 
lives, which are so closely co-related that are meant to be attacked, i.e. tempted, 
simultaneously.   
  Furthermore, what is subtly noteworthy and interesting in Screwtape’s strategic 
admonition, though perhaps not particularly so to his hellish reader, is the ambivalent 
undertone of Screwtape, implying that however exploitable and advantageous the 
emotional malleability of the human self can be to the evil tempter, the whole 
business of temptation to contend for the human soul still has to face the counterforce 
from the treacherous devil’s Enemy, i.e., God.      Such a spiritual contention between 
the devil and God over the humans bespeaks the signification of the triangular 
relationship of the human, the demonic tempter and God, who, in the context of 
morality, is suggested by Screwtape to be the supreme minder of the human soul.    In 
other words, within the very lectures on the know-how of temptation given by the 
penetratingly strategic and arrogantly perceptive advisor of the hell, there seems to be 
a sub-text about the facthood of the dynamic drama of tripartite interaction between 
man, devil and God, of which the script could be just beyond the devil narrator’s 
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apprentice how easily they can channel human psychology to a ridiculous and ironic 
extent to let human beings make fool of themselves.  For instance, humans tend (to 
be tempted) to mix the vicious feeling of hatred with an ostensible, self-cheating sense 
of “charity,” which means to believe that their hatred is felt on behalf of others and so 
exempted from the religious and moral imperative to forgive  the  enemies.   Besides, 
instead of generating a religious sense of humility, their self-loathing feeling is prone 
to become the demonically favorable yet truly sinful state of Despair.    Nevertheless, 
despite the evidence of the temptability of human psyche, Screwtape cannot but give a 
hint that the devil’s work, in reality, is either risky or extremely tough due to the 
Enemy God’s supply of moral antidotes for (hellish) vices to the ironic and vulnerable 
humans, including (godly) virtues, e.g., forgiveness, courage, humility and so on, and 
even God Himself.  That is why toward the end of Letter XXIX Screwtape stresses 
the important principle of tempting human’s feeling self—“to keep him feeling that he 
has something  . . . to fall back on” (150), be it “superstitions” or “charity” or even 
himself—in order that he may not turn to or rely on any religious “antidotes” as 
provided  by  the  Enemy.     
In view of this “ambivalence” about the extent to which the devil’s purpose of 
tempting humans against the Enemy (God) can be successfully achieved, it is 
tempting for us outside-the-text readers to read these diabolic epistles with some 
suspicion—mainly about Screwtape’s discourse which is obviously as well as 
malignly grounded on the devil’s strong sense of superiority over human amphibians.   
To push this readerly suspicion further, we (human readers) may as well re-approach 
the text by reversing the upside-down point of view that belongs to the devil.  If, 
when firstly approaching Screwtape’s text—an arrogantly rendered discourse on the 
contemptibility and temptability of human beings, we follow C. S. Lewis’s advice on 
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self-aggrandizing and human-humiliating discourse on temptation, we now might 
suspend this initial suspension and re-read the kind of ambivalent Screwtape with 
such possible interrogations as follows:  Are humans alone the substantially ironical 
beings even in the devil’s discourse on temptation?  How about the demonic 
articulator, so proud of its devil-hood (as “pure spirits”) and its power to victimize the 
human patient with the hope of totally, if only gradually, demolishing his Christian 
faith even if its perpetual, determined struggle against God is but “crippled” in certain 
sense?    In what sense, then, can we read Screwtape, the tactful master of temptation 
and the very deliverer of the ironic ridicule on the susceptibility of the earth-bound or 
self-bound human beings to temptation, as another ironic creature (without knowing 
it,) right in its own “ironic discourse” targeted at the despicably ironic “human 
animals”?    In another word, how can we say the ironic discourse within Screwtape’s 
epistle writing is essentially a discourse of double irony after all?       
Textually speaking, “appearing” to be the text on the subject of temptation and 
humanity, the Screwtape letters undoubtedly stand in the position of dominant 
discourse within which the humans rather than the devils are, rhetorically speaking, 
ironized.  Nevertheless, no matter how revealingly or undeniably, under the devil’s 
penetrating and extremely disdainful scrutiny, humanity bears considerable traces of 
ridiculous follies or vices or habits of mind, such as the propensity (to be tempted) to 
make “the World an end and the faith a means” (42) and focus on the “ordinariness of 
things” (14) and thus discard the intangible and invisible realities about their souls 
and about God, it remains legitimate for us (human) readers to ask a simple, 
hermeneutical, if not theological, question—Whose discourse is such ironic writing?  
If the authorship is explicitly the devil, then, who is the devil, at least within its own 
text?      These are actually different ways to wrestle with the same question—Who is 
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From a critical reader’s / interpreter’s point of view (belonging to humans of 
course), it is equally indisputable that the discourse about the human’s ironic state of 
being articulated by the devil-character is, in itself, a man-made narrative.    That is to 
say, humans, the very object of temptation as well as the laughingstock of the devil, 
stand at the same time of either writing or reading the narrative outside the text. On 
the contrary, the identity of the devil as the speaking subject who predominates the 
discourse of irony within the text of the infernal letters still has to be subjected both to 
the invention, e.g., characterization, of the behind-the-scene human writer and to the 
examination and critique of the outside-the-text human readers.  Therefore, the 
question about who is who within the text and context of the ironic discourse is 
noticeably more complicated than it seems on the surface.  Also, by raising such a 
critical question, a subjectivity-concerned inquiry, the reception of Screwtape’s ironic 
discourse becomes an exercise of double inversing the point of view that the text of 
irony is dependent on.  In this sense, to decide who is the spoken object of ironic 
ridicule and who is the speaking subject controlling the ironic discourse is clearly not 
a question merely of textuality but also of literary hermeneutics indeed. 
  To figure out, at least to approach in literary criticism, the complicated and, in 
some sense, dynamically unstable situation of the subject-object interchange involved 
with the ironic discourse which can itself be taken from different points of view, we 
may turn to some illuminating ideas of Paul de Man the literary theorist, especially his 
in-depth exposition about the notion of the “plurality of subjects.”  In one of the 
chapters of his book, Blindness and Insight, dealing with the topic of self-reflective 
consciousness in the act of literary creation, de Man analyzes the multiple selves in 
literary studies as follows: 
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In the study of literature, the question of the self appears in a bewildering 
network of often contradictory relationships among a plurality of subjects.  
It appears first of all, as in the Third Critique of Kant, in the act of judgment 
that takes place in the mind of the reader; it appears next in the apparently 
intersubjective relationships that are established between the author and the 
reader; it governs the intentional relationship that exists, within the work, 
between the constitutive subject and the constitutive language; it can be 
sought, finally, in the relationship that the subject establishes, through the 
mediation of the work, with itself.  From the start, we have at least four 
possible and distinctive types of the self: the self that judges, the self that 




This profound theory of de Man’s concerning the plural subjects co-existent in the 
textual space can definitely shed light on, although it reinforces rather than lessens, 
the complexity of the hermeneutics of irony that the present criticism is engaged with, 
i.e. the critical task of discussing and determining who is ironic according to whose 
say.  Just as what de Man rigorously explicates above, there is indeed a multiplicity 
of subjects or selves at work, even through interplay between each other, to construct 
the distinctively complex structure of meaning in the context of interpreting The 
Screwtape Letters, Lewis’s ironically inversed narrative of temptation.  In the light 
of de Man’s ideas about the manifold types of literary subject, it is firstly confirmed 
that the very act of either performance or interpretation of the ironic discourse is 
inter-related with subjective consciousness.  The question, then, goes back to the 
point of making a decision about whose subjective consciousness or 
self-understanding the play of irony is concerned with, whether in rhetorical, textual 
or  interpretative  terms.   
Besides, one is reminded of the textual nature of irony as a rhetorical act, what 
                                                 
123  Paul de Man, “Ludwig Binswager and the Sublimation of the Self,” Blindness and Insight, p. 39.     
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the persuasive power of the authoritative text which is stabilized by “established 
beliefs and assumption.”  And it is precisely this “inherently unstable and 
destabilizing” nature of irony that, according to Jasper, brings into play the “principle 
of intratextuality,” speaking of the “energetically” deconstructive functioning of irony 
to “work against its own narrative discourse and against its own textuality,” which 
accordingly brings about “a text within a text” lying in “the deep structure of the text” 
of the “surface discourse.”
124  Enlightened  by  this  literary conception of the principle 
of intratextuality of irony, we, so to speak, the outside readers of Screwtape’s text, 
may modify our inquiries not simply into this infernal epistler’s ironic discourse but 
further into the text within or underlying it, by asking such questions: In what sense or 
terms is the structure of meaning of the devil’s ironic discourse against mankind 
turned upside down, that is, becoming its own self-deconstructing discourse?  What 
does this self-alienating intra-text have to do with any theological implication about 
devil-hood and about the spiritual triangle mentioned above?  With these two 
questions concerning not only textuality or intratextuality but also the theological 
investment embedded within the ironic inversion of Lewis’s fantasy about diabolic 
temptation, the discussion would turn more clearly toward combining literary 
criticism of the rhetoric of irony and hermeneutical unravelling of the ironic discourse 
with the religious exploration of C. S Lewis’s apologetic enterprise in The Screwtape 
Letters.   
  That the devil, as agency of either tempting the human self into degenerated or 
lost faith or constructing an ironic discourse to deprecate humanity, is really a captive 
of double irony can be testified in more than one sense.   In terms of textuality, 
                                                 
124  See David Jasper’s discussion on irony and “intratextuality” in Rhetoric, Power and Community, p. 
126-133. 
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for human creatures and defiance against the divine Creator, can never escape from 
being entrapped by the self-reflexivity of the rhetoric of irony.    As regards the sense 
in which the devil himself becomes a self-reflexively ironical figure betrayed by the 
very textuality of irony Screwtape, in the act of writing on temptation, projects onto 
the being of the human patient, it is an issue not concerned with the rhetoric alone but 
invested with theological signification and also involved with a hermeneutical 
exercise.  From a theological perspective, the issue can be approached by asking a 
simple and basic question—who is the devil, the “real” identity of the tempter 
“collaged” (to readers) between the lines and in the context of the devil’s ironic 
discourse within the Screwtape letters?  As far as hermeneutics is concerned, the 
theological approach to identifying the devil-hood underlying the text is based on the 
reader’s suspension in the process of interpretation, if appropriate, of belief in the 
devil’s viewpoints or even, when necessary, of disbelief in the mere existence of the 
devil  in  the  spiritual  world.    
In fact, without suspension of belief or disbelief as such, neither the religious 
meaning nor the author’s (Lewis’s) apologetic implication can be given rise to in the 
act of reading Lewis’s or Screwtape’s text of these temptation-concerned letters.  
After all, textuality, implied or so-called smuggled theology, and the reader’s 
reception or “hermeneutical exercise” inspired (or maybe enforced) by the text must 
be inter-related to a well-coordinated extent so that the (artistic) work of literature can 
be meaningful for enjoyment and also for heuristic or didactic purpose.   Actually, 
the inter-relationship between the literary / rhetorical construction of the work, the 
surplus meaning yielded by theological association or what this study holds as the 
apologetic enterprise, and the indispensable element of the reader’s 
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125 can be regarded as a fundamental guideline of the “hermeneutics 
of art,” as maintained by the two hermeneutical thinkers, Ricoeur and Gadamer.  In 
this regard, Gadamer sounds perfectly convincing and also echoes Lewis’s critical 
views to some extent when he asserts, “in the experience of art we must learn how to 
dwell upon the work in a specific way” so that the work of art would “display its 
manifold riches to us.”
126  To explain what this means, Gadamer uses the art of 
architecture as an example (similar to Lewis’s instance of sculpture), suggesting that 
to fully appreciate it one has to “go up to the building, … both inside and out,” 
otherwise there is no way to really sense “what the work holds in store for us and 
allows it to enhance our feeling for life.”    In terms of this Gadamerian hermeneutical 
principle, we can be confirmed of the validity of dwelling upon the textual space of 
Lewis’s  The Screwtape Letters through going both into and outside its rhetoric 
performance (i.e. irony) and faithfully, if only temporarily, acknowledging its 
theological  preoccupations.   
However, it should be emphasized that such a cross-disciplinary approach, 
literary and theological, to Lewis’s imaginative and religious text does not in the least 
mean to endorse the critical view of Urang, who criticizes the “pervasive weakness” 
of C. S. Lewis as a literary writer of Christian apologetics in leaning too heavily on 
traditional theism and supernaturalism.  Not really convincingly, Urang holds 
Lewis’s “overemphasis” upon the “convictions about transcendence and the 
supernatural help” as the latter’s, as it were, “creative / literary incorrectness” on 
account of the tendency not merely to “baptize” but more keenly to “confirm” his 
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of belief or disbelief in the devils and recommends that either the obstinate disbelievers (such as 
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9.   
126  Both this and the following citations are derived from Gadamer’s essay “The Relevance of the 
Beautiful,” The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays, p. 45. 
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127  Yet, whether baptized or confirmed, it must be to some 
degree dependent on the reader’s participation in the whole play of literary 
imagination / creation so that the literary work can be resonantly meaningful, for 
entertainment or for persuasion or whatsoever.  Rather  than  any  intrusive  imposition 
of traditionalist persuasion based on Lewis’s own faith, what is more likely 
presupposed by C. S. Lewis’s authorship and his creative text is the free play of the 
imagination which demands a certain extent of self-forgetting on either the author’s or 
the reader’s part, although it must at the same time involve some kind of subjective 
preoccupation from the author, the reader and even the text itself.  In view of this, 
Urang’s criticism of Lewis’s literary apologetic—simplistically focused on “the 
problem of belief” that Lewis’s fantasies are presumably involved with—appears to 
be too narrow-minded as a reading or critical perspective.       
  In fact, reductively and heavily relying on the textual and, above all, authorial 
preoccupation with religious belief, Urang’s critique even goes so far as to suggest 
that Lewis uses literary fantasy to serve his end of apologetics just as his 
devil-character Screwtape’s tactic of exploiting the tremendous impact of “fantasy” 
upon and thereby “manipulating” the mind of the (human) “patient.”  Such a 
far-fetched suggestion is explicitly made in the quotation below:   
   
 
The value of fantasy in relation to belief is hinted at in one of Screwtape’s 
admonishments to the junior tempter.  “Think of your young man,” 
Screwtape writes, 
  As a series of concentric circles, his will being the innermost, his intellect coming 
next, and finally his fantasy.  You  . . . must keep on shoving all the virtues 
outward till they are finally located in the circle of fantasy, and all the desirable 
qualities inward toward the will [p. 37].       
Lewis’s way, too, is to work on the fantasy, with the hope of influencing the 
                                                 
127 Urang,  Shadows of Heaven, p. 38. 
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128 
 
The association Urang draws here between Lewis the fantasist’s apologetic strategy 
and Screwtape the demonic tempter’s tricky way of playing “puppet” of the human 
patient’s mind is worth giving a second thought—in terms of irony.  Under the 
presupposition that the text of The Screwtape Letters be read as an ironic discourse 
concerning human selfhood under the rein of diabolic temptation, Urang’s critical 
proposition in question sounds ambiguously ironical.  In one sense, he seems to 
suggest that Lewis the creator of the devil-epistler is actually of his devil-character’s 
party in fulfilling his apologetic intent of moving the reader’s inner being, especially 
the mindset to believe by means of fantasy.    In other words, Lewis becomes really an 
ironic fantasist of diabolic temptation, because, according to Urang, either his 
medium—fantasy—or his purpose of writing—apologetic persuasion—are in line 
with the devil’s cheat which Lewis supposedly seeks to warn his readers against.    
In another sense, we may argue, on the contrary, that it is not the author but the critic 
who is really ironical.   In his attempt to assimilate Lewis with the Underworld 
admonisher—the devil, Urang simply confuses the different meanings of fantasy for 
the devil’s business of temptation and for Lewis’s apologetic enterprise, one 
signifying wishful thinking while the other refers to a literary form of writing.   In 
Urang’s ironical reading, the two senses of fantasy become curiously, perhaps 
deliberately, identified. 
Following his ironical association, Urang goes on his inquiries about the place of 
fantasy in The Screwtape Letters, seemingly from the perspective of literary criticism 
yet really out of his prioritization of the apologetic meaning within Lewis’s fantastical 
text and also grounded on his assumption that fantasy “enters the story only as a 
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129  Nevertheless, 
he does impressively raise an intriguing question definitely worth thinking over here: 
“Is the fantasy meant to point only to subjective moral reality, or is it also intended to 
image objective supernatural reality?”
130  This interrogation of Urang’s about 
fantasy as a form of embodying subjectivity or supernaturality sounds tremendously 
pointed and bears some relevance to the reading this study is engaged with. 
Although Urang himself does not seem to “bother” to give his answer in his quick 
review of The Screwtape Letters, it can actually be inferred from his general assertion 
that the power of supernatural entities are highlighted and capitalized in Lewis’s 
fantastical world, while human subjectivity is relatively belittled, or, underrated.  
Basically, unlike Urang’s somewhat polarized understanding of Lewis’s (fantastical) 
treatment of subjective and objective realities, what the present interpretation of The 
Screwtape Letters, as well as later of The Great Divorce, intends to thematize is more 
synthetic as well as sympathetic in orientation.    As previously pointed out, this study 
reads C. S. Lewis’s fantasy as a text concerned ultimately with the relationship 
between selfhood and reality, between (human) existence and supernaturality, a 
certain kind of interactive relationship envisioned and manifested through literary 
imagination and translated through the rhetorical performance within the texts.  In 
other words, the subjective / the existential and the objective / the supernatural—the 
twofold senses of “reality”—are held to be correlated in the fantasy of Lewis without 
the question of one given a privileged status at the expense o
 
f the other.     
                                                
In  The Screwtape Letters, the correlation between the double-dimensioned 
realities, i.e., in Urang’s terms, “the subjective moral reality” and “the objective 
supernatural reality,” can be illustrated from different angles, just as the ironic 
 
129 Urang,  Ibid, p. 8. 
130 Urang,  Ibid, p. 9. 
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conspicuous example is the relationship between the subjectivity of human existence 
and the supernatural reality occupied by the evil force / source of temptation, namely, 
the existence of the devil.  As mentioned previously, this devil-human relationship 
must be viewed as part of a broader spiritual reality of the triangle among man, devil 
and God.  The category of subjectivity, from this perspective, should comprehend 
not only human selfhood but also devil-hood and even Godhead.    In this sense, what 
is objective becomes only a relativized term.  Indeed, from the devil’s angle, the 
subjective existence of human being, whether in the respect of soul or mind or simply 
body, is objectified as something that can be manoeuvred, tempted and ultimately 
consumed.  According to the infernal viewpoint—a mixture of the devils’ sense of 
being pure spirits and thus superior to human existence and their contemptuous 
attitude toward various kinds of human fallibilities which in the tempter’s eye can be 
easily turned into lapse or isolation from faith (in God), the subjectivity of humans is, 
rhetorically speaking, ironically  defined by Screwtape, the author of the infernal 
discourse about the art of temptation and also a negative ontology of mankind.  In 
the light of Screwtape’s “ironic discourse,” humans are ontologically born as 
amphibians (half spirit, half animal)—an identity that speaks for their ironic nature of 
being.  The sense of irony in humans’ state of being can be inferred by the part the 
human self plays in the spiritual triangle.  As disclosed by Screwtape’s marvellous 
spiritual insight, humans are created to be free subjects, spiritually free to respond to 
the wooing of their loving Creator (God) in their own ways; however, as moral beings 
or in psychic lives, they can be—to the devil’s satisfaction and 
amusement—vulnerable and malleable to such an extent that existentially they are at 
the same time not free from becoming the easy targets and victims of diabolic 
temptation.  That is to say, even if they are predestined to be free and become the 
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simply and also ironically subjected to the  devil’s  ridicule  and  manipulation.     
  How, then, about the subjective reality of the devil?    Is devil-hood an absolutely 
free entity—free to wage war against God out of its hopeless sense of self-importance, 
free to make a fool and victim out of a fallible human “patient” and yet free from 
being caught by the rhetoric of mockery, that is, being betrayed by the very act of 
irony—the uncontrollably self-reflexive speech act that might backfire to victimize 
the speech-maker, i.e., the devil itself?    From the angle of the human reader, (with of 
course naturally inferior spiritual perception,) underlying the ironic discourse of 
Screwtape can actually be detected such a self-betraying double irony.  In other 
words, like any rhetorical practice of irony, Screwtape’s contemptuous remarks 
against humans are inevitably double-edged—not only capable of exposing the truth 
about human selfhood but also devil-revealing and therefore, in a heuristic (and 
apologetic) sense, entertaining and useful.   In addition to the detached reader’s 
angle, the possibility of re-examining the devil’s selfhood along with re-reading its 
ironic discourse in a deconstructive approach can be associated with the enterprise of 
the real author of these diabolic letters, namely, C. S. Lewis the fantasy writer of The 
Screwtape Letters.      
In fact, it is discernible that through his ironic inversion of having a senior devil 
articulating an ironic discourse for revealing certain truths about human life, Lewis, 
certainly no less sharp-witted than the tactful Screwtape, actually manages to 
interpolate the surface text belonging to Screwtape with some penetrating ironic 
twists which aim to provoke rhetorical, theological and hermeneutical backfire against 
the identity of the devil constructed within Screwtape’s letters.  In terms of this, we 
may reasonably surmise that Lewis’s intention, not only literary but also apologetic, in 
making up these infernal letters full of diabolic hostility and contempt toward humans 
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in biblical words, “we may not be outwitted by Satan; for we are not ignorant of his 
designs” (2 Corinthians 2:11).  This intended double ironic inversion of Lewis’s 
writing is actually hinted at by the epigraphs in front of the whole book, in which 
Lewis cites both Luther’s and Thomas More’s suggestions about exorcism—to heap 
scorn upon the devils, for it is simply unbearable to them.
131    
  Concerning how devil-hood is defined or deconstructed by the double irony 
underlying the text of Screwtape’s ironic discourse and also how the intra-discourse 
about the devil’s selfhood is related with the apologetic and hermeneutical enterprises 
that not merely Lewis the fantasy writer is engaged with but the reader should also 
participate in, the correlation between subjective reality and supernatural / spiritual 
reality, specifically the triangular inter-relationship between the devil, man and God, 
is, again, significantly involved.    After all, what makes the devil appear existentially 
ironical lies in the very ironic discourse rendered by Screwtape in which the demonic 
despite against human beings is both based on the most vicious mark of the 
devil-hood—self-pride—and entangled with the devil’s hatred and antagonism toward 
God.  According to Screwtape’s theory, it is crucially prompted by so-called love in 
their Archenemy (i.e. God) for His human creatures, those despicable “earth-born 
vermins,” that their Underworld Father (i.e. Satan) decided to oppose against God.  
That pre-ordained loving relationship between God and mankind is disgustingly 
incredible and unacceptably unreasonable from the standpoint of the proudly 
ambitious and rebellious angels, now called devils, the self-assumed Adversary to 
God as well as to man.    Accordingly, the “object of divine love,” which is supposed 
to be the status of human souls in supernatural reality, becomes the target of preying 
                                                 
131  The original citations of Lewis are Luther’s words, “The best way to drive out the devil, if he will 
not yield to texts of Scripture, is to jeer and flout him, for he cannot bear scorn,” and More’s, “The 
devil …the prowde spirite …cannot endure to be mocked.”   
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Screwtape’s, with a view to making plain to its far less acknowledgeable junior the 
existential meaning of being a devil as well as the philosophy of their agency of 
temptation, is indeed ironical in the sense that instead of justifying the devils’ state of 
being, the discourse unintentionally yet revealingly exposes the manifold depravities 
of devil-hood.   This is particularly shown in the devil’s deceptive 
self-understanding and problematic dealings with others, e.g., human creatures and 
the divine Creator. 
  In the context of Screwtape’s account, which on the surface is about tactics of 
temptation and yet at the deeper level speaks of the demonic perception about their 
own selfhood, the otherness of manhood or Godhead in association with the 
inter-personal relationship among the three parties, it is evident that Lewis’s 
representation of the devil’s personhood hints at the truth that both the devil’s 
cognitive and emotive faculties are at best flawed.  In his essay entitled “Evil and 
God,” Lewis, in the terms of Christian theology, identifies the devil precisely as fallen 
and rebel angel and argues against the doctrine of Dualism about good and evil as 
equal though opposite entities.   There Lewis asserts that evil is to be viewed as a 
mere perversion of good and it stands in subordination to good both in existence and 
in perception.  On the ontological status of evil, Lewis obviously follows the 
Augustinian-Thomist tradition, which pinpoints the relation between good and evil, as 
John Hick in his book Evil and the God of Love details: “every existing thing is a 
good creation of a good God,  . . . Evil is thus loss and lack, a deprivation of good, 
and . . . it tends  . . . toward nullity and non-existence.”
132  Based on the teachings 
of Augustine and Aquinas, Lewis observes: “good should be able to exist on its own 
while evil requires the good on which it is parasitic in order to continue its parasitic 
                                                 
132 John  Hick,  Evil and the God of Love (London: Macmillan, 1966), p. 179-180. 
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133    Lewis’s depiction of the devil in the fantasy of The Screwtape Letters 
is basically consistent with this observation about the devil’s perverted and parasitic 
state of existence.   In spite of this (supernatural) reality about devil-hood, in the 
mouth of Screwtape, the defiant devil stands in determined opposition against the 
Creator, who is decried by the hellish view as undignified and irredeemably vulgar, 
specifically in his inventing and upholding such platitudes as ordinary pleasures and, 
what is worse, in his activating the policy of philanthropy toward the human 
selves—those lowly verminous creatures.  However eloquently scornful Screwtape 
may sound, when it comes to the devil’s identity, Screwtape seems to totally and 
ironically dismiss from his understanding of the devils’ selfhood the facthood of their 
parasitic as well as depraved existence.  In other words, what seems beyond 
Screwtape is the very actuality of his own existence of depravity, a state of being 
resulting from the Satanic transgression of becoming the opponent against God and 
also from the demonic corruption and subversion of the identity as angelic creation, 
that is, “the helping spirits” (cf. Hebrew 1:14), or, the “mean between man and 
God.”
134       
Regarding the parasitic nature of the devil, it is demonstrably manifested by the 
reality of temptation.  As suggested by Lewis in Preface to Paradise Lost, the devil 
“cannot directly attack” the Enemy, (i.e. God,); as a result, it simply engages itself 
with ruining human beings.  Against such a psychological background, Screwtape 
makes the following under-world utilitarian proclamation to the junior tempter: “To us, 
a human is primarily food; our aim is the absorption of its will into ours, the increase 
                                                 
133  Lewis, “Evil and God,” C. S. Lewis Essay Collection: Faith, Christianity and the Church,  p.94.     
134 Quoted  from  Lewis’s  The Discarded Image: An Introduction to Medieval and Renaissance 
Literature (London: Cambridge University Press, 1964), in which Lewis introduces the development of 
the Medieval “Model of the Universe,” a synthetically built system out of multiple sources and 
elements, Pagan and Christian.    On Page 74, Lewis comes to the discussion about pseudo-Dionysius’s 
appropriating the idea of “The Triad (agent-mean-patient) into his cosmological scheme, of which the 
key notion is phrased by Lewis as: “the total angelic creation is a mean between God and Man . . .” 
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devil as a ravenous predator feeding on human souls echoes Dante’s figuration of 
Satan in Inferno, where Satan is represented to be “constantly chewing on the  . . . 
sinners [or “damned souls] in Hell.”  In The Screwtape Letters, the Screwtape’s 
straight identification of devil-hood with the “predator” of human beings serves to 
specify the reality of the correlation among God, humans and devils.  But it at the 
same time becomes inevitably a verbal act of exposing his selfhood to an ironic 
revelation.  This is based on the fact that the demonic “predatism” toward human’s 
exploitability, that is, the diabolic weapon of offense against God, reflects the 
“infirmities” of the devils’ own, particularly in being both insulated from and ignorant 
of the inter-personal relationship based on love.  Discernibly, Screwtape’s hatred 
toward the humans is connected with his incapacity to make sense of divine love 
toward humans.    This incomprehension on the side of the devil is actually related to 
the fundamental distinction between heaven and hell regarding the relationship 
between selfhood and otherness.  To use the well-said comment of Clyde S. Kilsby, 
the author of The Christian World of C. S. Lewis, “God loves ‘otherness,’ but hell 
hates it.”
135  Indeed,  that  God  “really  loves the hairless bipeds he has created” (74) is 
acknowledged by Screwtape as “nonsense” and “the most repellent and inexplicable 
trait in [their] Enemy” (74) simply because it contradicts the “whole philosophy of 
Hell,” which may be summed up by “the axiom that . . . one self is not another self 
[and] ‘To Be’ means ‘to be in competition” (92).   In light of the contrast between 
the hellish philosophy of being  and the divine mindset of love governed by the 
principle that the “good of one self is to be the good of another” (92), it seems 
absolutely reasonable that this love is sheer impossibility and nonsense to the devil.  
                                                 
135  Quoted from Kilsby’s review of The Screwtape Letters in the chapter entitled “Hell and Heaven,” 
The Christian World of C. S. Lewis (Marcham Manor Press, 1965), p. 41. 
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hell is that it manifests the reality of devil-hood, namely, the impossibility of being a 
devil to acquire the knowledge of love, in mind and in existence.   
Furthermore, the sense of irony connected with the devil’s incapacity to love is 
heightened by Screwtape’s self-contradictory attempt to justify their devil-hood 
through devaluing the personhood of the divine Being.  In order to make up for his 
slip of the tongue about the truth of God’s love and to rationalize his mental 
incapacity to grasp the meaning of love in the Enemy, Screwtape, on the one hand, 
expresses strong suspicion toward the personality of God, specifically his loving 
nature.  Yet, on the other hand, Screwtape himself cannot but admit, in a sort of 
undertone, that the ground for his dismissing the impossible love is really the 
impossibility of the devil’s mind to unravel its secret.  In this sense, the very act of 
Screwtape’s inferring the divine love as nonsense can be regarded as the reflection of 
the nonsense of his own mental faculty.  That is to say, the inference, in itself, is 
self-reflexively derived from the absurdity in the selfhood of the devil himself rather 
than the otherness of the devil’s Enemy.   
Such a self-betraying irony is further reinforced by Screwtape’s advocacy to his 
apprentice about the grand scheme of their moral assault on foolish human 
beings—by “darkening [the human] intellect” (106).  In light of the Devil’s 
intellectual, not to mention his moral, flaw, Screwtape’s advice cannot but sound 
ridiculous and ironic.  Full of malign ingenuity as well as a contemptuous attitude, 
the worldly-wise senior tempter simply ignores the essential part of the destiny of 
devil-hood, that is, its fallen and depraved state of being.  Specifically, the irony of 
Screwtape here rests on his blindness to his own intellectual defectiveness.  The 
devil’s depravity in the intellectual aspect can be referred to Lewis’s critical review 
about the fallen state of Satan dramatized by Milton’s Paradise Lost.  In Preface to 
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will means Nonsense for the intellect.”
136  This notion about the devil’s “Nonsense 
intellect,” in fact, echoes Augustine’s doctrine of evil as Non-being, i.e. a being of no 
substance, absolutely void of goodness.  Also, it is a claim correspondent with the 
observation of the greatest medieval theologian Thomas Aquinas, who too identifies 
demons as Fallen Angels possessing only “darkened minds” and thus completely 
lacking “the knowledge that produces love and wisdom.”  Aquinas’ insightful 
viewpoint exactly explains Lewis’s representation of devil-hood, that is, the 
knowledge of love is simply beyond the reach of the devil’s “Nonsense intellect.”       
But, the depraved nature of the devil is of course not limited to the intellect.  
Theologically, according to Aquinas, the selfhood of Fallen Angels is marked by two 
predominant states of mind: Pride and Envy.  “Pride means insubordination, not 
submitting to one’s superior.  Envy means sorrowing over another’s good, in this 
case, Mankind’s.”
137    Actually, underlying the devil’s spiritual discrimination against 
human beings can be a blending of these two mentalities.  As pointed out in the 
discussion above, Screwtape’s grudge against the human creatures on account of the 
Enemy’s desire to “fill the universe with a lot of little replicas of Himself” (45) is 
intermingled with his proud sense of superiority over humans, who Screwtape holds 
in contempt as “amphibians—half spirit and half animal” (44).  Throughout The 
Screwtape Letters, the presumptuous devil postures as always ready to heap scorn on 
the human “patient.”  Nevertheless, Screwtape’s satanic laughter can be found 
subject to Lewis’s satirical  fight-back.   
For instance, reading closely into Screwtape’s disputation against the divine 
condescension happening in human prayers despite the poverty and even absurdity of 
                                                 
136 Lewis,  A Preface to Paradise Lost, p. 97. 
137  These words are Aquinas’s derived from his Summa Theologica (1.63.2), quoted by Henry Ansgar 
Kelly, author of Satan: A Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 244. 
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superficial the arrogant and jealous devil’s sense of superiority actually is.   
Extremely absorbed in the consciousness of his being pure spirit, Screwtape even 
goes so far as holding himself as dignified as the Enemy God.    On the one hand, it is 
entirely natural that Screwtape would acknowledge his state of being as the equivalent 
position to that of God, since “the essence of the demonic is the aspiration to be 
godhead.”  On the other hand, such self-assertion is in reality a lie, full of 
self-deception and inappropriate self-belief.  Compared with human beings, the 
devils may seem reasonably proud of their powerful perception.  However, it is 
equally preposterous for the devils to make such a self-claim since their nature as 
spirit and their intellect have both become blemished.  Otherwise, how come the 
very knowledge of God can be “permanent pain” and “stabbing and searing glare” to 
the fallen, dark-minded angels when it is both permanent joy and embraceable and 
enriching lightness to the good angels and to the “poor-sighted” yet obedient humans 
alike.   In  view of this  sharp contrast, Screwtape’s blindness to his own degradation 
and his insistence on the stupidity of humans, once again, make him a fool of himself.   
Furthermore, Screwtape the devil is characterized as hopelessly defective in 
emotion as well as in intellect.    Aside from his failure to understand the possibility of 
love, emotionally, this demonic character is depicted to be an impossible lover as well.   
As a matter of fact, all demons are doomed to fall into the state of mind incapable of 
loving as well as understanding “love,” because, as Stanley Fish explains in Surprised 
by Sin, “[f]or the agent who loves, love is the affective complement of what the 
intellect discerns.”
138  In spite of this genuine incapability, Screwtape nevertheless 
reiterates in all his letters how “truly affectionate” he is to his nephew apprentice.  
                                                 
138 Stanley  Fish,  Surprised by Sin: the Reader in Paradise Lost (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1997, 
second edition), p. 335. 
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Screwtape twists the conception of love.  Essentially, love in Screwtape’s infernal 
dictionary is nonsense.  In the mouth of Screwtape the old-hand deceiver and 
tempter, who maliciously admits his love for his demon-nephew as “dainty a morsel 
as ever he grew fat on” (156), the very notion of love is appropriated as a deceiving 
smoke screen for covering his devouring desire to increase his own self by means of 
the incorporation of other selves.    In view of the self-interested nature shared by the 
two devils and the fact that they really hate each other, the mere reiteration of love 
from one devil to the other effectively adds into the whole representation of the 
devil’s perverted selfhood some cunning sense of  diabolical  fun  and  irony.           
In addition to the sense of black humour instilled by Screwtape’s recurrent trick 
of twisting the idea of love, Lewis’s satire on the devil contains another more 
important black parody—concerned with the subject of death.  The treatment of the 
death of the human soul concerned, from the perspective of Screwtape or in the hand 
of C. S. Lewis, is perhaps the most excellent example of a double-edged rhetorical 
twist in the whole book of The Screwtape Letters.    To Screwtape, the very subject of 
death is one of the best weapons for the demonic tempter’s job of darkening the 
human mind by making humans pathetically scared of death so that humans would 
not live to perceive the true spiritual meaning of life and death.  Concerning what 
human birth and death signify for a human soul in the eye of God, Screwtape sounds 
like one full of spiritual insights: “It is obvious that to Him [the Enemy] human birth 
is important chiefly as the qualification for human death, and death solely as the gate” 
(145) into “the new life” (157).  That is the main reason why Screwtape strongly 
admonishes the junior infernal agent to fight against time and not to risk losing his 
patient before it becomes too late to take him into captivity once he dies.  
Accordingly, Screwtape makes a serious yet interestingly twisted admonition that the 
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advice laughably strange lies in Screwtape’s act of parodying the biblical idea of the 
Heavenly Father guarding His people “like the apples of His eye” and twisting it into 
the diabolic guideline of sustaining the human life within their control.  From a 
critical perspective, Screwtape’s rhetorical twist, or black parody, can be seen as 
deliberately devised by C. S. Lewis to caricature his demonic character as a malicious 
and meanwhile farcical imitator of Providence, including His will and His image.         
  The devil’s double scheme of manipulating the significance of “death”— by 
propagandizing death as the prime evil to mortals and meanwhile endeavouring to 
keep mortals from dying to enter into the highest good —at last, backfires.  The 
patient concerned finally dies his untimely death and thus gets free from the 
captivation of his infernal lifeguard / predator and indeed enjoys a new life and the 
ultimate spiritual enlightenment in Heaven.  So, the whole mission of temptation 
ends with total failure to the devils.  Devastated by his great disappointment, 
Screwtape bursts out his loser’s pathos in the final letter, which is marked by an 
unusually self-doubting pessimism in the self-confident Screwtape.  Unmistakably, 
the ultimate defeat of the devils dramatically precipitates the collapse of Screwtape’s 
self-illusion.  Rhetorically speaking, it avails Lewis the fantasist to turn all the 
elemental falsities in the devil’s knowledge of his selfhood inside out and upside 
down, mainly through portraying the reversal of Screwtape’s self-experience: from 
self-belief to self-doubt, from belief in self-sufficiency to admitting the necessity of 
being empowered by the knowledge of the Enemy, and from the consciousness of 
superiority to the awareness of powerlessness.     
Despite such a hint at the positive growth of the devil’s self-knowledge, the basic 
tone of this ending, nevertheless, remains ironic.    In fact, it serves to underscore, to a 
greater extent, the ridiculous flaws in the devil’s understanding of either his selfhood 
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endows the whole text with a sense of religious optimism.  It is denoted by the 
indication of certain truth directly opposite to the devilish lie about spiritual reality, 
namely, a true possibility that superior as the devils’ intellect can be, the ultimate 
victory may come to the inferior humans, who have good chances not to be consumed 
by evil but hopefully to overcome it—even through death.    That is to say, from such 
an ironic inversion of having the devil’s tactics of temptation backfire at devils 
themselves emerges a sign of hope for human victory over the devil’s temptation.  
Of course it does not mean that Lewis’s writing aims to underestimate the power of 
evil.  On the other hand, Lewis’s satirical treatment of the double irony in 
Screwtape’s speech act or mindset indeed rings like an apologetic reminder that it is 
equally unnecessary to overestimate the power of the devil.  Through characterizing 
the outstandingly ingenious admonitor on temptation like the devil Screwtape as 
ultimately an ironic creature, Lewis seems to propose to his readers that we amphibian 
humans might not be necessarily outwitted by the Devil and tricked and tempted by 
his lies, supposing that we know better what the Devil is and is not up to, namely, to 
grow more knowledgeable to the truth about devil-hood as Lewis’s book invites us to.       
More importantly, the apologetic significance is conveyed through the ultimate 
survival of the human “patient” in faith.    As indicated within the devil’s lament over 
their failure, what brings about the human patient’s liberation from the grip of evil at 
the point of finishing his journey of faith on earth is really the promise of the human 
pilgrim’s Christian faith in Christ, who alone is the very person to deliver the human 
soul from evil and from damnation.  In biblical terms, Christ represents for human 
believers a “merciful and faithful high priest,” who “was in all points tempted like as 
we are, yet without sin” and promised to “destroy him that had the power of death, 
that is, the devil”—“through death” as well (Hebrew 2: 13, 17, 4:14, King James 
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term abundant with religious meanings.  In reality, it is death that empowers the 
Christ to fulfill the divine scheme of salvation, although it equally empowers the 
devils in their enterprise of temptation.  “Through the fear of death” human beings 
are “all their lifetime subject to bondage (to the devil)” (Hebrew 2:14); on the other 
hand, death also serves as the very channel of freeing human souls from that bondage, 
supposing that their faith in Christ persists all their lifetime too. 
 Thus, it is strongly though implicitly advised that against the bondage or 
temptation enforced by evil the very antidote lies in (Christian) faith, by which the 
human “patient” eventually manages to escape the infernal tempter’s control.  To 
further this apologetic reading of Lewis’s fantasy, we may think more deeply about 
the textual implication of the significance of religious faith in the spiritual battle at 
least between the human person concerned and the devil.  In a theological sense, 
faith stands for the redemptive promise of overcoming the fearfulness of death for 
human existence and demolishing hellish temptation which is aimed at disrupting the 
prospective fruition of faith, that is, the eternal union of human souls with the 
Ultimate Reality, i.e. the Divine Creator and Redeemer.  In view of this, the happy 
ending, of the human patient in The Screwtape Letters, indeed, makes the whole text a 
persuasively apologetic case.     
From a rhetorical perspective, faith plays a crucial role too in distinguishing the 
different destinies of humans and devils, two distinct sorts of creatures yet both 
existentially trapped by the sense of irony.  As discussed above, within Screwtape’s 
epistolary discourse on temptation, what is recurrently and derisively underlined is the 
temptability of human animals whose state of existence is ironically defined by 
Screwtape.  In the eye of the devil, it is, in some sense, precisely the ironic state of 
human being as simultaneously the object of divine love and a fallen creature that 
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prey to be victimized and ultimately consumed in the rivalry of Hell with the 
“Enemy” in Heaven.  In this context, the human patient ends with spiritual survival 
by virtue of his Christian faith, which ultimately safeguards his soul from the 
damnation intended and enacted by demonic temptation.  Besides,  the  same  faith  that 
serves as the human self’s spiritual safeguard functions also as the key or solution for 
transcending the ironic selfhood of human existence.    This rhetorical significance of 
faith, in Lewis’s text of apologetic fantasy, is connected with the theological meaning 
that underlies the reality of temptation.   Owing to faith, not only could the human 
patient’s earthly pilgrimage, which is consistently overshadowed by the impact of evil 
temptation as well as Screwtape’s verbal humiliation, come into fruition, but the 
human being may also be ontologically restored to the created, primordial and 
pre-ironic state and thereby be saved from the ironic sense inherent with his existence 
and imposed by the demonic mocker—Screwtape.  The salvation contributed by 
faith of both the spiritual and the ontological status of human selfhood bespeaks the 
dependence of human beings upon a salvation from beyond themselves so that the 
internal void of human lives resulted from their “estrangement from God as the 
ground of [their] being”
139 can be existentially remedied, as held and believed by such 
Christian existentialists as Pascal  and  Kierkegaard.    
Regarding the relationship between irony and being, specifically how the 
subjective being can manage to transcend its ironic predicament, Paul de Man too 
refers to Kierkegaard, together with Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1829), the German art 
historian and critic in the Romantic period, as representative of resorting to religious 
faith to free the subject yearning for self-transcendence yet inescapably entrapped 
                                                 
139  The quotations are derived from John Hick’s expository passage about how Christian existentialists 
propose to deal with the problem of “non-being” in human existence.    See John Hick’s Evil and the 
God of Love, p. 183-184. 
  115within the closed system of  ironic  language:     
 
 
the rhetorical mode of irony takes us back to the predicament of the 
conscious subject; this consciousness is clearly an unhappy one that strives 
to move beyond and outside itself.  Schlegel’s rhetorical question “What 
gods will be able to rescue us from all these ironies?” can also be taken 
literally.  For the later Friedrich Schlegel, as for Kierkegaard, the solution 




It is observable that the implied apologetic appeal of Lewis in this fantasy is basically 
correspondent with the Kierkegaardian (Christian existentialist) recognition of faith as 
the extrinsic, the sole and the ultimate solution to unravel the entanglement between 
selfhood and irony.      In fact, faith could be viewed as the single most decisive factor 
in the distinction of “destiny” between the human believer and the devil; eventually 
they embrace totally different realities of being.  For the human patient it is the 
reality of the redemptive order grounded on his Christian faith that awaits him when 
he passes from his mortal ironical life to eternity.  As for the devil-hood, the 
situation is unsurprisingly the opposite: their reality of being is, from a subjective 
point of view, self-willed and self-doomed, which would come to nothing and end 
with being condemned by the eternal circularity of irony.    In other words, the devils’ 
is a destiny beyond redemption, for they would simply sneer at the very idea of rescue 
from outside their conceited selfhood, which can be easily inferred from Screwtape’s 
reiteration of the demonically haughty and disdainful disapproval of the divine act of 
condescension.  Rejecting even the mere idea of love, the devil-hood certainly will 
have nothing to do with the so-called free gift of incomprehensible love and saving 
grace from God the Creator through His beloved only Son, Jesus Christ, except doing 
                                                 
140  Paul de Man, Blindness and Insight, p. 222. 
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love.   Therefore, the double vision of subjective reality concerning not only 
manhood but also devil-hood serves to carry the ironic sense of the devil’s existence 
as well as their agency of temptation to incorrigible extremes, while it at the same 
time subtly touches upon a religious promise of eternal bliss for faithful humans and 
accordingly turns the devil’s malicious laughter at others around to the devil’s own 
selfhood.  Apologetically as well as rhetorically, Screwtape’s devil-hood is, so to 
speak, taken captive by double irony to a limitless extent, a result certainly far beyond 
the control or expectation of Screwtape, whose very act of irony is explicitly meant to 
devalue  and  victimize  humans.     
However, even if it is deducible that Lewis to some extent attempts to follow the 
advice of Luther and More to heap scorn on the devil so as to expel it or resist its 
temptation, Lewis’s writing does not intend to engage his readers to laugh at the 
devils merely.  In fact, it would be no less simplistic to think of the whole text as 
simply a play of double irony for the sake of satirizing devil-hood than to identify 
Lewis the fantasist with his devil-character with the assumption that Lewis, like 
Screwtape, is texutalizing his  “low estimate of man, a certain disgust at man’s 
creaturely limitations and his fallen wickedness.”
141  In other words, Lewis’s 
rhetorically intricate and dialectical treatment of the reality of selfhood cannot be 
easily explained away by a hermeneutically narrow-minded and reductive reading 
focused on the depravity of one single party, either manhood or devil-hood.    Against 
such a one-sided kind of interpretation failing to do justice to Lewis’s work, this study 
proposes that a reading of this ironically (double) inversed text about diabolic 
temptation involves not only awareness of the nature of evil temptation but also better 
understanding of “human lives.”  After all, we should not forget the 
                                                 
141 Urang,  Shadows of Heaven, p. 309. 
  117acknowledgement of C. S. Lewis, the real author of Screwtape’s text of ironic 
discourse, that it is through his own heart that he can come so close to the reality of 
devil-hood.    In the 1961 “Preface,” he proclaims:   
 
 
Some have paid me an undeserved compliment by supposing that my 
Letters were the ripe fruit of many years’ study in moral and ascetic 
theology.  They forgot that there is an equally reliable, though less 
creditable, way of learning how temptation works.    “My heart” –I need no 
other’s –“sheweth me the wickedness of the ungodly.     
 
 
In the same vein, in A Preface to Paradise Lost (1942), Lewis holds it unjust to view 
Satan as a comic, simply laughable figure on account of the commonality shared 
between manhood and devil-hood.    To use his well-put explanation, “all of us, in our 
measure, share the Satanic . . . blindness,” and “[a] fallen man is very like a fallen 
angel.”
142  In light of this, instead of naively responding to the ironic ridicule of the 
devil without simultaneous self-reflection on human selfhood, what seems more 
sophisticated and justifiable is to exercise a hermeneutic of irony no less dialectical 
than the “textuality” of Lewis’s apologetic fantasy.  That is, Lewis’s dialectical text 
of Screwtape’s ironic discourse demands a dialectical act of interpretation which 
recognizes, on the one hand, the ironic selfhood commonly possessed by 
(pre-redeemed) humans and devils alike and on the other hand, the distinction 
between the hope of self-transcendence for humans, namely, restoration into the 
pre-ironic or de-ironic state of existence through faithful relationship with the loving 
Creator / Redeemer and the irrecoverable self-deprivation of such a hope in the 
devil-hood.    Notably, the crucial element that ultimately determines whether or not a 
creature stands in an “ironic” status of existence lies in the sole source of power 
                                                 
142 Lewis,  A Preface to Paradise Lost, p. 101. 
  118capable of overcoming and transcending the doom caused by evil temptation into 
irony, that is, the salvation of the Divine.  Without such a comprehensive reading, 
one cannot re-experience what is fantastically imagined and apologetically envisioned 
by Lewis—the twofold reality of selfhood in the context of the spiritual, or 






















  119Ch. V.    The Great Divorce: Irony and the Free Choice of Either Heaven Or Hell 
 
 
    “But heaven is closed to such presumptuous speech, and it is written that God is tempted of 




As far as the question about the relation between irony and selfhood, or, irony 
and human existence within the snares of temptation, is concerned, The Great Divorce, 
another fantasy of Lewis conveying also a Christianity-related “imaginative supposal” 
of supernatural reality, appears to be a text even more poignantly suggestive of the 
ironic existence of the human self than the preceding work of The Screwtape Letters, 
published about four years earlier.  This is to a great extent owing to the (textual) 
fact that unlike the apparently mono-voiced discourse of irony in The Screwtape 
Letters, textually predominated by the devil’s point of view, the text of The Great 
Divorce consists of many a dramatic conversation
143 between self and other.  
Generally speaking, these conversations are made in the context more complicatedly 
dramatized, with the subjective reality of human existence split into two realms, i.e., 
the hellish and heavenly realms, which are respectively connected or bound together 
with the objective reality of either evil temptation or divine redemption.    Specifically, 
the conversations are mainly between the “ghosts” from Hell taking a so-called 
Refrigerium
144 excursion to the outskirts of Heaven and the “spirits” of Heaven, 
including angels and the redeemed souls who are these visiting ghosts’ earthly 
familiars sent to welcome them with the mission of persuading these lost and damned 
                                                 
143 On  The Great Divorce, Lyle Smith, Biola University, makes a similar observation, holding that 
conversation “is the essence of this novel.”    See C. S. Lewis’s Encyclopedia, p. 186. 
144  According to Manlove’s explanation, in C. S. Lewis: His Literary Achievement (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1987), Refrigerium is the doctrine “under which on rare occasion souls from Hell may visit 
Heaven and have the chance to repent” (Manlove, p. 97). 
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phantom-body might be solidified and thus able to enter into “Reality,” meaning to 
stay in Heaven for good.    Against this setting, to be or not to be converted seems the 
core issue upon which not only does the significance of the very journey rest, but the 
whole drama of conversation between Hell and Heaven is also centered.  However, 
so far as the theme of conversion is concerned, the journey as a whole does not turn 
out as promising as it is supposed to be.    Most of the ghosts, except for one, refuse to 
be spoken into any change, primarily of mind, and consequently almost all of the 
conversations end with the ghosts turning down the celestials’ invitation and turning 
back to where their old selves belong, that is, Hell.     
  It is observable that the text of The Great Divorce gains its intense poignancy 
significantly from the dramatic tension within such conversational but conflicting 
encounters between the infernal ghosts and the celestial spirits.  These encounters 
are indeed fantastic— extra-terrestrial, trans-mortal and thus quite surreal and yet also 
very real especially regarding the conversational issues all about human affairs and 
mindsets which are in direct connection with earthly lives, such as different kinds of 
personal relationships and various self-aggrandizing or self-snaring “businesses” of 
theology, art, sensualism and so on.  Moreover, the conversations conducted by the 
souls coming from two divided  realms of being—hell and heaven—are most 
intriguingly featured by an inevitable clash of points of view which are so different 
that the communication itself is rendered almost impossible, or at least becomes 
permeated with a strong sense of irreconcilable conflict.  In fact, that the 
communication between heaven and hell can be really difficult and even impossible is 
grounded on the very first principle governing C. S. Lewis’s imagination of the whole 
drama of the meeting between beings from two separate realms, namely, Lewis’s 
personal belief in the existence of, precisely the demarcation between, heaven and 
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  The very title of the book, The Great Divorce, expresses plainly the way Lewis 
envisages the realities of good and evil, heaven and hell, which may sound like a 
direct opposition to William Blake’s poetic piece, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell.  
But, Lewis himself in the beginning of the preface (indirectly) denies the inter-textual 
relation between his Great Divorce and Blake’s poem.
145  Though neither really 
meaning to contradict Blake nor attempting to compose an opposing piece of 
literature against Blake’s poetic invention, Lewis, however, does pronounce his 
antagonism toward the “perennial attempt to make that marriage” (of heaven and hell), 
which he explains in his “Preface”: 
   
 
The attempt is based on the belief that reality never presents us with an   
  absolutely  unavoidable  ‘either-or’; that, granted skill and patience and   
  (above  all)  time  enough,  some  way  of embracing both alternatives can   
always be found; that mere development or adjustment or refinement will 
somehow turn evil into good without our being called on for a final and 
total rejection of anything we should like to retain.    This belief I take to be 
a disastrous error.    … Evil can be undone, but it cannot ‘develop’ into good.   
Time does not heal it.  The spell must be unwound, bit by bit, ‘with 
backward mutters of disserving power’—or else not.  It is still ‘either-or’.  
If we insist on keeping Hell (or even earth) we shall not see Heaven: if we 
accept Heaven we shall not be able to retain even the smallest and most 
intimate  souvenirs  of  Hell.     (VII—IX, emphases added) 
 
  
Lewis’s exposition here makes very clear that what he is against is the problematic 
assumptions underlying the belief of the marriage of heaven and hell, some ways of 
thinking which obviously point beyond the bounds of the literary making of reality to 
                                                 
145  This is indicated in Lewis’s own explanation about his writing of the Divorce of heaven and hell.   
In the very beginning of the preface, he writes: “Blake wrote the Marriage of Heaven and Hell.    If I 
have written of their Divorce, this is not because I think myself a fit antagonist for so great a genius, 
nor even because I feel at all sure that I know what he meant.”    P. VII.     
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the naively optimistic credo about the hopeful convergence of good and evil together 
with its suggestion or tendency to welcome both categories is totally misleading.   
Against such an erroneous belief, Lewis’s arguments above help to illuminate his own 
notion of their divorce and thus make a good, informative introduction to his fantasy 
too.    Perhaps, the best and simplest expression that can sum up both Lewis’s belief in 
the “great divorce” and his fantastical vision of reality based on this belief is the 
reiterative phrase of Lewis within his arguments—“either-or.”  To Lewis as well as 
to traditional, or if you like, dogmatic, Christian believers, good and evil, heaven and 
hell, are essentially incompatible and irreconcilable (and unequal) entities.   
Therefore, it is strongly suggested by Lewis that existentially and ultimately, they 
cannot be double alternatives but “either-or” options to us humans.  Besides, as 
wrongs must be righted to stop being wrong, so evil can never be self-corrected but 
needs backward tackling so as to dispel its disserving power, that is, to undo or heal 
the harm and damage caused by evil to the human life.  In this sense, it could be 
inferred that Lewis’s religious outlook on good and evil puts considerable stress on 
the role the human self plays or has to play in coping with the impact of evil or in 
making such ultimate choices, on an everyday basis, between Heaven and Hell.  In 
other words, what concerns Lewis is not simply the objective reality of the 
antagonism between good and evil but also the importance of the subjective element 
in the meeting of human existence with good and evil.     
  That is to say, both in his belief and in his work(s) of fantasy, Lewis perceives 
and treats reality in a composite way—by taking into account not only the 
supernatural existences of good and evil but also the interplay or interaction between 
the subjectivity of human beings and these countervailing forces out there.   I n   f a c t ,  
it can be demonstrated that the fantasy of The Great Divorce manifests Lewis’s 
  123attempt to combine the supernatural with the existential, or the objective with the 
subjective, into his, so to speak, three-dimensional view of the truth about the 
inter-relationship between reality and the self, including good / heaven, evil / hell and 
human selfhood.  In the previous discussion on The Screwtape Letters, the focus of 
investigation is on the reality of the triangle of humans, devils and God, a spiritual 
inter-personal relationship involving also three subjects, with the demonic being 
contending against the Divine for the human being.    As has been pointed out above, 
although fallen and vulnerable to evil temptation and therefore in possession of a 
devil-amusing trait of ironic existence, the human self, spiritually as well as 
existentially, may embrace the ultimate (religious) hope of getting free from the 
bondage of evil temptation as well as the infernal tempter’s ironic ridicule—with the 
supernatural aid derived from faith in the heavenly Redeemer.      Basically, The Great 
Divorce could be viewed as a fantastical variation on the same theme about the 
supernatural contention for human souls and also about the ironic state of being 
reflected in human selfhood.   
But, there is still fundamental distinction between the two texts of fantasy.  
Perhaps, the most conspicuous change in The Great Divorce, the fantasy about the 
(human) souls’ holiday visit to Heaven, is that the character of the devil no longer 
appears on the scene.  Also, the irony of manhood is not verbalized as a discourse  
(delivered by the devil) but dramatized via the conversations between those hellish 
phantoms, or, settlers in Hell, and the sacralized and therefore solid spirits, who are 
the permanent inhabitants of Heaven.  Furthermore, compared with the narrative of 
the devil’s ironic discourse on temptation and on man’s temptability and 
contemptibility, the text of The Great Divorce appears keener on spotlighting the 
perverted and (therefore) ironic selfhood of the humans.    Indeed, it can be evidenced 
that this later Christian fantasy of Lewis’s puts tremendous focuses on the ironic truth 
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divine gift of freedom, which, in practice, only too easily becomes the evil tool for 
empowering the subjectivity of the empirical self to reject Heaven—the ultimate 
locale for the communion between human existence and Reality.  In view of this, 
despite the seeming disappearance of the devil in the fantastical drama of the 
encounter between (human) self / subject and supernatural reality, evil and the power 
of temptation are not absent after all, but become really possessed by the human self.   
As if being modelled on the devil-hood characterized by its self-determination to rebel 
against God and reject Heaven, all the souls who make self-willed choices of Hell 
instead of Heaven in The Great Divorce are not just temptable beings but substantially 
beings of tempting selfhood.  To put in another way, their selfhood becomes their 
own temptation.  In this sense, it is thus justifiable to say that the souls who would 
rather remain hellish inhabitants than become paradisal dwellers share with demonic 
creatures the similarly fallen, perverted and ironic state of existence.     
  From a dramatic point of view, the text of the fantasy displays, as it were, a 
platform that gives each ghost “a go” to live out (again) his / her own subjectivity in 
the sense that each of them plays out a certain character according to the individual 
personhood which is manifestly shaped by a particular background and corrupted by 
some specific passion(s).  Among such ghostly characters, we are presented with a 
great variety of highly personalized figures, including: a self-conceited 
“Tousle-Headed Poet” (7) who belittles the level of his fellow villagers as well as 
their hellish surroundings where he himself is actually a part and thus contributes to 
define; a Communist-tempered fellow once “singularly ill-used” (7) by the Capitalist 
world and desperately yearning for “Recognition” and “Appreciation,” while too 
much self-pity seems to incapacitate him to appreciate anyone around him as well; a 
self-righteous and shameless “Big Man,” (25) who strenuously although vainly heaps 
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condemning the other party’s paradisal situation as unfair misplacement while proudly 
refusing to follow the celestial “like a dog” but preferring to “be damned” in Hell with 
no sense of shame; a seemingly broad-minded and intellectually enthusiastic 
theologian, indeed, an Episcopal Bishop on earth, full of “sincere,” highbrow and 
“original” insights about Christianity yet totally unwilling or unable, spiritually as 
well as mentally, to recognize and acknowledge the reality of the mere existence of 
Christ; then, a “lean hard-bitten” (51) old man gripped by a hopeless cynicism toward 
the celestial offer which is believed to be no “free choice” but “all propaganda” (52) 
of a “cruel comedy” (58); still, a cruelly affectionate and willfully manipulative 
mother wanting her son (now in heaven) so as to satisfy her monomaniacal 
motherhood, an instinctive but smothering passion which makes her not only a 
disastrous mother and wife but also a self-contradictory believer in the God of Love 
seeing that she is both unlovable and ready to bluntly reject the love of God 
pronounced by His angel.     
Still another addition to this long list of examples is an irremediably embittered 
husband, perhaps the most dramatically vivified character on account of his theatrical 
manner of conversing with his wife, now a bright Saint full of joy and invincible love, 
through acting as two phantoms chained together—a Dwarf Ghost and a Tragedian 
Ghost.  The co-acting of this double identity in the scene of his meeting and 
communicating with the wife-spirit revealingly exposes the ghost’s split personality.  
On the one side, he is a cowardly, crippled and pathetically repressive lover, the 
silenced ego but possessing the seed of love within and thus the only one (of the two) 
that the wife-spirit minds and addresses.   On the other side, he is simultaneously a 
miserably demanding, aggressively distortive and, above all, really loveless husband 
with a domineering ego which is ironically nourished and even reinforced by his 
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preoccupying his split and indeed tragedian self—desiring for and resisting love at the 
same time.  It is not totally unpredictable that the conversation, in such a polarized 
case, between the loveless and the loving, between self-destroying resentment and 
exuberant joy, between dark lies and bright truth, that is to say, between hell and 
heaven, carries itself only to reach the incommunicable impasse, with the self-chained 
double ghost’s co-working but really conflicting selves vanishing altogether at 
last—as if vapourized into  nothingness.   
Noticeably, despite their varied personalities and the related tendencies to 
denounce the spirits or refuse their offers of help for different reasons, these ghostly 
performers all exhibit a clear sense of irony in their characters.    In other words, they 
do share a commonly characterized selfhood which is evidently ironic in one way or 
another.    About the commonness in these ghostly characters, we are actually given a 
vivid description by the narrator Lewis, who within the fantasy primarily plays the 
role, at first, of a co-passenger on the touring bus from Hell to Heaven and then of an 
onlooker overhearing the conversations going on between the evil-oriented, rejecting 
ghosts and the assuring, inviting spirits.  According to the narration of the 
witness-ghost Lewis, his ghost companions all possess fixed faces, full not of 
possibilities but impossibilities, some gaunt, some bloated, some glaring with idiotic 
ferocity, some drowned beyond recovery in dreams; but all, in one way or another, 
distorted and faded” (17).  Such ghostly images profoundly delineated here of the 
hellish tour-takers on their Refrigerium  bus to Heaven can be treated, in a 
retrospective sense, as a foretelling account for the failing of the very journey itself 
for most of the ghosts.  After all, the journey for these fix-faced ghosts is supposed 
to mean a heavenly chance for their rebirth and thereby re-location, i.e. to be 
transposed from Hell to Heaven.  But, as “Lewis’s” gloomy depiction seems to 
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all seeing that the whole group (including the narrator himself perhaps?), in spite of 
their willing participation in such a journey, manifests a depressing trait not just in 
(facial) appearance, but in the state of mind and in selfhood which is strongly 
suggestive of their impossibility to be altered, even if situated in the redemptive 
Heaven.    Therefore, besides their self-contradictory mindsets and reactions disclosed 
in their encounters with the celestial beings, the very act of taking the promising trip 
to Heaven is doomed to be betrayed by their defective, indeed depraved personhood, 
which again reinforces the sense of irony underlying both the journey itself and the 
subjectivity of these hell-bound souls.       
  Furthermore, the ironic selfhood of these damned souls could be sensed even 
more deeply from an ontological perspective.  To make an ontological investigation 
into the sense of irony underlying, or inherent in, the existence of this group of ghosts, 
we may inquire—what is the general nature of being pertaining to all human beings 
and indeed performed or exercised by every individual among these ghosts who 
determine themselves to stay or not to stay in Heaven?    To be more specific, what on 
earth is the most fundamental and intrinsic quality of being shared by all these hellish 
phantoms, coming from a place of no essential / substantial reality and yet struggling 
somehow against the help offered by those Solid Spirits who are in the role of, as it 
were, substantiating catalyzer commissioned to convert their phantasmagoric 
existences to become adjusted and ultimately transposed to the solid state of Heaven?   
In other words, what is the predominant feature that characterizes the collective 
selfhood of these ghosts, personally different as they are, and also capacitates them to 
come or resist coming into that conversion?  In fact, the answer could be deduced 
right from the actual happenings in the encounters and mostly in the conversations 
between the damned souls and the celestials.  Absolutely self-obsessed, 
  128provocatively stubborn and hardly negotiable, the hellish ghosts are, in “reality,” not 
mere or passive receivers of the invitation of Heaven at all.    As a matter of fact, they 
all sound and behave themselves as absolutely autonomous beings, which is 
manifested in the ways they converse with  the good-intentioned spirits—either 
actively confronting them or readily turning them down at “will” or with pride.  In 
other words, they can all be termed free subjects who are endowed with rights to 
make their own choices between stepping into the heavenly otherness or sticking to 
their own selfhood, however hellish it is.  That is to say, underlying these hellish 
ghosts’ presentation of their “ironic” selfhood is actually the reality of freedom—the 
inherent and fundamental property of human existence and also the crucial part of 
human subjectivity that determines how the selfhood of human individuals functions 
and orients itself—toward either Hell / Self or Heaven / Faith. 
In effect, this notion regarding the immediate relationship between human 
freedom and the destiny of the human self in eternity is not simply dramatized by the 
confrontation, or better, negotiation between the hellish ghosts and the Bright Spirits 
but also didactically conveyed by the mouth of the redeemed George MacDonald, 
who plays within the fantasy the character of guiding and teaching “Lewis” as the 
latter tours in the Valley of Heaven with the company of souls from Hell.    In the tone 
of a sage and also like a father, “MacDonald” explains to “Lewis” about two ways of 
viewing human freedom—in existential / temporal and eternal / trans-temporal terms:   
  
 
Time is the very lens through which ye see—small and clear, as men see 
through the wrong end of a telescope—something that would otherwise be 
too big for ye to see at all.  That thing is Freedom: the gift whereby ye 
most resemble your maker and are yourselves parts of eternal reality.  But 
ye can see it only through the lens of Time, in a little clear picture, through 
the inverted telescope.  It is a picture of moments following one another 
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otherwise.  Neither the temporal succession nor the phantom of what ye 
might have chosen and didn’t is itself Freedom.  They are a lens.  The 
picture is a symbol:  . . .Ye cannot know eternal reality by a definition.  
Time itself, and all acts and events that fill Time, are the definition, and it 
must be lived.  The Lord said we were gods.  How long could ye bear to 
look (without Time’s lens) on the greatness of your own soul and the eternal 
reality  of  her  choice?        (140-141) 
 
 
According to “MacDonald’s” truth-revealing teaching about eternal reality from the 
perspective of heaven (contrary to the infernal point of view on which Screwtape’s 
admonition of deceptive tactics of temptation is dependent), human beings are not 
merely endowed with but also defined by the divine gift of freedom—their innate 
freedom bespeaks their identity as, so to speak, divine mortals because the nature of 
being free within humans, in reality, pertains to divinity.   However, as mortals, 
humans cannot cognize what freedom or being free really means in terms of eternal 
reality, which is referred not merely to the natural, mundane and physical but also, in 
a more exact sense, to the supernatural, transcendental and metaphysical.  The only 
access to the knowledge of freedom as well as “eternal reality” for mortals, as advised 
by “MacDonald” of profound wisdom, is to live it out existentially and empirically 
within time, which means to make the free choices their mortal lives bring them to.  
Ultimately, these choices made out of free will are of eternal significance; they 
become significant determinants for defining the eternal destiny of human selves 
(with the divine nature of freedom).   Basically, the whole fantasy of The Great 
Divorce attempts to center its mimetism (imaginative and realistic representation) and 
didacticism (moral within and behind the text) on this revelation concerning human 
freedom or self-will that brings about not simply ordinary choices but decisive 
choices for what or where human selves eternally are.  As asserted early on by 
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end: those who say to God, ‘Thy will be done,’ and those to whom God says, in the 
end, ‘Thy will be done.’  All that are in Hell, choose it.  Without that self-choice 
there  could  be  no  Hell”  (75).          
What is brought to light by “MacDonald” the spiritual and heavenly teacher and 
actually communicated by the whole fantasy is precisely the important and crucial 
role of self-choice in making “the great divorce” between heaven and hell, or in other 
words, causing the ultimate contrast between the damned souls and the saved ones, 
who  separately become in eternity either “immortal horrors” or “everlasting 
splendours,” to use Lewis’s expressions in his sermon article, “The Weight of Glory.”   
In view of this, Clyde S. Kilsby, the author of The Christian World of C. S. Lewis, 
indeed rings very true in his well-said commentary about the gist of The Great 
Divorce—“the cleavage between heaven and hell with eternal destiny contingent upon 
the soul’s own choice.”
146      Also, it is definitely pertinent when C. N. Manlove goes 
further to pinpoint the human self as exactly the real “agent of ‘the Great Divorce’,” 
and based on this he concludes, “Lewis shows us Hell making itself, severing itself 
from Heaven.”
147      What is most intriguing in this brief yet rightly put conclusion of 
Manlove’s is the straight identification strikingly made between the human self and 
the very existence of Hell.  Indeed, rendered by the fantasy of The Great Divorce is 
Lewis’s astounding manifestation of the direct connection between human selfhood, 
defined by the individual soul’s free and therefore subjective choice, and the objective 
reality which is split into two opposing and conflicting states of being, i.e., hell and 
heaven.   
Through the exposition of “MacDonald,” Lewis’s fantastical mouthpiece, and 
                                                 
146 Kilby,  The Christian World of C. S. Lewis, p. 50. 
147 Manlove,  C. S. Lewis: His Literary Achievement, p. 109. 
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with the heavenly spirit, it is made plain that “Hell” in The Great Divorce signifies a 
state of mind which is absolutely self-oriented.  It is indeed such a mindset that 
prompts those ghostly characters to choose naturally, namely, in accordance with the 
nature of the self, the grey town where everyone of them could stick to their own 
selfhood regardless of the fact that it is a place overshadowed by a strong sense of 
hostile alienation and the terribly imminent aura of darkness.  Moreover, these 
phantasmal ghosts’ hell-bound mindset is also revealingly exposed in their 
psychologically mixed reactions—cynically suspicious, scared, evasive, repugnant 
and resistant—to the otherness of “Heaven,” which in their experiences is featured by 
its unbearable prevalence of solidness, lightness and the most exotic abundance of the 
passion of joy.  In fact, considering the contrasting incompatibility between “Hell” 
and “Heaven,” in physical dimension or in heart, there is no wonder that the state of 
mind  of “Hell,” personified by the ghosts who are hopelessly seized by an overt 
self-consciousness and over-preoccupation with their own self, can neither stand nor 
appreciate, not to mention accept, what “Heaven” means and passionately offers.    Of 
the distinction, even contrast between “Heaven” and “Hell,” the following clear-cut 
clarification is provided in one of the dialogues between “Lewis” the narrator-ghost 
and  “MacDonald”:      
 
 
‘Then those people are right who say that Heaven and Hell are only states 
of mind?’ 
‘Hush,’ he [MacDonald] said sternly.  ‘Do not blaspheme.  Hell is a 
state of mind—ye never said a truer word.    And every state of mind, left to 
itself, every shutting up of the creature within the dungeon of its own 
mind—is, in the end, Hell.    But Heaven is not a state of mind.    Heaven is 
reality itself.    All that is fully real is Heavenly.    For all that can be shaken 
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In this dialogue, it is clearly stressed by “MacDonald” that Heaven and Hell should 
not be confused as both pronominal signifiers for such subjective signified as the state 
of mind of human self: Hell is, while Heaven is not.    Moreover, what is significantly 
emergent out of “MacDonald’s” theory is the equation between reality and “Heaven,” 
side by side with the identification between state of mind / selfhood and “Hell.”  
Clearly, the perspective “MacDonald” here speaks from is grounded on Christian 
theology, which proclaims the transcendence, God Himself, as the fully real, the 
absolutely unshakeable truth and the ultimate meaning of what “Heaven” pertains to.     
Yet, even if the idea of reality, or “Heaven,” ought to be defined in Christian 
theological terms, certainly, also with a clear touch of Platonic transcendentalism, one 
may still be curious about how to relate such a theological and Platonic notion of 
reality with the drama about the self-choice of human beings that the whole fantasy 
undertakes to manifest?    Is reality in such a dramatic context referred to the objective 
world only—a world out there for the human soul to know and to experience so that it 
may be transcended beyond its natural bound and get involved with the existence of a 
universal and supernatural order?  Or, does reality also refers to the subjective 
domain—comprehending also the world within the self, the epistemic, empirical and 
the religious / spiritual self?   Actually,  in  “MacDonald’s” theory about “Heaven” or 
in the overall context of the drama about the ghostly selves choosing to be (reigning) 
in Hell rather than stay (and serve) in Heaven, reality is not a word of any singular 
meaning but a compound idea with multiple meanings to be grasped—at least, in two 
senses.    In one sense, it is subjectivity-concerned; that is to say, reality, or, subjective 
reality, discloses the truth regarding the nature of the (human) self or the state of 
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objectively real, including both the natural and the supernatural.   To  think  of  reality 
in this objective sense, the scope of what is real or objectively true is not to be 
restricted within the domain of a personal being, such as personhood or subjective 
consciousness.  That is to say, objective reality refers to the reality beyond the self.  
However, this does not mean that so-called objective reality has nothing to do with its 
counterpart, subjective reality, namely, truth about what is inside  the  self.   They  are 
actually not just co-existent but also connected with each other to such an extent that 
they may even be cross-referential notions.      That is to say, the hell-oriented self and 
the self-oriented hell can really mean the same thing.  In other words, the self and 
“Hell” can simply be interchangeable names.  Likewise, the significance of reality 
can equally be interchanged with the meaning of the redeemed self, the self that 
severs itself from the old, tempted, hell-bound, in a word, ironic selfhood and 
re-orients its free will to receive the divine grace, that is, to become a convert and 
enter into “Heaven,” a regenerated state of being and also the state of being restored 
(back) to union with Reality.  Within the fantasy, the very term—“eternal 
reality”—coined by “MacDonald” and indeed by Lewis the Christian apologetic 
fantasist to speak of the eternal destiny of human existence, must be associated with 
both of the two possibilities of cross-references—identifying the (one) self choosing 
Hell instead of Heaven as “Hell” itself and the (other) self becoming part of Heaven 
and never turning back to Hell any more as what  reality  signifies  (to  humans).         
In light of this interchangeability between “Heaven” / “Hell” and the state of 
existence the self is willingly oriented to be, “MacDonald’s” equation between what is 
Heaven and what is real is, therefore, inseparable from the reality of the self or the 
interaction between reality (the objectively real) and the self (the subjective existence).   
Just as observed earlier in this discussion, Lewis’s treatment of reality is not 
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dimensions and their existentially meaningful interplay.  To  further  illustrate  Lewis’s 
twofold vision of reality, the evidence could be derived from the contextual fact that 
the whole fantastical drama about the hellish ghosts’ journey to heaven is not confined 
within a single setting—simply of either “Hell” / self or “Heaven” / other / reality.  
The “dramatic arena” actually consists of “settings” that are both within and beyond 
the self.    It is exactly through a series of dramatic encounters and collisions between 
the subjective being and the objective truth (regarding what is heaven and what is 
hell), between selfhood and otherness, and between evil and redemption that “the 
Great Divorce” between “Hell” and “Heaven” is effectively manifested and 
thematized.  In terms of this, (eternal) reality and “Hell” and “Heaven” can all be 
compound referents in the sense that they are notions both subjectively and 
objectively  meaningful.     
  Thematically (and also apologetically), what is at the core of Lewis’s dramatic 
fantasy is the truth that from (human) selfhood can “Hell” or “Heaven” be seen, and 
vice versa.  From the rhetorical perspective, this truth is largely conveyed in the 
voice of an ironist, a manner of expression adopted by Lewis mainly for 
characterizing the hellish ghosts whose performances of their individual personhood 
become, as it were, the very scenario for the whole fantastical drama of “the Great 
Divorce.”    Lewis’s approach to manifest the irony of these hellish beings is basically 
through portraying how these ghosts are addicted to their inconvertible habits of mind 
which are full of tempting blindness of different sorts.  Some typical examples 
include the intellectual passion, as shown in the liberal theologian’s endless seeking 
after knowledge and yet stubborn evasion from acquiring any definite answer to his 
highly intelligent inquiries, and the extremely self-centered love with the tendencies 
either of indulgence in illusionary self-sacrifice yet genuine oppression and 
  135domination over others, like the emotionally frenzied and willfully domineering 
mother, or of overwhelming obsession with self-pity and the sense of being victimized 
in relationship, like the resentful and truly loveless husband, or even victimized by the 
whole world, such as the suicide ghost.  Noticeably, these blind souls are blind 
precisely because they do not have authentic awareness of what they are really 
after—not any object of pursuit or desire they themselves claim, such as knowledge, 
motherly affection or (sexual) love or recognition whatsoever, but their own 
aggrandized selfhood.      It is their self-aggrandizement, which ironically makes them 
so self-imprisoned (135), that their selfhood ultimately becomes as constricted and 
insubstantial as “Hell.”   
Moreover, a keener sense of irony in which Lewis attempts to depict and expose 
the truth about these hellish ghosts’ existence as well as their selfhood could be 
detected from the fact of their being irredeemable souls—inconvertibly hell-bound 
and at the same time hopelessly heaven-repellent.    To be more specific, these hellish 
beings are considered ironic not merely because they all lack true self-understanding 
and possess a commonly hell-like nature but also in the sense that their blind egotism 
makes them so self-willed and unchangeable that they are simply unable or unwilling 
to believe what they are offered in Heaven, e.g., Christ the Saviour, the answer to the 
earthly theological quest, and true love that yields liberty, joy and life.  As a result, 
they would rather be bound to Hell than be saved and enabled to move to Heaven.  
Such a choice, in itself, reflects their state of existence, blind, depraved, resistant to 
reality, and in a word, ironic.  As pointedly observed by “MacDonald,” “[t]here is 
always something they insist on keeping even at the price of misery.    There is always 
something they prefer to joy—that is, to reality” (71).  Ironically, this something, 
whatever it is supposed to be, is, in nature, nothing but “Hell.”       
  Evidently, irony is a convenient rhetorical tool for Lewis the fantasist to do a 
  136perspective drawing of human selfhood—to lay out the problems of the self, 
especially self-centeredness and self-illusion and the related moral ills that tend to veil 
reality and consequently orient the self toward the darkness of Hell.  Yet, within the 
textual space that features not only the fantasist’s practice of literary imagination but 
also his apologetic enterprise, irony actually serves as more than a useful tool for 
dramatic depiction.    In effect, it also functions to impart the Christian writer’s moral 
reflections on the nature of the self and his /her choice displayed in his fantastical 
drama of the meeting and “divorce” of heaven and hell.   From the close link 
between irony and the moral sense of the fantasy, we could go further to hold that 
significantly through his ironic  representation of the self-imprisoned and morally 
impaired beings’ orientation toward Hell does Lewis manage to make his dramatic 
fantasy an implicit yet persuasive case of Christian  “apologetics.”   To  explain  more 
clearly what Lewis’s apologetic investment is about and how it is mediated through 
irony in The Great Divorce, we may once again turn to Kierkegaard, particularly his 
thinking of irony as a meaningful vehicle for imparting existential truth.  The 
reference to Kierkegaard can be proved justifiable on account of the congeniality 
between Kierkegaard’s philosophical conception of irony and Lewis’s employment of 
irony as his important medium of reflection.      As far as Lewis’s apologetic reflection 
underlying The Great Divorce is concerned, Kierkegaard, as an existentialist thinker 
about irony, discernibly shares with Lewis (the apologetic fantasist) the similar 
concerns with such important issues as human existence / self, reality, and the ironic 
truth about their relationship.     
As we can see within the following illuminating discussion of Kierkegaard’s 
ideas made by D. J. Enright, the author of The Alluring Problem: An Essay on Irony, 
these key issues, namely, irony, existence and reality, are significantly combined in 
Kierkegaard’s thinking.    In terms of Kierkegaard,   
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it might seem that irony is a cure for all moral ills, in that it ‘limits, renders 
finite, defines, and thereby yields truth, actuality, and content’, and 
moreover ‘chastens’ and punishes and thereby imparts stability, character, 
and consistency’, . . . he [Kierkegaard] penetrates to the heart of irony in 
submitting that, when mastered (i.e. not merely employed in passing or 
casually), it ‘actualizes actuality’: which is to say, it dispels illusion, 




Enright’s accurate and penetrating statement quoted here captures the double, 
potentially dialectical characters of irony—negativity and transcendence—informed 
by Kierkegaard’s formulation of irony.  In The Concept of Irony, Kierkegaard 
describes irony as “infinite absolute negativity,” a Hegelian formula which 
Kierkegaard expounds as follows: “[Irony] is negativity because it only negates; it is 
infinite because it negates not this or that phenomenon; and it is absolute because it 
negates by virtue of a higher which is not.    Irony establishes nothing, for that which 
is to be established lies behind it.”
149  In this explication, definitely influenced by 
Hegel’s Idealistic point of view, Kierkegaard defines irony according to its 
double-edged qualities or functions: on the one side, irony is fundamentally 
subversive, ceaselessly engaged in disrupting any reference of mere “appearance” to 
“essence”
150 through laying bare the “non-reality” of objects (or subjects) existent 
within “phenomena”; on the other side, it is “essentially transcending,” capable of 
“pointing toward a ‘higher and as yet undisclosed reality,”
151 that is, the “essence” 
                                                 
148  D. J. Enright, The Alluring Problem: An Essay on Irony (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 
9. 
149 Kierkegaard,  The Concept of Irony, p. 278. 
150  Earlier in his treatise, The Concept of Irony, Kierkegaard infers that emerging from the ironic 
speech act of “say[ing] the opposite of what is meant” is “a determination present in all forms of irony, 
namely the phenomenon is not the essence but the opposite of the essence.”    P. 264.     
151  This phrase is borrowed from Harvie Ferguson, who remarks, “for Hegel, the essentially 
transcending character of irony, which always points towards a ‘higher’ and as yet undisclosed reality.”   
See his Melancholy and the Critique of Modernity: Søren Kierkegaard’s Religious Psychology.    P. 41. 
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of irony, which means that the act of irony involves the double dealing of negating the 
reality of phenomenal existences, owing to which the concealments of reality, like 
blindness and moral ills, may be dissipated, and on the other hand, revealing or at 
least acknowledging the very existence of reality.  To put in another way, the 
dialectic of irony works through transcending its own negativity, which eventually 
enables irony to actualize actuality, to cause, as it were, a possible removal or 
transference from nothingness to reality to happen to the beings who are de-actualized 
by deception, illusion or simply “assertive subjectivity”
152 and therefore subject to 
perpetual negation.   
      From a religious perspective, how can irony, with such dialectic characteristics, 
channel the replacement of the existential subject’s “being-in-itself” into a state of 
actuality, which, in Christian sense, means a redeemed state already residing in 
Ultimate Reality, or Heaven, as suggested in Lewis’s fantasy of The Great Divorce?  
In fact, this “replacement” back into reality / Heaven is the very expectation, at least 
from the heaven’s angle, that the occasions of the meeting between the hellish and the 
celestial, the self-enclosed beings of non-substance and the solid existences of reality, 
look to fulfill but mostly fail.  What (the hell) is going wrong? And how can the 
wrongs be possibly right again if given a chance?  These may be the questions that 
the apologetic fantasist would like to ask and tackle.    But, as readers of the religious 
fantasy featured by Lewis’s ironic reflection upon separation or union between 
(subjective) beings and reality, we may wonder how his apologetic response to this 
“either-or” situation has to do with the ironic way of showing it.   To figure out the 
                                                 
152  According to Kierkegaard, “assertive subjectivity” is a crucial causation of irony, a notion derived 
from his following statements: “when subjectivity asserts itself, irony appears.    Subjectivity feels 
itself confronted by the given actuality, feels its own power, its own validity and significance” (The 
Concept of Irony, 280).  
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investment, exhibited in Lewis’s fantasy, Kierkegaard undoubtedly also has great 
insights to offer.     
For instance, in the quotation below from The Concept of Irony, Kierkegaard 
most insightfully draws association as well as distinction between irony and “religious 
devotion.”  Kierkegaard’s distinct and profound understanding of the meaning of 
religious piety as a most “adequate” mindset of the self toward reality (i.e., God) and 
his perspicacious analysis of how irony can be near to yet also very far from 
becoming such a devout mind can surely illuminate our apologetic reading of The 
Great Divorce, which also means to inspect the ironic beings’ problem of faith 
reflected in their want of an adequately receptive mind for the actuality given by 
reality / Heaven.  In fact, it can be demonstrated that Kierkegaard’s comparison and 
contrast between irony and the faithful self’s religious bond with reality is in great 
kinship with the correlation between selfhood and the problem of faith manifested in 
Lewis’s dramatic fantasy.  Beginning with the religious quality of irony, the 
following passage shows Kierkegaard’s ingenious comparison between irony and 
“religious devotion” firstly in terms of their (seeming) similarity and then through an 
elaboration of how the devout mind relates itself to God, the “absolute reality” and 
how it “locates” its own subjectivity or “personality” in this relationship and lastly by 
emphasizing the essential quality of the “ironic subject,” namely, the “infinite 
absolute negativity” which sets its own subjectivity vacuously free, to manifest the 
striking contrast between the two sets of mind: 
 
insofar as irony becomes conscious of the fact that existence has no reality, 
thereby expressing the same thesis as the pious disposition, it might seem 
that irony were a species of religious devotion.  In religious devotion, if I 
may be permitted to put it this way, the lesser actuality, that is to say, the 
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as the relationship to God at the same moment asserts its absolute reality. 
The devout mind also affirms that all is vanity, but this is only insofar as 
this negation thrusts aside all interference and allows the eternally existent 
to become manifest.  Add to this that when the devout mind perceives all 
is vanity, it makes no exception regarding its own person, makes no fuss 
respecting itself; on the contrary, this, too, must be thrust aside so the divine 
will not be impeded by its resistance, but pour itself out in the mind made 
receptive by religious devotion.    Indeed, we see from the more penetrating 
writings for edification that the pious mind regards its own finite personality 
as the most wretched of all.  With irony, on the other hand, when 
everything else becomes vain, subjectivity becomes free.  And the more 
vain everything becomes, so much the lighter, more vacuous, more 
evanescent becomes subjectivity.  Whereas everything else becomes vain, 
the ironic subject does not himself become vain but saves his own vanity.
153    
                                   
  
Noticeably, Kierkegaard’s penetrating exposition concerning the similarity and 
dissimilarity between irony and the “religious devotion” puts tremendous stress on the 
relationship between subjectivity and reality.  Though both ascribe non-reality to 
existence, a sort of transcending, or if you like, Idealistic, reality-beyond-existence 
awareness, the devout and godly one willingly gives away subjectivity to Ultimate 
Reality (God) and thereby becomes being of (eternal) “actuality,” while the ironic 
subject is, by contrast, faithful to no reality outside its own subjectivity and out of 
self-will and vanity perpetuates its absolutely negative freedom and also its 
“being-as-nothingness.”  This clear and poignant contrast, in another word, is a 
contrast between faith and self-belief or self-worship.  Kierkegaard’s insight is 
obviously associable with Lewis’s polarized depiction of the godly spirits in Heaven, 
who are of course the faithful party with religious devotion, and the ghostly group 
from Hell, who are rendered as nothing but victims or captives of their own 
                                                 
153 Kierkegaard,  The Concept of Irony, p. 274-275. 
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their free will simply makes them insubstantial, hell-bound, and perpetually ironic.     
  Indeed, Kierkegaard’s examination of irony, or ironic subjectivity, against 
devotional sensibility on existential and religious levels, is most enlightening to an 
apologetic reading of the ironic selfhood represented by those self-determined beings 
of Hell in Lewis’s fantasy.  Evidently, in either Kierkegaard’s discourse or Lewis’s 
ironic characterization, existence and irony are treated or can be considered as a joint 
issue.  Besides, another important commonality shared by Kierkegaard’s philosophy 
of irony and Lewis’s irony-mediated fantasy lies in the fact that both of them are 
imbued with a sense of (Christian)  theology.  In  Kierkegaard’s case, this is definitely 
true at least in the previous quotation wherein ironic subjectivity is probed into 
against the faithful mind’s actuality which is gained through self-emptying piety 
toward Reality / God.    This philosophically ingenious observation about the contrast 
between ironic and religious states of mind is clearly invested with deep theological 
significance.    As pointed out previously, Kierkegaard’s contrast is made on the basis 
of the religious meaning, indeed, a theological understanding, of the relationship 
between subjectivity and absolute reality.  In terms of Kierkegaard, this relationship 
is fulfilled in the faithful  self with religious devotion yet unrealized in the ironic 
subject whose trust is not to be put in any otherness, including that of divine reality, 
but absolutely saved for the selfhood—of negativity, vanity and non-reality.  The 
same distinction figured out by Kierkegaard’s religion-concerned philosophy of irony 
could be seen in Lewis’s Christian fantasy about the ironic selfhood preferring hell to 
heaven.  Lewis is most akin to Kierkegaard precisely in the theological 
presupposition shared between them that subjectivity is void of substance or actuality 
unless the (free) subject is spiritually integrated by turning away from the self toward 
God, the Reality, which is a free move and self-choice of converting to faith, even if it 
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self.”
154  
  Noticeably, not only Lewis but also Kierkegaard puts serious emphasis on the 
divorced state in the relationship between human existence and God, i.e., the ultimate 
/ absolute reality.  In fact, both of their practices in reflecting upon such a 
relationship at either existential or religious level could be associated with a certain 
sense of Christian existentialism,
155 which, far from the existentialism upheld by 
nihilistic and atheistic thinkers, such as Jean-Paul Sartre, is basically a “Christian 
mode of thinking” about the relationship between the individual person and reality 
from “a subjective point of view” and within the frame of Christian faith, as 
exemplified by Pascal and Kierkegaard and could even be linked with St. Augustine’s 
spiritual and theological exercise of “confessions” as well.    C. S. Lewis too, to some 
extent, can be regarded as a (literary) practitioner of Christian existentialism, which is 
most conspicuously reflected in his literary motifs, such as the individual self’s state 
of mind / being in the midst of spiritual struggles and the necessity of regenerating the 
(finite) self, that is, undergoing, in a religious sense, the spiritual death and rebirth of 
the self in the process of wrestling with subjective experiences, in intellect, heart or 
emotion, of the conflict and disunion between the disintegrated (e.g., ironic) selfhood 
and the divine other (i.e., reality).  These subjective issues are indeed recurrently 
treated in many a text of Lewis’s apologetic literature, like the allegory of The 
                                                 
154  This phrase of Lewis’s is derived from his book, English Literature in the Sixteenth Century, 
Excluding Drama (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954).    In the passage about Protestant theology, Lewis 
writes, “The man who has passed through [the religious experience of catastrophic conversion is] like 
an accepted lover,    . . . feel[ing] that he has done nothing, and never could have done anything, to 
deserve such astonishing happiness . . . All the initiative has been on God’s side; all has been free, 
unbounded grace . . . It is faith alone that has saved him: faith bestowed by sheer gift.    From this 
buoyant humility, this farewell to the self with all its good resolutions, anxiety, scruples, and 
motive-scratchings, all the Protestant doctrines sprang.”    P. 33.       
155  The attempt here to define the term “Christian existentialism” used in the present discussion of the 
similarity between Kierkegaard and Lewis is based on the ideas developed and explicated by David E. 
Roberts in his book, Existentialism and Religious Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957).   
The following quotations are derived from the “Introduction” of the book.    Pp. 3-11. 
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irony-mediated fantasies of The Screwtape Letters and  The Great Divorce.  
Underlying all these texts is a repeatedly underscored moral given by the allegorical 
or mythic or ironic or simply existentialist Lewis concerning how to grapple with the 
lack of actuality or integrity of the self.  As to the healing or ultimate resolution of 
such a not merely existential but also religious problem, that is, in Kiekegaardian 
terms, the key to “actualizing actuality” of the self, Lewis’s answer, in his apologetic 
undertone, is again focused on the free subject.   In other words, it is still a matter of 
self-choice—between the self and the “leap of faith” (out of the self) into reality.   
Obviously, such an apologetic indication within a variety of Lewis’s literary texts is 
touched by an undeniable sense of Christian existentialism.
156  That is to say, both 
Lewis’s literary theme about the severed relationship between subjectivity and reality 
and his implied apologetic attempt at reintegrating the self, or re-actualizing ironic 
subjectivity through underlining the significant role of faith for its fulfillment are, on 
the one hand, governed by an existentialist manner of thinking and on the other hand 
fundamentally informed by Christian theology.   
In  The Screwtape Letters, for instance, within the “devil-viewed” text that 
subjects human existence to the malign and ironic scrutiny and devaluation of the 
devil-tempter, Lewis implicitly and persuasively embeds his apologetic and definitely 
theologically-based idea that the identity of humanity can hopefully, indeed, actually, 
escape from being pinned down by the devil’s ironic discourse, if the human self 
remains faithful throughout his earthly pilgrimage.   Especially toward the end of 
the whole (theological) fantasy, it is strongly suggested that this very hope of being 
                                                 
156  It can be evidenced that the theme and approach of Lewis are both in line with the contents of 
existentialism, as stated by David E. Roberts: “the most basic, inner problems” that existentialism deals 
with include “what it means to be a self” and “how we ought to use our freedom;” also, the objective of 
the existentialist approach, namely, wrestling with these problems from “a subjective point of view,” is 
to bring the individual self-growth “into personal authenticity” and a “deepened” and “clarified” 
relationship with reality.    See Existentialism and Religious Belief, p. 4, 7-8.     
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through the salvation promised by Christian faith.   This apologetic idea of being 
saved out of irony (or ironic existence) through faith is reiterated subtly and more 
dramatically in the “moral” of Lewis’s another equally theologically informative 
fantasy, The Great Divorce.      The moral of this dramatic fantasy can be summed up 
by such a simple fact: the (human) self either lives by self-dependent and 
self-enclosed subjectivity, which means ultimately a “non-reality” (or hellish) state of 
existence, or chooses to step out of the insubstantial selfhood to become substantiated 
and actualized as a (heavenly) being of Reality.  The latter option means, in another 
word, to leave ironic subjectivity behind and become a convert to Christian faith.  
From an existentialist standpoint, to make this option work depends on the self-choice 
of the free subject, i.e., the human individual.    Yet, from the theological perspective, 
it is absolutely justifiable for Lewis, a (Protestant) Christian fantasist, to 
counterbalance this subjective factor with the objective truth that salvation is really 
initiated and worked out by divine grace even if it cannot be enacted without the 
subjective assent made by the willing, receptive and believing self.  After all, one  is 
saved not only “through belief in the truth” but also “through the sanctifying work of 
the Spirit” (Cf. 2 Thessalonians 2:13 NIV). 
In other words, it is impossible to approach a religious issue, such as salvation, 
simply in existentialist terms, namely, from an exclusively subjective point of view.  
Rather, the principle proclaimed by religious faith, i.e., Christian theology, is 
significantly indispensable.  In The Great Divorce, Lewis, in a comprehensive 
manner, depicts how the redemption of the hellish being is carried into effect—by 
means of both the subjective volition and the divine aid of sanctifying, e.g., 
solidifying and transforming, the (phantasmagoric) self.  This is shown in the only 
one scene with the Bright Spirit successfully talking the sensualist ghost into 
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symbolized by “a little red lizard” sitting on his shoulder and “twitching its tail like a 
whip and whispering things in his ear” (107), this sensually gripped ghost firstly 
undergoes what could be called a pretext of salvation, that is, the spiritual struggle of 
giving consent either to the temptation of sin or to the agency of sanctification.  At 
last, out of his free choice of the latter, the ghost becomes the sole “fruit of salvation” 
in the whole fantastical drama of the encounter between hell and heaven.  The 
following tripartite conversations among the ghost, the “lizard” and the spirit lucidly 
and dramatically demonstrate such a pretext and the dynamic process of redemption: 
 
 
The Angel’s hands were almost closed on the Lizard, but not quite. Then the 
Lizard began chattering to the Ghost    . . .   
‘Be careful,’ it said.  ‘ . . . He can kill me.  One fatal word from you 
and he will!  .  .  . He doesn’t understand.  He’s only a cold, bloodless 
abstract thing.  It may be natural for him, but it isn’t for us.  .  .  .    
I’ll give you nothing but really nice dreams—all sweet and fresh and almost 
innocent.    You might say, quite innocent . . .’   
‘Have I your permission?’ said the Angel to the Ghost. 
‘I know it will kill me.’ 
‘It won’t.    But supposing it did?’ 
‘You’re right.    It would be better to be dead than to live with this 
creature.’ 
‘Then I may?’ 
‘Damn and blast you!  Go on, can’t you?  Get it over.  Do what you 
like,’ bellowed the Ghost: but ended, whimpering, ‘God help me.  God 
help  me.’   
Next moment the Ghost gave a scream of agony  . . . The Burning One 
closed his crimson grip on the reptile    . . . and then flung it, broken backed, 
on the turf.    (110-111) 
 
 
So far as salvation is concerned, what is theologically meaningful in this conversion 
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process with the self determining to receive the divine grace mediated and executed 
by the surgeon-like Angel.    In charge of sanctifying the Ghost through exterminating 
the damned creature, i.e., the Lizard (symbol of his lechery), which is exactly the 
sinful and hellish mark of his soul, the Angel, according to Lewis’s depiction, would 
not take action until it is granted by the self wanting out of the old, depraved selfhood 
and into faith, which means re-orientation of the self to salvation and Reality.  That 
is to say, it is strongly suggested that redemption of the self really takes the 
co-working of the subjective (willing act of faith) and the divine (operation / action of 
grace).    
  Moreover, in the same scene of the damned ghost becoming a convert seeking 
for divine salvation through the aid of the Angel, Lewis also displays dramatically 
what makes a convert a convert—in psychological terms.  Evidently, the moment 
this ghost decides that “to be dead” is even better than “to live with” “the damned 
thing [or sin]” (109) which preoccupies, predominates and even defines his 
personhood as well as his old, natural state of being, he comes to the very point of 
converting  his mindset from doubt to faith.   From this coincidence, it could be 
inferred that the meaning of being a convert to faith is more than simply determining 
to cease listening to doubt, which is a consequence, merely the effect, of conversion.  
The cause as well as the real motive of becoming a convert actually comes from a 
suicidal state of mind, or more specifically, a desire for the death of the natural, fallen 
and sinful state of the self.    To put it more positively, this desire for self-death can be 
simultaneously a desire for self-transcendence.  To fulfill such a (possibly 
ambivalent) desire, Lewis’s ghostly convert, therefore, comes to put his faith in 
supernatural salvation.  This may explain how come this sexually obsessed and 
captivated ghost finally allows the Angel to deal with the Lizard and set him free from 
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well.    
For the convert-ghost whose mind has been reset to prefer death to a life of sin 
and become accordingly re-oriented from indulgence in the hellish habits to seeking 
for salvation offered by Heaven, to be dead is certainly not the ultimate destiny of his 
self.    What happens next after he chooses death for his life-bond with the Lizard (the 
symbol of carnal pleasures), after the Angel’s drastic work uproots his damned soul 
out of Hell, while silencing once for all the damned reptile’s whispering of doubt to 
dissuade its enslaved master, the ghost himself, from conversion to Heaven?    In fact, 
upon receiving the divine operation (of killing the sinful selfhood), this ghost also 
undergoes a fantastic transformation from a damned, insubstantial and phantasmal 
being to a redeemed, solidified and totally “new-made man” (102).  Such a 
metamorphosis is absolutely supernatural, since it is all done “by divine grace”
157 to 
re-make the natural state of existence—hellish and with no substance and reality, as a 
result of being ironically de-materialized and de-actualized by the evil of indulgence 
in fleshly lust.  Thanks to divine sanctification and salvation, the ghost gets 
re-materialized through a process of “actual completing of a man” (111, emphasis 
added).    His restored manhood is described as “immense” in size, “not much smaller 
than the Angel” (111), and full of glowing brightness and celestial solidness.  In 
Kierkegaardian terms, his ironic subjectivity is now de-ironized seeing that it has been 
endowed with actuality in place of “absolute infinite negativity.”  To put in another 
way, this ghost’s ironic state of being is definitely transcended and replaced by the 
redeemed selfhood; growing into a complete man and shining with heavenly glory, he 
                                                 
157  In his book, Studies in Words (Cambridge U. P., 1960), Lewis gives a “theological” definition of the 
word “supernatural:” “whatever a man is enabled to receive or do by divine grace, and not by the 
exercise of his own nature, is supernatural” (Lewis, 61).    This definition definitely fits in with the 
theological significance of his fantastical drawing of what supernatural salvation does to a human soul.         
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eternally damned by evil temptation—and become, so to speak, a new creature of 
Reality.  The glorious and self-transcending rebirth of the convert-ghost, 
theologically speaking, signals the fulfillment of what Kierkegaard terms, the 
“expectation of faith,” that is, victory in eternity.
158  
More than that, the fantastic and amazing metamorphosis happens even to the 
Lizard as well—being turned into a magnificent “stallion,” “silvery white but with 
mane and tail of gold” (111).    The last scene of the transformed pair, the “new-made 
man” and the “new horse,” is tremendously meaningful, especially regarding 
Christian salvation: “In joyous haste the young man leaped upon the horse’s back.  
Turning in his seat he waved a farewell, then nudged the stallion with his heels” (112, 
emphasis added).  In such a farewell scene, what is most striking is not simply the 
physical metamorphoses of both the ghost and his reptile companion but also, more 
significantly, the qualitative change in their relationship.  Before redemption, the 
ghost was situated within a hopeless predicament of being totally unable to keep a 
tight rein on the Lizard sitting on his shoulder, the embodiment of irresistible 
temptation of carnal desires without control.  But now the post-redemption situation 
is quite a sharp contrast.    Empowered by divine salvation, the convert-ghost appears 
no longer under the domination of temptation.  On the contrary, we are given a 
victorious picture with the redeemed man riding on and fully controlling the 
transformed creature, a beautifully conveyed image of the concord, even harmonious 
union between the new man and the new horse.    Undoubtedly a product of salvation, 
such a state of harmony is absolutely beyond Hell (and irony) but pertains to the 
realm of everlasting joy, peace, and love, namely, Heaven and Reality.  Moreover, 
                                                 
158  According to Kierkegaard, in Edifying Discourses, faith is “the eternal power in man,” and the 
“expectation of faith” is “victory.”    P. 34. 
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ahead to enter into deeper Heaven, is subtly but strongly suggestive of the twofold 
status of his new existence—both a genuine “divorce” with Hell, his pre-redeemed 
ironic selfhood and a (restored) union with Heaven, which is, in the sense of Christian 
faith, the Ultimate Reality.    In the light of this understanding, this farewell to the self 
scene could be regarded as summing up the apologetic significance C. S. Lewis 
embeds within the whole fantasy of The Great Divorce: the eternal reality of the 
“great divorce” between heaven and hell reflects not just the religious truth about the 
supernatural and the objective but also the existential  truth about the ultimate 
self-choice  of  the  human  subject.      
Needless to say, to interpret the fantasy in accordance with Lewis’s apologetic 
intent as such requires the willing suspension of disbelief of the non-Christian readers 
as well as the exercise of the theological pre-understanding of the believing readers.   
Yet, to both kinds of readership, there are actually similar hermeneutical principles to 
follow in approaching a literary text, like fantasy, not just its theological subject.  
Perhaps the most basic and important hermeneutical rule is to remain open-minded to 
be the right reader of fantasy and allow it, including its form and sense, to work upon 
the mind.  In his essay, “Sometimes Fairy Stories May Say Best What’s to Be 
Said,”
159 Lewis, in the voice of a literary critic, makes the following lucid and 
sophisticated explication about the power of the art of fantasy, which to some extent 
touches upon the issue of appropriate reception or readership of fantastic or mythical 
literature:   
 
 
The Fantastic or Mythical is a Mode available at all ages for some readers; 
                                                 
159 See  C. S. Lewis Essay Collection: Literature, Philosophy and Short Stories.  Ed.  Lesley  Wamsley.  
London: HarperCollins Publishers, 2000.    Pp. 118-120.    The quotation below appears on p. 120. 
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the right reader, it has the same power: to generalise while remaining 
concrete, to present in palpable form not concepts or even experiences but 
whole classes of experience, and to throw off irrelevancies.  But at best it 
can do more; it can give us experiences we have never had and thus, instead 
of ‘commenting on life’, can add to it.    I am speaking, of course, about the 
thing itself, not my attempts at it.      (Emphasis added) 
  
 
Even though Lewis modestly dissociates these elucidative ideas about how powerful 
the fantastic mode can be from his own literary attempts at making fantasy, it is 
actually fitting and illuminatingly helpful to apply Lewis’s views about what fantasy 
can do to readers to the reading experience of his fantasies.  Indeed, in The Great 
Divorce as well as in The Screwtape Letters, Lewis’s fantastic manifestation of the 
interactive relationship between the objective / supernatural and the subjective / 
existential, on the one hand, exhibits representatively and symbolically the realistic 
and even ironic truth about human selfhood.  On the other hand, owing to its 
“metaphoricity”—the essential nature of these fantastical texts deeply informed by 
Christian theology and imbued with some significant sense of Lewis’s “apologetic” 
response to the problematic self-choice of evil / hell rather than faith / heaven, 
Lewis’s portrayal of the interaction of human subjectivity with either evil temptation 
or heavenly salvation is pointing to a reality which is spiritually and eternally true, 
that is, beyond the merely existential and temporal.     
In other words, in Lewis’s fantastic world, the realistic and the fantastic, 
subjectivity and supernaturality, co-exist and even correlate with each other.   
Furthermore, within Lewis’s fantastic imagination, their co-existence and correlation 
are not only realistically true but also supernaturally real.  This is to a great extent 
because Lewis’s Christian fantasy is abundant with what Paul Ricoeur terms the 
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160  However,  regarding  the  question 
about how persuasive the meaning of reality imagined or redescribed by it, it is again 
a hermeneutic issue about right readership.  Therefore, it is worth reiterating that 
without the reader’s willingness to follow the Christian fantasist to enter into his 
imaginative world with the structure of meaning metaphorically located within the 
domain of Christian faith and theology, he or she could not really share Lewis’s 
apologetic vision of Reality and the implied answer to transcend the irony of human 
selfhood subjected to the temptation of Hell.   Only if Lewis’s vision as well as his 
answer is seriously, or better, positively, taken, the reader may feel that the experience 
of seeing through Lewis’s art of fantasy-making, as he does in The Great Divorce and 
The Screwtape Letters, is something like embarking on a pilgrimage, not just in a 
pagan, e.g., Platonic
161, sense of the word, but, more precisely, in the sense of 







                                                 
160  This idea is derived from Ricoeur’s insightful remark on the power of metaphor to impart “reality” 
in his influential book, The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in 
Language    (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, trans. Robert Czerny with Kathleen 
McLaughlin and John Costello).    In the “Introduction” Ricoeur states the gist of this book, saying that 
the “most important theme” of the work is that “metaphor is the rhetorical process by which discourse 
unleashes the power that certain fictions have to redescribe reality.” P. 6.   
161  The Platonic sense of “the pilgrimage from appearance to reality” here is borrowed from Iris 
Murdoch’s work, The Fire and the Sun (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977).    In her concluding 
exposition and in some degrees, critique, of Plato’s philosophy, particularly Plato’s opposition to art as 
legitimate conveyor of “truth,” Murdoch makes her acute observation, which is illuminatingly relevant 
to the present discussion about the correlation between art and reality to be detected in Lewis’s 
theological fantasies: “Art is about the pilgrimage from appearance to reality (the subject of every good 
play and novel) and exemplifies in spite of Plato what his philosophy teaches concerning the therapy of 
the soul.”    The Fire and the Sun, p. 80. 
  152Ch. VI.  Myth, (Jungian) Psychology of Religion and the Mystical Sense in 
Till We Have Faces 
 
 
“If God chooses to be mythopoeic—and is not the sky itself a myth? —shall we refuse to 
be mythopoetic?  For this is the marriage of heaven and earth: Perfect Myth and Perfect 
Fact: claiming not only our love and our obedience, but also our wonder and delight    . . .”   




The observation that the reader can be, if willingly, existentially engaged with a 
textual pilgrimage from appearance to reality in Pagan (i.e., Platonic) or Christian 
sense is verifiable in the experience of almost all of C. S. Lewis’s religious narratives. 
Undoubtedly, it can be validated in one way or another by all the texts treated in this 
research.  Also, it is detectable that the central and recurrent motif of Lewis’s 
narratives is the inter-relationship between individual existence and transcendence.  
The interpretations offered above are, in fact, aimed at elaborating this important 
motif of Lewis’s apologetic literature.    Indeed, there is strong evidence that the issue 
of union or disunion between the self and the divine preoccupies either Lewis’s 
allegorical concretization of a modern individual’s Joy-initiated journey toward 
conversion (The Pilgrim’s Regress) or his fantastical imagination about the human 
subject’s orientation towards either Heaven or Hell (The Screwtape Letters and The 
Great Divorce).  Within these texts, the everyday and existential is co-existent and 
even interconnected with the eternal and universal.  This important concern of 
Lewis’s is associated with an essential quality of his literary apologetics in content, if 
not in form, namely, the mythopoeic, which, according to Lewis, is relevant to “the 
predicament of humanity” (or simply to “humanity”) and essentially concerned with 
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162  Discernible in Lewis’s apologetic allegory and 
theological fantasies dealing with the encounter of the human self with the 
trans-mortal and trans-temporal, the mythopoeic element can also be profoundly 
sensed in his myth-rewritten novel, Till We Have Faces, with its in-depth treatment of 
the entangled problem of the self and the truth about the divine, not to mention its 
close connection with a Greek myth, the ancient tale of love between Cupid and 
Psyche.  
Evidently, the twofold concern with human subjectivity and supernaturality is 
fundamental to a close understanding of the kind of reality envisioned within the texts 
of Lewis’s literary apologetics and also the calling forth of our existential response in 
the process of reading these texts.  What is exactly this reality that both the textual 
space and the hermeneutical experience of Lewis’s religious narratives inhabit or 
involve?  Actually, it is one of the central ideas this study attempts to maintain and 
demonstrate that what is real in the context of Lewis’s literary apologetics pertains not 
only to the metaphysical / spiritual universe but also to the individual self and 
furthermore to the relationship between the two.  Indeed, without this double and 
compound notion of reality in mind, one can neither appreciate profoundly the 
mythopoeic quality of Lewis’s narratives nor carry out rigorous analyses of how 
Lewis the imaginative and apologetic writer tackles and probes into the existential 
problem of faith.  Lewis’s approach, on the whole, can be viewed as partaking in a 
Christian existentialist endeavour to “diagnose” and wrestle with the spiritual 
phenomenon of the human self’s alienation from, or worse, antagonism against, the 
Ultimate Reality, i.e., God—through penetrating into and digging out the covered 
truth about the self, in intellectual, moral and psychological respects.     
                                                 
162  Lewis’s essay, “The Mythopoeic Gift of Rider Haggard,” C. S. Lewis Essay Collection: Literature, 
Philosophy and Short Stories, p. 153, 154. 
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boundaries of disciplines, which basically include literature (in varied modes), 
religion (of many an aspect—theological, epistemological, ethical, psychological) and 
also philosophy (regarding existential and sometimes ontological questions).  In 
terms of this, the interpretative approach to Lewis’s apologetic literature (or, literary 
apologetics,) must be accordingly multi-disciplinary as well.  The interdisciplinary 
study undertaken in the discussion below about the text of Till We Have Faces will 
cover such special areas as mythopoeic literature, the psychology of religion, and a 
certain kind of mysticism (particularly related to psychological and theological 
understandings of religious experience).   
Following the comparative study between Lewis and Kierkegaard in terms of 
Christian existentialism and the rhetoric of irony done in the previous chapters, the 
present task of exploring Lewis’s last imaginative work, Till We Have Faces (1956), 
intends to focus on its depth psychology in characterization alongside its profound 
and ingenious portrayal of an unbelieving individual’s self-growth in personality and 
spirituality as an intertwined experience.  Apologetically speaking, this mythic text 
carries its own distinctive core message, different from, say, what the fantasy of The 
Great Divorce purports to communicate—substantiation (i.e., redemption) of the 
hell-bound self’s ironic being is premised on the existential subject’s willingness to be 
restored by Heaven, that is, to be re-united with Ultimate Reality, i.e., God.  
Centered upon the leading character’s double estrangement from her self and the 
divine other, the narrative of Till We Have Faces, on the one hand, does give 
expression to the dominant theme of Lewis’s religious literature—the interaction and 
meeting between reality of the self and reality of the divine—shared by the other three 
texts discussed formerly.  However, the key import of this mythic novel is still 
distinct from Lewis’s other books of literary apologetics.  Its focal concern is about 
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integrity—psychic and spiritual.  This, of course, is not an explicitly, or 
straightforwardly, apologetics-related concern.  However, in a broad sense of the 
word apologetics, we can still sense, if not argue, that a Christian outlook and mindset 
is governing and underlying Lewis’s mythic conveyance of the warring situation of a 
human mind against the religious meaning which is subjectively or existentially real 
as well as against the spiritual reality which is objectively true.  To Lewis, as 
indicated by this mythic text and other religious narratives, the problem of faith or 
belief is not a problem of supernatural reality after all, but a problem of the human 
self’s  own.    
    Continuing such a significant theme of Lewis’s apologetic literature, this 
myth-retelling work still stands out in content as well as in form.    This last (wholly) 
imaginative work of Lewis’s
163 is the first book in which the thematic focus is put 
upon an individual self’s internal conflictions and struggles.  Gradually but 
penetratingly, the text itself becomes a documentation of the process of the central 
character’s coming to know her true self, which is followed by her knowing what is 
true about the transcendent and eventually her achieving reconciliation in personal 
relationships.    As regards the form of expression, the critic, William Gray, makes the 
following convincingly pointed comments: “Till We Have Faces is in 
form    . . .almost unrecognizable as Lewis’s work . . . having that most characteristic 
device of the modern novel, an unreliable narrator.”
164  Indeed, that the whole 
narrative is structured as the heroine’s writing down her life-experience of love and 
hate, which turns out to be not merely a writing but a self-discovering process, does 
                                                 
163  Three years later than the publication of Till We Have Faces, Lewis’s wrote A Grief Observed after 
the death of his wife, Joy Davidman, although the latter is arguably an autobiographical work rather 
than a real fiction.     
164  William Gray, “Consummatum Est: Tales of Love and Death,” C. S. Lewis, p. 91. 
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observation that with such a first-person narrative which invites interpretation on 
different levels, such as the questions about the authenticity of writing itself, 
subjective (sub)consciousness, self-understanding or self-deception, C. S. Lewis 
demonstrates his novel writing technique not really out of tune with modern literature 
after  all.   
Nonetheless, it is equally undeniable that through using a Greek myth as the 
source tale of his mythic fiction, Lewis shows, perhaps more consciously, not just his 
love for this classical story-telling form but also his attempt to re-awaken the long, 
universal and for Lewis, indestructible, enjoyment of myth.  Concerning Lewis’s 
engaging himself in inter-mixing the ancient mythology with his imaginative writing 
of Christian literature, Doris Myers observes that Lewis’s first purpose in writing this 
myth-refashioned novel is to “vindicate the classical literature he loved so much by 
giving it a place within the Christian explanation of the universe.”
165  It  is  absolutely 
certain that C. S. Lewis is always a strong lover and even defender of myth and its 
value, whereas the link between the mythic storyline in the novel and the Christian 
worldview is quite another issue.  In some sense, it remains a controversial point 
about how far the novel, even its mythical element, is to be taken as an embodiment 
of Christian belief.   Colin Manlove, in his book, Christian Fantasy: From 1200 to 
the Present, includes Lewis’s Till We Have Faces in the category of what he names 
“modern Christian fantasy,” referred to the works of those Christian writers, including 
George MacDonald, Charles Kingsley, Charles Williams, J. R. R. Tolkein and C. S. 
Lewis.  According to Manlove’s concise definition, “Christian fantasy” means “a 
fiction dealing with the Christian supernatural, often in an imagined world.”
166  I n  
                                                 
165 Doris  Myers,  C. S. Lewis in Context, p. 213.   
166  In further details, Manlove goes on explaining that their works are characteristic of “giv[ing] 
substantial and unambiguous place to other worlds, angels, devils, Christ figures, miraculous or 
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traditional trait of fantasy demonstrated in Spenser’s works (such as Legend of 
Holiness), alludes to Christianity “as it were heavily disguised.”
167  Taking Lewis’s 
lion Aslan as an example of fairy tale version of the Christ figure, Manlove 
furthermore makes a very pertinent observation: “the Christian truth in [Lewis’s] 
retelling of the Cupid and Psyche myth in Till We Have Faces (1956) is still more 
deeply hidden.”
168  In this sense, supposing that there can be any associations 
between Lewis’s mythic novel and his Christian belief, the making of that association, 
more possibly relies on the readers than on Lewis the author of the novel.       
Next, Myers makes another assertion that Lewis’s novel also serves to counter 
the modern trend of demythologizing the Gospels, fostered by some Nineteenth and 
early Twentieth Century biblical critics who assume that the Gospels are made up of 
historically unverifiable, essentially mythical and most importantly non-factual 
narratives.  The anti-demythologizing position and practice of C. S. Lewis is 
discernible in his mythic work, which, in terms of Myers, is written to reverse that 
assumption by “showing how the myth of Psyche could be based on historical 
fact;”
169 “historical” here certainly speaks of the context within the imaginative text.  
Myers’ assertion about Lewis’s counter-demythologizing attempt could be deemed 
valid if we take into account Lewis’s far more explicit endeavour, albeit not exactly 
by literary means, to counter-argue the “demythologizing theology” which dominates 
biblical hermeneutics at Lewis’s time.  For example, in a paper entitled, “Modern 
Theology and Biblical Criticism,” originally a speech delivered to theological 
students at Cambridge, in 1959, Lewis robustly disputes New Testament critical 
                                                                                                                                            
supernatural events (biblical or otherwise), objects of numinous power, and mystical relationship with 
some approximation of the deity; and all under the aegis of Christian belief” (Christian Fantasy, 5). 
167  Manlove, Ibid, p. 6. 
168  Manlove, Ibid, p. 6. 
169 Myers,  C. S. Lewis in Context, p. 213. 
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Gospels cannot be explained away by a purely symbolic reading with its dismissal of 
the literal sense of the historical account within the biblical texts.  Besides, Lewis 
finds their treatment of the Gospels as romances or legends totally unacceptable; to 
Lewis this exposes the fact that these biblical critics simply “lack literary judgment” 
and are “imperceptive about the quality of the texts they are reading.”
170  Based on 
his understanding and reading experiences of “poems, romances, vision-literature, 
legends, myths,” Lewis maintains that the narrative of the Gospels are far from mere 
literary texts.    This is expressed clearly in the essay “What Are We to Make of Jesus 
Christ?” wherein he says, “as a literary historian, I am perfectly convinced that 
whatever else the Gospels are they are not legends.  I have read a great deal of 
legend and I am quite clear that they are not the same sort of thing.”
171  Even  though 
the Gospels as narratives are in themselves inadequate truth-conveyors, yet, Lewis 
retorts, “how if we are asking about a transcendent, objective reality to which the 
story [of the Ascension] is our sole access?”  To our own inadequate understanding 
of the transcendent, the miraculous or even the historical, the truth can be both 
spiritually and historically true, whether it being reported, recorded, or symbolized, or 
mythologized or whatsoever.  To make final, even genuine, instead of imaginary or 
wishful, judgment, even verification of that truth—including its spirituality and 
historicity—for us mankind, Lewis asks in his conclusion, “Had we not better wait?” 
In Lewis’s another essay entitled, “Myth Became Fact,” he makes the following 
apologetic statements, more directly relevant to the subject of myth, to re-affirm 
Christian faith as both myth and fact: 
 
                                                 
170  “Modern Theology and Biblical Criticism,” The Seeing Eye and Other Selected Essays from 
Christian Reflections (New York: Ballantine Books, 1967, ed. Walter Hooper), p. 206.       
171 Lewis,  C. S. Lewis Essay Collections: Faith, Christianity and the Church, p. 40. 
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What flows into you from the myth is not truth but reality (truth is always 
about something, but reality that about which truth is), and, therefore, every 
myth becomes the father of innumerable truths on the abstract 
level.  .  .  .   
Now as myth transcends thought, Incarnation transcends myth.  The 
heart of Christianity is a myth which is also a fact.    The old myth of Dying 
God, without ceasing to be myth, comes down from the heaven of legend 
and imagination to the earth of history.   .  .  .  By  becoming  fact  it  does 
not cease to be myth: that is the miracle.  .  .  . To be truly Christian we 
must both assent to the historical fact and also receive the myth (fact though 





What Lewis is suggesting in this clear, forthright and comprehensively insightful 
statement is, so to speak, perfect compatibility between mythical truth and historical 
fact co-existent in the core message of Christianity, namely, the Incarnation of Christ.   
On account of this, who can deny that as a Christian thinker Lewis is not even more 
liberal than some liberal theologians of modern time, whose obsession with a modern, 
more precisely, scientific way of thinking makes them so narrow-minded that myth or 
fact becomes an absolutely either-or question.  In contrast with these bigoted 
disciples of modern science, C. S. Lewis exemplifies a liberal Christian thinker, 
capable of recognizing the marriage rather than the contradiction between the mythic 
qualities and the historical elements within the Gospels.    This evidences that his is a 
broad mind—remaining open to the mythic qualities, e.g., the unverifiable, the 
miraculous and even the imaginative parts of the accounts and at the same time 
without abandoning his firm belief, or willingness to believe, in and spiritual 
perception of the fact-hood of the Gospels.    Moreover, Lewis’s myth-become-fact or 
                                                 
172  Lewis, “Myth Became Fact,” C. S. Lewis Essay Collection: Faith, Christianity and the Church, p. 
141. 
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Christianity are pointed at reality—what is real about humanity and the universe.  
The failure to embrace both, that is, to recognize and give assent to the supernatural, 
miraculous revelation of Reality via the coordination of myth and fact, both being 
ascribed to the Word, is an error not on the side of the divine but, rather, on the side of 
the human.  Take Orual, the heroine of Till We Have Faces, for example.  Her 
failure to believe in the divine revelation is a disability caused crucially by her 
blindness to the hard fact about either her self or other humans or the divine being and 
also significantly by her refusal to acknowledge the mere existence of transcendence, 
which is mythical—imaginary rather than logical, not to mention factual—to her.   
  Noticeably, it is the subjective and substantially untruthful viewpoints of Orual, 
the ugly sister of Psyche, that Lewis’s retelling of the myth of Cupid and Psyche rests 
upon.  Structurally, the whole novel consists of Orual’s texts of writing to voice her 
personal accusation against the god to whom Psyche was sacrificed in a religious rite.   
The sacrifice turned out to be a celestially blissful marriage for Psyche, but for Orual 
all of it was utterly unbearable and unbelievable, and her writing was full of her 
passion of grief over the loss of Psyche and her hatred of the divine intrusion into her 
life by “stealing” Psyche, her only love, away.  Despite the fact of once gaining a 
glimpse of Psyche’s Sacred Palace, Orual persistently hardened her heart and chose 
not to believe in it.  In the name of true love, but actually driven by the passion of 
jealousy and possessive desire, Orual fiercely forced Psyche to betray her unseen 
god-husband; as a result, not only was Psyche’s happiness utterly destroyed, but the 
loving relationship between the two sisters was also tragically ruined.    Noticeably, in 
his re-fashioned story, Lewis attempts to put great efforts in the characterization of the 
central figure of his fiction.    The most remarkable twist in Lewis’s fiction is perhaps 
the fact that the heroine’s self-reflective narration of her life-long antagonism towards 
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of authentic self-understanding, that is, the reality of her self.       
My discussion of the novel aims at analyzing the heroine’s psychological and 
spiritual struggles and developments within such a journey, looking especially to 
explore Lewis’s sophisticated portrayals of the heroine’s estrangement from her real 
self, her experiences of religion, and her ultimate growth in personality and 
spirituality.  In fact, the gist of this interpretation is pointing at the primary concern 
underlying Lewis’s mythic narrative, the idea that the precondition of coming to terms 
with religious belief, e.g., truth about divinity, is to ascertain the genuine voice, or 
face, of one’s self.    This significant idea is revealingly suggested by the very title of 
the novel, Till We Have Faces.  To this intriguingly meaningful title, Lewis himself 
makes the following illuminating footnote in a letter to one of his readers:   
 
 
How can they (i.e. the gods) meet us face to face till we have faces? The 
idea was that a human being must become real before it can expect to 
receive any message from the superhuman; that is, it must be speaking with 
its own voice (not one of its borrowed voices), expressing its actual desires 
(not what it imagines that it desires), being for good or ill itself, not any 
mask, veil, or persona.
173 (Emphasis added) 
 
 
In this explication, it is made very clear that only the self with a “bareface,”
174 that is, 
the real face / self without in-authenticity in any forms of disguise, could possibly 
meet with the divine, which means that the reconciliation between self and belief will 
thereby become possible.  In other words, reality of the self is where religious 
                                                 
173  These words of Lewis are derived from Lewis’s letter to Dorothea Conybeare [collected in Letters 
to a Sister from Rose Macaulay, 1964, ed. Constance Babington Smith, p. 261], cited and put in the 
entry about the title of Till We Have Faces in Walter Hooper’s C. S. Lewis: A Companion & Guide 
(London: HarperCollins Publishers, 1996), p. 252.   
174  “Bareface” is the original title Lewis gave to his book that was not accepted by his publisher.     
  162meaning and experience can become real, or realistic, to the self. 
This study, on the one hand, is oriented toward reading the novel from a 
psychological perspective—investigating into the psychic process Orual, the heroine, 
undergoes to discover and even transcend the true face of her being.  On the other 
hand, equally indispensable to my approach is the religious point of view because my 
reading is based on a critical assumption that in Lewis’s revision of the mythic story, 
the heroine’s psychic process toward the integrity of her psychological self is 
significantly intermingled or inter-related with her spiritual progress toward the 
regeneration of her religious self.  Methodologically speaking, psychological 
analysis and religious study, or, an exploration of religious psychology, are viable as 
well as valuable channels to get to the heart of Lewis’s (or Orual’s) narrative.  To 
probe into the heroine’s double-faceted journey to the self, both in psyche and in spirit, 
the following three critical avenues will be applied: firstly, Jungian psychology of 
religion is employed to probe into the mythic construction of the heroine’s self; 
secondly, Evelyn Underhill’s psychological approaches to mystical studies is another 
informing tool in mapping out the mystical construction of the self in the heroine’s 
psychic and spiritual journey; lastly, Rudolf Otto’s conceptions about the impact of 
the numinous experience upon human consciousness are also valuable references for 
an in-depth understanding of the nature of religion and how it can affect the 
construction of the self.    These theoretical references actually echo each other in one 
way or another, and they are valuable and illuminating mediums for a psychological 
and religious interpretation of this novel.   
Needless to say, to undertake such a mixed exploration is a reasonable approach 
to Lewis’s narrative, which is essentially about the interplay between development of 
personality and experience of religion.  However, one may still wonder whether or 
not the religious experience and meaning within Lewis’s mythic text is necessarily 
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what extent is the literary narrative about the historically realistic life of Psyche 
becoming a myth related with the myth-become-fact faith (i.e., Christianity)?  Or, is 
it simply an overstatement that the religious significance of Lewis’s mythic novel is 
supposed to be explained within the framework of Christian theology?  Can Till We 
Have Faces be counted as one of Lewis’s works written “in symbolical or mythopoeic 
forms” for the purpose of “embody[ing] [his] religious belief,”
175 like the fantastical 
text of The Screwtape Letters and what Lewis himself calls “theologized 
science-fiction”?    These are important questions to think about if we are interested in 
knowing how in Lewis’s mythic novel, literature and religion or even theology 
become, as it were, “married.”         
After all, set against the background of a pre-Christian state, the transcendental 
experiences or existence in this mythic text are of no viable identification with 
Christian  theology.  Therefore,  Myers,  who grounds her criticism of the novel on the 
observation that Lewis’s rewritten text of the ancient myth is meant to validate the 
factuality of the Christian “myth,” must at the same time remind the readers of the 
writing tactics of Lewis aimed for avoiding direct association between his mythical 
imagination and the Christian faith.  In terms of Lewis’s tactfulness in this respect, 
Myers, on the one hand, attempts to read Till We Have Faces as a fictive manifestation 
of the purpose of myth espoused by Lewis himself, that is, “to foreshadow the coming 
of Christ and to build up metaphors and mental pictures through which pagans can 
understand the significance of the Incarnation when they hear of it.”
176  O n   t h e   o t h e r  
hand, she is sensitive to the critical fallacy of grounding any religious meaning on a 
                                                 
175  This is quoted from one of Lewis’s letters in which he said he was motivated “to embody my 
religious belief in symbolical or mythopoeic forms, ranging from Screwtape to a kind of theologized 
science-fiction.”   See  C. S. Lewis Collected Letters Volume III: Narnia, Cambridge and Joy 
1950-1963 (London: HarperCollinsPublishers, ed. Walter Hooper, 2006), p. 517.     
176 Myers,  C. S. Lewis in Context, p. 210-211. 
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following critical remarks of Myers: 
 
Orual’s final vision, a meeting with the Divine Bridegroom, is an encounter 
with the grace of Christ, even though Lewis tactfully avoids describing the 
god.    He is careful to remember, as some critics are not, that Till We Have 
Faces is a work of “(supposed) historical imagination.”    It is impossible 
for Orual to see the Divine Bridegroom as the historical Jesus.
177   
 
Myers’s disagreement with the straight identification of Lewis’s literary work / world 
with Christianity is actually a rejection of a naïve tendency of sticking to allegorical 
reading of Lewis’s literature.  As far as literary criticism is concerned, this is, no 
doubt, a more convincing position.  Moreover, on this point, Myers also touches 
upon, though not directly, the issue of the textuality of Lewis’s mythic fiction.       
It is unquestionably valid to hold that the text of Till We Have Faces is, in an 
unequivocal sense, characteristic of the mixture of two dimensions—literature and 
religion.   However, the apparent blending of Lewis’s literary undertakings and 
religious meanings does not make his works of literary imagination, in a strict sense, 
practices of Christian allegory or, in Myers’s well-expressed phrase, “a forthright 
defence of Christianity”
178 even though there is unmistakably close relationship 
between Lewis’s literary practice and his Christian worldview.  Concerning how 
Lewis’s reading and writing of literature are related to his Christian belief, W. E. 
Knickerbocker, in his “From Fairy tales to Fairy Tale: The Spiritual Pilgrimage of C. 
S. Lewis,” makes such general but perceptive remarks: 
 
 
                                                 
177  Myers, Ibid, p. 212. 
178  Myers, Ibid, p. 213. 
  165for Lewis, the myth-bearing fairy tale of Jesus Christ, which is also fact, 
becomes the key to a deeper understanding of other literature and all of 
life.  .  .  .  [The]  central  truths  of Christianity, proclaimed in the true 
myth-bearing fairy tale of Jesus Christ, also provide the basis for Lewis’s 
imaginative writing.
179   
 
 
Knickerbocker indeed rings very true when he claims that Lewis’s belief in 
Christianity forms the very foundation of not only his view of life but also his literary 
practices.  Still, this only paves out the basis on which we can definitely make the 
association but not necessarily the identification between Lewis’s religious writing 
and  his  religious  belief.     
The issue of textuality, specifically referring to Lewis’s literary texts that are 
fundamentally interfused with his religious outlooks, is important not just for a true 
understanding of what Lewis’s texts inherently and perhaps implicitly signify but also 
how we can appreciate the texture of Lewis’s imaginative writings.  Take Till We 
Have Faces for example.  The structure of this fictive text is featured both by the 
mixture of fiction with religious meanings, even apologetic ideas, and explicitly by its 
mythic elements.  In other words, not merely religious significance but also the 
mythic way of representation is most essential to the textual discussion of the novel.   
With the attempt to describe the characteristics of myth, C. S. Lewis the literary critic 
in the article entitled “On Myth” provides a list of six “mythical qualities:” (1) what is 
mythical is “extra-literary;” (2) the “pleasure of myth” depends hardly on “any 
narrative element;” (3) “Human sympathy is at a minimum;” (4) “Myth is always 
‘fantastic;’” (5) “The experience is always grave;” (6) “The experience is 
                                                 
179  Knickerbocker, W. E., “From Fairy tales to Fairy Tale: The Spiritual Pilgrimage of C. S. Lewis,” 
Essays on C.S. Lewis and George MacDonald: Truth, Fiction, And The Power of Imagination 
(Lewiston, N. Y.; Lampeter: Edwin Mellen, 1991, ed. Cynthia Marshall), p. 110-111.   
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180   This list of the essential elements 
of myth may be valuable for us readers of Lewis’s own mythic novel at least in two 
ways: it gives us a kind of interpretive orientation toward discerning the “mythic 
qualities” represented in such a mythical narrative as Till We Have Faces; secondly, it 
helps us appreciate the distinctively mythical elements that are indispensable 
components of the overall structure of this fiction-narrative, which is at the same time 
greatly preoccupied with religious concerns.     
Nevertheless, these mythical qualities in Lewis’s list are neither sufficient nor 
fully applicable to Till We Have Faces, his fiction-myth, basically because of the 
textual fact that after all, Lewis is writing not exactly a myth but a mythic novel.  
Besides, Lewis explains definitely in the same article that the “value of myth is not a 
specifically literary value, nor the appreciation of myth a specifically literary 
experience.”
181  However, as we approach the literary text of Till We Have Faces, 
we could actually take pleasure not only in its mythical qualities, such as the fantastic 
and the numinous feeling, but also in its narrative attractions like suspense or 
surprise
182 and most subtly in some empathetic response quite contrary to the 
experience of reading a myth.  In other words, the overall experience of reading the 
fictional as well as mythic book of Lewis is really a literary experience, not the same 
as what Lewis describes the experience of a myth.   
                                                
To put the genre of myth into our consideration of the novel’s textuality, perhaps 
Jungian psychological conception about myth can also be of good service.  In fact, 
Lewis himself finds Jung’s psychoanalytical theory rather appealing.  In his article, 
“Psycho-Analysis and Literary Criticism,” Lewis makes some approving comments 
 
180  The summary of this list of the mythical qualities made by Lewis in his “On Myth” is based on 
Lewis’s own wording and phrases.    See pages 43-44 of the article in C. S. Lewis’s An Experiment in 
Criticism. 
181 Lewis,  “On  Myth,”  An Experiment in Criticism, p. 46. 
182  Lewis, Ibid, p. 43. 
  167on Jung, describing his “interpretation of myth and imagery” as “much more civil and 
humane” (in comparison with the rival psychologist Freud).  Besides, Lewis admits 
that sometimes he himself has slipped into Jung’s theory, specifically his most noted 
idea of “collective unconsciousness.”    In Lewis’s paraphrase, Jung most insightfully, 
at least highly poetically, recognizes that “myths, or at any rate the older and greater 
myths, are such images recovered from the collective unconscious,”
183 which is 
commonly shared by all mankind.  Indeed, it is not surprising to learn that Lewis is 
much attracted by this “doctrine of Primordial Images or Archetypal Patterns”
184 
theorized by Jung.    As evidenced in the quotation above of Lewis’s thoughts in “On 
Myth,” Lewis himself puts great emphases upon myth as representation of reality, or 
in other words, concretization of “universal principles,” when myth, the story itself, is 
“tasted” as concrete images rather than “known” as “abstract meaning(s).”
185   
To be further informed by Jung’s not just psychology- but also religion-related 
and to an extent anthropological study of myth, the following quotation from Hans 
Schaer’s book, Religion and the Cure of Souls in Jung’s Psychology, can be of 
tremendous help, in which some of Jung’s basic principles are stated as follows:     
 
 
What we find pictured in the myths of various peoples and religions is    . . . 
the projection of the unconscious inner world.  .  .  . Myth is primarily 
the experience and expression of what happens in the soul.  For those to 
whom myth is a living thing, it conveys a meaning as shattering as that 
which is given to us in the experience of revelation.  It is experienced as 
such by the primitive mind.    .    .    . It voices the aspirations, the struggles, 
and also the horror and terror that are inevitably bound up with human 
existence.
186     
                                                 
183 Lewis,  “Psycho-Analysis and Literary Criticism,” Selected Literary Essays (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1969, ed. Walter Hooper), p. 297. 
184  Lewis, Ibid, p. 296.   
185  Lewis, “On Myth,” p. 141. 
186  Hans Schaer, “The Psychic Bases of Religion,” Religion and the Cure of Souls in Jung’s 
Psychology (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1951, trans. R. F. C. Hull), p. 69-71. 
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From this passage, it is elucidated that according to Jung, there are abundantly 
informative contents in myth pertaining to the abyss of human psyche, from whatever 
perspective myth is approached, anthropological, philosophical, religious, or certainly 
psychological.  Specifically, the Jungian understanding of myth is significantly 
related to the “psychic reality” of human beings.    It is exactly at this point that Jung’s 
psychology of religion, not limited in the subject of myth, can have a good dialogue 
with and serve as an illuminating tool of exploring C. S. Lewis’ characterization of his 
heroine in the mythic novel, Till We Have Faces.    In effect, Orual the heroine can be 
viewed as a mythical figure for various reasons.  For one thing, as a (leading) 
character, her life is depicted as part of the myth on which the whole structure of the 
novel’s storyline is based.    In addition, Orual is also mythical as a human being since 
her life story is indeed a personal document as well as existential self-account of what 
Jungian narrative of myth highlights—“the aspirations, the struggles, and also the 
horror and terror that are inevitably bound with human existence.”  In this respect, 
Orual’s “psychic contents” could be said, in Jung’s terms, to epitomize the psychic 
reality of mankind.   
This is basically why the psychological approach, particularly Jungian analytical 
psychology, may be regarded most applicable to Lewis’s mythic figuration of Orual.  
It is illuminatingly helpful, for instance, to put Orual’s self-expression into 
perspective and further into an in-depth analysis of her personal problems at different 
levels—with love, religion / faith, her body and her soul—disclosed not just within 
but more importantly behind her first-person narration (/ narrative) of her life-story.  
Noticeably, Orual’s development of personality as a whole is to a great extent related 
to the process of her spiritual growth and has very much to do with the inter-personal 
relationship in her life, namely, her individual situatedness of experiencing and 
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and ultimately their assimilation at the climatic stage of her life.    In other words, the 
inter-relationship between the psychology of love and the psychology of religion is 
elemental to our investigation into the question of Orual’s self-growth.  For that 
matter, Jung’s psychological theory, including his insight into the inter-connection 
between the psychic process and religious experience, is most fittingly applicable to 
our exploration of the psychic and spiritual reality / realities of the character of Orual. 
  Jung is certainly not the only theorist to put great concern with the necessary 
association between religion and psychology.  Evelyn Underhill, the author of the 
prestigious book, Mysticism (1912), may be counted as another outstanding example, 
for she also endeavours, to a certain extent, to orient her mystical studies to 
psychological inquiries.    For instance, in the second part of Mysticism, entitled “The 
Mystic Way,” Underhill offers a profound examination of the psychological 
development that the mystic’s life is involved with.  Expounding her psychological 
approach, Underhill notes that her attempt is “to set out and justify a definite theory of 
the nature of man’s mystical consciousness: the necessary stages of organic growth 
through which the typical mystic passes; the state of equilibrium towards which he 
tends.”
187  Underhill’s psychological perspective sounds justifiable indeed as she 
applies it to theorize “the nature of man’s mystical consciousness.”  Besides, her 
theory about the mystic’s stages of life, as cited above, is equally informing and 
sensible for a study of Lewis’s novel taking seriously the development of Orual’s 
religious  consciousness.   
Furthermore, in her “Preface” to Mysticism, Evelyn Underhill makes such an 
insightful observation: “The metaphysician and the psychologist are unwise if they do 
                                                 
187 Evelyn  Underhill,  Mysticism: A Study in the Nature and Development of Man’s Spiritual 
Consciousness (London: Methuen, 1912), p. ix. 
  170not consider the light thrown upon the ideas of the mystics by their attitude toward 
orthodox theology.  The theologian is still more unwise if he refuses to hear the 
evidence of psychology.”
188    What Underhill is advocating here is a general mindset 
that she holds appropriate for either metaphysician or psychologist or even theologian, 
which is also the very theoretical position Underhill herself puts into practice in her 
ingeniously excellent studies of mysticism—a position that validates the integration of 
metaphysical and theological and psychological dimensions.    If we take this position 
as a touchstone of the validity of a theory or the sensibility of a theorist, then we 
might say that C. G. Jung is definitely a theorist, a psychologist of course, who 
satisfactorily meets the criteria set by Underhill.       
Actually, there are remarkable affinities between Underhill’s mindset and that of 
Jung’s in the sense that Jung the psychologist adheres very much to the conception of 
the integrity of humanity, meaning that the human being is not simply a being with a 
mind, but also by nature a spiritual being.  In “Freud and Jung--Contrasts,” one of 
the articles in Jung’s Modern Man in Search of a Soul, Jung makes the following 
claim, interestingly corresponding to Underhill’s appeal:   
 
 
[M]an’s advance toward a spiritual life which began with the primitive rites 
of initiation, must not be denied.  . . .  [The psychotherapist] must not 
allow himself to forget that the ailing mind is a human mind, and that . . . it 
shares in the whole of the psychic life of man.  The psychotherapist must 
even be able to admit that the ego is ill for the very reason that it is cut off 
from the whole, and has lost its connection with mankind as well as with the 
spirit.
189          
 
                                                      
                                                 
188  Underhill, Ibid, p. viii. 
189  C. G. Jung, “Freud and Jung—Contrasts,” Modern Man in Search of a Soul (London: Ark 
Paperbacks, 1984, trans. W. S. Dell and Cary F. Baynes), p.141.     
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mindset substantially concerned with the spirituality of psychic phenomena, is indeed 
wise enough to gain some light from theological reflection and combine with it his 
psychological investigation.  Perhaps, such a psychological position preoccupied 
with spiritual thinking is, in some sense, the key reason why Jung’s psychology 
outgrows the biology-bound doctrines of Freud the atheistic psychologist.     
To justify his psychological position on acknowledging the significance of the 
spiritual life within the whole being of man, Jung “confesses”:   
 
 
Because of [the position] I am accused of mysticism.  I do not, however, 
hold myself responsible for the fact that man has, everywhere and always, 
spontaneously developed religious forms of expression, and the human 
psyche from time immemorial has been shot through with religious feelings 
and ideas.  Whoever cannot see this aspect of the human psyche is blind, 
and whoever chooses to explain it away, or to “enlighten” it away, has no 
sense of reality.
190                                       
 
                                                                      
In this confession, Jung provides a clarified vision of the universal truth of the 
anthropological phenomenon that religiosity is essentially an intrinsic “aspect of the 
human psyche.”  On the basis of this vision, Jung develops his distinguished 
religious psychology, a psychology concerned with religious experiences of the 
individual human being or (presumably) the collective religious (un)consciousness of 
the whole mankind.  Jung’s insight in this respect, together with his admonition 
about the ignorance of man’s spirituality being equal to blindness to reality, is of great 
value and good sense, especially when we think about the predicament of Lewis’s 
heroine in Till We Have Faces.  In view of Lewis’s great efforts in depicting subtly 
                                                 
190  Jung, Ibid, p. 140. 
  172and profoundly Orual’s problematic experience of the Holy and her psychological and 
spiritual progresses from darkness to lightness, we might infer that Lewis must to a 
great extent agree with Jung.      The kinship between Jung and Lewis, again, justifies 
the choice of Jung’s psychological ideas as appropriate theoretical support for 
interpreting  Till We Have Faces.  In Jung’s analytical psychology, probably his 
notion about “self-experience” inter-related with the individual’s religious experience 
is particularly helpful in bringing to light the abyss of Orual’s psyche.  Moreover, 
they can illuminate the dynamic development of Orual’s personality, which gradually 
brings about some turning points for her spiritual growth. The twofold progress, in 
psyche and in spirit, ultimately enables her to encounter with “the numinous” face to 
face. 
As well phrased by Hans Schaer, the elemental idea of Jung’s psychology is 
concerned with psychic experience of the self: “All experience passes through the 
psyche”
191 and “all experience, that of extraneous life included, is always bound up 
with self-experience.”
192   To dig out the psychological depth within Lewis’s 
characterization of the heroine of Till We Have Faces, the Jungian conception of 
“self-experience,” no doubt, would be a remarkably handy and enlightening tool.    In 
Jungian terms, self “serves as a symbol of wholeness,” the total integration of the 
human being developed or achieved through a process of “individuation,” that is, the 
process of synthesizing “the conscious and unconscious in the personality.
193  T h i s  
conception, in a sense, serves to sketch a psychological overview of Orual’s psychic 
                                                 
191  In “Translator’s Note” of the book, there is a quotation of Jung’s definition of “Psyche”: “Psyche is 
the totality of all psychic processes, conscious as well as unconscious (“Psychological Types, 
“Definitions).”  Schaer,  p.  1-2. 
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symbol for wholeness, for the synthesis of the conscious and unconscious elements in the personality, 
which is achieved through the process of individuation.    The ‘self’ is both this individuating process 
and the goal towards which the individuant is developing.”    p. 3. 
  173life, as displayed in and between the lines of her personal account of her own lived 
experiences.  Indeed, as Orual’s autobiographical writing lays bare by degrees her 
internal world, including her spontaneously inward voices, interpolated into the 
description of her extraneous life, we readers of her text appear to be naturally invited 
to read into the psychic process she as well as her writing comes to get involved with.   
It is, therefore, necessary and worthwhile to adopt a myth-relevant, 
religion-concerned psychoanalytical perspective to approach Orual’s text and Lewis’s 
mythical dramatization (through her act of writing) of her life-journey into 
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“The bad psychological material is not a sin but a disease.    It does not need to be repented 
of, but to be cured.”    -- C. S. Lewis, “Morality and Psychoanalysis”   
“To some, God is discoverable everywhere; to others, nowhere.    … Much depends on the 
seeing  eye.”        --  C. S. Lewis, “The Seeing Eye” 
  “ Spirit is the living body seen from within, and the body the outer manifestation of the   




  C. S. Lewis’s retelling the myth of Cupid and Psyche in his peculiar fiction, Till 
We Have Faces, creates a re-fashioned text, not less mythic, but meanwhile imbued 
with or even more complicated by its own intricate fabrics—the intermingling and 
interplay among multiple dimensions, predominantly, the textual, the psychological, 
and the spiritual.  Thus, the textuality of Lewis’s rewritten story is endowed with 
some unique, mysterious feeling and depth.  To appreciate or contemplate the 
peculiarity of Lewis’s version of the mythic fiction, we might gain some light from 
Lewis’s own statement concerning his attempt to re-adapt the source story from the 
ancient Latin writer Platonicus’s Metamorphoses.    In the “Note” of his novel, Lewis 
writes: “The central alteration in my own version consists in making Psyche’s palace 
invisible to normal, mortal eyes . . . This change of course brings with it a more 
ambivalent motive and a different character for my heroine and finally modifies the 
whole quality of the tale.”
194  In this short yet significant and meaningful statement 
of Lewis’s, not only is the distinctive element of the rewritten text made clear—the 
invisibility of the sacred locality—but the focal point that is accordingly shifted in his 
text is also indicated— the psychological complexity and the character of the heroine 
                                                 
194  Lewis, C. S. Till We Have Faces: A Myth Retold (Orlando: Harcourt, Inc., 1984), p. 313. 
  175displayed in her response to the ambiguity of religious meaning, or the 
incomprehensibility of metaphysical reality.       
In light of the framework of Lewis’s revision as suggested above, we may further 
infer that what Lewis thematically puts efforts to centre upon within his text and 
ultimately re-shapes the texture of the whole story is his characterization of the central 
figure of his fiction, the ugly, doubting, self-centered and yet pathetically self-ignorant 
Orual with her life-long struggles against the deprivation of her beloved sister, the 
physically and spiritually beautiful Psyche, by the divine.  In terms of this, it is 
apparently Orual’s struggles to come to terms with her life-experiences of love, of 
religion, and ultimately of the reality of her self that invite and demand our focused 
and in-depth exploration.  Basically, this interpretation of Till We Have Faces is 
oriented toward exploring the characterization of Lewis’s heroine in these respects.     
That the novel deals with the inter-relation between personality and religious 
experience is generally recognized, but few of the critics of this mythic novel really 
treat it as a major critical issue.   Almost all the readings of Till We Have Faces 
touch upon, in one way or another, the key issue of the wrestling between the problem 
of the intelligibility of the divine and the subjective experiences of the human person 
as a cognitive and conscious being.      The most conspicuous example is of course the 
critical approach based on the perspective of religious epistemology.  Among the 
criticisms done through this approach, Robert Holyer’s “The Epistemology of C. S. 
Lewis’s Till We Have Faces” offers an excellently sophisticated study of the novel.   
In his critical attempt to treat the novel as one that “offers us the most complete 
account of Lewis’s religious epistemology,”
195 Holyer, however, does not fail to 
acknowledge the close relation between the epistemological issues and Orual’s 
                                                 
195  Holyer, Robert, “The Epistemology of C. S. Lewis’s Till We Have Faces,” Essays on C.S. Lewis 
and George MacDonald: Truth, Fiction, and The Power of Imagination (Lewiston, N. Y.; Lampeter: 
Edwin Mellen, 1991, ed. Cynthia Marshall), p. 53.   
  176personal predicament, as can be seen from his observation—“What Orual has to 
report is not leisured and dispassionate theological reflection, but events that are 
highly charged personally.”
196  Toward the end of his sophisticated discussion of 
religious epistemology Holyer comes up with an impressively insightful conclusion 
that the epistemological questions in Orual’s religious experience cannot be resolved 
unless she achieves “self-knowledge.”  In the same vein, he makes an equally 
remarkable observation: embedded within Lewis’s representation of Orual’s 
predicament is Lewis’s idea that metaphysics “inevitably involves a projection of the 
being of the metaphysician and is to an important degree a matter of fashioning 
ultimate reality in his or her own image.”
197   In spite of this insight of the strong 
association between “our grasp of ultimate truth” and “a grasp of the truth about 
ourselves,”
198 Holyer, nevertheless, does not substantially put his critical concern with 
the process of the latter as he does emphasize the “know-how” of the former.    In fact, 
the development of Orual’s personality, or, to be more specific, the psychological 
process through which Orual finally discovers and transcends the true face of her 
being deserves our focal attention, if we intend to understand genuinely and 
completely her life-long antagonism toward the gods and her ultimate spiritual 
progress.  In other words, simply investigating the epistemological problems of 
religious perception without serious analysis of the perceiver’s mind is not really a 
comprehensive and thorough discussion about the correlation between personality and 
religion, at least in Till We Have Faces.    
Furthermore, there is also a textual justification for the argument that Lewis’s 
mythic narrative is centered upon the question of Orual’s self-growth in personality 
                                                 
196  Holyer, Ibid, p. 55. 
197  Right before making this remark, Holyer cites this idea of Lewis’s from Lewis’s another book, 
Reflections on the Psalms, and he paraphrases it as follows: “as Lewis commented in Reflections on the 
Psalms, there is a real connection between what the metaphysicians and myth-makers of the past 
thought and what they ‘most deeply are’ (90).”    P. 79-80. 
198  Holyer, Ibid, p. 80. 
  177and spirituality.  As a narrative recounted by Orual’s first-person point of view, the 
whole novel appears to be manifestly the text of the heroine’s autobiographical 
writing.  The subjective narration of the heroine’s life-story evidently confirms the 
central position of Orual in the whole story.  But, surely, the significance of her 
autobiographical writing is far beyond this sheer confirmation.     
  As a medium of voicing her accusation against the god of the Grey Mountain, to 
whom Psyche was sacrificed in a religious rite, which turned out to be a marriage of 
blissful happiness for Psyche, but for Orual all of this is utterly unbearable and 
unbelievable, Orual’s writing of the most traumatic experience in her life—the loss of 
her only love, Psyche, and her charge against the god because of it, signifies or 
functions far more than Orual herself intends it to be.  Through the process of 
writing, Orual actually expresses her subjective feeling and understanding of her lived 
experiences.  From a psychological perspective, her writing process could actually 
be taken as a gradual disclosure of her subjective consciousness, or even more deeply, 
of her unconsciousness.  Furthermore, this “writing as self-expression,” in effect, 
serves as a presumably authentic channel for not only the heroine but also the readers 
of her text to probe into her problematic selfhood that is intertwined with her religious 
struggles in believing the invisible existence of the divine.    In view of this, it is thus 
sensible to hold that the first-person point-of-view narration about the heroine’s own 
life is indeed the best medium for Lewis to represent the psychic process his heroine, 
whose life-journey as a whole is depicted as one of grappling with the double 
mystery –not just of the sacred but also of her own selfhood.       
However sincere Orual intends it to be, her complaint, mostly, should not be 
taken literally, which means to take her words at their face value, since we readers are 
not just the neutral third party but the supposed judges of her written charge.    Instead, 
on account of the simple fact that the accuser’s narration of her story is probably not 
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piercing eye.      For instance, our judgment or understanding of Orual’s full-heartedly 
passionate love for Psyche, her sister of fascinating beauty and virtue, must not be 
simply based on Orual’s confession.    Love in Orual’s case is one of the central issues, 
problematic ones, but Orual’s problems with love are not actually in line with her own 
understanding of them.  It is noticeable that there is a tremendous discrepancy 
between her subjective awareness of her love toward Psyche, which Orual herself 
holds as perfectly authentic and the very meaning of her life, and the objective truth 
about the real problematic qualities of this love, as can be perceived in close reading.     
Moreover, the complexities of the psychology of Orual’s passion for Psyche and her 
strong sense of deprivation are definitely lying under the surface of her conscious 
feeling and subjective cognition.  Orual is, so to speak, extremely blind, simply 
ignorant of the truth about herself as well about love.   
The first and foremost blindness in Orual is that her so-called true love for 
Psyche is, in essence, full of egotism and possessiveness.  Her egoistic and 
possessive desire is manifestly shown in all her intense resentment toward Psyche’s 
being victimized in a religious sacrifice and her overwhelming grief over their 
separation.  Orual’s sense of bitterness is subtly conveyed within her narration, 
which rather honestly reveals, “amid all [her] love,” even the feeling of bitterness or 
repulsion toward Psyche, for her possessive ego cannot help grudging against the 
courage and comfort shown in Psyche in the face of approaching death and 
unpredictable fate.        With her own overwhelming self-centered passion and without 
Psyche’s spiritual leaning and calmness, Orual simply cannot tolerate Psyche’s 
willingness and readiness for the sacrifice with the prospect of fulfilling her secret 
death-longing, which means, to Psyche, “the sweetest thing in all [her] life,” “the 
longing—to reach the Mountain, to find the place where all the beauty came from” 
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beloved and the spirituality in her transcendent yearning for being united with the 
transcendence through death, Orual is only up to interpret them as indication of an 
iron-hearted, cruel, unloving treatment of their parting.    This unfair and false-headed 
judgment strongly evidences Orual’s possessiveness—how she is in desperate need of 
feeling being loved by Psyche as well as getting her full attention.  Indeed, inside 
Orual’s mind she would like Psyche to treat her as the central passion of Psyche’s life, 
just as she herself does to Psyche.    Therefore, she cannot bear listening to Psyche “as 
if someone or something else [even the god] had come in between [them]” (75), nor 
can she even bear hearing Psyche’s description of their relationship as “loving 
friends.”  “Why must she say bare friends?” (69) is Orual’s inner cry, as her 
confessional narration discloses.     
What Orual fails to confess or recognize is her own possessive mentality, which 
defines both the nature of her love and her personality.  It is primarily her egoistic 
narrowness in love and in character that hardens her heart and blinds her perception; 
as a result, she becomes unable either to share Psyche’s spiritual vision and strength 
or to know about the meaning of true love.  Controlled entirely by her self-centered 
passion, it is actually no wonder that Orual is not in the least like Psyche.      She also 
shows no willingness to heed or capacity to grasp the wise advice of Fox, the enslaved 
Greek intellectual and also her father-figure mentor, concerning the virtue of love: “To 
love, and to lose what we love, are equally things appointed for our nature.  If we 
cannot bear the second well, that evil is ours.    It did not befall Psyche” (86).    In the 
mouth of the wise Fox, Psyche appears to be the very personification of the virtue of 
love spontaneously pouring out of her pure nature.    In the sense that this natural type 
of virtuous love is exactly what Orual is in lack of, we might assume that Orual, by 
contrast, is the representative of the evil party.  
  180The contrast between Orual and Psyche is somewhat acknowledged by Orual 
herself.  In narrating her second meeting with Psyche in the sacred valley, Orual 
depicts how their different states of mind are reflected in their appearances—“We 
might have been two images of love, the happy and the stern—she so young, so bright 
face, joy in her eye and limbs—I, burdened and resolute, bringing pain in my hand” 
(157).   The joy and brightness shown up on Psyche’s body are notably the natural 
revelation of the true love within her and also the reflection of the lightness of her 
spirit.   To Orual, who shows up with a storm-clouded face, Psyche remarks in an 
assuring tone: “You do not think I have left off loving you because I now have a 
husband to love as well?  If you would understand it, that makes me love—why, it 
makes me love everyone and everything—more” (158).    It can be easily inferred that 
Psyche’s sense of the enlarged love is perceived from her right and blessed spirit.  
However, Psyche’s idea about the enlargement of love is absolutely something beyond 
the narrow-minded Orual’s perception and experience; her love, to a great extent, is 
comparatively an egoistic and wrong-spirited output.  The correlation between love 
and spirit reinforces the double contrast between Orual and Psyche—in their 
experience and conception of love and in their spiritual levels.  The essential 
differences between them are not really what Orual is capable of reflecting on and 
perceiving  after  all.      
Aside from her incapability of recognizing the close relation between love and 
spirit, Orual is equally ignorant of the truth that her narrowness and possessiveness 
have sown the evil seed in her spiritually unsound soil of love and that her 
overpowering passion would consequently turn out to be some pathetically 
uncontrollable vile monster within her.  Ironically, she is far better at judging the 
vileness or blindness in others than discerning the unrighteousness of the hidden 
desire in herself, as all those who have no self-awareness do.    Despite the fact that on 
  181her first journey to the sacred valley she has gained a view or glimpse of Psyche’s 
Sacred Palace, Orual persistently hardens her heart and chooses not to believe in it but 
to fantasize a foul story about Psyche’s marriage and to rationalize her presumptuous 
speculation about the foulness of Psyche’s unseen “god”-husband.  The following is 
her seemingly logical but explicitly ironical theory:   
 
 
Nothing that’s beautiful hides its face.  Nothing that’s honest hides its 
name.  No, no, listen.  In your heart you must see the truth, . . . There’s 
your lover, child.    Either a monster—shadow and monster in one, maybe, a 
ghostly, un-dead thing—or a salt villain  . . . Child, has his vile love so 
turned your brain that you can’t see the plainest thing? A god?    Yet on your 
own  showing  he  hides  .  .  .                      (160,  161) 
  
 
However reasonable she tries to sound in order to persuade Psyche to leave her 
husband, the viewpoints Orual makes here ring really ironical in that she is absolutely 
unconscious and unaware of the real fact that the ill will and vile desire and blindness 
are all hers.    Obviously, her willing and feeling heart as well as her knowing mind is 
indeed malfunctioning, which results in her unbelief in the existence of either the god 
or the palace of the god (and Psyche), despite her real though temporary vision of the 
not so material building.    Orual’s skepticism, or more precisely, her refusal to believe, 
is not at all a common-sense decision but really a moral choice.    According to Lewis, 
in Mere Christianity, it is one’s “psychological outfit,” including “various feelings, 
impulses and so on,” that makes the very “raw material”
199 of his or her choice—to 
believe or not to believe, to love or to undo love    . . .       
The hard fact about Orual’s distorted thinking and twisted nature and mind has 
been plainly and kindly pointed out to Orual by Fox, before her second visit to 
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danger” of being a monster’s or villain’s bride.  As Orual speaks out her horribly 
destructive attempt—“If there is no other way, I will kill [Psyche]” (148), Fox, in 
spite of his definite scepticism toward the supernatural being of Psyche’s husband, yet 
still full of wise judgment of a mundane sort, bursts out his warning against Orual’s 
devastating plan: “Daughter, daughter.  You are transported beyond all reason and 
nature.    Do you know what it is?    There’s one part love in your heart, and five parts 
anger, and seven parts pride” (148).  The Fox’s view is of course pointedly true, 
while the passion-controlled and self-righteous Orual simply could not listen.  She 
would not heed any dissuasion of Fox or the inner counsel out of her conscience but 
obstinately try to convince everyone including herself that she could and would do 
anything to save Psyche for the sake of “love.”  This arrogant justification is not 
justly grounded at all since it is very clear that her love is in reality close to non-love; 
to borrow the words from C. S. Lewis’s famous book on love, The Four Loves, it is at 
best “a very imperfect sort of Affection,” taking liberties only “spitefully in obedience 
to resentments or ruthlessly in obedience to egoism.”
200 
Besides, that the fierce resolve to force Psyche to abandon her happiness with her 
so-called god-husband is love-motivated is truly a self-deceiving justification of 
Orual’s.    On the surface, all is based on Orual’s belief that Psyche’s bridegroom must 
be either a horrible creature or a despicable soul instead of some unseen divine being 
and that if anyone should end Psyche’s “shame and danger” Orual herself is the one 
because she loves Psyche full-heartedly.  Yet, underlying both the pseudo-rational 
speculation and the emotional justification is actually an attempt to camouflage her 
possessive desire.  The genuine ground for Orual’s speculative belief is not merely 
                                                 
200  See “Affection” in C. S. Lewis’s The Four Loves (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1988), p. 44. 
 
  183an epistemic grappling about the personality of Psyche’s husband, but, more 
importantly, a psychological one.  Deep in her grief-afflicted and embittered heart, 
she simply hates the fact that Psyche now belongs to her god-husband and enjoys in 
her married life a state of happiness apart from Orual herself.  In this sense, what is 
inherent in Orual’s real motive and resolve is basically this hatred, which takes its root 
in the emotion of jealousy.    Undoubtedly, the passion of jealousy is one of the “fatal” 
blind spots in Orual; its impulsive and dark power indeed causes tremendous harm 
and impairment to almost the whole being of Oural, including her emotional, rational 
and spiritual life. 
The dark power of the passion of jealousy serves to make Orual a manipulative 
monster and her love toward Psyche, as it were, her demon’s weapon.    Although she 
does take notice of the self-questioning voices inside her conflicting mind, such as the 
lines of her inner voices written down in her book—“I was half frightened when I 
perceived what I was resolving” (137) and “I ask myself,  . . . how will you bear to 
wipe out Psyche’s happiness?” (138)—Orual, however, refuses to yield to these 
temporary internal struggles but entirely allows herself, with a hardened and conceited 
heart, to obey the vile and impulsive passion and determines herself to overrule 
Psyche by all means.  At last, Psyche gives in to Orual’s threat of killing her and 
then Orual herself and takes an oath of following Orual’s command to betraying the 
god-husband—committing the forbidden act of bringing light to “the holy darkness” 
of their meeting chamber.    “Tortured into [her] disobedience” of the god’s command 
by Orual’s violent threat, Psyche is really willingly victimizing herself for the sake of 
Orual’s life and sacrificing her sacred marriage of happiness in obedience to Orual’s 
deadly manipulation.  As a result, Orual’s victory in overruling Psyche causes great 
affliction to both of them; not only is Psyche’s happiness utterly destroyed, but the 
loving relationship between the two sisters is also tragically ruined.  Psyche finally 
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You are . . . teaching me about kinds of love I did not know.  .  .  . Oh, 
Orual—to take my love for you   . . . and then to make of it a tool, a 
weapon, a thing of policy and mastery, an instrument of torture—I begin to 
think I never knew you.  Whatever comes after, something that was 
between  us  dies  here.       (165)   
 
 
These words express how the heart-broken Psyche comes to her despairing realization 
of the truth about Orual in terms of love.      To put in another way, Orual, dominated 
by her heart of darkness, is embodying the definition of the most vicious kind of love, 
just as defined by Lewis himself—“Love, having become a god, becomes a 
demon.”
201 
To investigate into what such an embodiment signifies in the characterization of 
Orual, perhaps we should ask with Psyche the same and indeed the very key question: 
“how—or why—[Orual] can have blackened and tormented [her] soul with such 
thoughts?” (160).  Along with this pointed question, there are also other intriguing 
and more specific interrogations to make: What’s the meaning of her central 
accusation of the gods: “They gave me nothing in the world to love but Psyche and 
then took her from me” (249)?    Or, why does Orual love Psyche so much that Psyche 
seems to become her second self and that Psyche’s god-husband becomes her great 
Rival, the ultimate object of [her] jealousy
202?  And, in what sense could Orual be 
counted as a vulnerable sinner in terms of love and religion?    Lastly, what then is the 
hope of enlightening and also curing a pathetically blind creature like Orual in 
                                                 
201 Lewis,  The Four Loves, p.56. 
202  See C. S. Lewis’s relevant observation on jealousy-laden Affection: “For Affection is the most 
instinctive, in that sense the most animal, of the loves; its jealousy is proportionately fierce.    It snarls 
and bares its teeth like a dog whose food has been snatched away . . . his second self” (The Four Loves, 
p. 46). 
  185personality and in spirit?      It is noticeable that these questions have much to do with 
Orual’s personal relationships, and besides they point to her personal problems behind 
those  relationships,  too.     
As mentioned above, the writing of Orual’s book is centered on her grief over the 
loss of Psyche and her hatred of the divine intrusion into her life by stealing Psyche 
from her.   In other words, the central issues of her complaint are concerned with 
how she is unjustly treated by the god.  However, Orual’s claim that she herself is 
the real victim may sound rather unconvincing on account of the imperfection of her 
love and her ignorance of true love and of the real problems in her own personality.  
On the other hand, if we re-examine the psychological predicaments Orual really 
undergoes that can be detected from her confessional writing, we might hold a more 
sympathetic position toward Orual’s claim.    We may even understand the meaning of 
her victim-hood better than Orual herself.  Reading into her personal expression of 
her life-experiences, including the happenings in her exterior life and the inward 
voices going on within her interior consciousness, we are invited not merely to share 
her subjective experiences but also to explore or interpret those experiences so as to 
know better the author as well as her text.   For that purpose, it appears most 
intriguing and necessary for her readers to probe into the psychological truth 
underlying her emotional experiences on the one hand and her spiritual struggles to 
come to terms with the religious meaning concerning those experiences on the other.     
For example, from the way as well as the devastating degree in which Orual goes 
through the experience of bereavement, it is not hard to discern that the very 
experience of bereavement in Orual is pregnant with psychological meaning.  In 
addition to her egoistic character and her jealousy, there is still another crucial 
element underneath Orual’s passion of grief and her strong emotion of hatred toward 
the god, the stealer of Psyche—the element of fear deep in Orual’s soul.  Orual is 
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because, according to Orual’s confession, she sees her life without Psyche is one 
without the cause of living and thus is analogous to “deadness” (89), a hopeless sense 
of emptiness and would make the rest of her life “the dead desert” (89).  Yet, why 
must Orual’s life without her beloved Psyche be “the dead desert”?   How come 
Orual cannot love like Psyche, embracing different loves with the sense of 
enlargement instead of deprivation?    To these questions, Orual herself, in the process 
of her    “sincere” writing, doesn’t seem able to give right answers. 
Reflective as she is, the best truth Orual the writer could come to grasp about her 
traumatic experience of losing Psyche is that she loves Psyche truly with her life and 
with all her heart and that she is ugly and thus unlovable, so Psyche is her only love.   
The interrelationship between ugliness and undesirability is a cruel and hopeless fact 
that Orual herself consciously acknowledges and believes in.  This is exactly what 
she replies to the mysterious voice as she is located in the enlivened landscape of the 
god’s secret valley and delighted by the “strange and beautiful things” (96) all around 
her: “Why should your heart not dance?” “My heart to dance?    Mine whose love was 
taken from me, I, the ugly princess who must never look for other love”(96).  One 
the one hand, Orual’s response here makes very plain that her fundamental mentality 
in dealing with human relationship, like with Psyche, is grounded on the hard, indeed 
cruel, fact that she is ugly.  On the other hand, the narration is also significantly 
suggestive of Orual’s problem with establishing her personal relationship with the 
transcendence.  It  is  strongly hinted that Orual cannot help but let her preoccupation 
with her bodily ugliness hinder her heart from dancing to the fascinating presence of 
the numinous beauty, as her intuition or the divine voice is telling her to.  In fact, 
with or sometimes without her recognition, Orual’s bitter preoccupation with her 
ugliness is indeed a huge burden in her mind and soul; consciously or unconsciously, 
  187it becomes a tremendous and hopeless mental obstacle to the welfare of her whole 
being.    It is definitely a significant contributor to the narrowness and blindness of her 
mental, emotional, and spiritual outlooks.   Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the 
significance of her complex of ugliness—its comprehensive and harmful 
influence—and more importantly, how she can embrace any prospect of getting rid of 
its spell are really not within  Orual’s  grasp.   
   Actually, not only for Orual but also for every human being, to envisage the 
authenticity and potentiality of one’s self-image must be a tremendously difficult task 
to undertake.  In this sense, Lewis indeed shapes his heroine as an archetype, which 
is a very significant element that Lewis the literary critic, probably very much under 
the influence of the psychologist C. G. Jung, ascribes to the mythopoeic.
203  A s  w e  
can learn from depth psychology, it is largely in one’s unconsciousness wherein lie 
one’s deepest or most real nature and motives, including hidden desires and 
vulnerabilities, which are either unacknowledged or simply rejected by the conscious 
realm of one’s psyche.    That is to say, without truly diving into the realm of darkness 
inside her psyche to attain the unknown part of the truth about her self, Orual, like 
anyone else, can never meet with the genuine face of her being no matter how hard 
her conscious reflection or how sincere her self-expression means to be.  Lewis’s 
representation of Orual’s case, specifically her living experiences of the problematic 
cognition of her self-image and the spiritual problem, greatly corresponds with his 
description of the phenomenology of conversion, based on his personal experiences of 
reaching the Christian God, of which the pretext is a self-knowing process.    In “The 
Seeing Eye,” Lewis writes:   
 
                                                 
203  In his article, “The Mythopoeic Gift of Rider Haggard,” Lewis writes that the “hatred [toward the 
mythopoeic] comes in part from a reluctance to meet Archetypes; it is an involuntary witness to their 
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[I]t is significant that this long-evaded encounter happened at a time when I 
was making a serious effort to obey my conscience.    … One of the first 
results of such an effort is to bring your picture of yourself down to 
something nearer life-size.    And presently you begin to wonder whether 
you are yet, in any full sense, a person at all; whether you are entitled to call 
yourself ‘I’ (It is a sacred name).    In that way, the process is like being 
psycho-analysed.   …You  find  that  what you called yourself is only a thin 
film on the surface of an unsounded and dangerous  sea.  But  not  merely 
dangerous.    Radiant things, delights and inspirations, come to the surface 
as well as snarling resentments and nagging lusts.     
One’s ordinary self is, then, a mere façade.    There’s a huge area out of 
sight behind it.
204  
                         
 
According to Lewis’s explanation here, there is apparently a close relationship 
between one’s encounter with the truth about Him and one’s exploration of the 
knowledge of “I” (“a sacred name”) through undergoing a continuous journey into 
“the depth behind the façade    . . . the ordinary, conscious I.”
205  
Such a journey, which, in Jungian terms, is a psychic process, is indeed what 
Orual should go through so that her heart could be enlightened and unburdened and 
her spirit be renewed as well.  Besides,  Lewis’s  ideas  about the self-knowing process 
clearly echo the Jungian notion of “individuation,” which     
 
 
consists essentially in recognizing and assimilating the unconscious.   
Therefore a new center of personality must come into being, which is not 
bound to consciousness like the ego but is capable of taking equal account 
of both consciousness and the unconscious.  .  .  . This new center Jung 
calls the “self,” and individuation is the way to the self.
206  
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206  The quotation is Hans Schaer’s summary of Jung’s conception of “individuation.”    See “Religion 
as a Psychic Function,” Religion and the Cure of Souls in Jung’s Psychology, p. 122. 
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This specified notion about the process of individuation aiming to achieve a whole 
grasp of self-knowledge is indeed in line with Lewis’s understanding of the way to a 
genuine meeting with the “I”.  Both Jungian and Lewis’s claims on the integrity of 
an individual self, or personality, are insightful to our reading of Orual’s 
self-experiences.  It seems inescapable and necessary for Orual to journey into the 
depth and darkness of her heart to experience a wholesome development of 
personality—to be really faced with or come to grips with or, even better, find the way 
to transcend the un-resolved problems within her psyche and personality.  Then, 
within her, self and reality as well as self and belief (in the god) can hopefully come 
to meet together.  To reach such a happy end of integration, Lewis would suggest 
that what it really takes is to, in Lewis’s own words, “put the human machine right” 
again, as inferable from his preaching in one of his broadcast talks (on BBC), later 
published as the article entitled “Morality and Psychoanalysis.”  Moreover, about 
how to achieve this goal of turning the disordered “human machine” to normal, i.e., 
removing the bad raw materials of moral choices—all different sorts of psychological 
perversion, Lewis names two partly overlapped techniques, namely, Christian morals 
and psychology.
207   This thinking of Lewis’s may explain why this mythic novel, 
particularly in the character of Orual, is imbued with such a strong religious sense and 
at the same time with so deep a psychological  touch  and  profundity.       
    As far as Orual’s most insidiously unresolved and not fully acknowledged 
problems are concerned, her complex of ugliness is perhaps the chief skeleton in the 
cupboard.  To better analyze the psychological significance of this skeleton we 
                                                 
207  By “psychology,” or “psychoanalysis,” Lewis excludes the psychological school that adds into their 
scientific theories “the general philosophical view of the world,” which Lewis specifically refers to the 
anti-religious theorists like Freud.    Cf. Lewis’s “Morality and Psychoanalysis,” Mere Christianity, p. 
88-89. 
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“Psychological Theory of Types,” Jung provides a specific definition of “complexes:” 
 
 
Complexes are psychic contents which are outside the control of the 
conscious mind . . . and lead a separate existence in the unconscious, being 
at all times ready to hinder or to reinforce the conscious intentions . . . They 
are “vulnerable points” which we do not like to remember and still less to 
be reminded of by others, but which frequently come back to mind 
unbidden and in the most unwelcome fashion.  . . . to have complexes . . . 
means that something incompatible, unassimilated, and conflicting 
exists. . . . they indicate the unresolved problems of the individual, the 
points at which he has suffered a defeat , and where there is something he 
cannot evade or overcome—his weak spots in every sense of the word.
208        
 
 
The qualities and functions of complexes expounded in this passage are greatly 
applicable to the predicament of Orual under the spell of her bodily ugliness.  
Without doubt, Orual’s complex of ugliness is her major weak spot or, say black spot, 
and it breeds other vulnerable points to her inner self, such as low self-esteem, 
self-righteousness, self-delusion, self-pity and even self-hatred.   In view of the 
close relation between her ugliness and her unwholesome self-images, we can see that 
ugliness does not merely signify a mark of shame on her body but also adversely 
affects her psyche.  Moreover, nearly all the personal crises in Orual’s life are 
involved with the psychological effects the complex of ugliness causes on her, by 
either “hinder[ing] or reinforc[ing] [her] conscious intentions,” to use the words of 
Jung.      The most significant crisis is certainly concerned with her passionate love for 
Psyche and her near-to-collapse situation in the wake of losing Psyche.  Such a 
devastating crisis is seemingly based on love but substantially related to the 
psychological confliction or tension between Orual’s craving to be loved and her 
                                                 
208 Jung,  Modern Man in Search of a Soul, p. 90-91. 
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    Playing a centrally dominant part within Orual’s psychic contents, the complex 
of ugliness, however, is not an innate quality of Orual’s personality.   It is, in a 
psycho-genetic sense, basically derived from her sonless and daughter-hating King 
Father.  Apart from her unfavourable daughterhood, the King also outspokenly 
discredits Orual by making humiliating remarks with reference to her extraordinarily 
ugly appearance.  For example, to Orual’s frenzied readiness to sacrifice her life in 
place of Psyche to be the Brute’s bride, the King Father makes his dismissive 
response of repulsion: “There’s some cursed cunning that I haven’t yet smelled out 
behind all your sobbing and scolding.  You’re not asking me to believe that any 
woman, let alone such a fright as you, has much love for a pretty half-sister?    It’s not 
in nature” (60-61).  Later, leading Orual to look into the great mirror and see the 
“perfect image” of herself, the King adds, “Ungit [the goddess] asked for the best in 
the land as her son’s bride . . . [a]nd you’d give her that” (62).  The effect of the 
repeatedly insulting feedback from the Father is not really reinforcement but an 
imposition on Orual’s thinking and feeling mind the deep sense of shame and 
repugnance toward her face and even worse—toward her worth as a love-object for 
other humans or the god.     
In fact, the repulsive attitude of the Father, together with their alienated and 
unloving relationship, has a detrimental influence both on the building of Orual’s 
self-image and on her personality.  Primarily owing to the traumatic experience of 
being humiliated and discredited by her supremely authoritative King-Father, Orual 
embraces a life-long sense of terror of the mirror, along with her inescapable sense of 
fear toward her Father.  Besides, throughout her life, Orual is gripped and thwarted 
by her complex of ugliness and low self-esteem, mostly inherited from her Father’s 
negative attitude, and this seems to be the key reason why Oural would have many 
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loving joyfully and light-heartedly like Psyche or at least having a wiser instead of 
distorted understanding of love, and why at the same time in the depth of her heart 
there seems to be an unspeakably agonizing longing to be loved.    Also,  perhaps  we 
can say that her persistent disputing perspective about the cruelty of the gods is, at 
least in a psychological sense, a projection of her experience of the cruelty of her 
Father.  
It is therefore probably true to suggest that Orual’s disturbing relationship with 
her Father overshadows her life tremendously and even comprehensively and that the 
Father plays a decisive part in making Orual a victim who suffers from continuous 
struggles, consciously and unconsciously, under the spell of the complex of ugliness.  
Toward her old age and long after her succeeding the King to become the Queen of 
Glome since his death, there is an inward cry of Orual’s recorded in her book, “How 
could I ever have thought I should escape from the King?” (273).   This question 
tellingly expresses Orual’s lasting fear-bound relationship with her Father-King.  
However, even if she cannot evade the cruel reality that as an ugly daughter, she is 
unfavourable and doubly ill-fated and can never change the predestined fate of 
looking ugly and becoming unlovable, Orual can at least choose for herself to be seen 
or not to be seen.  She thus determines to cover her shame of ugliness—by veiling 
her  face.    
  The meaningfulness of the very choice of putting on a veil to face the world is of 
course not limited to her motive of hiding the very sign of her shame, as Orual herself 
consciously acknowledges.  Underneath her self-willed decision and behind her 
ambivalent feeling of bitter-sweetness for having her face veiled, there could be found 
other hidden intentions and significance that are not totally recognized by Orual’s 
consciousness.  To put it in another word, as a significantly meaningful symbol, her 
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largely existent within her unconscious self though they do not remain utterly 
imperceptible in her self-expressive text.   Thanks to the ambiguities the new sign of 
veil brings about, the advantages of showing up as a veiled Queen are far better than 
Orual herself could expect.  With her ugly face covered, Orual, in a sense, manages 
to get released from, as it were, a hermeneutic bondage of her original image of 
ugliness that unavoidably and dogmatically defines her value and situates her in a 
disadvantaged position.  By means of veiling her face, she finds that the veil 
amazingly strengthens her Queenship and opens up new possibilities of signification 
for her image.   In the narration quoted below, we can hear from Orual how she 
admittedly enjoys the fact that the very medium of hiding her shameful looking turns 




[A]s soon as my face was invisible, people began to discover all manner of 
beauties in my voice.        . . . The best story was that I had no face at all; if 
you stripped off my veil you’d find emptiness.  But another sort . . . said 
that I wore a veil because I was of a beauty so dazzling that if I let it be seen 
all men in the world would run mad; or else that Ungit was jealous of my 
beauty . . . The upshot of all this nonsense was that I became something 
very mysterious and awful.    I have seen ambassadors who were brave men 
in battle turn white like sacred children in my Pillar Room when I turned 
and looked at them . . . and was silent.  I have made the most seasoned 
liars turn red and blurt out the truth with the same weapon.      (228-229) 
    
Just as the Queen Orual discovers for herself, the veil becomes a mystifying tool and 
is indeed a marvellously useful weapon, not only for covering her face, the very 
emblem of her shame and powerlessness, but also for empowering her Queenship.   
However, there are still other possibilities of the psychological significance of her 
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  The depth psychology of Orual underlying the act of indulging herself in being a 
veiled Queen is a most intriguing topic about the symbolic conveyance of the veil and 
about Orual’s personality as well.   As both a medium of covering her most 
disadvantageous part, her face, and a weapon to empower her, especially her identity 
as a Queen, the veil becomes a new emblem, standing for power, and is considerably 
in association with her Queenship.  Yet, either as a medium of disguise or as an 
emblem of power, the veil, if re-examined more closely in psychological terms, bears 
a certain significance of paradoxical profundity.  On the one hand, it signifies an 
explicitly conscious choice and an insincere gesture to hide her genuine image, her 
weak spot; that is to say, in order to establish in herself a persona for Queenship of 
remarkable strength—to be a worthy, powerful, and respectable Queen, Orual has to 
hide her real but vulnerable, even failing self.    In this sense, the choice as well as the 
gesture is really a cheating act with an intention preoccupied with her weakness.    On 
the other hand, it is simultaneously an implicit and subtle indicator of her 
subconscious desire for power, not just referred to the empowerment of her Queenship, 
as it appears to be, but essentially correlated with her hopeless and unceasing longing 
for being re-affirmed as a lovable and valuable person.  The complexity of this 
intertwined desire—for power, for love, and for self-worth—is especially meaningful 
to our exploration of Orual’s selfhood.           
  It is not difficult to find textual evidence to exemplify these two paradoxical 
observations about Oural’s personality, since her own “faithful” account of the 
external and internal events is full of valuable clues as well as straightforward 
expressions.  Sometimes, the narration of her inward thinking sounds like the an 
internal monologue and therefore serves particularly effectively our psychoanalysis of 
her inner self.    For instance, from Orual’s expression of her state of mind just before 
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security of her country but the strength of her Queenship could be affirmed and 
solidified, we can overhear the secret voice within her which speaks deeply her 
craving  for  power.   
 
 
if . . . the swords were out, my courage failed me?  I’d be the mockery of 
the whole world; . . . I could hear them saying, ‘and yet how bravely her 
sister went to the offering!  How strange that she, who was so meek and 
gentle, should have been the brave one after all!’    And so she would be far 
above me in everything: in courage as well as in beauty and in those eyes 
which the gods favoured with sight of things invisible, and even in 
strength . . . ‘She shall not,’  I  said  with  my  whole  soul.           (200) 
   
 
It is manifested in this passage that Orual’s hidden desire for empowerment is, in a 
sense, blackened by her mentality of rivalry between Psyche and herself.  This 
subconscious mentality reveals a vile touch of jealousy mixed with some streaks of 
vanity and pride in Orual.  Surprised at the vileness and sickness of her thinking, 
Orual turns to blame the cruel gods who she accuses of making her beloved Psyche 
her enemy and tries to suppress the true voice of her inner self.  For us readers, 
however, it makes it very clear that Orual is actually symptomatic of the pathetic 
mentality of those in want of the sense of self-worth and thus endowed with a 
complicated mixture of emotions—the fear of being disaffirmed and rejected, the 
anxiety of being surpassed, the embittered sense of jealousy toward someone superior 
and the strong desire for affirmation from others.    In view of this, the desperate need 
of affirmation originated from her complex of ugliness is, in itself, not just a weak 
point but a black spot too.       
The consequence of the critical fighting is a beautiful victory for Orual.  
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meantime conscious of a split internal world—“Three parts of me was a shamed and 
frightened Orual  … and was bitterly lonely; the fourth part was Queen, proud 
(though dazed too)” (223).   Evidently, in Orual, the moment of outwardly 
celebrating her winning of power parallels with an inwardly self-pitying moment.  
Enjoying the heat and clamour among the guest crowd, she at the same time suffers 
from a double loneliness for Psyche and for Bardia, the chief commander of Glome’s 
army, a married man whom Orual the Queen falls in love with secretly inside her 
heart.  The sense of divided-selfhood mixed with the affliction of her unsatisfied 
yearning for being loved also with the attempt to reinforce her power as a Queen 
becomes such an overwhelming force that even prompts the Queen-Orual to make 
such a determination laden with a figurative touch of suicidal violence: “I am the 
Queen; I will kill Orual too” (225).  It follows that her inner world becomes a 
battlefield for her self-willed engagement in an intramural fight between the outer self, 
the Queen, and the inner self, Orual.  The following passage provides another 
figurative description about the development of this inner war: “I locked Orual up or 
laid her asleep as best I could somewhere deep down inside me; she lay curled there.   
It was like being with child, but reversed; the thing I carried in me grew slowly 
smaller and less alive” (226).    Compared with the act of veiling her outer appearance, 
this inward process of hiding the original self is far more destructive than the physical 
disguise. 
In another sense, the same self-deceptive nature of the disguised self-image can 
also be found in the hidden motivation of the attempt to kill Orual.  To be more 
specific, the mentally suicidal attempt is intertwined with an overwhelming sense of 
guilt for the destruction of Psyche’s celestial happiness enacted by Oural’s egoistic 
and possessive passion.  During those years when the Queen (Orual) is stably and 
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crying in the garden” (224), which Orual imagines should be the wailing of the “cold, 
hungry, and banished” (224) Psyche, but she strives repeatedly to convince herself 
that “it was the chains swinging at the well” (224).   Finally, after a long time of 
being constantly troubled by the haunting wailing voice, the Queen makes a frenzy 
command of having the well covered with “madly thick walls” to silence the terrible 
voice once and for all.  Yet, in the wake of such a willfully and frantically silencing 
action, the fear of being persistently haunted becomes transformed and reappears in 
Orual’s dreams: “For a while after that an ugly fancy used to come to me in my 
dreams, or between sleeping and waking, that I had walled up, gagged with stone, not 
a well but Psyche (or Orual) herself”(235).    This recurrent “ugly fancy” in the realm 
of the dream and the imagery of the “crying girl” or the “swinging chains at the well” 
are undeniably abundant with symbolic meanings and significant for our examination 
of Orual’s psychic process of coping with her sense of guilt. 
As psychological symbols, those elements of Orual’s fancies, including the 
horrible sound, chains at the well, and the walling, must be interpreted in terms of the 
inter-relation between her life-experiences and psychic contents, especially the depth 
feelings and struggles that may be existent in her unconsciousness.    Evidently, all 
of them are involved in the traumatic experience of losing Psyche and ruining her 
happiness.  From the psychological point of view, this painful experience could be 
seen as an un-resolved problem in the depth of her psyche, primarily because Orual is 
consciously unwilling and probably unable to go through the trauma truly  and 
sincerely.  Her emotional and rational incapacity of letting Psyche “go,” of letting 
Psyche’s happiness be, and perhaps more importantly, of facing and knowing the 
wrong she has done, is closely related to her failure to love and see properly.   The 
crucial causes to the double failure lie in her blind spots in love, in spirit, and in the 
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are foreign to her conscious self.       
As for insincerity, the fancies discussed here can serve as signal evidence.  To 
Orual, she seems to have no other way to stop the terrible crying voice that haunts her 
day and night but cover the “swinging chains” (the traumatic memory and her sense 
of guilt) at “the well” (the depth of her heart) by thick walls.      Walling the well can 
thus be understood as a concretized measure taken to put into practice her 
terror-stricken evasion.  Yet, the evasion itself is certainly not as simple as a 
reasonable psychological reaction.      In the sense that the horrible sound is genuinely 
the voice of her conscience coming from within, the very act of walling the well / 
Psyche / Orual, however concrete or fanciful it is, is intended to numb or silence the 
itchy sense of guilt and to bury the sickening residue of the memory of Psyche or the 
old Orual.   The evasive act of “walling,” in itself, is symbolic of Orual’s resort to 
her familiar strategy of evading from reality, namely, her tendency to disguise.  It  is  a 
disguise, just like the attempt to hide her authentic bodily image, symbolically 
conveying her psychology of self-evasion and self-hatred.   Furthermore, the 
disguise in this context concretizes her insincerity in that she thoroughly would not or 
cannot be true to her inner self.   Both her indulgence in veiling the genuine face 
and the frantic move to bury and silence the inner voice reveal her double 
estrangement from her real self, who remains living in her unconsciousness, no matter 
how she could willfully split her self-image to the veiled and bare-faced Orual and 
naïvely divide her whole being as the Queen and Orual.  Ultimately, she makes 
herself symbolically faceless by means of rejecting the true face of both her outer and 
inner self—through veiling / walling, through burying the traumatic memory, through 
paralyzing her feeling heart and silencing her conscience, and lastly through fooling 
herself that she can lead a self-divided life and make the vulnerable self (Orual) 
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But, in reality, Orual refuses to die, and the voice of conscience cannot actually 
be silenced.  If it cannot be heard from within, it will be uttered from without.  
Until she starts giving ear to the whisper or megaphone of conscience and 
encountering with the knowledge about her self bare-facedly, she cannot undergo the 
kind of death that she really needs to go through.  Self-disguise is only a deceitful 
and foolish kind, after all.  In other words, she must meet with the true face of her 
inner self; then she can really embrace the hope of undoing the old Orual and getting 
rid of, or better, growing out of, her vulnerabilities.  The turning point for this 
undoing task lies in the beginning of firstly undoing her blindness to the truth about 
love and her personality.    As long as she is in the path of a gradual grasp of authentic 
self-knowledge, she is undergoing a self-growing process in the psyche and in spirit 
too.    
The multi-dimensioned development of the growth of the self is suggested in 
Orual’s confessional text as follows: “I did not, even when I had finished the book, 
see clearly many things that I see now.  The change that the writing wrought in me 
(and which I did not write) was only a beginning—only to prepare me for the gods’ 
surgery.    They used my pen to probe my wound.  .  .  .  in  the  writing  there  came 
stroke[s] from without” (253-254).  In these meta-critical words, Orual the 
autobiographical writer seems to testify the discovery that in her text are actually 
embedded many of her blind spots and that outside her writing there are yet other 
changes for her to experience, primarily the growth of self-understanding and the 
perception of reality, which she supposes is enacted by the gods and thus could be 
ascribed  to  spiritual  enlightenment.    
 One stroke from without that calls into question Orual’s presumption of the 
reality is about her alienated and sometimes hostile relationship with her another sister, 
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in a contemptuously indifferent manner.    But on a special occasion, Orual happens to 
learn that Redival has suffered because of Orual’s cruel indifference and actually she 
is miserably lonely.  To pathetically self-centered and self-pitying Orual, this is 
indeed the most foreign and shocking news.    But this surprise is only an appetizer to 
initiate the main course of de-constructing Orual’s presumably correct judgment of 
others and particularly of herself.  It is Bardia’s wife, Ansit, who is the most 
important megaphone of conscience that crucially prompts Orual to enter into the real 
experience of being tied down and operated by the divine surgeons.   
The explosive interaction between the two women happens on the occasion when 
Orual, under a complicated psychological background, pays her visit ostensibly 
offering condolences to the widowed Ansit.  Inwardly Orual believes that she is not 
less saddened by Bardia’s death than his wife Ansit because she herself too used to be 
madly in love with Bardia inside her secret heart; besides, Orual cannot help feeling 
some bitter jealousy and a touchy sense of superiority toward this rival in love.  
Their interaction, from the beginning, is full of tension with some inexpressible or 
unnamed sense of conflict going on between them.  Then comes the climatic 
moment after the unintentional disclosure of the Queen-Orual’s secret love for Bardia.   
Following the momentary friendliness shared, as it were, between the fellow sufferers, 
the confrontation between the two enemies restarts, and this time Orual the Queen 
becomes totally caught unprepared by the sad, embittered, yet acute-minded Ansit, 
who definitely has a sophisticated understanding of love and apparently gets the upper 
hand over the issue of love.    Without hesitation, Ansit attacks Orual by insisting that 
her “queenship drank up [Bardia’s] blood year by year and ate out his life” (264).  
More pointedly but truthfully, Ansit advances a further charge that rightly hits the 
fatal point of Orual and nearly causes the stronghold of her ego  to a complete 
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Oh, Queen Orual, I begin to think you know nothing of love. . . Perhaps you 
who spring from the gods love like the gods.  Like the Shadowbrute.  
They say the loving and the devouring are all one, don’t they? . . . Faugh! 
You’re full fed.  Gorged with other men’s lives, women’s too: Bardia’s, 
mine, the Fox’s, your sisters’—both your  sisters’.        (264-265) 
 
 
The criticism rings so true that Orual has nowhere to escape from the terrible reality 
of her devouring personality.  For the first time in her life, she is forced to face the 
real image of herself—an insatiably greedy, all-demanding, and entirely 
unsympathetic, a vampire-like exploiter in love.  This explosive moment marks the 
very turning point of Orual’s psychic and spiritual life: now she really begins trying to 
look at her inner self and listening to the voice of conscience and growing receptive to 
the “operation” of the “divine Surgeons” (266).       
Immediately following the revelation of the fact about her devouring nature, 
Orual makes a confession (to her readers) of her old “mad midnight fantasies: “(Ansit 
dead, or, better still, proved whore, witch, or traitress) when he was at last to be 
seeking my love, I always had him begin by imploring my forgiveness . . .” (266-7).  
Such fantasies are not merely mad but also fully immoral, which makes the 
confession itself bear some inevitable moral touch and thus signal out Orual’s leaning 
toward moral reflection.  In fact, Orual is really coming to a new stage of life in 
which she would undergo a so-called self-disillusioning process.  Ansit’s revelation 
is indeed a fatal enlightenment to Orual, who again confesses: “nearly all that I called 
myself went with it.  It was as if my whole soul had been one tooth and now that 
tooth was drawn.  I was a gap.  And now I thought I had come to the very bottom 
and that the gods could tell me no worse” (267).  It appears that Orual is conscious 
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the very truth that her previous self-knowledge is nothing but a façade.    This sense of 
being a “gap” is a clear expression of self-disillusionment and, in another sense, a sign 
of the beginning of self-growth. 
Progressive as Orual’s self-knowing or self-growing process appears, we are not 
allowed to assume that Orual has now already reached the very bottom.  The death 
she experiences at this stage is still only a superficial kind of death, for as Orual’s 
journey into the abyss of her psyche and into the truth of reality goes on, there are 
more new discoveries to make for Orual as well as for her readers.  Her next vital 
encounter with a clearer recognition of her true image is experienced in a vision, in 
which she is led by her dead Father to his great mirror again and she sees that her face 
projected on the mirror is the face of Ungit.  In the narration of this transcendental 
experience of seeing, Orual the writer notes about the twist of her writing, which 
undoubtedly parallels her psychic process toward self-knowledge: 
 
  
“I am Ungit.”    My voice came wailing out of me and I found that I was 
in the cool daylight and in my own chamber.    So it had been what we call 
a dream.  But I must give warning that from this time onward they so 
drenched me with seeings that I cannot well discern dream from waking nor 
tell which is the truer.  This vision, anyway, allowed no denial.  Without 
question it was true.    It was I who was Ungit.    That ruinous face was mine.   
I was that  . . . all-devouring womblike, yet barren, thing.  Glome was a 
web—I the swollen spider, squat at its center, gorged with men’s stolen lives.   
                                                     (276)            
 
 
The key alteration in her writing Orual explains here about the increasing 
interpolation of the dream-texts into her life-experiences is an extremely significant 
signpost of the inter-related development of her psyche, her spirit, and her writing as 
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fantasies” which she felt ashamed to write of but did not gain any insight into the 
hidden truth about her self, now the writing becomes endowed with recurrent dreams 
and fantasies full of light shed from the divine on her growing acknowledgement of 
the truth about her life and self.  In this sense, the textual alteration evidently 
corresponds with Orual’s psychic and spiritual development.   
As far as the significance of the living experiences in the dreams is concerned, 
Orual herself is certainly right to acknowledge that the dream-texts are full of spears 
and water-spouts of truth from the very depth of truth” (277).  From the perspective 
of the Jungian psychology of individuation, the blurring of the boundary between 
waking and dreaming lives is importantly functional in transferring Orual’s ego to the 
next stage of life—to recognize and accept her alter ego, the “also-I.”  The psychic 
process of this ego-transference is exactly in line with Jung’s analysis of the 
psychic-development from the “childhood level of consciousness” to “that of the 
dualistic stage:” 
 
Something in us wishes to remain a child; to be unconscious, or, at most, 
conscious only of the ego; to reject everything foreign, or at least subject it 
to our will; to do nothing, or in any case indulge our own craving for 
pleasure or power.  . . . it is persistence in a hitherto existing state whose 
level of consciousness is smaller, narrower and more egoistic than that of 
the dualistic stage.    For in the latter the individual finds himself compelled 
to recognize and to accept what is different and strange as a part of his own 
life—as a kind of “also-I”.     
It is the extension of the horizon of life which is the essential feature of 
the dualistic stage . . . The very aim of religious education, from the 
exhortation to put off the old Adam, backward in time to the rebirth rituals 
of primitive races, is to transform a human being into a new—a 
future—man, and to allow the old forms of life to die away.
209  
                                                 
209  Jung, “The Stages of Life,” Modern Man in Search of a Soul, p. 116-117. 
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It is not an overstatement to share that Jung’s insight, as quoted here, about the 
psychic process of individuation is precisely mapping out the trajectory of Orual’s 
development of personality.  Throughout Orual’s writing, especially toward the end 
of it and of her life too, we find indeed that her living experiences undergo a similar 
psychic process coinciding with the Jungian psychological paradigm, which definitely 
would illuminate our psychological investigation into  the  changes  in  Orual’s  life.        
    According  to  Jungian  psychology,  during the process of individuation, that is, the 
way to integrate the subject’s consciousness with the psychic contents within the 
unconscious level, the ego would experience “the danger of disintegration” and the 
process itself would be “a time of crisis for his soul”
210 before the blissful stage of 
reintegration through a process of religious transformation.    In the case of Orual, her 
text intermingled with her dream-texts testify to such a psychic process.    Ultimately, 
it is the element of spirituality that becomes the indispensable turning point for the 
disintegrated self to restore the integrity of her whole being.  Specifically speaking, 
as soon as Orual comes to the knowledge that she is “as ugly in soul” (281) as Ungit, 
her soul becomes perilously on the edge of total collapse and in order to cease being 
Ungit she even makes attempts at suicide.  As she is about to fling herself into the 
deep river, a god’s voice comes to stop her: “‘Do not do it,’ said the god.  ‘You 
cannot escape Ungit by going to the deadlands, for she is there also.    Die before you 
die.    There is no chance after’” (279).    If she cannot live with Ungit’s soul, nor can 
she die to escape Ungit, how then can she die before she dies?    The words of the god 
are indeed very much like riddles, and the mystery of this one seems no less hard to 
                                                 
210  The phrases are quoted from Hans Schaer’s “Elements of Jungian Psychology.”    The original 
context is: “The approach to the unconscious exposes the ego [the center of consciousness] to the 
danger of disintegration.    That is why a man descends into the unconscious only at a time of crisis for 
his soul” (Schaer, p. 47). 
  205unravel as the ambiguity imbedded in the divine voice that reaches Orual for the first 
time right after the destruction of Psyche’s happiness: “You, shall know yourself and 
your work. You also shall be Psyche” (174).  Nevertheless, these mysterious or 
ambiguous voices from the divine ultimately turn out to be the very prediction of the 
prospect of her personal life-journey; as for the meaning of such a life-journey, Orual 
has got to live it out.   
The striking discovery of the identification between herself and Ungit—both 
faceless in body and ugly in soul—is itself already a kind of death for Orual in the 
sense that Orual simply cannot live with such a terrible fact—Ungit being her alter 
ego.  But this death—the most desperate resistance to face the truth of the 
“also-I”—is not the same sort of “death” foretold by the god that Orual needs to go 
through before she dies.  In her struggle to grasp the meaning of this “death before 
death” and to figure out how she can live on instead of committing suicide, Orual 
turns to the Greek philosopher’s wisdom with a view to changing her “ugly soul into a 
fair one” (282).  With great efforts to put her “passions and desires and vain 
opinions” (281) to death, Orual, however, falls into the greater despair of finding 
herself to be a hopeless failure as a moral being.      Deeply frustrated, she finds with a 
cold fear in her heart that she could never mend her soul any more than her face.  
Then trying to turn to the help of the god, she is immediately gripped by a more bitter 
thought that because of her double ugliness in body and in soul, she must also be 
doubly ill-favoured both as a woman and as a human being; that is to say, she will 
never be granted any help from the god.  Her reasoning logic sounds ridiculously 
simple; however, it reveals also some change in Orual as a spiritual being.  Now, 
more than ever and even for the first time in her life, she is in the desperate position of 
seeking the help of the gods with all her heart. 
The divine help does not come to the desperate Orual as she expects perhaps 
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her moral consciousness is probably not the death meant by the god.   Besides, 
although she feels like a gap because of being stricken by the ugliness of her soul, she 
has not approached the complete emptiness of the self yet.    After all, it is evident that 
up to now Orual does not grasp the whole truth about her self, and therefore the 
self-emptying process has yet to be carried on.  There remains, as it were, some 
residue of delusion about her self that is to be uprooted.    The most steadfast delusion 
in Orual is unmistakably her deep-rooted belief in her love for Psyche.  To the old 
Orual in her despairing state of mind, this is like the last cornerstone for her nearly all 
crashed stronghold.  The following narration describes how she clings to this belief 
to console herself: 
 
 
However I might have devoured Bardia, I had at least loved Psyche truly.   
There, if nowhere else, I had the right of it and the gods were in the 
wrong.    .    .    .    And one day I took this book . . . to comfort myself, and 
gorge myself with comfort, by reading over how I had cared for Psyche and 
taught her and tried to save her and wounded myself for her sake.    (285) 
 
 
Obviously, Orual still remains blind to the truth of love or her love for  Psyche.  Her 
self-confidence in this aspect actually rings very ironically, especially in view of the 
narcissistic touch conveyed in the self-assertion she makes here.  Aside from her 
false self-justification, another important point worthy of our re-examination is her 
equally delusive conviction in the truthfulness of her writing.  Yet, from the 
perspective that Orual’s book as a whole is substantially a faithful self-expression and 
therefore inevitably contains a considerable amount of Orual’s blindness, it is actually 
understandable why Orual would embrace such a comfort which is based on the 
  207twofold  misunderstanding.   
  However, her self-misunderstanding is exactly the first and foremost plank in her 
eye that needs to be removed so that she can see  properly what she used to be 
incapable of seeing.    Without the capacity of seeing she is unable to gain insight into 
her true level and to discern the falseness of unrealities and the truthfulness of realities.   
The restoration or cultivation of the seeing capacity of this sort is exactly what 
“purgation” means, according to the observation of Evelyn Underhill in the essay 
entitled “The Essentials of Mysticism.”  Underhill’s explanation of the meaning of 
“purgation” from a point of view that fuses religious and psychological dimensions is 
tremendously insightful to the present investigation concerning Orual’s self-growth:   
 
 
[T]he self is either suddenly or gradually inclined to “true wisdom”; and this 
change of angle affects the whole character, not only or indeed specially the 
intellectual outlook, but the ethical outlook too.  This is the meaning of 
“purgation.”  False ways of feeling and thinking, established complexes 
which have acquired for us an almost sacred character, and governed though 
we knew it not all our reactions to life—these must be broken up.  That 
mental and moral sloth which keeps us so comfortably wrapped in 
unrealities must go.
211   
              
In the same essay, Underhill also notes that the practice of “purgation” is “the first 
essential stage in the development of the mystical consciousness.”  It is noticeable 
that Underhill’s psychologically-based specification of purgation is greatly in 
accordance with Jung’s psychology of religion and also with C. S. Lewis’s testimony 
or observations in some of his Christian writings, especially when he deals with the 
issue of conversion in Surprised by Joy.  All of these  authors are really akin to each 
                                                 
211  Underhill, Evelyn, “ The Essentials of Mysticism,” The Essentials of Mysticism and Other Essays 
(London & Toronto: J. M. Dent& Sons Ltd., 1920), pp. 1-24.    For this long passage and the short 
quotation below, see p. 12. 
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consciousness and psychological transformation.  So, in this respect, they can echo 
each other and all sound undoubtedly relevant to this study of Orual’s psychic and 
spiritual journey to know her self.     
Put in the context of Orual’s living experiences, the essential goal of “purgation,” 
specifically the development of the self from misperception toward true wisdom to 
attain a character of humility, in its full sense, is not accomplished until Orual’s 
climactic encounter with the god—“the most dreadful, the most beautiful” (307).    On 
the other hand, toward the climactic moment of her life, there are indeed purgatory 
phases for her to go through in order that her perception may become perfected and 
her whole being can be renewed and prepared for the ultimate experience of the 
numinous.  Of such purgatory phases the most crucial event happens in a “living 
vision” in which Orual is taken to the sacred court with her book written to make 
complaints  against  the  gods.   The  dramatic  scene in the divine court when Orual is 
asked to read her complaint is the most vital turning point for her to discover the real 
voice from her inner self.      Taken to stand in front of the divine judge, who too has a 
veiled face, Orual is firstly commanded to speak in her bare-face.  The first two 
words of the divine judge, “Uncover her,” (289) are symbolically meaningful, 
pointing straightly and precisely to the most conspicuous and crucial blind spot in 
Orual.  The divine command can be understood as an immediate though maybe 
implicit suggestion that before Orual could sound true, she must show her true image.  
Moreover, this order of revealing Orual’s bare face may also be associated with the 
simple but inescapable fact that in the presence of the divine, not just the veil-mask 
but also all of Orual’s self-disguise, in any form, at any level—conscious or 
unconscious, must and would eventually be uncovered.  This is actually the essence 
of the “purgation” that Orual needs to live through.   
  209The demarcation between the veiled and the revealed, the real and the unreal 
must be, in a sense, restored and re-legitimated, at least in the sacred place.  Orual, 
therefore, would have to face the challenge of acknowledging the unrealities that she 
used to embrace out of her own intention or because of her ignorance and blindness.    
For example, now in the land of the divine, she is both located in and faced with the 
metaphysical reality, which she used to obstinately dismiss and reject as unreality on 
account of its invisibility.  Orual’s misperception in this respect is actually based on 
an  invalid dichotomy between the seen / known or knowable and the unseen / 
unknown or unknowable that she used to usurp (disbelieving in Psyche’s sacred 
Palace and her unseen God) or enjoy “playing” with (always wearing a veil).  Now, 
Orual has to abandon her false dichotomy and change her mind as well as her “view” 
to embrace the Reality revealed to her—of the god and of her self.         
To Orual, the most striking discovery of the unreality she has naively clung to is 
about her book.    As soon as she is bid to read her complaint, she sees the book in her 
hand become utterly strange to her; it is not her book at all.    It is no longer the same 
book that she wrote and which gives her unspeakable comfort.  Now it becomes a 
roll of “all vile scribble—each stroke mean and yet savage, like the snarl in [her] 
father’s voice, like the ruinous faces one could make out in the Ungit’s stone” (290).  
Her immediate reaction to this incredibly shocking alteration is to request the divine 
agents to give her back her original book, but the request is not met.  In “a great 
terror” (290) and a loathing attitude, Orual, however, puts aside her strong resistance 
and starts reading it.  Her second surprise is the strangeness of her reading voice, 
which she finally realizes is her “real voice” (292).  This  weird  experience of reading 
a different book in a strange voice from herself is like a deconstructive moment as far 
as the authenticity of her autobiographical text is concerned.    What used to be real to 
her has gone, and she is forced both to look at and listen to something foreign but 
  210really belonging to her—from the innermost depth of her being.       
As a result of listening to her own repeated reading of the different but authentic 
book, at last Orual comes to the real bottom of her downward process of 
self-disillusionment.  The essential problem about her love toward Psyche and her 
charge against the gods is uncovered and disclosed to Orual: she is actually blinded by 
her own weak and wicked nature—egoism and self-pride and even jealousy toward 
the externally and internally superior Psyche.  Her weakness in character or inward 
wickedness is, so to speak, the very foundation on which she has built her own 
fictional world full of hatred, bitterness, pride, and prejudice about the god’s mean 
and cruel deprivation of her only love, Psyche.    Now, the very text of her fiction, that 
is, her writing, has been proved all wrong-headed  and  a  dark-hearted  illusion.   Yet, 
on the bottom of self-disillusionment there lies also a light of hope, for the moment of 
complete disillusionment can be the turning point for the growth of the self.    Thanks 
to the disclosure of the true face of her being, Orual from now on no longer has to be 
the faceless Ungit; instead, she becomes faced again by means of the retrieval of 
authentic self-knowledge.  That’s why in response to the divine judge’s brief 
question, “Are you answered?” (293) Orual can give a definite “Yes.”    Now that she 
has grasped the truth about her self, it seems that she has also come to reconcile 
herself with the imperceptible gods.     
The correlation between self-knowledge and the perceptibility of the divine is 
another wonderful enlightenment to the self-disillusioned yet fully appeased Orual, as 
noted in the narration below:   
 
 
The complaint was the answer.    To have heard myself making it was to be 
answered.    . . . When the time comes to you at which you will be forced at 
last to utter the speech which was lain at the center of your soul for years . . . 
  211I saw well why the gods do not speak to us openly, nor let us answer.    Till 
that word can be dug out of us, why should they hear the babble that we 
think we mean?    How can they meet us face to face till we have faces?   
                                                      (294) 
         
  
This enlightenment as a whole is of multi-layered significance concerning the 
encounter between human subjectivity and the divine otherness.  Specifically, Orual 
at least comes to the twofold realization: firstly, the outcry from “the center of her 
soul” is her real voice and reveals very true face of her soul; secondly, without 
integrating this level of self-understanding into the so-called self-knowledge, she can 
never be sincerely or right-mindedly seeking after the knowledge of the divine other, 
either the divine voice or face.   In psychological terms, the very turning point for 
the human subject to be aware of the unconscious self so as to re-integrate both the 
conscious and the unconscious would make a crucial meeting point for human beings 
to encounter with the divine, to achieve reconciliation and dialogue out of true 
sincerity on the part of humans.  Meanwhile, since the spiritual  achievement is 
correlated with the psychic development, the divine may take an active part in the 
human acquirement of the enlightenment.     
In Lewis’s dramatization of Orual’s psychic and spiritual journey, it is 
discernable that for a blind creature like Orual, she simply needs to be led or brought 
out of her darkness, within the psychic and intellectual and spiritual domains, into the 
lightness of Reality.  The interaction between the psychic force and the religious 
power which leads to the ultimate comprehensive integration of the whole being of 
the self—the inner and the outer and the spiritual—is correspondent with Jung’s 
assertion that “religion ministers to psychic hygiene.”
212   Hans  Schaer  in  “Religion 
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living religion” can function in the psychic process toward the self: 
 
 
Religious experience can be defined by saying that it tends towards psychic 
integration.    Religion is the acknowledgement of the things that 
consciousness fails to realize; or it can go further and bring about an inner 
unity and wholeness.    Thus,    . . . a living religion is needed for the full 
development of personality.
213    
 
 
The notion of the ministry of religion to psychic health helps justify the observation 
that C. S. Lewis’s heroine achieves her self-growth, namely, “psychic integration,” not 
really through a process of reflection on within  but more indispensably and 
substantially because of the religious strength and insight from above. 
Furthermore, what Orual is also enlightened to perceive in the whole event of 
knowing herself and reconciling herself with the gods is about the discrepancy 
between the “word” uttered from her conscious mind and the “real voice” poured out 
of the depth of her psyche.    The recognition of such a discrepancy is just meaningful 
not merely in terms of her spiritual regeneration but also in the aspect of her 
meta-critical thinking about her book.  From Orual’s acknowledgement of her own 
responsibility in her incapacity of hearing and seeing the gods because of her 
insincerity, we may further infer that once she has a full grasp of the reality of her 
inner self—preoccupied and predominated by weakness and blindness, she becomes 
genuinely capable of reflecting on her own writing objectively.  In other words, in 
addition to becoming able to receive the message and the vision of the divine, 
entering into the stage of true self-knowledge also changes Orual’s views on her 
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  213previous subjective writing, which she afterwards acknowledges as problematic and 
inauthentic as her old self.  Orual’s self-discovery in a double sense, the personality 
of her whole self and the textuality of her writing, testifies too Jung’s insightful 
statement about the interrelationship between “seeing” and “being” and “writing:” 
“Our way of looking at things is conditioned by what we are.  And since  . . . 
people are differently constituted, they see things differently and express themselves 
differently.”
214  
  Indeed, the writing of Orual is inevitably conditioned by the narrowness of her 
perspectives and personality.  Until the horizons of both her thinking mind and her 
being can be broadened through at least acknowledging her narrowness and 
limitedness and even sinfulness, she cannot truly and effectively engage herself in a 
self-critique.  Before her growing out of her self-importance or self-righteousness, 
her reflective writing can only, at best, reflect her blind spots imbedded within the 
intellectual and moral dimensions of her being.  C. S. Lewis in his essay 
“Christianity and Literature” comments on the “two ways in which a man may be said 
to write about himself,” and he takes St. Augustine and Rousseau, the two most noted 
writers of “confessions,” as his examples:     
    
  
[W]e have the expressionist and the Christian attitudes towards the self or 
temperament.    Thus St. Augustine and Rousseau both write Confessions; 
but to the one his own temperament is a kind of absolute (au moins je suis 
autre,) to the other it is “a narrow house too narrow for Thee to enter—oh 
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Augustine, it could be inferred that the situatedness of Lewis’s heroine as a sort of 
confessional writer undergoes some transference  from the position of vehement 
self-expression to a posture edified by the character of humility.    Her transference in 
the consciousness of writing is undoubtedly in accordance with her development in 
personality.    To put in another way, as the confinement of her subjectivity is to some 
extent transcended, so her consciousness as a writer is also being enlarged.  This is 
the very significance of Orual’s interconnected transformation in the two 
dimensions—personality and textuality.        
  However, this is still not the whole story of Orual’s life-transformation; it only 
prepares Orual to approach a better end of her life-journey.   The working of 
religion has to be done more thoroughly to her life so that she could be clothed with a 
renewed psychological outfit, i.e., a new consciousness of being, and further undergo 
a comprehensive renewal of her self, in both soul and body.  In this mythic fiction 
about the heroine’s psychic and spiritual growth, Lewis employs a series of living 
visions as the mediators of religion for his heroine to re-live her life with a view to 
righting the wrongs preoccupying her feeling and cognition during the history of her 
life.  The experience of reading out a different but more correct version of her 
complaint is one of the living visions Orual walks into and prompts her to re-examine 
the truthfulness of her book and her self-understanding.  Later, led by the loving 
Fox’s ghost to her “true judges,” the gods themselves, and waiting with him in the 
sacred chamber, Orual is bestowed more living visions from the story pictures painted 
on the walls of the sacred locality.   What is more marvellously significant is that 
those enlivened pictures are all about the life-stories of Orual herself and Psyche.  
On this occasion, as a distanced viewer, Orual has a chance to look into their stories 
and to discover more truth about their interrelated and even mystically inter-changed 
  215lives.    
  To Orual’s amazement, displayed in the visions on one of the walls are the 
scenes in which she and Psyche toil together to undertake the same ordeals, but 
between them there is a great contrast—Psyche is almost always “merry and in good 
heart” (300), while Orual bears “nearly all the anguish” (300).  The most surprising 
and strange discovery to Orual in these “co-working” scenes is that it is herself who 
“bore the anguish” but Psyche “achieved the task” (301).  How could Orual 
understand such a mysterious and ambiguous interchange of “anguish” and 
“achievement”?  According to the wise Fox, their sharing each other’s burdens and 
tasks and contributing to each other’s gain and achievement are actually the 
phenomena of the very reality of interpersonal relationship: “We’re all limbs and parts 
of one Whole.  Hence, of each other.  Men, and gods, flow in and out and mingle” 
(300-301).    Or, as Doris T. Myers puts, the interchanged living experiences of Orual 
and Psyche are basically “a Charles Williams-like process of substitution,” through 
which “Orual’s sufferings have spared Psyche, and Psyche’s beauty has been shared 
with her, so that both of them are worthy to stand before the god.”
216  However, the 
ambiguity of the meaning of their interrelationship does not seem completely cleared 
away by the moral in the mouth of Fox, nor can it be pinned down by Myers’s rightly 
made association.  We interpreters of Orual’s viewings may further wonder: What 
does this revelation of the inter-mingled living relationship between Psyche and 
herself mean to Orual personally?  And, how would Orual re-interpret her 
relationship with Psyche with this discovery of co-living as a “whole body”?     
  Apart from the moral-based interpretation of Fox (in the afterlife, quite curiously, 
appearing as a convert, a believer, no less), another way of looking at Orual’s vision 
and rethinking its significance to Orual’s understanding might be to interpret this 
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different level of understanding of the newly discovered reality.  That Orual has in 
reality gone through with Psyche the ordeals Psyche is punished to undergo in her 
banished miserable predicament, in fact, signifies something psychologically 
illuminating to Orual to such an extent that she now could be set free from a sense of 
imprisonment buried deep in her heart.  As revealed in the living vision of reality, 
like the victimized Psyche because of Orual’s possessive and manipulative love, Orual 
herself too suffers to share Psyche’s ruinous state of being; Orual’s suffering for 
Psyche’s sake, in a sense, does herself credit, for it is she who bore the anguish in 
their shared sufferings.  In light of this revelation, Orual can thus be relieved of the 
long-gripping sense of guilt for the destruction of Psyche’s happiness.  In other 
words, with the reinterpreted inter-relationship between Orual and Psyche, the depth 
of Orual’s heart long haunted by the psychologically and morally unresolved problem 
involving her guilty doings to Psyche’s life can now be greatly unburdened.           
 The  last  mystically surreal vision on the wall of the sacred chamber is about the 
last ordeal for Psyche set by Ungit to fetch beauty for Ungit from the Queen Death 
herself.    On Psyche’s journey to the deadlands, forbidden by Ungit’s law to speak to 
anyone “for any fear or favour or love or pity” (301), Orual sees that the most 
tormenting and grieving challenge for Psyche is to go past the most demanding and 
seductive wailing voice out of Orual herself.  The touching pathos in Psyche’s 
suffering, which now Orual understands is to a greater degree than her own, provides 
Orual with the dawning realization of the truth that her undeniable jealousy toward 
Psyche’s happy union with the god / “the Divine Nature” (304) has made herself the 
most “dangerous enem[y]” (304) to Psyche.  Orual’s dawning though belated 
realization seems to be the final point of her downward process of self-disillusionment 
and simultaneously an essential point of her upward development of spiritual 
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supposed to approach—to die before she dies.     
The signification of this bottom, namely, a kind of death, is presented through the 
way the totally changed Orual greets and confesses to Psyche the goddess.  At the 
moment of their long-deferred reunion, we see the humblest profile of Orual 
welcoming the victorious and glorious returning of Psyche to her sacred house, and 
we can hear Orual’s honest confession full of self-negating repentance: “Oh Psyche, 
oh goddess    . . . Never again will I call you mine; but all there is of me shall be yours.   
Alas, you know now what it’s worth.  I never wished you well, never had one 
selfless thought of you.  I was a craver” (305).  The clear touch of the abolition of 
egoism and the sense of dedication and compassion mark distinctly the change in 
Orual in terms of love and personality.    She seems totally transformed—from the one 
who subconsciously tends to abuse her own passion for Psyche and the latter’s love to 
satisfy the wickedly destructive kind of possessive desire to become profoundly 
sympathetic and full-heartedly repentant.    Besides, the subjective emotion expressed 
in her confessional petition to Psyche the goddess manifests as well the spiritual 
virtue that Orual has grown into.  In her article, “The Place of Will, Intellect and 
Feeling in Prayer,” Evelyn Underhill describes the “operation of feeling in prayer” 
with such a note about the self’s feeling state of spiritual humility: “the self’s feeling 
of its own imperfection . . . a feeling which grows with the growth of the soul’s 
spiritual perceptions, and includes all the shaded emotions of penitence and of 
humility.  ‘For meekness in itself is naught else but a true knowing and feeling of a 
man’s self as he is.’”
217    Such a mystic state of feeling as Underhill delineates serves 
to characterize the exact state of spirit as well as mind of Orual. 
  In view of her new characteristic, or quality, of spirit and psyche, Orual may be 
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  218claimed to have fulfilled the essentials of purgation, according to Underhill’s criteria 
in terms of mystical development.  Up to now, she has indeed approached the “true 
wisdom” with a full grasp of reality, at least the reality of her true self.  However, 
this is still not a full stop for either her psychic process or spiritual  journey.  As  far  as 
the loving relationship is concerned, until the broken relationship between Orual and 
Psyche, the central passion of her old self, can be totally mended and healed, the 
unresolved problem within Orual’s deep heart is not fully dealt with.  To Orual’s 
heartfelt confession, Psyche immediately responds with the same old sense of 
intimacy of love, which sustains Psyche’s selfless concern for Orual: “But Maia, dear 
Maia, You must stand up.    I have not given you the casket.    You know I went a long 
journey to fetch the beauty that will make Ungit beautiful” (305-306).  Psyche’s 
response at such a moment, without doubt, signifies their reconciliation based on 
forgiveness and shared compassion.  More importantly, the message in Psyche’s 
words of love bears also some key point referring to the total solution to Orual’s 
problem, in both the psychic and spiritual sense, namely, her ugliness.     
Indeed, the most essential problem within Orual’s psyche and even spirit lies in 
her complex of ugliness, as has been elaborated before in this study.  It is, so to 
speak, the very root of her bitterness and her contradictory tendencies of self-hatred 
and egotism, especially in her treatment of love.  Because of her ugliness, she holds 
the fatalistic view of life that because she lacks a beautiful body and soul, she is 
unworthy as a love-object for men and for the gods; on the other hand, largely 
subconsciously she possesses the pathetic sense of desire or longing for being loved, 
with a “hopeless dream” that in “some other land, some other world, some other way” 
(282-283) an ill-favoured woman like her might be also a conqueror of some sort, not 
always a predestined loser.  To resolve this complicated psychological problem, 
Orual is offered by the goddess Psyche beauty of a transcendent order.  As the 
  219mythical vision shows, the ultimate purpose of Psyche’s long journey to the Deadland 
is for “facing” the faceless or ruinously-faced Ungit (the alter ego of Orual) with 
beauty from the Death herself so that both the inward and outward ugliness of Ugit / 
Orual can be “re-innovated.”     
Such an offering as well as undertaking of Psyche is meaningful at least in two 
levels.  Firstly, the act of offering beauty itself to satisfy Orual’s deepest and most 
desperate wish and need is based on Psyche’s love, that is, Charity, as coined by 
Lewis in his The Four Loves referring to love of a divine order.  Secondly, just like 
the divine quality of love, the beauty Psyche fetches for Orual is of an eternal order 
too because it is earned by Psyche the goddess through overcoming the difficulties 
and dangers of journeying all the way to the land of Death.  In a spiritual sense, the 
beauty in Psyche’s basket signifies both the victory of love and the defeat of death and 
is thus endowed with the nature of eternity.    To be given such beauty in this sense for 
Orual means sharing with Psyche the status of conqueror of death and ugliness.  
From a religious point of view, Psyche represents a mythic version of Christ (the 
Saviour) in the Christian sense, and Orual becomes prototypically once the damned 
one now reborn into a blessed being of no shame.  The religious significance of 
divine gift of beauty serving to fulfill Orual’s fundamental wish for liberation from 
the damnation of her double ugliness fully justifies the fact that Orual’s whole 
experience of being redeemed is in essence a religious experience.     
So far, this discussion has been focused on Orual’s psychic process through 
which Orual manages to grow out of the personality un-integrated with her 
unconscious self yet predominated by the internal struggles and aspirations and even a 
horrible sense of dark-heartedness all pertaining to her unconsciousness.  As for the 
existential sense of terror that is inevitably bound with her humanity, our discussion of 
Orual’s psychic changes must be re-oriented toward her transformed stage of life, in 
  220which her self undergoes re-integration and her personality  becomes wholly 
renovated—fundamentally through her encounters with the transcendence.   
Following her seeing the living visions that reveal the realities and thus thoroughly 
de-construct the unrealities in her perception and ultimately serve to redeem both her 
body and soul by replacing her ugliness with beauty, Orual then comes to her fullest 
experience of the “living religion,” through encountering with the god himself, the 
son of Aphrodite (or Ungit).  It is the climactic coming of the holy god that brings 
Orual into the ultimate power of religion and gives her the absolute feeling of the 
numinous.  In Orual’s own description, the experience of the holiness of the god, 
even just at his approaching, is a completely piercing and shattering experience to her 
whole being: “Each breath I drew let into my new terror, joy, overpowering sweetness.   
I was pierced through and through with the arrows of it I was being unmade.  I was 
no one” (307).  It is evident that at the coming of “the most dreadful, the most 
beautiful” (307), or in Rudolf Otto’s words, “the overpowering,” Orual’s state of 
mind—feeling her self “being unmade”—bespeaks the so-called 
“creature-consciousness.”  Orual’s extremely self-diminutive or self-depreciating 
attitude toward the existence of the holy is undoubtedly a religious emotion in 
response to the “absolute overpoweringness,” which according to Otto is an element 
denoting the nature of the holy.    Lewis’s delineation of the “creature-consciousness” 
in Orual closely corresponds to Otto’s ideation in this respect.  In The Idea of the 
Holy, Otto expounds the relation between the “creature-consciousness” and the 
“overpowering” nature of the holy: 
 
 
It is especially in relation to this element of majesty or absolute 
overpoweringness that the creature-consciousness,    . . . comes upon the 
scene, as a sort of shadow or subjective reflection of it.    Thus, in contrast 
  221to ‘the overpowering’ of which we are conscious as an object over against 
the self, there is the feeling of one’s own submergence, of being but ‘dust 
and ashes’ and nothingness.    And this forms the numinous raw material for 




In terms of Otto’s ideas, the heightened sense of the death of the self in Orual’’s 
response to the numinous other is derived from a special quality of her subjective 
consciousness, which is unmistakably a quality of a religious order, namely, religious 
humility.    In other words, with such a numinous experience of encountering the holy 
god, the ultimate meaning and reality of religion, Orual also approaches the ultimate 
reality of her self as a human being, and as a result she really comes to her death, 
which means that now she finally achieves to “die before she dies.”   
Furthermore, Otto also attributes this religious sense of “self-depreciation” to 
“one of the chiefest and most general features of mysticism,” and besides he 
elaborates such a mystical feeling state as one “which comes to demand its own 
fulfillment in practice in rejecting the delusion of selfhood, and so makes for the 
annihilation of the self.”
219    It is observable that this mystically-based conception of 
“self-depreciation” can be unquestionably applied to Orual’s feeling of “self-death.”  
Based on this observation, Orual’s religious emotion of death of the self is no doubt a 
mystical experience.  She has at last achieved in the highest degree the purpose of 
“purgation,” which is one of the essential stages of mysticism as conceptualized by 
Evelyn Underhill.  Actually, in terms of Underhill’s conception of mysticism, 
obviously echoed by Otto’s understanding, we can infer that Orual’s life journey 
becomes not merely a journey to self-knowledge but essentially a mystic  journey.  To 
justify this inference, it is worthwhile to quote Underhill’s insightful definition of 
                                                 
218 Rudolf  Otto,  The Idea of the Holy (London: Oxford University Press, 1923), p. 20. 
219  Otto, Ibid, p. 21. 
  222mysticism, in the Preface to her magnum opus, Mysticism:   
 
 
I understand [mysticism] to be the expression of the innate tendency of the 
human spirit towards complete harmony with the transcendental order;    . . . 
so long as this is a genuine life process . . . I believe this movement to 
represent the true line of development of the highest form of human 
consciousness.
220     
      
 
From Underhill’s mystical perspective, we may infer that the moment Orual fulfills 
the mystical phases of purgation and her spirit becomes in complete harmony with the 
holy deity, her whole being reaches also the mystical ideal of coming to “the highest, 
and to the utmost fullness of being which the human soul can contain” (306). 
In the end, the beatitude of the numinous experience brings about the total 
redemption of Orual’s life, including not only her spirit but also her body.  At the 
climactic moment as the god of love approaches, standing side by side with Psyche, 
Orual looks into the pool at the sacred place and discovers the ultimate significance of 
her personal encounter with the transcendence—her own transfiguration: “Two 
figures, reflections,    . . . stood head downward in the water . . . Two Psyches, the one 
clothed, the other naked?    Yes, both Psyches, both beautiful (if that mattered now) . . . 
‘You also are Psyche,’ came a great voice” (307-308).  This  transcendental  vision  in 
which Orual has been transformed into another Psyche (her super-ego) is indeed full 
of significance.  For one thing, it signifies that the hopeless distance between Orual 
and Psyche is completely annihilated, for now they share and both reflect the beauty 
of a divine order, spiritually and physically.  This, in another sense, means that with 
her new self Orual’s life-long bitterness toward her own ugliness and her tendency to 
gaze obsessively at Psyche’s beauty are both transcended.  That is to say, for Orual, 
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  223the life-binding spell based on the dichotomy between beauty and ugliness is broken 
at last.  Moreover, the transcendental experience of self-transformation is of 
tremendous significance in terms of Orual’s development of personality.  
Undergoing the spiritual and bodily metamorphoses in the presence of the holy god 
indicates the ultimate achievement of Orual’s psychic journey toward the self, namely, 
the attainment of a fully and perfectly developed personality.   
Therefore, it is true to say that Orual’s psychic progression or her mystical 
journey culminates in the climactic meeting with the transcendent god happening in 
the sacred place, which is the exact space where Orual becomes ultimately 
transfigured and sanctified.   But, we should also put in mind that all of these 
transcendental experiences do not happen in reality but are lived through by Orual as 
a mortal through “seeings” (308).    As the final section of Orual’s book tells us, soon 
after she returns from those “living visions” to the real world, she is about to die 
physically.  Suppose the metamorphoses and sanctification of her self actually 
happen to Orual as a living being in whatever forms, spiritual, mental, or mythically 
fantastic, we may wonder where then is the very channel for the still mortal Orual to 
undergo all those transcendental seeings and surreal livings.    We might thus come to 
a presumably valid suggestion that the real space or channel for Orual firstly to face 
the reality of her true self and then to encounter with the transcendence and 
accordingly go through the experience of her life being transcended is located within 
her psyche.  On the basis of this, another justifiable assumption would be that it is 
actually in her psyche that lies the sacred locality wherein she can discover the truth 
of reality and meet with the numinous face to face and ultimately recovers the sanctity 
of her living being.     
That the sacred space of Orual’s journey to self-discovery, spiritual (re)union 
with the transcendence, and redemption of the whole being is her very psyche 
  224validates the fundamental concern of this study—investigating Orual’s self-experience 
through exploring her psychic process and its inter-relation with the functions of the 
living religion.  From the psychological perspective or a religious point of view, 
Lewis’s myth-rewritten novel, Till We Have Faces, can be interpreted as a profound 
text that represents sophisticatedly both the problematic and the potential of human 
self as a sacred space for the interaction or meeting between humanity and divinity.   
In her autobiographical book, Orual once voices an interrogative outcry from her 
inner being: “Why must holy places be dark places?” (249).  We readers and 
interpreters of Orual’s writing and life-journey can raise another question in response:   
How come the domain of human psyche is as dark as the holy places?      To induce a 
possible answer, we might further think about such probabilities: Couldn’t the 
darkness of the holy place be the projection of the darkness of human  psyche?  And, 
might the psyche of humanity not be the sacred space, dark though it is, for the 
lightness of divinity to come in and ultimately dwell within?     
On how religion can function to minister the psychic predicament, Hans Schaer, 
the German Jungian scholar, makes the following sophisticated observations in 
“Religion as a Psychic Function:”       
 
 
Surveying at a glance what Jung has to say about the function of religion, 
we see that religion always relates to man’s wholeness.  .  .  .  even if 
the myths and [religious] symbols harbour all sorts of unconscious elements, 
these may yet produce a psychic cosmos instead of a psychic chaos.  All 
the psychic contents which are touched into life by religion then become 
related to one another, e.g. the conscious to the unconscious, the spiritual to 
the natural; . . . The symbols release things in us, create order, and broaden.   
Psychic functions that might otherwise exert a disturbing influence become 
positive in their effect.    The individual attains to    . . . an active experience, 
  225which imposes a cosmos on the chaos of his soul.
221  (Emphases  added) 
   
 
Based on the insight of Jungian psychology of religion, these valuable thoughts of 
Schaer can be associated with Orual’s case.  Throughout her whole psychic journey 
toward the integrity of personality, Orual indeed undergoes the transference from 
“psychic chaos” to “psychic cosmos” through the mediation and ministry of religion.   
It is no wonder that the dying yet also redeemed Orual / Psyche would conclude her 
writing by finding herself answered because she has been faced with the ultimate 
meaning of religion—since the visitation of the divine.    Out of a renewed spirit and a 
rehabilitated mind and with a clearly religious sense of peace, she utters her last 
words: I know now, Lord, why you utter no answer.  You are yourself the answer.  
Before your face questions die away.  What other answer would suffice?  Only 
words, words; to be led out to battle against other words.   Long did I hate you, long 
did I fear you, I might— ” (308).    These words, in psychological and religious senses, 
sum up the overall significance of Orual’s growth in personality and spirituality 
through a psychic process.       
Also, these last words indicate a certain conclusion of Orual as a writer.  It 
seems that toward the end of her life and writing, Orual has come to the reality of 
writing or words as well; she realizes that all the battles of words for the purpose of 
pursuing or claiming authenticity and truth are fatally failing in the face of the 
ultimate revelation of Truth Himself.  Finally, her writing ends without a full stop, 
and the suggestiveness of the meaningful open-ending could be, to some extent, 
informed by the postscript written by the priest, who notes:  “From the markings 
after the word might, we think the Queen’s head must have fallen forward on them as 
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  226she died and we cannot read them” (308).  The unreadable and inconceivable 
conclusion of Orual’s writing caused by her death, in a certain sense, could be 
associated with the unlimited possibilities of being-after-death in eternity.    If so, then 
the open ending is most appropriate for the writing of Orual’s life.    Her story should 
go on, but the on-going part of Orual’s eternal life after she dies defies either the 
writing of C. S. Lewis or the reading of any human being in this world.     
  For us readers, exploring Lewis’s mythical yet also very realistic world, full of 
revealing imagery of the scenarios of an individual human’s personal struggles in 
psyche, in relationship and in wrestling with the divine, is a rather peculiar 
experience—of the mythopoeic manifestation of humanity, or predicament of 
humanity.  From a literary perspective, the peculiarity of Lewis’s rewriting of the 
Cupid and Psyche myth, in effect, has much to do with his ingenious artistry in 
creating such a psychologically complicated character, Orual, the hopelessly ugly and 
ignorantly doubtful sister of Psyche.  Owing to the profound complexity in Lewis’s 
characterization, we readers seem invited to undergo a first-hand experience of 
journeying into the undiscovered land, that is, the untouched abyss of the heroine’s 
psyche, as we read through her first-person writing of her love and hate and her 
ultimate, albeit poignant, reception of catharsis, in both the psychological and the 
religious senses.  At the end of her story, we indeed come with her to the very truth 
that as her ugliness is not beyond transformation, so can her life-long ignorance and 
deficiency in love, in knowledge of her self and others, and in faith be ultimately 
tackled and healed.  This ultimate hope of the multi-faceted redemption of 
personality as well as personal relationships (with other humans and with the god) 
may be counted as a revelation, a cathartic one, not simply for Orual but also possibly 
for her (and Lewis’s) readers.     
Moreover, the very revelation or suggestion of such a hope reflects the 
  227mythopoeic texture of Lewis’s work, since it speaks not merely of a particular 
situation but also a universal principle regarding human psyche becoming a sacred 
space.  But, as “an object of contemplation,”
222 which is what Lewis suggests us to 
treat a myth, the text (or story) of Till We Have Faces is profoundly mythopoeic for 
other reasons as well.  Besides its well-wrought “externalization” of “psychological 
forces”
223 suggesting some universal truth about humanity, Lewis’s mythic novel also 
indicates some permanent and inevitable principle concerning how the human being 
must wear a real and renewed face so as to transcend the intertwined problem of the 
self and (religious) belief.  From a straightly religious point of view, could this 
mythic representation of the existential problem of belief be apologetically significant 
as well, like Lewis’s previous religious  narratives?  Evidently,  Till We Have Faces is 
probably the most heavily disguised Christianity-related text of all Lewis’s 
imaginative works.    Deeply allusive as it appears, from the mythic novel as a whole, 
the association with the following reflection over the relationship between the human 
self and Christian faith, made by Lewis the Christian thinker, is, however, not 
impossible to make:   
 
Christianity is not, in the long run, concerned either with individuals or 
communities.  Neither the individual nor the community as popular 
thought understands them can inherit eternal life: neither the natural self, 
nor the collective mass, but a new creature.
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  228Ch. VIII.    A Grief Observed: An Inward Drama of the Crisis of Faith 
 
 
“The characteristic of Pains and Pleasures is that they are unmistakably real, and therefore, 
as far as they go, give the man who feels them a touchstone of reality.” 
-- C. S. Lewis, The Screwtape Letters 
“Providence stings some people to avoid giving them happiness for too long . . . to 
strengthen their virtues of mind . . . she brings to self discovery through hardship.”   
          - -   B o e t h i u s ,   The Consolation of Philosophy 
“The battle is between faith and reason on one side and emotion and imagination on the 




In order to highlight the crucial part that human self / psyche plays in the 
existential problem of faith or belief in supernatural reality, i.e., God Himself, C. S. 
Lewis indeed very skillfully characterizes his doubting heroine in Till We Have Faces 
as an autobiographical writer of her own life-experience.  It has been proven in the 
previous discussion about this mythic novel that the first-person and self-reflective 
account can be a fittingly effective mode of expression to lay bare the reality of the 
self and the close relationship between self and faith.    In effect, such an employment 
of writing self as the same agent engaged in the existential / subjective wrestling with 
religious belief serves not just as a device of rhetorical convenience.  Owing to its 
literary effect upon the perfect match between form and content, it actually becomes a 
useful medium for apologetic persuasion too.  Based on this understanding, we may 
also infer that another deeply autobiographical text of Lewis, A Grief Observed, is 
characteristic of the same expressive method—using the pen of the narrator himself 
to dramatize a self-reflective and also self-realizing journey through which the truth 
about the entangled problem of the self and his crisis of faith can be really 
ascertained.   
  229Published as a pseudonymous book in 1961 some time after the death of his wife 
from cancer, C. S. Lewis’s A Grief Observed is apparently constructed as an intensely 
personal book on suffering.  Nevertheless, it is a critical controversy whether this 
text should be treated as an autobiographical recording of the author’s personal 
experience of bereavement or as a fictional narrative that chronicles the emotional and 
spiritual struggles of the average individual in bereavement.    Some readers or critics 
tend to take the first perspective, namely, identifying the authorship of the journal 
writing within the book with the real author, C. S. Lewis himself.  Without 
dismissing Lewis’s apologetic attempt, they take seriously the crisis of faith recounted 
in those private (now published) journals simply as Lewis’s own.  The 
philosophically perceptive (perhaps somewhat obsessive) critic, John Beversluis, is 
one of the faithful upholders of this critical position, which is manifested by his book, 
C. S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion.  Besides,  Lewis’s  stepson,  Douglas 
H. Gresham, can be counted as another representative; his deeply moving “Foreword” 
written for the 1994 version shows his close understanding of the connection between 
the book and Lewis’s marriage.     
On the other side, there are other critics who hold such an overt biographical 
approach unnecessary and even illegitimate.  They argue, in different ways, that A 
Grief Observed is a substantially apologetic work, in which the biographical 
associations should or might as well be brushed aside.  Cynthia Marshall, for 
example, in her response to the disagreement about the “fictionality” of A Grief 
Observed, recommends approaching the book “in terms of belief,” and she makes an 
interesting, literary sort of suggestion, in parentheses, that “it may be in its own way 
‘a true fairy tale.’”
225   Before putting the literary issue into more serious 
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  230consideration, perhaps we should also hear Walter Hooper’s first-hand report of what 
Lewis himself said of this seemingly autobiographical book.    According to Hooper, 
 
 
A Grief Observed is a carefully constructed work of Christian apologetics in 
which the author tries to imagine what reactions and follies each of us is 
likely to commit when we lose someone we love.  Lewis told me that he 
felt he had to make the book sound autobiographical if it was to help the 
average man or woman who had lost husband or wife.  This meant he 
couldn’t publish it under his own name, not only because it isn’t 
autobiography but because he wished to avoid drawing attention to his 
marriage and his grief.
226        
 
     
With Lewis’s own say as reported here by Hooper, does it mean that the 
autobiography or fiction dispute has been resolved once and for all?      The answer is 
no.    After all, even Lewis himself, whether as a literary author or critic, would agree 
that when dealing with a literary  text, such as A Grief Observed, to draw a 
demarcation line between the autobiographical and the fictional is really  superfluous.   
Such a line simply does not have to exist in literature.    It is worth bringing up again 
what Lewis asserts in The Allegory of Love to the effect that the division between “an 
autobiographical document” and “a literary exercise” is a “fatal dichotomy” which a 
literary critic, e.g., of poetry, ought to avoid.
227   As a matter of fact, within the 
textual world of literature, “life and letters are inextricably intermixed,” according to 
Lewis.    Then, perhaps we should ask: Isn’t A Grief Observed a text of this sort?    Or, 
is it taken as a literary piece of work at all?     
  Needless to say, Lewis’s writing and publishing of this highly personalized book 
on bereavement and crisis of faith is far from intended to be self-expression, or in any 
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  231other forms of self-obsessive enterprises.  In fact, as a literary critic Lewis is a 
persistent opponent of “the idea that literature is self-expression,”
228 or that poetry is 
primarily the “expression of the poet’s personality”—a fallacious concept coined by 
Lewis as “the personal heresy.”
229  The reason why this thinking is erroneous and 
misleading is because it disorients the reader from meeting with “a true text, a true 
world” and experiencing a successful and truly literary enterprise of a good poet.    In 
his well-made introduction to Lewis’s 1939 publication, The Personal Heresy, the 
distinguished Lewis scholar, Professor Bruce L. Edwards, summarizes Lewis’s 
proposition as follows:   
   
 
the successful poet’s achievement is to create an object that is universal not 
local, public not private, impersonal not personal, since thereby the poet 
allows the reader to see what the poet sees—and not the poet “himself” in 
some crude or unguarded fashion.  Consequently, for Lewis, the critic’s 
role is neither to reconstruct the poet’s psyche between the lines of the poem 
nor to deconstruct the poem as concealed biography …
230    
 
 
It is very clear that the text of a poem is a construction of art and therefore not 
supposed to be a mirror of the poet’s state of mind or selfhood.  This notion about 
what a literary text is, or, how to regard the textuality of a literary work, can be 
applied to our reception of A Grief Observed as well.  However subjective or 
personal this book is, in tone, in content and even in form, the subjectivity or 
personality should not be pointed to Lewis’s own not just because Lewis proclaimed 
he did not mean to write any autobiography.  What Lewis did  mean to do is to 
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  232textualize a particular predicament of a bereaved man at the edge of losing his faith 
based on his deeply felt absence of God.  In other words, the writing itself is a 
literary attempt, which is, in itself, an act aimed at the “universal,” the “public” and 
the  “impersonal”  indeed.    
 On account of this, the unmistakable sense of subjectivity or trace of 
subjectivism most surely pertains to the text or the narrator within the text rather than 
C. S. Lewis himself.    Lewis’s readers or critics or friends mostly tend to bypass this 
point too easily.  Among them is Austin Farrer, himself a very close friend and 
reader of Lewis.  Regardless of its literary qualities, Farrer adopts the most popular 
perspective to approach A Grief Observed, i.e., an autobiographical one.      It is worth 
rethinking here Farrer’s association between this personal book of Lewis’s and The 
Problem of Pain, a highly intellectual book written twenty years earlier, of little 
personal touch but dealing with a similar topic—the problem of believing in a good 
God in the reality of pain: 
 
 
A Problem of Pain? Surely not.    How can we take The Problem of Pain 
seriously now that we have A Grief Observed?    When his wife died, Lewis 
felt the reality about which he had so airily theorized and his theories were 
of no consolation or assistance in the hour of trial.    He had to find the 
existential  solution.  .  .  .  But  Lewis’s aim is apologetic, and therefore 




Comparing Lewis’s two books on the similar subject of suffering, Farrer is certainly 
right to highlight the individualistic and empirical significances of A Grief Observed, 
contrasted with the relatively general and theoretical qualities of the discursive work 
of  The Problem of Pain.  Moreover, in spite of his definite identification of the 
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  233consolation-seeker in A Grief Observed with Lewis himself, Farrer’s comments on 
how and for what Lewis wrestles with “his” experience of the problem of pain are 
rather meaningful for a literary consideration of the work.  Firstly, he correctly 
points out the significant feature of Lewis’s contemplation of the problem of pain in A 
Grief Observed—via an existential approach.    With this keen observation of Farrer’s, 
we could further inquire: How do we readers sense the intensely and subtly imparted 
existentialism?    Isn’t it conveyed through a particular way of expression, namely, the 
self-reflective, or if you like, autobiographical, writing of the narrator?  Moreover, 
Farrer’s insightfulness touches upon Lewis’s awareness of his readers in close relation 
with his apologetic purpose of writing.    No doubt, to write an apologetic work like A 
Grief Observed, Lewis must have his readers in mind.    To put in another way, a book 
with apologetic intent is of course done and meant for its readers.    That is to say, its 
concern and scope must be not merely subjective but also objective (if not universal), 
and definitely not simply private or personal, even if not wholly impersonal.  With 
these mixed qualities, what else can the text of A Grief Observed be if not a piece of 
literature? 
  Basically, the following discussion treats A Grief Observed as a religious 
narrative, that is, as another text of Lewis’s literary apologetics.  To appreciate and 
examine its literariness, the best and most valid mode of reading is, of course, 
literary.
232  Therefore, the present study is primarily a literary 
investigation—specifically into the texture of the “autobiographical” / self-reflective 
writing of a  suffering and doubting self within Lewis’s pseudo- or 
semi-autobiographical book.  Also, this study purports to explore the apologetic 
import embedded within this literary narrative.  Noticeably, even in terms of its 
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reading.  See  “Poetry,”  in  An Experiment of Criticism, pp. 95-103. 
  234apologetic signification, the narrator’s self-reflective mode of thinking and writing 
still plays a very important, even indispensable part.    This is actually not beyond our 
expectation of Lewis’s apologetic literature, which is generally featured by the 
intermingling of the literary form and apologetic  implication.  Textually  speaking,  A 
Grief Observed is a book of autobiographically imparted apologetic.    Aside from the 
topic of personal grief, the title of the book actually also hints at how such a topic is 
to be dealt with.   The very notion of observation in the title suggests that the 
intertwined problem of grief and faith will be approached and tackled —through 
introversive observation, namely, a self-reflective mode of thinking.      In view of this, 
this combined discussion, from both literary and apologetic points of view, means to 
consider thoroughly the narrative persona’s attempt, with his probing pen, to look into 
and map out the particular landscape of his grief through the self-reflective writing of 
his heart. 
 That  the  text of the book could be compared with a landscape of “grief” is noted 
suggestively and somewhat pictorially in the beginning of the last chapter of A Grief 
Observed:   
 
 
I thought I could describe a state; make a map of sorrow.    Sorrow, however, 
turns out to be not a state but a process.  It needs not a map but a 
history, . . . there is something new to be chronicled every day.  Grief is 
like a long valley, a winding valley where any bend may reveal a totally 
new  landscape.             (76-77) 
 
 
In this brief yet enriched and vivified description, it is gripping to find what the 
narrator himself experiences in grief and in writing about his grief.   At the closing 
stage of his journal writing, the writer comes to realize that the emotion of sorrow, or 
the feeling of mental suffering, he has gone through is by nature not static but 
  235dynamic.  Equally unexpected to him is his verbal portrayal of the emotional 
experience—the text itself—which accordingly has undergone a historical instead of 
topographical move.  In other words, what he self-consciously discovers here is, so 
to speak, a landscape of dynamism, in both empirical and textual senses.   In view of 
this double discovery, it is manifest that the summing-up imagery of grief (like “a 
long winding valley”) is appropriately constructed to visualize such a landscape.   
  In terms of this, the task of interpreting the book, i.e., all these private and 
personal journals, should be oriented toward a twofold discussion of how such a 
dynamic landscape of grief is situated  both within the mind of the experiencing 
subject and within the text of his experiential writing.  This discussion, however, is 
not meant simply to look at the theme about the experience of grief and how it is 
packaged in a specific form of writing.  Rather, the whole study is aimed at 
practicing a hermeneutical principle proposed by Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911)—to 
understand a text through re-experiencing its “texture of inner life” that “comes fully 
into expression.”    To investigate “the texture of writing” of Lewis’s book, this study 
aims to undertake multi-layered explorations: firstly, what is sensed and perceived, 
namely, the materials of the feeling and thinking mind, or the inward drama—the 
individual situatedness of the experience of grief; secondly, how the subjective 
experiences are rhetorically conveyed—the nature and particularity of its language; 
last but not the least, the significance of the self-conscious writer’s tendency to reflect 
upon his psyche and his writing—the interrelation between the frame of mind and the 
structure  of  writing.    
Moreover, it would be wrong to assume that these references are separate 
elements irrelevant to one another.  On the contrary, the texture of writing of the 
book is actually reinforced not only by the interpolation of each of these elements but 
also by the interplay among them.  It is, in effect, the major character that makes A 
  236Grief Observed a text of complexity rather than merely a “highly personal journal, or 
a “manifestation” of Lewis’s grief.
233  As mentioned in the discussion above, the 
personal touch is indeed an essential and fundamental fabric of the text.  However, 
the autobiographical point of view is yet to be intensified and integrated with other 
significant “fabrics,” such as psychological display and inquiry and along with it 
spiritual interrogation and reconciliation thereafter.  Altogether they make up the 
tapestry of an extraordinary landscape of grief, one that is not simply 
autobiographically marked but also psychologically charted and spiritually 
(re-)shaped. 
Thematically, the predominant motif of the overall text is apparently the problem 
of a bereaved man’s grief, which is such an overwhelming experience that it nearly 
shatters his faith.  The whole book manifests how this emotionally afflicted man 
“confront[s] the depth of his despair” and consequently out of his troubled soul his 
personal journal discloses “a fascinating dialectic between his intense feelings on the 
one hand and his theological reasonings on the other,” as the critic, Thomas Talbott, 
sensibly remarks.
234  It is, in some sense, centered upon such a war within that the 
psychology of grief is dramatized in depth within the text.  Yet, this war within is 
also of complicated qualities in the sense that in addition to the spiritual wrestling 
with a staggering faith, the first and ongoing confrontation within the consciousness 
of the griever is between his emotional self and his rational mind.   
Here and there in his journal, the disquieted writer bursts out with 
self-questioning observations on the overflow of his overpowering emotions and 
whimsical states of mind—a totally self-conscious act related to an internal conflict 
                                                 
233  In his reference to A Grief Observed collected in The C. S. Lewis Readers’ Encyclopedia 
(Zondervan Publishing House, 1998), Thomas Talbott holds Lewis’s book as a “highly personal 
journal,” which is “not so much an account of Lewis’s grief as it is a manifestation  of  it.”  P.  193. 
234  See also Thomas Talbott’s reference entry about A Grief Observed in The C. S. Lewis Readers’ 
Encyclopedia, p. 193. 
  237between his feelings and his intellect.
235  For instance, from the following internal 
monologue in the first chapter, we could overhear the cross-currents within his mind 
concerning such a confliction.     
 
 
There are moments, most unexpectedly, when something inside me tries to 
assure me that I don’t really mind so much, not so very much, after all.   
Love is not the whole of a man’s life.    I was happy before I ever met 
H.    . . . People get over these things.    Come, I shan’t do so badly.    One is 
ashamed to listen to this voice . . . Then comes a sudden jab of red-hot 
memory and all this ‘commonsense’ vanishes like an ant in the mouth of a 
furnace.  
On the rebound one passes into tears  and  pathos.  Maudlin  tears.  I 
almost prefer the moments of agony.    These are at least clean and honest.   
But the bath of self-pity, the wallow, the loathsome sticky-sweet pleasure of 
indulging  it—that  disgusts  me.           (19-20) 
 
 
Here, it is evident that the naked expression of his uncontrolled emotion of grief is 
entangled with some rational attempts to contend with the force of it.    Also, between 
the lines of this passage, we can sense the tension between his willing indulgence in 
the agony of mourning and his intellectual reaction against such self-indulgence— a 
disgusting pleasure of wallowing in grief and self-pity.    Obviously, at these moments 
when the emotion of grief seems to have the upper hand, the commonsensical defense 
mechanism does not appear to work very well; his rationality could not really manage 
to dictate the feeling and emotional self.  As a result, the writer gripped by his 
passion of grief is inevitably losing solid foothold in his religious faith as well.     
  Indeed, in parallel with the tension between emotion and reason, his problem of 
faith is being developed into another even darker mental storm.  It is a storm raging 
                                                 
235  The notion of mental “confliction” made here is correspondent with Thomas Talbott’s critical 
observation that “Lewis was fully conscious of the internal war raging between his intellect and his 
feelings.”  See  The C. S. Lewis Readers’ Encyclopedia, p. 193.   
  238out of a spirit on the verge of being broken by the sorrow of his heart.
236  T h i s  
religious storm within his mind, not really unbelieving but helplessly coming to 
disbelieve in a Good God, is triggered by a desperate but unsatisfied need for 
consolation.   Not incapable of psycho-analyzing himself so as to know that his 
doubting interrogation about “Where is God?” is really “one of the most disquieting 
symptoms” (21) of grief, the consolation-seeker, however, cannot help feeling 
thwarted by a strong sense of the void.    The dispirited writer thus imagines: 
 
 
But go to Him when your need is desperate, when all other help is vain, 
and what do you find?  A door slammed in your face, and a sound of 
bolting and double bolting on the inside.    After that, silence.    You may as 
well turn away.  The longer you wait, the more emphatic the silence will 
become.    There are no lights in the windows.    It might be an empty house.   
Was it ever inhabited?  It seemed so once.  And that seeming was as 
strong  as  this.  What  can  this  mean?                (22) 
 
 
Such a despairing picture of an unresponsive or simply absent God bitterly and 
honestly reflects his feeling of desperation.  On the other hand, in spite of this 
hopeless outlook, the repeated use of the word seem to some extent connotes that the 
whole picture is based on human speculation.  In this sense, perhaps it is not the 
existence of God but the foundation of one’s personal faith that should arouse 
suspicion.    Is it on his imaginative, or worse, his wishful mind that his faith in God is 
grounded?  At this stage, the writer is too desperately wanting for consolation to 
undertake such a self-examination.  In reality, the inward storm is simply further 
unleashed into a total disavowal of the goodness of God, at least for the time being.  
                                                 
236  Cf. Proverbs, 15:13: “by sorrow of heart the spirit is broken.” 
 
  239In view of the unbearable reality of human life, the man in his bitter grief targets God 
and makes a bombardment of criticisms: 
 
 
If God’s goodness is inconsistent with hurting us, then either God is not 
good or there is no God: for in the only life we know He hurts us beyond 
our worst fears and beyond all we can imagine.    . . . I am more afraid that 
we are really rats in a trap.    Or, worse still, rats in a laboratory.    . . . 
Supposing the truth were ‘God always vivisects’?  .  .  .  Time  after  time, 
when He seemed most gracious He was really preparing the next torture.       
                                          (44,  46-47) 
 
                                               
Such vituperative comments about God can be understood as the outcry of a resentful 
sufferer whose viewpoint is psychologically twisted, which is later admitted by the 
writer himself with the hindsight derived from his journal writing.    Yet, is it a purely 
psychological  crisis of faith at all?  Or is it a logical crisis, as John Beversluis 
proclaims in his book, C. S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion?  Taking A 
Grief Observed as the autobiography of Lewis, Beversluis proclaims that the book 
testifies to the bankruptcy of the rational approach that Lewis used to emphatically 
espouse to understand the goodness of God.  In the same vein, Beversluis further 
argues that what the famous rational apologist for Christianity underwent is the loss, if 
not of faith, then at least of a belief in faith’s intelligibility.”
237   How truthful are 
these observations about the “crisis of faith” dramatized within A Grief Observed, 
about the fact that “faith’s intelligibility” has become logically problematic to Lewis? 
  Actually, they ring more or less like partial judgments if we take into account the 
whole process in which the writer (not necessarily or exactly Lewis) within the text 
goes through his crisis of faith.  Reading carefully into his turns of thinking, we 
                                                 
237 John  Beversluis,  C. S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion (Frand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
1985), p. 145. 
  240would see that the mourner does not entirely cease to be a capable thinker and that to 
him faith is not absolutely unintelligible after all.    On the contrary, he is, at least, still 
up to reflecting on all the nonsense in his mind preoccupied by his emotional 
“suspension of belief.”  Right through the following passages we could witness the 
changed scene of the drama within—the crippled yet continually inquiring believer is 




I wrote that last night.    It was a yell rather than a thought.    Let me try it 
over again.    Is it rational to believe in a bad God?    Anyway, in a God so 
bad as all that?    The Cosmic Sadist, the spiteful imbecile?    I think it is, if 
nothing else, too anthropomorphic.    .    .    .    Why do I make room in my 
mind for such filth and nonsense?    Do I hope that if feeling disguises itself 
as thought I shall feel less?    Aren’t all these notes the senseless writings of 
a man who won’t accept the fact that there is nothing we can do with 
suffering except to suffer it? .    .    .    Feelings, and feelings, and feelings.   
Let me try thinking instead.    From the rational point of view, what new 
factor had H’s death introduced into the problem of the universe?    What 
grounds has it given me for doubting all that  I  believe?       (47,  50,  53) 
 
 
In these fragments of introspection, the writer, now more reasonable, reflects on all 
the nonsense in his mind as well as in the writings at the previous period of 
dis-equilibrium when his rationality appeared to be intricately entangled with strong 
emotion.  Presently, from a psychologically distanced position and a “rational point 
of view,” he attempts to disentangle thoughts from feeling and more importantly 
becomes able to re-situate the problem about the relationship between his experience 
of bereavement and his crisis of faith.  Moreover, from his reflective and analytical 
language, we could sense the writer’s endeavour to re-embrace his intellect, which 
  241consequently makes him ready to undertake the task of self-inquiry.   As he strives 
to exercise his rationality to pursue the truth about the reality of the universe, he at the 
same time inquires for the reality of his self.  As a result, the writer’s conscious 
appeal to retrieve his rational self—a purer thinking mind without being disturbed by 
the emotional feeling— becomes the crucial turning point to his rehabilitation in faith.   
The evidence that the writer’s rational returning and his restoration of faith are 
actually closely related can definitely discredit the criticism that the book is a 
document showing the impossibility of re-affirming faith through rational thinking.     
  However, it is equally questionable to assume that Lewis is a thinker or believer 
who completely or simply relies on reason to establish his faith and understanding of 
life.    Aside from the appeal to rationality as a counterbalance to feelings, Lewis also 
emphasizes the value of the authenticity of experience as a counterpoint to the 
importance of the validity of reasoning in human understanding.  As Stephen 
Thorson sophisticatedly remarks in “‘Knowledge’ in C. S. Lewis’s Post-Conversion 
Thought: His Epistemological Method,” “Lewis believed experience brought one in 
touch with the reality of [the subjective world and the supernatural world], as opposed 
to reasoning which is about reality.”
238  It follows that to Lewis, the rational 
Christian apologist or the narrative writer on grief, to acquire the real knowledge 
about oneself and about God, one must appeal both to reason and to experience; the 
two are and should be complementary to each other.  What Lewis said about his 
conversion obviously corresponds to his epistemological principle: “I arrived where 
now I am, not by reflection alone, but by reflection on a particular recurrent 
experience.    I am an empirical Theist.    I have arrived at God by induction.”
239 
                                                 
238  Stephen Thorson, “’Knowledge’ in C.S. Lewis’s Post-conversion Thought: His Epistemological 
Method,” Seven: An Anglo-American Literary Review, vol. IX (Marion E. Wade Center of Wheaton 
College and Bookmakers Guild, Inc., 1988), p. 108.   
239  R. L. Green and W. Hooper, C. S. Lewis: A Biography (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 
Harvest Paperback, 1976), p. 113. 
  242  Such correspondence can also be found in the text of A Grief Observed.  It is 
perceivable that at the core of the writing of the journal are the writer’s endeavours to 
solve the dialectic between his experience of powerful emotion and his intellectual 
exercise of reasoning primarily involving his Christian faith.  In other words, what 
his internal struggles seek to achieve is integration of his empirical as well as 
emotional self with his rational and religious self.  The need for pursuing such 
integration is basically in line with Lewis’s clarification regarding what gives rise to 
one’s loss of faith.    In “Faith,” one chapter in Mere Christianity, Lewis remarks that 
it “is not reason that is taking away my faith: on the contrary, my faith is based on 
reason.  It is my imagination and emotions.  The battle is between faith and reason 
on one side and emotion and imagination on the other.”
240  The “battle” Lewis 
describes here is actually a very close portrayal of the narrator’s experience 
chronicled in A Grief Observed.  As the narrator’s confessional journal reveals, the 
subjective experience of traumatic feeling and the religious inquiry are intertwined in 
a more and more promising way firstly to recognize the truth about what he himself 
and his faith are really like, then to “arrive at God,” and hopefully in the end to 
rebuild his faith, “not in imagination but in reality.”     
As far as the quality of his personal faith is concerned, it is noticeable that based 
on some logical induction related to his experience in real life, the writer comes to 
realize the vulnerability of his “imaginary faith.”  In a highly figurative way of 
speaking, the writer concludes that   
  
 
If my house has collapsed at one blow, that is because it was a house of 
cards.    .  .   It  has  been  an  imaginary faith playing with innocuous 
counters labeled ‘Illness,’ ‘Pain,’ ‘Death,’ and ‘Loneliness.’    I thought I 
                                                 
240 Lewis,  Mere Christianity, p. 139. 
  243trusted the rope until it mattered to me whether it would bear me.    Now it 
matters, and I find I didn’t.    .    .    .    Nothing less will shake a man—at 
any rate a man like me—out of his merely verbal thinking and his merely 
notional beliefs.    He has to be knocked silly before he comes to his senses.   
Only torture will bring out the truth.    Only under torture does he discover 
it  himself.  .  .  .   But  then  the  Cosmic  Sadist  and  Eternal  Vivisector 
becomes  an  unnecessary  hypothesis.              (54-55) 
                
 
Evidently, instead of keeping wrestling with onto-theological questions about “God or 
no God,” “a good God or the Cosmic Sadist” (54), the griever is now in a changed 
frame of mind, no longer centered on self-pity but oriented toward self-critique.  As 
a result, the former religious disillusionment caused by his resentment in grief and 
thus disbelief in the goodness of God is replaced by a discovery of the true face of his 
faith—as vulnerable as “a house of cards” because of lacking sincerity and 
authenticity.  Resonant  with  an  Augustinian  association of the “soul” with a “house” 
recorded in the great autobiographical book, The Confessions,
241 the very comparison 
of the nature of his faith to “a house of cards” here imbues the narrator’s 
self-reflective writing a discernibly deepened sense of confession.    The reader is also 
reminded of Augustine’s self-deprecating outcry for salvation, emerging out of the 
recognition of his impiety of heart:     
   
 
    The house of my soul    . . . lies in ruins; rebuild it. [I.5.6] 
    For my mind is clouded by darkness and is far from your face. [I.17.27] 
O God of hosts, turn us around and show us your face, and we shall be 
saved.    For in whichever direction the soul of man turns, unless it turns to 
you, it is transfixed on things that cause pain. [4.10.15] 
 
Augustine’s confession here lays bare the truth that it is really the darkness of the 
                                                 
241 Augustine,  The Confessions (London: Everyman Publishers plc, 2001, trans. & ed. Philip Burton).   
The following quotations of Augustine are derived from this version. 
  244human mind that blocks the self from seeing God—a “pious” kind of self-awareness 
indeed which is also a true understanding of the personal problem of faith.  This 
insight is poignantly echoed by Lewis’s self-analytical narrator in the midst of his 
struggle to get over the crisis of faith, to remain in faith in spite of the invisibility and 
silence of God.  Also, it is reminiscent of the confession of Orual in Till We Have 
Faces, another autobiographical writer in Lewis’s texts.  Toward the end of her 
almost life-long unbelief, the embittered and veiled queen receives an epiphany-like 
understanding that until her true face of being can be uncovered, no longer hidden 
from the god, others and even her self, the divine being as well as dwelling can 
become intelligible and visible.  In a similar vein, the confessional writer in A Grief 
Observed acknowledges the fact that his experience of the collapse of faith, in reality, 
reflects the untruthfulness not of God but of his own faith, which is ruined by the 
darkness out of his own heart.  As an act of mind, faith must be existentially 
grounded on an individual self’s state of mind.  By the same token, it is only after 
the bereaved persona penetrates into his heart possessed by the passion of grief that he 
may come to share the pious insight of Augustine, who managed to see what the 
prodigal in the biblical parable sees—the truth about his own state of mind “full of 
darkness, and cut off from [God’s] face” (The Confessions, I.17.27).   
With the awareness of the genuine face of his imaginary faith, the narrator 
indeed turns around gradually from being “transfixed” upon his “pain” and doubt 
toward the same good God.    As we can read in the entry of his journal quoted above, 
the painfully grieving and doubting writer has changed his mind to such an extent that 
he even tries to see and designate torture as a blessing on the ground that without it he 
cannot come to the truth.    It seems that the endeavour of his rational self has done a 
marvellous job indeed.  The recuperation of his rational mind firstly leads him into 
self-analysis, then into self-realization and thence into a wonderful “leap of faith,” 
  245which signifies not only an act of willingly suspending his disbelief but also a mind 
turning perceptive to what the ancient consoler, “Philosophy,” once helped Boethius 
(c.A.D. 475-525) to see, namely, the blessing of “self discovery through hardship.”
242   
How does such a “leap in faith” affect the writer’s self-reflective portrayal of a 
personal landscape of grief?  In effect, the landscape itself has undergone a 
wonderful transformation into that of faith.  In other words, the journey of grief has 
been turning into a progressive pilgrimage toward a truer faith as well as a wiser 
self—from disillusionment about the goodness of God to the remarkable 
enlightenment of taking his suffering in the brightest religious sense by associating 
grief with the blessed inhabitation of truth.  Such a landscape is indeed full of 
unexpected bends.  In some places, the writer picks up his old tone of rational 
apologist to further induct his theological reasoning.  Of course, in the text that 
depicts a blended landscape of grief and faith, the voice of the rational thinker is 
naturally attenuated and mingled with the voice of the believer who is suffering from 
the torture of grief.  In such a mixed and maybe too overtly apologetic tone, the 
writer describes the induction that guides him to reconsider the question about how 
belief in God and the suffering would be correlated: 
 
 
But suppose that what you are up against is a surgeon whose intentions are 
wholly good.    The kinder and more conscientious he is, the more 
inexorably he will go on cutting.    .    .    .    But is it credible that such 
extremities of torture should be necessary for us?    Well, take your choice.   
The tortures occur.    If they are unnecessary, then there is no God or a bad 
one.    If there is a good God, then these tortures are necessary.    For no 
even moderately good Being could possibly inflict or permit them if they 
w e r e n ’ t .                                            ( 6 0 - 6 1 )  
                                                 
242 Boethius,  The Consolation of Philosophy (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, trans. V. E. Watts), p. 
139. 
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The induction recorded here marks, first of all, a renewed perspective on the image or 
the nature of God—in a transformed picture of a good-intentioned conscientious 
surgeon.  Besides, it serves to locate an important signpost showing the fact that his 
reasoning mind does not fail the grieving writer after all.    What is also noteworthy is 
his suggestion that the key to the theological question about the relationship between 
God and human sufferings is a matter of choice.  In the face of cruel reality of 
bereavement, the writer now tries to choose to believe in a benevolent and 
conscientious surgeon God, which for him is a totally free and rational decision.     
Such an appeal to choose faith (instead of fall, meaning the choice of self rather 
than God)
243 so as to come to terms with the paradox of the faith in a good God and 
the real experience of suffering is in line with the solution to the question of theodicy 
suggested by Lewis in The Problem of Pain.  To make sense of a good God who 
allows his creatures to suffer pain, Lewis argues that it is better to have an omnipotent 
God who would not prevent evil at the cost of human freedom, since without human’s 
free will, real love and real goodness are impossible.  Clearly, Lewis’s apologetic 
argumentation in tackling the problem of pain is grounded on the doctrine of human 
freedom / will.  The same approach is detectable in the context of the bereaved 
griever’s problem of faith in the goodness of God.  In The Problem of Pain or A 
Grief Observed, as in Lewis’s other religious narratives, such as The Great Divorce 
and  Till We Have Faces, Lewis consistently and emphatically recommends the 
momentous role of human choice / will in knowing and experiencing divine goodness.   
The doubting persona in grief, for example, deeply desiring consolation yet thwarted 
by the sense of God’s absence, finally copes with his crisis of faith by re-shaping his 
                                                 
243 Cf.  Lewis’s  The Problem of Pain, Ch. 5, “The Fall of Man.”    Pp. 63-85. 
  247thinking mind as well as re-assuring his feeling heart toward believing again in a good 
God—most crucially out of the choice of his willing self.     
The analogy of the all-intentioned surgeon,” a metaphor for God repeatedly used 
in Lewis’s religious writings, indicates the suffering self’s attempt at re-confirming 
his belief in the goodness of God.    More importantly, it anticipates a spiritual victory 
attained through the cooperation of reason and faith over the temptation dictated by 
emotion and (unfaithful) imagination.      In view of the treatment of faith as a mental, 
precisely cognitive, act in collaboration instead of confliction with the exercise of 
human reason, Lewis clearly follows the epistemological tradition founded by 
Thomas Aquinas (1224?-1274), one of the greatest theologians since the Middle Ages.   
According to St. Aquinas, in his well-known Summa Theologiae, there are two 
channels for humans to acquire knowledge, namely, divine revelation and natural 
reason, which actually co-work synthetically, not necessarily antithetically, to lead the 
human mind to the knowledge of God.    In this sense, it is definitely a sensible move 
for Lewis’s persona to resort to a rational approach to his problem of faith—via 
thinking it over again to make his reasoning mind compatible with the revealed 
knowledge of God, which can also be understood as an act of choice, both rational 
and faithful, to reintegrate the self in suffering with the belief in a good God.         
  As regards the momentousness of human choice in giving assent to the 
compatibility between the experience of suffering and the goodness of God, the key 
point that makes such a choice of faith rationalistic, at least for the narrator in the 
teeth of grief, lies in the very association of God, or Providence, with “a kind and 
conscientious surgeon.”  Certainly, this association is not a mere rationalization 
welcomed and also reiterated by C. S. Lewis, given the fact that his Christian 
apologetics is notably tinged with rationalism.    In fact, Lewis’s apologetic or literary 
utilization of such a metaphor, or analogical imagination, of the nature of God could 
  248find a classical and philosophical echo in Boethius’s The Consolation of Philosophy 
(AD524), in which God is described as “the mind’s guide and physician” or as 
“Providence [who] stings some people    . . . by hard fortune to strengthen their virtues 
of mind.”
244  More precisely, Lewis’s perception of suffering as an instrument of 
“discipline and correction” from Divine Providence is greatly indebted to Boethius’ 
Christian Platonist views on human life and Divine Being.  In Boethius’ 
world-classic book, the Lady Philosophy’s scheme for consoling the human self in 
adversity is advising the sufferer the significance of, in the translator V. E. Watts’ 
phrases, “the turning of the gaze from what is false to what is true and the realization 
that God is the supreme good.”
245  Although Lewis’s bereaved sufferer has got no 
consoler like Lady Philosophy, he is, however, aided by his reason to make logical 
induction and thereby draw the religious conclusion about the falsity of his imaginary 
faith and the function and usefulness of tortures for bringing up the truth about his 
own self and about the ultimate goodness of God.  In addition to reason that serves 
to bring light and, in a sense, consolation to the dark-minded griever and doubter, the 
exercise of freedom or “moral will”
246 to choose faith and suspension of all emotional 
blasphemy plays another key role in relieving both the intensity of the emotion of 
grief and the tension between the griever and his religion.  Lewis’s highlighting of 
free choice as a determinant factor in resolving the crisis of faith is undoubtedly 
                                                 
244 Boethius,  The Consolation of Philosophy, p. 138-139. 
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God “too narrowly as a moral relation.”    Farrer counter-argues Lewis’s “overbalanced” moralistic 
apologetics by asserting that “pain cannot be related to the will of God as an evil wholly turned into a 
moral instrument.”    Farrer’s critique, however, seems to miss the point when put in the context of A 
Grief Observed, wherein Lewis quite convincingly treats the will to belief as the decisive turning point 
for the person in grief to rehabilitate his belief in a good God.    Rather than simply making association 
(not exactly equation) between “pain” and “the will of God” or between “evil” and “a moral 
instrument,” Lewis means, more possibly, to underscore the vital influence of man’s choice—to believe 
or not to believe—upon either his existential predicament or his relation with God.    See The Light on 
C. S. Lewis, pp. 23-43.       
  249resonant with the wise admonition of Boethius’s “Philosophy,” which makes very 
clear to the ill-fated and confused prisoner that “[i]t is in your own hands what fortune 
you wish to shape for yourself.”
247       
Besides figuring out the fact that either turning “away from the false to the true” 
(regarding his faith) or the believing in a good God despite the presence of pain is 
significantly a matter of choice, the self-reflective and more sober writer also engages 
himself in probing deeply into his own psyche.  In other words, he does not simply 
rely on his will to consolidate his faith at crisis; rather, his retrieved rationality also 
makes him ready to journey farther into the depth of his state of mind which is an 
unmistakable cause of his crisis of faith.  These two undertakings in grappling with 
the problem of faith, namely, logical induction and psycho-inspection, actually consist 
in the methodology of judging the validity of assumptions which Lewis asserts 
elsewhere: “You must find out on purely logical grounds, which of them do, in fact, 
break down as arguments.  Afterwards, if you like, go on and discover the 
psychological causes of the error.”
248  This is exactly the very methodology the 
writing of A Grief Observed is involved with.  Within the text of recording what he 
observes in his perplexing situation of living “each day thinking about living each day 
in grief “ (26), as his tongue-twisting words expresses, the writer applies the method 
of combining logical and psychological examinations to judge and analyze his own 
mind.    In view of this, the writer does not do this journal writing simply for the sake 
of getting somewhat outside of his subjective experience but he goes further with his 
reasoning power to endow his writing with self-analysis on a psychological basis.  
The experience of writing itself thus becomes an introversive undertaking of 
interpreting the depth psychology of his inner life in grief.  So far as the text is 
                                                 
247 Boethius,  The Consolation of Philosophy, p. 144. 
248 Lewis,  God in the Dock (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1970), p. 273. 
  250concerned, this analytical aspect serves to render the texture of the writing 
psychologically  profound.   
One of the examples of his analytical mode of thinking and writing can be seen 
in the writer’s observation of the change in his mood.  Looking closely into his 
feeling mind, the writer tries to grapple with its state of confusion.   
 
 
Still, there’s no denying that in some sense I ‘feel better,’ and with that 
comes at once a sort of shame, and a feeling that one is under a sort of 
obligation to cherish and foment and prolong one’s unhappiness.  .  .  .  
Partly, no doubt, vanity.   We want to prove to ourselves that we are lovers 
on the grand scale, tragic heroes; not just ordinary privates in the huge army 
of the bereaved.  .  .  .  I think there is also a confusion.  We don’t 
really want grief, in its first agonies, to be prolonged; nobody could.  But 
we want something else of which grief is a frequent symptom with the thing 
itself.  .  .  .  What we want is to live our marriage well and faithfully 
through that phase too.  .  .  .  We will be still married, still in love.  
Therefore we shall still ache.  But we are not at all—if we understand 
ourselves—seeking  the  aches  for  their  own  sake.     (71-72) 
                                        
 
With his rational and clearer mind, he manages to probe into the complicated feeling 
of his bereavement and gain insight into the psychology of the bereaved.    It is indeed 
extremely insightful to be able to detect what underlies his ostensible indulgence in 
grief is a hidden desire to keep intact the sense of love and connection with the dead.   
This kind of self-indulgence could be viewed as, so to speak, a complex of 
bereavement.  His analytical observation is especially penetrating as he objectively 
looks at his personal predicament and deconstructs such a complex by criticizing 
himself as one pathetic bereaved man driven by his vanity to be addicted to the 
feeling of unhappiness with a subconscious motive to heighten the tragic sense of 
bereavement.  With such acute self-understanding and self-criticism, the grieving 
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himself and unload the emotional burden of grief.   The acuteness of his analysis 
and judgment about the psychological symptoms of bereavement imbues the texture 
of his writing with a certain dissectional acuity.    By degrees, we have read to see the 
writer come to acquire a mind of clarity.   
 Owing to his conscious and rational efforts to untangle emotion and thoughts, 
the writer gradually recovers his equilibrium.  As a result, the inner journey he has 
been embarking on to make sense of his grief takes a turn for the better and brighter 
prospect, mentally and spiritually.  It is, in some sense, like a journey out of the 
darkness of Gethsemane into the lightness of the promised land where not only his 
faith but also his spiritual sensibility would eventually be restored and renewed.   
Regarding this refreshed and transformed situation, the writer notes: “It was as if the 
lifting of the sorrow, removed a barrier” (62).    Once the “barrier” is removed, that is, 
without tears to blur his eyes, or the passion of grief to blind him, faith becomes 
intelligible again because he has regained his vision of clarity, which enables him to 
receive.  To put in another way, as long as those misleading psychological errors as 
well as the emotional causes to the spiritual deadlock could be uncovered and 
removed, the spiritual breakthrough would follow.   The landscape of grief in the 
writing accordingly moves forward (or “upward”?) to the turn for a vision of 
spirituality.    With a renewed spirit within, the writer becomes equipped with new, or 
perhaps restored capacity to interpret the words of God meditatively and 
self-reflectively.   
   
 
You can’t in most things, get what you want if you want it too 
desperately .  .  .   ‘Them as asks’ (at any rate ‘as asks too 
importunately’)  don’t  get.  Perhaps  can’t.   
  252And so, perhaps, with God.    I have gradually been coming to feel that 
the door is no longer shut and bolted.  Was it my own frantic need that 
slammed it in my face? .  .  .  Perhaps your own reiterated cries deafen 
you to the voice you hoped to hear.     
On the other hand, ‘Knock and it shall be opened.’  But does 
knocking mean hammering and kicking the door like a maniac?  And 
there’s also ‘To him that hath shall be given.’  After all, you must have a 
capacity to receive, or even omnipotence can’t give.  Perhaps your own 
passion temporarily destroys the capaci t y .              ( 6 3 - 6 4 )  
 
 
It is evident that the writer has come to acknowledge his former mistakes in dealing 
with God through reading and digesting the biblical messages.  From the passage 
quoted above, somewhat in the tone of the edifying apologist, we could see the 
bereaved self has pulled himself out of the mire of grief with the aid of his reasoning 
capacity and his religious perceptiveness that cooperated to lead him into a 
rehabilitated state of spirit and mind.  In fact, the capability to make sense of his 
predicament does play a significant role in his progressive reconciliation with God, 
which in turn freshens up his faith and his perception for brooding over more truth 
about reality, the reality of his self, of God, and even of the dead.   That is why in 
the end of his writing, the writer could arrive at the hopeful prospect that “all manner 
of things shall be well,” which ultimately is far from an empty promise but a spiritual 
reward to this fascinatingly capable thinker and receptive mind.    . 
A perceptive interpreter of both his miserable experiences and biblical messages, 
the narrator in grief, through writing of his personal Gethsemane, walks through and 
also grows wiser out of, as it were, the darkest valley of his emotional and religious 
life.  Throughout  A Grief Observed, the interpolation of those blissful and insightful 
observations into his sincere account of his gloomiest feelings and thoughts indeed 
makes the whole text itself a glowing landscape.    Through reading, we too enter into 
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believes omnipotence intends him to learn from the very experience of bereavement, a 
trial (70) rather than a torture from God.  What this trial means to him, above all, is 
to give him the opportunity to know the real quality of his imaginary faith in God and 
his egoistic love for his wife.  Bereavement, in one sense, is just for God to knock 
down his “card-castle about both” so that he could know the very truth.  The 
suffering experience as well as the crisis of faith itself thus becomes a meaningful 
blessing, indeed a gift of grace, for it turns out to be the turning point that leads him to 
a revival of faith.  C. S. Lewis’s manifestation of such a personalized landscape of 
grief is, without doubt, apologetically meaningful.    Though conveyed in the mode of 
subjective journal writing, the intent to objectify the personal struggles in pain and in 
crisis of faith so as to make defence for Christian belief is still largely perceptible to 
the readers.     
On a private occasion, Lewis once explained how this book is structured to serve 
its apologetic aim—on the basis of the pattern of journeying demonstrated in Dante’s 
Divine Comedy: “You go down and down and down.  Then, as in Dante, when you 
hit the bottom and pass Lucifer’s waist you go up to a defence of God’s goodness.”
249  
Lewis’s narrator indeed undergoes a, so to speak, rebounding journey—setting out by 
plunging himself deep into the overwhelmingly dark passion of grief and doubt, then 
with the help of rational, self-analytical thinking gradually pulling himself out of the 
all-time low in his emotion and faith, and ending up with peace of mind and the 
enlightened recognition of the hidden blessing and divine grace in suffering.  
Through such a downward and upward journey, Lewis’s persona ultimately 
encounters the apologetic truth that not only reveals, on the existential level, the 
                                                 
249  This quotation of Lewis is derived from the report of Walter Hooper, in his essay, “C. S. Lewis: The 
Man and His Thought,” collected in Essays on C. S. Lewis and George MacDonald: Truth, Fiction, 
And The Power of Imagination, p. 22. 
  254infirm, even false faithfulness all belonging to the human believer but also testifies, 
on the religious level, to the “constant” goodness of God, in whom lies the eternal and 
victorious power to turn everything into good.  Lewis’s portrayal of the journey 
invested with such apologetic significance can actually be viewed as a literary 
manifestation of the following discourse of Kierkegaard, the Christian and 
existentialist edifier in the early Nineteenth Century, around the peak of the Age of 
Crisis  of  Faith:     
 
 
When sorrow casts its shadow over our lives, when despondency veils our 
sight, when the clouds of anxiety take God away from before our eyes, then 
sounds the apostolic warning, that with God there is no shadow of 
turning.  .  .  .  That which he emphasizes is that as God’s all-powerful 
hand made everything good, so He, the Father of lights, still constant, 
makes everything good in every moment, everything into a good and perfect 
gift for everyone who has the heart to humble himself, heart enough to be 
confident.
250    
 
 
In this edifying yet also poetically conveyed passage, it is evident that Kierkegaard 
grounds an apologetic understanding of the reality of sorrow upon his faithful 
interpretation of the biblical admonition regarding the nature of God and the right 
spirit in face of adversity.    In the same vein, Lewis’s autobiographical persona, when 
capable of reasoning like the rational apologist Lewis himself, also bases his 
rethinking of his own frustrating experience of the silence and absence of God on the 
teaching in the biblical text.  Being perceptive once again to the biblical revelation 
about the Being of God, along with the recognition of his own problematic faith, the 
writer ultimately manages to get over his crisis.   
                                                 
250 Kierkegaard,  Edifying Discourses: A Selection (London: Collins, 1958, ed. Paul L. Holmer), p. 54.   
  255Yet, with all its apologetic significance, the truth that the narrator journeys into, 
in effect, is not simply religiously but also psychologically significant.  “With [his] 
own instrument” (70), that is, his writing pen, he tries conscientiously to dig down 
into his widower-hood to explore its meaning as much as he can.  Thereafter, he 
discovers that all his moans and groans are revealing evidence not just of his 
inauthentic faith but also of his self-centered love.    At the epiphany-like moment, he 
questions himself: “What sort of a lover am I to think so much about my affliction and 
so much less about hers?    Even the insane call, ‘Come back,’ is all for my own sake” 
(58).  The awareness of his own egotism serves to shift the focus of his writing as 
well as of contemplation more away from himself, more toward his beloved wife. 
Reciprocally, the shifting moves the writer further out of his agonies for her death and 
into the blissful sense of intimacy and the enjoyment of love in their marriage, which 
for him goes on even after her death.     
Becoming least absorbed in self-pity, the mourning writer enters into his 
exceptional and illuminating understanding of bereavement:     
 
 
bereavement is a universal and integral part of our experience of love.  It 
follows marriage as normally as marriage follows courtship or as autumn 
follows  summer.   It  is  not  a  truncation of the process but one of its phases; 
not the interruption of the dance, but the next figure.    We are ‘taken out of 
ourselves’ by the loved one while she is here.  Then comes the tragic 
figure of the dance in which we must learn to be still taken out of ourselves 
though the bodily presence is withdrawn, to love the very Her, and not fall 
back to loving our past, or our memory, or our sorrow, or our relief from 
s o r r o w ,   o r   o u r   o w n   l o v e .                        ( 6 7 - 6 8 )  
                   
 
Such a wonderfully insightful definition of bereavement is, in itself, a telling signpost 
that the bereaved writer’s receptive capacity has nearly grown to its culmination; 
  256without doubt, he has finally become receptive to her death, in a peaceful mind.    His 
is also a mind capable of transcending his predicament of widowerhood through 
developing quite sagaciously his own idea of matrimonial love which should last even 
when “one or other dies” (67).  The essence of love or a marital union, in his 
conception, comprehends simultaneously a certain kind of self-denial and a full 
recognition of the “otherness,” “the full reality” (73) of the beloved one.    The whole 
understanding of matrimony is packaged metaphorically as a kind of “dance,” which 
carries a tragic undertone and a mixed sense of beauty and sublimity. 
  The more perfect the intimacy of matrimony is, the more intense the sense of 
loss is felt by the bereaved one, for whom both can be beyond description, or at least 
beyond expression of any ordinary language.  The way Lewis articulates the 
matrimonial relationship between him and his now passed-away wife shows, indeed, 
the particularity of his language. 
  
 
One flesh.  Or, if you prefer, one ship.  The starboard engine has 
gone.  I, the port engine, must chug along somehow till we make harbour.  
Or rather, till the journey ends.    How can I assume a harbour?    A lee shore, 
more likely, a black night, a deafening gale, breakers ahead—and any lights 
shown form the land probably being waved by wreckers.  Such was H.’s 
landfall.    Such was my mother’s.    I say their landfall; not their arrivals.   
                                                ( 5 0 - 5 1 )  
 
  
In a fascinatingly effective manner, the writer creates a metaphoric space for his 
imaginary vision of his bereavement and her death to inhabit.  Together with its 
highly suggestive diction, the metaphoric force makes the passage read like a prose 
poem.  In fact, the language Lewis employs here to convey his metaphorical 
imagination concerning marriage and death is fittingly informed by his ideas of poetic 
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to Lewis explication in the essay, “The Language of Religion,” “poetic language” 
possesses remarkable powers “to use factors within our experience so that they 
become pointers to something outside our experience—as two or more roads on a 
map show us where a town that is off the map must lie.”
251  Moreover, in the same 
article, Lewis proclaims that the “very essence of our life as conscious beings . . . 
consists of something which cannot be communicated except by hints, similes, 
metaphors.”
252  Based on these theoretical ideas, we can see why the “poetic 
language” is such a particularly effective medium for the writer to transport the 
essence of matrimony and the deep sense of loss in his desperate experience of 
bereavement, not to mention the incomprehensible, even unimaginable condition of 
afterlife.  Specifically, the bonds of matrimony and the situation of their parting are 
subtly and vividly embodied by the complete set of imagery—the voyage of one ship.   
Rhetorically and aesthetically, such highly informative imagery indeed renders the 
texture of the writing poetically imaginative. 
   Perhaps, the autobiographical text presents a more enriched drama because of 
the added dimension of spirituality, also an important element underscoring the close 
relationship between his faith and his life-experience of grief.  Comparing his 
widower-hood as an “incomplete ship,” or a “one-legged man” (71), the persistently 
and capably truth-seeking writer, however, is no spiritual cripple at all, otherwise at 
last he would never possess the seeing eye and the tremendously sensitive feeling 
mind that prepare him for the most mystical experience of transcendence, the climatic 
encounter with the very reality of H., his dead wife.  It is an utterly emotionless 
encounter, with a pure and complete sense of intimacy, transcending all the earthly 
                                                 
251  Lewis, “The Language of Religion,” The Seeing Eye and Other Selected Essays from Christian 
Reflections, p. 177.   
252  Lewis, Ibid, p. 183. 
  258senses of emotion, totally beyond his aspiration and imagination. 
 
 
Just the impression of her mind momentarily facing my own.  .  .  .   
Not at all like a rapturous reunion of lovers. . . .  Not that there was any 
‘message’—just intelligence and attention.  No sense of joy or sorrow.  
No love even, in our ordinary sense.  No un-love.  . . . so business-like.  
Yet there was an extreme and cheerful intimacy.    An intimacy that had not 
passed through the senses or the emotions at all.  . . . The dead could be 
l i k e   t h a t ;   s h e e r   i n t e l l e c t s .                              ( 9 0 - 9 1 )  
 
 
This heavenly moment is perhaps the most rewarding experience for a man in his 
bereavement who has trained his emotion and overcome his grief through the strength 
of his intellect and from his religious belief.  In other words, he has become most 
blessed “with a growth that is from God” (Colossians 2:19).  The extremely joyful 
yet absolutely unemotional exchange of intimacy between the living and the dead that 
the writer tastes or foretastes in this mystical moment evidences one significant aspect 
of his growth in God—from self-indulgence in the grief for his loss of the beloved 
wife to a self-emptied, that is, selfless, love.       
In other words, the whole experience of the transcendental intimacy signifies the 
double changes in the writer, both as a Christian mourner and as a lover.    One recalls 
Mother Julian of Norwich’s revelatory vision regarding the will of God for His 
children who suffer from bereavement.    According to her vision, “it is not God’s will 
that we dwell on the painful feelings, and grieve and mourn over them.    He wants us 
to let go of them quickly, and hold on to his endless joy.”
253  In terms of this, the 
writer may be said to have conducted God’s will—by letting go his self-willed grief 
and self-centered love and as a result embracing the joy that is indeed endless and 
                                                 
253  Julian of Norwich (c.1342 - c.1416), Revelations of Divine Love (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 
1987, ed. Halcyon Backhouse with Rhona Pipe), p. 35. 
  259limitless, for it is, in nature, heavenly and eternal, transcending either earthly emotion 
or mortality.  In addition to such transference from dwelling in grief to inhabiting 
trans-mortal and trans-temporal joy, we can also perceive a mark of 
self-transcendence in Lewis’s persona in regard to love.  As put by the narrator 
himself, the experience of intimacy, or, the mind-and-mind communion of a 
transcendental order, transcends any ordinary sense of love, while it is also 
paradoxically no “un-love.”  To understand the paradoxical nature of this love, the 
exhortation given by “George MacDonald” within the fantasy of The Great Divorce is 
tremendously illuminating.    On love in relation to bereavement, the redeemed soul of 
“MacDonald” instructs the ghost of “Lewis”: “love, as mortals understand the word, 
isn’t enough: Every natural love will rise again and live forever in this country [i.e., 
Heaven]: but none will rise again until it has been buried” (The Great Divorce, 105).  
That is to say, the very means for human love / “natural love” to survive mortality, 
namely, to be revived in eternity, is to die first.  What does the death of “natural 
love” mean, in the context of the narrator’s bereavement as well as Christian belief?  
Firstly, it is related not to the annihilation of love itself but the annihilation of the self 
involved with love.  In other words, to have his natural love buried, the narrator’s 
self must die first; he must learn not to love his own self-love but to love selflessly.  
Besides, he also needs to really let his beloved go.    Otherwise, in his subjective mind, 
how can he meet with her, who was gone and now lives in “the other world,” and taste 
that mystical moment of intimacy full of love of a supernatural and  divine  order?   
That the bereaved narrator has really let his dead wife go can be evidenced by 
the very ending of his journal.  No longer holding on to self-centered love or the 
state of mind darkened by the unreligious passion of grief, the self-reflective writer 
ends his inward journey with a most peaceful and hopeful note, which is about his 
new understanding not just of himself but also of her: “How wicked it would be, if we 
  260could, to call the dead back!  She said not to me but to the chaplain, ‘I am at peace 
with God.’  She smiled, but not at me.  Pio si tornò all’ eternal Fontana” (94).   
Now, at the end of the whole journey through his personal grief, the mourner has 
indeed come to a state of mind and being that can understand and even share his 
wife’s peacefulness—whether in the face of death or in front of God.  The final 
words, “ All manner of things shall be well,” directly derived from Mother Julian of 
Norwich’s Revelations of Divine Love, are fully reflective of what a renewed creature 
this journal writer once gripped by the intense passions of grief and doubt has been 
turned into in or by faith.  Evidently, the whole process of writing down and living 
through his predicaments of grief has turned out to be not merely a psychologically 
triumphant attempt to defend his self “against total collapse” (75).  Ultimately, it 
signifies a spiritual triumph that transforms the inward battlefield of the self into a 
temple of real faith for the immanence of the Supreme Good and the reality of divine 
love to occupy.     
As readers, we do not know, nor can we imagine, like Lewis’s persona, if his 
dead wife does live through Purgatory in her afterlife.  Yet,  re-visiting  the  landscape 
of grief laid out in his writing, we are allowed, to a great extent, to witness both the 
restoration of his psychological self and the regeneration of his spiritual life after a 
fascinating journey through the purgatory of bereavement in the  real  life.  More  than 
that, through reading, we are actually, in some sense, engaged with the lived journey 
taking place within or emerging from the text.    That is to say, we are hermeneutically 
involved in the autobiographical narrator’s businesses either of making sense of his 
personal experience of grief or of drawing out a landscape of it.    To be more specific, 
our hermeneutical journey is made as we attempt to understand, even to re-live, the 
experiences of the autobiographical narrator who journeys to pursue (religious) 
meaning and ultimately discover the reality of his faith and self.  It follows that the 
  261readers in the process of understanding, that is, interpretation,
254 also participate in the 
writerly experience, which is to a large extent the same as the business the narrator 
undertakes all along.   
Yet, in the matter of searching for meaning in the experience of the landscape of 
grief in the text, the readership does not pertain to us, the outside readers alone.  In 
fact, as we readers “outside the text” are engaged with the “writerly experience,” so 
does the narrator, or the writer “within the text,” of this particular landscape partake in 
the “readerly experience”
255 (of his own writing).  As the author of the first-person 
account of the journey, the narrator himself ought to be regarded and indeed is acting 
as the first reader of the / his text.  It is actually one of the conclusive observations 
made in the discussion above that without both of the engagements or exercises, i.e. 
self-reflective writing and reading, the narrator cannot come to realize what the 
experience of grief means to him objectively.  Nor can he, indeed, experience as we 
do the texture—not simply the “outer form / reality” (referred to his life-experience of 
bereavement and grief) but more importantly the “inner form / reality”
256 (concerning 
                                                 
254  According to Gadamer, in Truth and Method, “understanding is always interpretation.”    See p. 
274. 
255  According to Bruce L. Edwards in the entry written for The C. S. Lewis Readers’ Encyclopedia, C. 
S. Lewis changed his critical emphasis from strong opposition to the subjectivism inherent in the 
psychological and biographical criticism of literary works to the less objectivist principle of reading 
highlighting the “interplay between the reader and the text,” which is expounded by Edwards as 
“readerly experience, that is, a primary confrontation with a textual world offered by a real self.” 
Moreover, Edwards rightly observes that this advanced notion about “readerly experience” in Lewis’s 
critical thinking can be applied to both readers of literature and “the author who ‘discovers’ the 
meaning of his work and the presence of his intentions by composing the work,” such as, Edwards 
points out, what Lewis’ last novel, Till We Have Faces, purports to portray, namely, the significance of 
the heroine’s “readerly experience” in the process of her “autobiographical” writing.    See p. 319.   
256  The two distinctive ideas are appropriated from the introduction of Schleiermacher’s theory of 
“inner and outer form” made by Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), a modern theorist of hermeneutics and 
also a celebrated biographer and true student of Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834)—“the father of 
modern hermeneutics.”    In Dilthey’s article, “The Development of Hermeneutics” (1900), 
Schleiermacher’s ingenious conceptions about the only two interpretative methods to approach a text, 
i.e., “grammatical interpretation” and “psychological interpretation; the latter, Dilthey explains, “starts 
with penetrating the inner creative process and proceeds to the outer and inner form of the work and 
from there to a further grasp of the unity of all his works in the mentality and development of their 
author.”  Schleiermacher’s  notion of “the outer and inner form” together with the idea of 
“psychological interpretation” is noteworthy and relevant here because the present interpretation of A 
Grief Observed is also very much psychological-based, purporting to probe into the narrator’s inward 
journey toward the reality of self and faith.    The quotation of Dilthey is derived from David E. 
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grief” emerging out of the text on the one hand and transforms his being on the other.   
Interestingly, the self-reflective narrator’s inter-mixed engagements with writing and 
“readerly experience” to an extent parallel the readers’ joint businesses in 
understanding the text—we read and interpret as the writer in order to relive 
textuality and (re)construct meaning.  Such a parallel is pointedly stated by the 
German philosopher, Wilhelm Dilthey, as a fundamental hermeneutical situation, that 
is, “[r]eceptivity and creativity cannot be separated.”
257  In terms of the overlap or 
interchangeability between reading and writing, does it mean that the reader, after 
undergoing the whole process of “observing” and “confronting” the text as the 
self-reflective narrator does, is “transformed” as well?  In what ways?  To what 
extent?   
These are perhaps questions only the reader him- or her-self can answer.    Also, 
it is highly probable that the answer(s) may vary with each individual reader, as every 
single act of reading as well as every existential and personal being is different in one 
way or another.  However, the paradoxical truth about reading or understanding or 
even existence itself is that every individual, whether playing the part of reader or 
writer or both, is by no means an absolutely isolated island but actually shares some 
common ground with other fellow humans.  To grasp the commonality shared 
universally by (human) readers across ages and cultures, one needs not go to the level 
of understanding as intangibly deep as the “collective unconscious” theorized in 
Jung’s anthropological psychology.  There is, instead, a relatively commonsense 
explanation provided by hermeneutical ideas, such as Dilthey’s notion about the 
                                                                                                                                            
Klemm’s Hermeneutical Inquiry Volume I: The Interpretation of Texts (Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars 
Press, 1986), p. 104.      See also David Jasper’s concise but pointed introduction to Dilthey’s 
hermeneutics under the influence of Schleiermacher in his 2004 book, A Short Introduction to 
Hermeneutics (Louisville, London: Westminster John Knox Press).    P. 95-97. 
257  See Dilthey’s “The Development of Hermeneutics.” Hermeneutical Inquiry, p.102. 
  263“lived experience” common to all human existence, or simply “human nature,” which 
transcends the boundaries set by time or cultural differences and therefore “makes 
common speech and understanding among men possible.”
258  Of course, awareness 
of a “common human nature” may explain human selfhood in general terms but still 
insufficient for specific, if not full, grasp of the truth about the human self as an 
individual being.  For better and genuine self-understanding as well as valid 
interpretation, one must live the inevitable tension between universality and 
individuality, just as any interpreter in order to gain holistic comprehension of a text 
cannot but remain situated within the “hermeneutical circle,”
259 which is essentially a 
dialectical relationship between the particular and the general.  Based on this 
universal principle of understanding, it is inferable that the moment one “confronts” a 
text, which according to Dilthey’s definition is the “written record of human 
existence,”
260 one already plunges into the experience of the meaningful tension that 
can yield not only understanding but also a transformation of the self.  As to why 
and how the self of the reader may undergo transformation through the text, Gadamer 
offers illuminating insights in his masterwork on hermeneutics, Truth and Method.  
The text, or, “the work / play of art,” Gadamer proclaims, “has its true being in the 
fact that it becomes an experience changing the person experiencing it,” for the very 
experience of the text entails the inquiry for what is true or “how true it is, i.e. to what 
extent one knows and recognizes something and oneself.”  Moreover, Gadamer 
asserts that to be transformed out of the experience of “the play of art,” the player has 
to “lose himself in his play.”
261  
                                                 
258  Dilthey, Ibid. p. 103.    See also David Jasper’s introduction to Dilthey’s hermeneutics, in A Short 
Introduction to Hermeneutics, p. 96. 
259  Viewed as a guiding principle of text interpretation, the “hermeneutic circle,” in Schleiermacher’s 
terms, is about “the continual interplay between the particular parts of the text and its complete whole,” 
as well phrased in David Jasper’s A Short Introduction to Hermeneutics, p. 86.     
260  Dilthey, “The Development of Hermeneutics,” p. 95. 
261 Gadamer,  Truth and Method, p. 92. 
  264  All these hermeneutical insights, especially Gadamer’s idea of transformation 
regarding the redemption the autonomous being of play / text can work upon the 
player / reader, are tremendously worthwhile and stimulating thoughts for the 
self-reflection of our own.   Indeed, if we do journey with the narrator through the 
living landscape of his grief and crisis of faith, which means not only intellectually 
observing it from outside but also existentially entering into it even at the cost of the 
autonomy of our own selves, we must also share the blessed experience of catharsis 
the narrator derives from his own text.  Ultimately, we both gain light from the true 
being of the text for some truer, if not absolutely true, understanding of our existential 
relationship with others we think we love, with God who we find is good and love 
even in this world of pain, with our own selfhood that cannot regain integrity without 
experiencing the taste of death to receive the redemption—in faith and from the text.   
The whole experience of the landscape of grief displayed in A Grief Observed thus 
leads us ultimately into the readerly experience C. S. Lewis describes in his last book 
on literary criticism, An Experiment in Criticism (1961).  As we can see in the 
quotation below, Lewis’s views about good readership are quite in line with 
Gadamer’s sagacious hermeneutics regarding the dynamic interaction between self 
and text.   
 
 
Good reading, therefore, though it is not essentially an affectional or moral 
or intellectual activity, has something in common with all three.    .    .    .   
The primary impulse of each is to maintain and aggrandize himself.    The 
secondary impulse is to go out of the self, to correct its provincialism and 
heal its loneliness.    In love, in virtue, in the pursuit of knowledge, and in 
the reception of the arts, we are doing this.  Obviously  this  process  can  be 
described either as an enlargement or as a temporary annihilation of the self.   
But that is an old paradox;  ‘he  that  loseth  his  life  shall  save  it’.  .  .  .  
Here, as in worship,    . . . I transcend myself; and am never more myself 
  265than when I do.
262   
 
 
From this passage, it is observable that what really concerns Lewis, a devoted literary 
critic and writer as well as a committed Christian, is ultimately less about how to read 
than about how to be.  To some extent, our textual  experience of his religious 
narratives, such as this self-reflective and transforming text on grief and faith, 
partakes of such existential purpose and significance.  We, indeed, seem to undergo 
the paradoxical moment of self-experience—getting lost into the text from the outset 
























                                                 
262 Lewis,  An Experiment in Criticism, p. 138, p.140-141. 




The interpretation offered above is meant to demonstrate a way of reading C. S. 
Lewis’s religious narratives in order to establish the meaningfulness of Lewis’s texts 
and the artfulness of his literary communication that render these texts interestingly 
readable and religiously edifying to readers in the present time.  Following the 
interdisciplinary investigations in the former chapters and some hermeneutic 
reflections on the role of Lewis’s readers, the concluding section is not focused on the 
texts themselves but concerned with their author, C. S. Lewis, and his readers.    There 
are basically two inquiries to tackle in the discussion below: firstly, how C. S. Lewis 
related himself with his time and then, how his readers can relate themselves to his 
literary  texts.   
The world that C. S. Lewis and his literary works entered into was characteristic 
of, or in the words of T. S. Eliot, “corrupted by,” a “secular” spirit, which according to 
Eliot’s definition is the phenomenon of discarding “the primacy of the supernatural 
over the natural life” as nothing but archaic among the general reading public, even in 
modern literature as a whole.
263  In such a context of modern literature, it is no 
surprise that C. S. Lewis’s voice, spoken from a traditional Christian outlook, can be 
easily dismissed as out of tune with his time.    As elaborated in the discussions above, 
underlying his literary enterprise could be detected an apologetic vision that the 
integrity of human self is not subjectively generated but must be gained through 
(re-)union with the Ultimate Reality,
264 which means re-embracing the archaic belief 
                                                 
263  The words and the idea are derived from T. S. Eliot’s 1935 essay, “Religion and Literature,” in 
which Eliot observes that “the whole of modern literature is corrupted by    … Secularism …[and] 
simply unaware of, simply cannot understand the meaning of, the primacy of the supernatural over the 
natural life.”    Selected Prose (London: Penguin Books, 1953, ed. John Hayward), p. 41-42.     
264  “The Ultimate Reality,” in religious sense, means “the origin and end of all reality,” as defined by 
  267in the supernatural and the ultimate power of salvation, as revealed and promised in 
Christian faith.  To call this Christian vision and faith-related concern apologetic is 
not saying that these religious narratives are intended by the Christian author to be the 
mere mediums for serving his apologetic purpose.  Lewis himself, no doubt, would 
absolutely object to such an “unliterary” supposition about the reception of his literary 
works.
265   If these works are essentially literary rather than Christian apologetics 
per se, how, then, can we justify an apologetic reading of Lewis’ texts of literature?  
Or, are we, by treating Lewis’s religious narratives as literary apologetics, ultimately 
endorsing or reinforcing the unsympathetic critics’ dismissal of C. S. Lewis’s 
literature as nothing but the propaganda of his dogmatism?  Otherwise, how can we 
respond to Harold Bloom’s completely unfavourable and somewhat “prophetic” 
remark aimed at devaluing C. S. Lewis’s literary authorship (e.g., in his creation of 
Aslan) that “Dogma may always be in fashion, but even dogmas change.  Time’s 
revenges are absolute”
266?  
  For all his dogmatic rejection of C. S. Lewis’s literature, such as the Narnia 
books, which he takes in a clearly negative manner as the products of a “Christian 
apologist and allegorist,”
267 Bloom, however, is right in his view of the variable 
quality of “dogmas.”  Indeed, as C. N. Manlove’s historical survey into the 
development of Christian fantasies up to the twentieth century has informed us, there 
are discernible changes in the writings of the modern Christian fantasists, C. S. Lewis 
being one of them, that are partly but significantly affected by the influences of 
                                                                                                                                            
the Catholic theologian David Tracy.    In his book, Plurality and Ambiguity, Tracy expounds its 
religious and existential meaning as follows: “For believers, to be enlightened religiously is to be 
empowered to understand: to understand, above all, a power that is the ultimate power with which we 
all must deal” (Tracy, 89).       
265 In  An Experiment in Criticism, Lewis makes it very clear that “while we read, we must treat the 
reception of the work we are reading as an end in itself” (Lewis, 130).    In other words, we must enjoy 
literature as literature, not as instruments for ultra-literary aims, such as “telling truth about life” or 
serving “as an aid to culture.”   
266  Harold Bloom, “Introduction” to C. S. Lewis’s The Chronicles of Narnia, p. 3. 
267  Bloom, Ibid, p. 1. 
  268modernized Christian theology.  One of such modern modifications within fantasy 
writing as well as within theology is a “humanizing” trend—less “theocentric” but 
putting more emphases on man’s experience of the immanent God.  This trend of 
“immanentism” or a “humanist” approach to the meaning of God to man or heaven to 
earth, according to Manlove’s analysis, has much to do with “a general shift over the 
centuries, through the Renaissance via the Enlightenment to Romanticism, from a 
God-centred to a much more man-oriented Christian view of the universe.”
268  I n  
this regard, Manlove rings very true as he makes a keen observation of the connection 
between C. S. Lewis’s fantasies (in a broad sense, i.e. including different modes of 
writing, such as allegory) and the theological shift of concern from the transcendent 
God to man’s experience of the immanence of God.  The central motif of “the 
dialectic of desire,” i.e. Sehnsucht, in Lewis’s allegory, The Pilgrim’s Regress, is a 
good example, noted by Manlove as well, of stressing the immanence of the divine 
within the subjective consciousness of a human self.  Lewis’s critic Corbin Scott 
Carnell too rightly points out the remarkable parallel between Lewis’s theological 
interpretation of man’s existential experience of Sehnsucht and Paul Tillich’s theology 
about God being “both immanent and transcendent.”
269  There is indeed certain 
common ground between Lewis’s understanding of the mystery of human soul’s 
transcendental longing as message sent from God and Tillich’s existentialist theology.   
Though not a systematic theologian himself, Lewis does share with Tillich, one of the 
most eminent and influential theologians in the twentieth century, the important idea 
that “the questions implied in human existence” are “correlated” with the theological 
answers given in Christian faith.
270  
                                                 
268 Manlove,  Christian Fantasy, p. 156-157. 
269 Corbin  Scott  Carnell,  Bright Shadows of Reality (Michigan, Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 
1974), p. 149. 
270  Cf. Paul Tillich’s theological statement: “The Christian message provides the answers to the 
questions implied in human existence.”    Systematic Theology, vol. 1 (London: Nisbet & Co., Ltd., 
  269As already reiterated throughout this research, at least in all of the narratives 
examined above, Lewis’s approach to represent the existential problem of faith is in 
itself an existentialist one—certainly not of the nihilistic and atheistic type but of 
Christian kind.
271  In other words, to convey the ultimate, indeed Christian, concern 
with the meeting rather than separation between the human self and the transcendence, 
Lewis’s thematic focus is always upon the religious experiences or struggles that the 
human subject goes / journeys through in reality.  In addition to the transcendental 
longing that haunts a nonbeliever’s soul, these existential experiences of religion 
cover other matters too—everyday temptations from the devil, as treated in The 
Screwtape Letters; the eternal orientation toward heaven or hell in close relation with 
mundane affairs and relationships, in The Great Divorce; a problematic personality 
entangled with a personal antagonism towards and a refusal to acknowledge the 
existence of the divine, the predicament of the heroine in Till We Have Faces; the 
trauma originating from love and death and the sense of God’s absence, in A Grief 
Observed.      From these thematic concerns, it is very clear that Lewis pays emphatic 
attention to the existential self when contemplating the relationship between the 
human and the divine.  In terms of this, it is valid to claim with Manlove that 
Lewis’s fantasy writing marked by an “existentialist” touch can definitely be 
associated with the modern trend of doing Christian theology with more 
“man-oriented” and “down-to-earth” considerations.
272   Meanwhile, this also 
                                                                                                                                            
1953, c1951), p.72. 
271  The distinction of the two “roughly divided” groups of existentialists, i.e., nihilists / atheists and 
Christian thinkers, is based on David E. Roberts’ exposition in his book, Existentialism and Religious 
Belief.    According to Roberts, Jean-Paul Sartre and Martin Heidegger are representatives of the first 
“self-sufficient, self-authenticating” group of proposing “human self-sufficiency” and 
“self-authentication,” whereas Pascal and Kierkegaard belong to the “school” of practicing 
“penetrating forms of Christian faith” (Roberts, 11). 
272  Actually, Manlove does not make any association between Lewis and “existentialism,” which is, 
however, one of the main observations this study purports to highlight.    Also, he seems to bypass the 
existentialist significance in the “theology” of some modern Christian thinkers, which can be found in 
the following remarks of his made in the chapter of “Modern Christian Fantasy”: “The theocentric side 
of Christianity, represented by such figures as Kant, Jakob Fries, Schleiermacher, Kierkegaard, Rudolf 
  270explains the invalidity of some critics’ casual commentaries about Lewis’s 
overemphasis on “transcendence, eternity, objectivity, and the supernatural at the 
expense of immanence, temporality, subjectivity and the natural”
273 and about his 
disconnection with the contemporary “pattern of presuppositions”
274  of  his  time.     
In the “Conclusion” of his book, Shadows of Heaven: Religion and Fantasy in 
the Writing of C. S. Lewis, Charles Williams, and J. R. R. Tolkien (1971), Gunnar 
Urang makes his comments on what he regards the failure of the three Christian 
writers of fantasy his book is about:   
 
 
They do not fail because they are true to an ancient pattern of 
presuppositions; they fail because—one must dare to say—in that allegiance 
they are less than true to themselves.    A man who would be true to himself 
must come to terms in some manner with his culture, and thus, in turn, with 
his history.    To set aside the reality of the present in any significant degree 
is to reject or distort some part of oneself.
275  (Italics  mine)   
 
 
Although the kinship between Lewis, Charles Williams and Tolkien is not the topic of 
this study, Urang’s adverse comment about these authors’ problematic relation with 
time, and more precisely, the present time to which they (are supposed to) belong, is, 
in some sense, controversial and deserves some careful rethinking.  After all, in 
order to re-estimate the worth of what Urang calls “didactic” fantasies / allegories / 
myths, particularly C. S. Lewis’s, to modern or even “post-modern” readers, it is 
necessary to consider seriously the accusation of “anachronism” together with 
                                                                                                                                            
Otto and Karl Barth, became steadily more embattled and attenuated throughout this [Victorian] 
period,” (Manlove, 157).    In mentioning these thinkers of Christian theology and stressing their 
“theocentric” concern, Manlove overlooks the fact that there is actually certain “existentialist” aspect in 
their contemplations, perhaps more so in some of them, among whom Kierkegaard is perhaps the most 
conspicuous  representative.   
273  Cited from Gunnar Urang’s criticism of Lewis’s fantasies, particularly his “space myth.”    Shadows 
of Heaven, p. 33. 
274  The phrase is borrowed from Urang’s commentary again, of which the context is quoted below. 
275  Urang, Ibid, p. 169. 
  271dogmatism heaped upon Lewis’s Christian and traditionalist stance, which is 
sometimes thought of as, in Urang’s terms, a self-distorting resistance to the modern 
modes of ideas and (literary) expression.  Apparently trying not to push his view to 
an extreme, Urang still goes too far in holding that adherence to the “ancient” 
truth-claim and literary tropes signifies not simply “disloyalty” to modernity but even 
“untruthful” self-identity.    However, the truth may be that C. S. Lewis, anachronistic 
freak as he is often counted, is really truer to his modern self when he persists in 
riding against the modern tide of thought, especially some ideas that he believes 
disputable and untruthful.     
In fact, some of his critics, such as the excellent scholar Doris T. Myers, 
recognize Lewis as “very much a child of his own time” despite his staunch devotion 
to “preserv[ing] the ancient verities of classicism and traditional Christianity.”
276 
Lewis himself in his middle age, already a very noted Christian author and literary 
scholar (in Medieval study), once proclaims that “[a]ll contemporary writers share to 
some extent the contemporary outlook – even those, like myself, who seem most 
opposed to it.”
277  Noticeably, conversion to Christianity in his early thirties 
definitely divides his life to two separate stages insofar as his engagement with 
modern thinking is concerned.  Before returning to Christian belief, the orthodox 
rather than the modern liberalized version of course, Lewis used to be deeply affected 
by what can be roughly called “modern culture.”  As reported in his autobiography, 
Surprised by Joy, in the atheist period while he “was still very much modern” and also 
addicted to what he called “chronological snobbery” of his own age, he was so 
uncritically immersed in the modern enlightenment that he not only became a believer 
                                                 
276  This is quoted from Myers’s “Preface” to her book, C. S. Lewis in Context, p. xi.    Myers’s treatise 
is to explore Lewis’s involvement, in literary practice as well as criticism, with the context of the 
twentieth-century philosophy of language and literary criticism, which according to Myers evidences 
Lewis’s connection with the modern context.       
277  Lewis, “On the Reading of Old Books” (first published in 1944).    C. S. Lewis Essay Collection: 
Literature, Philosophy and Short Stories, p. 31. 
  272or at least a student of most fashionable patterns of thinking, including materialism, 
evolutionism, “new Psychology,” realism, and so forth, but also tended to discredit 
“whatever has gone out of date.”   At this period, any conceptions related to the 
supernatural or spiritual, like “gods, spirits, after-life,” were taken by Lewis as “terms 
of abuse;” as for Christianity, nothing but mythology.
278   To put in another way, at 
this stage of life, Lewis’s modern self was well developed—with a typical modern 
look of “secularism.”  In the allegorical text of The Pilgrim’s Regress, his first 
post-conversion narrative, we are given a comprehensive account about how his 
personal, basically intellectual development out of the journey within the modern 
world / culture paralleled his search for the real object of the desire named Joy and 
finally turned into an individualized adventure of faith.  Ultimately, it is Lewis’s 
personal experience of undergoing a modern self’s pilgrimage into conversion that 
changes not only his secular outlook but also his loyalty to the modern time and spirit, 
which means, ironically, spiritual disintegration.   
Or, is it Lewis’s betrayal of his old modern self that should be seen as an irony 
instead?    After his conversion, out of a renewed and resolutely un-secular personality, 
which is shown conspicuously in his Christian apologetics while more implicitly in 
his literary enterprise, Lewis’s new voice is, in some sense, articulated in a 
self-negating  sort of way.  As to examples for supporting the assumption of his 
self-negation, there are many indeed.    For one thing, once a follower of the evolution 
theory, Lewis later disclaims vehemently against it as a “myth” specifically when it is 
no longer theory of purely scientific hypotheses but transformed into what Lewis calls 
the “popular Evolutionism or Developmentalism,” i.e., a “theory of improvement” of 
all existence from “the status of ‘almost zero’ to the status of ‘almost infinity.’”
279  
                                                 
278 Cf.  Surprised by Joy, pp. 201, 236, 239-241, 247-249. 
279  See Lewis’s essay, “The Funeral of A Great Myth,” C. S. Lewis Essay Collection: Faith, 
Christianity and the Church, pp. 22-32. 
  273To deal with such a modern yet essentially un-scientific “myth,” Lewis proposes a 
“funeral” for it.  For another example, in contrast with his old assumption of “the 
Christianity mythology,” after being a Christian and even Christian apologist, his 
manifesto becomes: the “heart of Christianity is a myth which is also a fact.”
280  
Based on this paradoxical reception of the miracle of Incarnation, which Lewis holds 
as the core message of any “true Christian’s” belief,
281 Lewis, therefore, voices rather 
defiantly his layman’s dispute against the demythology appeal made by some modern 
Christian theologians.  It is basically an apologetic fight against the unorthodox and 
presumably misleading theology of a few modern New Testament critics,
282 whose 
attempt to disavow the historicity and the miraculous (albeit selectively) of the 
Gospels is not only unappealing but also disputable to Lewis, a modern convert and 
also a “mere Christian” (i.e. not a liberal Christian).
283   
Although it is not the purpose of this conclusion to make a conscientious 
comparison between Lewis’s “layman theology” and the demythologizing theology 
which was being popularized influentially at Lewis’s time, nor is the aim of this study 
to evaluate which theory is more appealing to modern people, however, the 
theological controversy over “demythology” is still worthy of a closer look at.  In 
fact, to think carefully about both the “consonance” and the “dissonance” made out of 
                                                 
280  See Lewis’s essay, “Myth Became Fact,” C. S. Lewis Essay Collection: Faith, Christianity and the 
Church, p. 141. 
281  In the same essay, “Myth Became Fact,” Lewis proclaims: “By becoming fact it [the Incarnation] 
does not cease to be myth: that is the miracle. … To be truly Christian we must both assent to the 
historical fact and also receive the myth (fact though it has become) with the same imaginative 
embrace which we accord to all  myths.”   P.  141. 
282  The names that are mentioned in Lewis’s essay, “Modern Theology and Biblical Criticism” 
(originally a speech addressed at Westcott House, Cambridge, in 1959), include “Loisy, Schweitzer, 
Bultmann, Tillich, and Alec Vidler.”   
283  See Lewis’s essay, “Modern Theology and Biblical Criticism.”    The essay is collected in C. S. 
Lewis Essay Collection: Faith, Christianity and the Church, with a new title “Fern-seed and 
Elephants,” a phrase taken from Lewis’s “caricature” of the modern theologians who “claim to see 
fern-seed and can’t see an elephant ten yards away in broad daylight,” on account of the fact that their 
de-mythologizing theology “either denies the miraculous altogether or, more strangely, after 
swallowing the camel of the Resurrection strains at such gnats as the feeding of the multitudes.”    See 
p. 243, 246. 
  274the clash between modern theological “demythology” and Lewis’s 
counter-demythologizing position may bring us more light to C. S. Lewis’s 
relationship with his time, especially from the perspective of his apologetic enterprise, 
which is part of the major concern of this research on Lewis’s religious narratives.  
After that, we could see from a different angle that for all his medievalist taste and 
traditionalist leaning, Lewis actually actively engages himself with his own age—in 
an eloquent, albeit negative, but far from ironic voice in defense of “mere 
Christianity.”  Undoubtedly, this balanced view about Lewis’s disengagement and 
his engagement with modern thinking bears tremendous relevance to a comprehensive 
estimation of Lewis’s apologetic work which is not only robustly undertaken in the 
context of his popular / layman’s theology but also significantly indicated in the 
context of his literary imagination, as pointed out formerly in this study on the 
different texts of Lewis’s apologetic literature. 
In spite of his disagreement with the “demythology” of modern theology for 
various reasons, we should, however, remember that Lewis himself once makes very 
clear, in the essay entitled “Modern Theology and Biblical Criticism,” about his 
critical posture, namely, a non-fundamentalist one.  In other words, he has no 
intention to repudiate totally “this sort of theology” as he thinks it still has some 
“different elements [that] have different degrees of strength,”
284 though he does not 
specify what they are.   Yet, we may wonder: perhaps what Lewis leaves out, 
consciously or not, when articulating his encounter and confrontation with the 
thoughts of those modern, unorthodox theologians might be certain “commonalities” 
shared between his contemporary Christian thinkers and Lewis himself.  Take the 
German theologian Rudolf Bultmann (1884-1976) for example, who is the most 
important figure of the “de-mythologizing” movement in the first half of the twentieth 
                                                 
284  Lewis, Ibid, p. 252.   
  275century.  It is intriguing to see, on the one hand, the differences between Lewis and 
Bultmann in reading the Gospels and yet at the same time their similarity in putting 
emphatic concern with the relationship between the existential self and religious faith, 
or in Bultmann’s own words, “the existential relation between God and man.”
285  O f  
course, unlike Bultmann, Lewis, who reads Pascal and some Kierkegaard while 
referring to either rarely, never uses the term “existentialist” to describe his 
theological or apologetic or even  literary  work.     
Regarding the existentialist nature of de-mythologizing theology, Bultmann 
states very clearly that de-mythologizing is “an existentialist interpretation”
286 of the 
Bible, for it undertakes to “translate” the ancient, mythical (i.e., unscientific) 
narratives of biblical texts for the understanding of modern readers, each of whom can 
thus be facilitated to “encounter with God in His word” here and now.  A  student  of 
Heidegger’s existentialist philosophy, Bultmann profoundly and, we might say, very 
“faithfully” appropriates the philosophical analyses of the reality of “being in time,” 
which involves full responsibility of making moment-to-moment free decision 
without any intrinsic source of security, i.e. that available within existence itself, to 
elucidate the reality of faith and the demand of reading the Bible existentially:     
   
 
Faith is … the readiness to find security only in the unseen beyond, in 
God … who has power over time and eternity,    …the Word of God … calls 
[me] into freedom, freedom in obedience.  .  .  .  [C]onfined to man’s 
temporal life with its series of here and now, [the analysis of existence] 
                                                 
285  Quoted from one of the chapters entitled “The Meaning of God as Acting,” in the text of Jesus 
Christ and Mythology (1958) originally the text of many lectures given in the universities and divinity 
schools in the United States in 1951, on the subject of “demythologizing.”    The abridged text of Jesus 
Christ and Mythology is collected in the sixth chapter of Rudolf Bultmann: Interpreting Faith for the 
Modern Era (London: Collins Liturgical Publications, 1987, ed. by Roger A. Johnson), p. 319.   
286  Bultmann, Ibid, p. 305.    In the beginning of the chapter entitled “Modern Biblical Interpretation 
and Existentialist Philosophy,” Bultmann remarks: “I call de-mythologizing an interpretation, an 
existentialist interpretation, and that I make use of conceptions developed especially by Martin 
Heidegger in existentialist philosophy.”       
  276unveils a sphere which faith alone can understand as the sphere of the 
relation between man and God.  .  .  .  In the fact that existentialist 
philosophy does not take into account the relation between man and God, 
the confession is implied that I cannot speak of God as my God by looking 
into myself.    My personal relation with God can be made real by God only, 




Insofar as Bultmann’s demythologizing hermeneutics is concerned with the truth of 
existence and the relation between existence and faith (revealed in the Word of God) 
implied in existentialist philosophy, it is probable that Lewis may have acquiesced 
mostly in Bultmann’s hermeneutical project.    In fact, he might even find Bultmann a 
rather congenial theologian, as Lewis himself too tends to draw existentialist 
associations between the eternal reality of the self and his / her everyday act of 
choosing.   
In Mere Christianity, for example, Lewis gives the following account for the 
relationship between existence and God, which is ultimately determined by the 
making of the “central self” within each individual being based on every temporal 
choice he or she makes: 
   
 
[E]very time you make a choice you are turning the central part of you, the 
part of you that choose, into something a little different from what it was 
before.    And taking your life as a whole, with all your innumerable choices, 
all your life long you are slowly turning this central thing either into a 
heavenly creature or into a hellish creature: either into a creature that is in 
harmony with God, and with other creatures, and with itself, or else into one 




                                                 
287  Bultmann, Ibid, p. 303, p. 313. 
288 Lewis,  Mere Christianity, p. 92. 
  277In this simple, not so philosophically rigorous yet still penetrating explanation of the 
practical and authentic life of faith, we could indeed read the existentialist touch of 
Lewis’s “layman / popular theology.”    This tendency of thinking like an existentialist 
is a style of Lewis’s not just detectable in his “evangelizing” talks but also discernible 
in his literary practice.  It has been repeatedly evidenced and highlighted in the 
previous chapters that Lewis’s writing of the problem of faith from a predominantly 
subjective standpoint marks him out as a substantially existentialist Christian writer.  
In other words, he writes like a typically existentialist thinker who, according to 
David E. Roberts (author of Existentialism and Religious Belief), tends to focus on the 
individual human being on account of the fact that “in the search for the ultimate truth 
[or reality] the whole man, and not only his intellect or reason [but also “his emotions 
and his will”], is caught up and involved.”
289  Such an existentialist approach is 
taken in this study as the most distinctive trait of C. S. Lewis’s literary apologetics.  
That is to say, the perspective Lewis adopts in the literary writing to manifest an 
apologetic response to the macro-predicament of the modern man’s alienation from 
God is primarily concerned with the micro-situatedness, or, the lived experience of the 
individual self.  This way of doing literary apologetics is shown not just in his 
allegory which is directly concerned with the modern self’s pursuit of the divine 
reality, but also in the fantastical texts about the impact of evil temptation upon a 
convert and about the divorce between heavenly and hellish states of being, in the 
mythic novel focused on an individual being’s lifelong struggle with the religious 
truth, hostile and unwilling to believe, and finally in the self-scrutinizing text about a 
grieving man’s psychological and spiritual breakthrough.  Unquestionably, all these 
textual instances of intermingling an existentialist perspective with the joint practice 
of literary writing and apologetic treatment of the entangled problem of faith and self 
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  278serve to testify C. S. Lewis’s implicit but real “kinship” with other modern 
existentialist thinkers, even with Bultmann, against whose biblical criticism Lewis 
openly expresses his antagonism.         
  As regards Lewis’s quarrel with Bultmann, or, more precisely, with the 
de-mythologizing criticisms of the Gospels in modern theology, there is, in fact, some 
subtle and also kind of ironical truth about Lewis’s disengagement from the modern 
trend of thinking.  What can be regarded ironical in Lewis’s argumentation against 
Bultmann’s demythologizing is the simple fact that the latter is originally devised to 
aid the faith of modern readers to whom the “mythology” of the New Testament
290 
may be a crucial “stumbling block” to the happening of their conversion, yet this 
theory significantly misses out or misses the point to Lewis, who happens to be a 
modern convert after a personal journey of struggling to sort out the incompatibility 
between Christian faith and modern ways of thinking.  What exactly makes Lewis 
react unsympathetically against Bultmann’s “scientific” interpretation of the Bible, 
even if it purports to fit in with modern man’s patterns of thinking and “make clear the 
true meaning of God’s mystery” via “freeing the Word of God from a by-gone world 
of view”
291?    Is there any “hermeneutical” principle that moves Lewis to dispute the 
latest movement of theology and stick to the traditional way of reading the Bible?     
If we are to name any governing principle underlying Lewis’s allegiance to the 
traditional as well as his disloyalty to the modern, whether it is about worldview, 
values, religion or even books, we could definitely say that his principle, as he 
oftentimes admonishes, is to keep the mind from being muddled by what he calls 
“chronological snobbery,” or (historical) “provincialism,” namely, the narrowness of 
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  279perspective indiscreetly restricted to the age that one was born into.   To put in 
another word, it is the principle of “broad-mindedness.”  As mentioned above, 
Lewis’s own conversion from a modern unbelieving frame of thinking to belief in 
(traditional) Christianity is to a great extent initiated by the awareness of his own 
“chronological snobbery” and by the attempt to open his mind to such “obsolete” and 
“mythological” ideas as traditional Christian belief.    In fact, it can be inferred that at 
the heart of Lewis’s disputation against the “demythology” of modern theology is this 
changed habit of mind that Lewis himself has held on to since his conversion and also 
keeps urging others to acquire.  For example, in the essay entitled “Is English 
Doomed?” Lewis remarks very judiciously on the “true aim” of English literary 
education—“to lift the student out of his provincialism by making him ‘the spectator’, 
if not of all, yet of much, ‘time and existence.’”
292    That is to say, students of English 
are to be guided “to meet the past where alone the past still lives, [to be] taken out of 
the narrowness of his own age and class into a more public world” where he can find 
out “what varieties there are in Man.”
293   
Lewis’s opinion about what literary education can and ought to achieve actually 
speaks for the very principle Lewis himself adheres to in cultivating his own literary 
taste, which is liberally formed indeed through meeting with varieties of great minds 
across centuries instead of focusing on authors of merely here and the present.  In 
some sense, it could explain Lewis’s scholarly dedication to medieval literature, 
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  280although it by no means endorses some simple-minded critics’ depreciatory view that 
Lewis “achieve a Christian mind by living in a prescientific world,” which in terms of 
Austin Farrer “is the easiest way of writing him off as a thinker.”
294  Concerning 
Lewis’s allegiance to medieval times, Farrer pertinently cites Lewis’s posthumous 
scholarly book, The Discarded Image (1967), to exemplify how Lewis can present the 
late-medieval mindset and worldview as engagingly as if he were living then and yet 
also recognize in a detached way its beauties as part of a myth.  Moreover, Farrer 
rings very true in observing that what Lewis really achieves in this book is to make 
his readers / students not just acquainted with the medieval point of view but also “be 
better placed for viewing with a reasonable detachment the scientific myths of [the 
modern] age.”
295    Actually, Lewis also applies such a principle of distancing oneself 
from one’s own time to his recommendation of choosing old Christian books to read.   
Why choosing old books for either doctrinal or devotional purpose?  According to 
Lewis’s own explication, we need old books to “correct the characteristic mistakes 
[and “blindness”] of our own period” and to acquire “a standard of plain, central 
Christianity …which puts the controversies of the moment in their proper 
perspective.”
296  Without doubt, it is grounded on the imperative of gaining such a 
“standard” and also comprehensive “perspective” that Lewis always propagandizes 
the value of “mere Christianity,” which in the words of Lewis stands for “something 
positive, self-consistent and inexhaustible” after having been “measured against the 
ages.”
297    
Now, what does this principle of broadening the mind, or healing one’s 
provincialism, via reading old books have to do with Lewis’s disagreement with the 
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  281“de-mythologizing” interpretation of the Bible?    Is the negative reaction nothing but 
a  narrow-minded  repulsion because of his religious conservatism or dogmatism?  
Definitely not.  On the contrary, we might even say that what moves Lewis to 
deprecate the demythology of modern theology is basically the liberal mind he both 
possesses and preaches.  That Lewis is really liberal as a believer or a reader of the 
Bible (and other books) can be well evidenced by his remark as well as confession 
made in the paper entitled “Is Theology Poetry?” which Lewis concludes with these 
words: “Christian theology can fit in science, art, morality, and the sub-Christian 
religions.  …I believe in Christianity as I believe that the Sun has risen, not only 
because I see it, but because by it I see everything else.”
298    Here, Lewis makes very 
clear two important suppositions.  Firstly, theology is essentially a comprehensive 
field of knowledge, that is, neither exclusive of nor necessarily conflicting with other 
cultural areas, be it (modern) scientific development, artistic activity, even paganism.  
Based on this wide-scoped understanding of the nature of Christian theology, it then 
follows that Christian faith is supposed to open rather than delimit the believer’s, 
including his, “seeing eye.”   In other words, to C. S. Lewis, it is perfectly possible 
and also sensible for a modern believer to be of a mind that is theological, scientific, 
poetic or mythological in orientation all at the same time.  Therefore, he can preach 
eloquently as well as believe deeply in the twofold truth about the Incarnation—which 
is simultaneously mythical and factual / historical.    Obviously, this view of theology 
afforded by a liberal mindset, as exemplified by the readiness to embrace both the 
mythology and the factuality / historicity of the Gospels, substantially contradicts the 
theological demand for the de-mythologizing the Bible, as proposed by Bultmann and 
other theologians of Lewis’s time.   
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  282According to Bultmann, the whole de-mythologizing project is prompted by the 
conflict between the mythology of the Bible and modern scientific thinking.  To 
de-mythologize, therefore, is, in a technical sense, to help remove the 
stumbling-blocks within the biblical texts for modern man, including all the obsolete 
ideas no longer believed by modern science.  Regarding what these mythological 
and thus problematic ideas to modern, scientific mind are referred to, Bultmann 
expounds them clearly as follows: 
 
 
The whole conception of the world which is presupposed in the preaching 
of Jesus as in the New Testament generally is mythological; i.e., the 
conception of the world as being structured in three stories, heaven, earth 
and hell; the conception of the intervention of supernatural powers in the 
course of events; and the conception of miracles, especially the conception 
of the intervention of supernatural powers in the inner life of the soul, the 
conception that men can be tempted and corrupted by the devil and 
possessed by evil spirits.  This conception of the world we call 
mythological because it is different from the conception of the world which 
has been formed and developed by science since its inception in ancient 
Greece and which has been accepted by all modern men. …In any case, 
modern science does not believe that the course of nature can be interrupted 




Evidently, in terms of Bultmann, the “problem of mythology” within the New 
Testament is judged by the criteria of modern science.  For the de-mythologizing 
theologians, this “problem of mythology” needs to be tackled, that is, got rid of, so 
that it won’t cause to the problem of faith for modern man.  At this point, Lewis’s 
viewpoint about the compatibility of Christian theology and science to some extent 
would suffice to undermine the initial impulse which gives rise to the whole business 
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  283of de-mythologizing the Bible, that is, the confliction between (mythological) 
theology and modern science.     
Furthermore, as far as the question of reading the Bible is concerned, Lewis’s 
interest is less in whether the biblical messages, e.g. the Gospels, can be digested by a 
scientific mind or not.  His real confrontation with the “demythology” of modern 
theology actually lies in his awareness of the value, rather than the “problem,” of 
mythology in the Bible. Against Bultmann’s hermeneutic proposition of 
de-mythologizing biblical texts, Lewis makes a kind of opposing appeal, also 
hermeneutics-concerned, to read the Bible “mythopathetically.” Lewis’s hermeneutic 
appeal is rendered in the following passage quoted from his essay, “Myth Became 
Fact,” in which Lewis indeed makes a reversing suggestion that not the “mythology” 
but “demythology” would be the true “stumbling block” for the biblical readers, e.g., 
when encountering the revealed truth about the Incarnation:       
 
 
God is more than a god, not less;  . . . We must not be ashamed of the 
mythical radiance resting on our theology.  We must not be nervous about 
‘parallels’ and ‘Pagan Christs’: they ought to be there—it would be a 
stumbling block if they weren’t.  We must not, in false spirituality, 
withhold our imaginative welcome.  If God chooses to be 
mythopoeic—and is not the sky itself a myth? –shall we refuse to be 
mythopathetic?    For this is the marriage of heaven and earth: Perfect Myth 
and Perfect Fact: claiming not only our love and our obedience, but also our 
wonder and delight, addressed to the savage, the child, and the poet in each 
one of us no less than to the moralists, the scholar, and the philosopher.
300   
 
   
It is elucidated here by Lewis that the significance of the mythological of the biblical 
narrative is based on the mythopoeic nature of the divine reality.  Therefore, when 
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  284we approach the biblical text, it is unavoidable and indeed good for us to engage 
ourselves imaginatively with the mythically imported enchantment of the supernatural, 
the miraculous and the transcendental—all that is objectively true in the divine reality 
but also truly beyond either expression or human understanding.   Noticeably, this 
way of reading the Bible suggested by Lewis is opposite to Bultmann’s 
de-mythologizing approach.  For Bultmann, only via de-mythologizing can the 
biblical reader meet existentially and subjectively with the real and spiritual meaning 
of the words of God behind their mythological screen.  For Lewis, contrarily, our 
existential encounter with the words of God, or God Himself, will not be obstructed 
by but, instead, must rest on the whole mythic experience contained in the 
mythological and also truthful expression of the divine reality—which is perhaps the 
only best means of transporting both the tangible body of the historical fact, e.g. the 
event of the Incarnation, and the intangible “soul” within the myth, i.e., the 
inexpressible reality of the divine.
301  In other words, to Lewis, the mythic 
experience or the presence of the mythological in the biblical text is an indispensable 
part of the genuine textual experience for the human readers of the Bible.     
 Certainly, Lewis’s defense of the mythological element of the Bible is not 
targeted at the readers’ textual experience only.    In fact, his counter-demythologizing 
stance has indeed some “dogmatic” import.  As mentioned above, what makes the 
de-mythologizing movement essentially problematic to Lewis is its tendency to doubt 
or even deny the authenticity and historicity of the supernatural and the miraculous 
happenings recounted in the stories of the Gospels.  It is suggested sagaciously in 
Lewis’s paper, “Modern Theology and Biblical Criticism,” that underlying the whole 
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  285“demythology” of the modern theology is this kind of “scepticism,” which, Lewis 
argues, deserves our “scepticism” in response seeing that what these sceptical 
theologians’ de-mythologizing work is ultimately up to is not to extract but to dilute, 
even to distort the spiritual reality conveyed by the biblical narratives.  If we return 
to Lewis’s critics’ questioning about his dogmatic mindset, we might ask whether this 
“skepticism” suggested by Lewis against the skepticism insidious in modern theology 
is just the expression of Lewis’s dogmatism in a different form.  How about his 
mythic reading of the biblical narrative about the Incarnation as “the marriage of 
heaven and earth”?    Should we take it together with the hermeneutics behind such an 
interpretation, namely, reading theology via mythology, as nothing but evidence of 
Lewis’s dogmatic adherence to the traditional  orthodoxy  of  Christianity?       
  For those who believe not in “the marriage of heaven and earth” as Lewis does 
but in “the marriage of heaven and hell,” like the famous literary critic Harold Bloom, 
who claims to be a disciple of William Blake in regard to this conception, the answers 
to these questions are probably and unsurprisingly positive.  However, following 
Austin Farrer’s expression, we could say that this criticism of Lewis’s dogmatism is 
actually “the easiest way of writing him off” not only as a thinker but also as a 
(biblical) reader.  Although Lewis never makes any counter-arguments against such 
a criticism, however, in his fight against the de-mythologizing and 
de-supernaturalizing trend of modern theology, it is discernible that his theological or 
hermeneutic posture has nothing to do with so-called dogmatism.  Rather, as Lewis 
proclaims in his address to an audience of theological students, what he really 
purports to preach is “a due agnosticism,”
302 which means in the context of biblical 
studies to remain “agnostic” is sometimes more judicious and legitimate than the 
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  286sceptical and un-dogmatic interpretation of the Gospels—reading only the symbolic 
meaning at the expense of the literal expression.  To illustrate how to put this “due 
agnosticism” into hermeneutical practice, Lewis in the end of the same paper, 
“Modern Theology and Biblical Criticism,” recommends that we suspend our 
disbelief in the connection of the story of Ascension with any physical meaning of 
“space,” for we simply do not know yet whether “the transcendent reality … excludes 
and repels locality” or “assimilates and loads it with significance.”    Adopting neither 
an exclusively symbolical nor a completely literal approach to the Ascension story, 
Lewis urges us to “take our ignorance seriously.”  Thus, instead of giving any 
answer to the possible meaning of how “the union of God with God and of man with 
God-man” could really happen, Lewis inquires only and wisely: “Had we not better 
wait?”
303  Compared with the scepticism underlying modern demythologizing 
theology, Lewis’s proposal of “due agnosticism” together with his understanding of 
the Gospels as both historically truthful and mythically significant is far more 
open-minded in the hermeneutical if not the theological sense.               
  Furthermore, the characteristic of open-mindedness  in Lewis’s hermeneutic 
principle as well as in his thinking mind demonstrates the quality of C. S. Lewis as a 
truly  interdisciplinary  reader of the Bible.  Though he strongly objects to the 
secularist theory about the biblical texts as mere literature, Lewis, nevertheless, 
approaches the sacred text, i.e. the Bible, without totally disregarding or devaluating 
the significant part the literary element plays in either the conveyance or the reception 
of the messages about the divine reality.  In other words, he reads the Bible both 
from the perspective of Christian faith and in literary terms. The trait of 
“interdisciplinarity” is actually not ascribable to his readership alone.  It also  speaks 
for the essential nature of his literary output.    Although not all the readers / critics of 
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  287Lewis’s literature pay serious attention to its literary aspect, yet none of them would 
fail to recognize its religious bearing, whether one likes it or not.  Thus, literary 
categories that are varied in name while similarly pointing to the combination of the 
literary and the religious, such as “religious / Christian literature,” “Christian / 
theological fantasy,” and “apologetic allegory,” are easily and normally associated 
with the texts of Lewis’s literature.    Indeed, whether Lewis himself likes it or not, the 
association between his literary authorship and his popularity as a Christian apologist 
is most commonly and almost inevitably made by his readers.     
Yet, Lewis’s literary  readers too have their own responsibility to take, after 
recognizing the principle of “open-mindedness” or “due agnosticism” (rather than 
“dogmatism”) underlying C. S. Lewis’s engagement and disengagement with his time 
as the very principle that really defines the fundamental nature of C. S. Lewis’s 
apologetic enterprise either in his discursive defense for the traditional Christian 
orthodoxy or in the embedment of his Christian outlook within his literary narratives.   
Aside from the imperative of undertaking an interdisciplinary reading, namely, 
considering not simply the Logos of the texts, the religious / apologetic meaning, but 
also their Poiema, the textual interweaving of the content and the form, wherein lies 
the literariness of the texts, the readers of Lewis’s religious narratives need also equip 
themselves with a mindset similar to Lewis’s own.      Needless to say, the mindset for 
the sake of a proper reception of Lewis’s apologetic literature, or literary apologetics, 
has nothing to do with Lewis’s personal faith or taste—whether his religious 
traditionalism or his medievalist leaning.  It is, instead, correspondent with the 
critical principle Lewis himself follows and also consistently “propagandizes,” that is, 
avoiding “provincialism” by being open to different traditions, modern or 
old-fashioned, to varied forms of communicating the divine reality, such as history 
and mythology, and above all to the text itself, be it literary or biblical.         
  288Such an open mindset is clearly pronounced in Lewis’s masterly treatise on 
literary criticism, An Experiment in Criticism: “We must empty our minds and lay 
ourselves open.  There is no work in which holes can’t be picked; no work that can 
succeed without a preliminary act of good will on the part of the reader.”
304  In line 
with his theoretical claim in the centre of the proposed critical “experiment” (of 
shifting literary evaluation from the author to the reader) that good literature cannot 
exist without good reading, Lewis here is succinctly reiterating the importance of 
reader response.  No doubt, this calling for the participation of the reader’s willing 
self can find many echoes in modern literary criticism or hermeneutic theories.  As 
discussed previously, it is an often ignored but irrefutable fact that Lewis’s thinking is 
involved in significant ways with the modern fashion of thoughts, although as a 
thinker and reader, he is avowedly unwilling to be committed to any trends of idea or 
taste on the mere ground that they are modern and fashionable.  Indeed, we may 
apply the idea of “sure taste,” coined by Gadamer in Truth and Method, to C. S. 
Lewis’s thinking and reading.  According to Gadamer, a man of taste “observes 
measure even in fashion, not following blindly its changing demands, but using one’s 
own judgment.”  As for someone of “sure taste,” he or she keeps up “a specific 
freedom and superiority” “against the tyranny exercised by fashion.”
305   In  light  of 
Gadamer’s definition, C. S. Lewis is definitely a modern man who cherishes “sure 
taste.”   This can be conspicuously evidenced by both his tendency to remain 
attuned to the pre-modern literary tradition and his unfashionable yet unfaltering 
voice from the position of a traditionalist Christian apologist spoken to an age in 
which the traditional orthodoxy or Christian dogma has long been in great 
discredit.
306    Yet, as readers / critics of Lewis’s literary texts, our task is surely not to 
                                                 
304 Lewis,  An Experiment in Criticism, p. 116. 
305 Gadamer,  Truth and Method, p. 35-36. 
306  The idea is borrowed from Austin Farrer’s essay “The Christian Apologist” that he wrote to 
  289be informed by the nature of Lewis’s taste or mind only.   In fact, if we really keep 
our mind open in order to encounter or confront with Lewis’s texts, we must to some 
extent be challenged by the taste emerging from them, if not in direct relation with 
their author.   
In what sense would C. S. Lewis’s readers be challenged by his works of 
religious / apologetic / Christian literature?  Is it because they are the kind of 
“religious literature” T. S. Eliot once denounces as “deliberately and defiantly 
Christian”
307 but scant of literary merit?  Or, ought they to be taken as nothing but 
“an apologetics that pretends to lead reflection, without a break, from knowledge 
toward belief,” as phrased by Ricoeur
308?  Certainly  not.  Considering  seriously  the 
inter-mixture of the literary structure and the religious / apologetic import within 
Lewis’s texts, this interdisciplinary study means exactly to repudiate the easy and 
unliterary judgment of Lewis’s literature as such.  Actually, the question about the 
confrontation between the reader and the text is basically a hermeneutical question.  
After all, as we can learn from modern hermeneutics as well as Lewis’s critical 
outlook, the practice of reading as interpretation or understanding is fundamentally 
“an intersubjective process” of “conversation,” a process Ricoeur associates with 
textual criticism to mean “the connection between two discourses, the discourses of 
the text and the discourses of interpretation.”
309   In Gadamer’s terms, this 
intersubjective conversation within the text can be designated as a “dialogical 
event.”
310   Moreover, these hermeneutic ideas about “dialogicity” or 
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  290intersubjectivity or intercourse between the reader and the text are echoed by Wayne 
C. Booth’s conception of the reader as the author’s “second self,” as lucidly 
expounded in the following quotation from Booth’s book, The Rhetoric of Fiction 
(1961).  Noticeably, Booth’s theory of literary reception is of even closer relevance 
to the reception of Lewis’s literary apologetics, for it serves to illuminate the interplay 
between two selves, the author and the reader, which is regarded as necessarily 
involving the coincidence of the beliefs of the two parties:         
                                                                                                                                           
 
 
It is only as I read that I become the self whose beliefs must coincide with 
the author’s.  Regardless of my real beliefs and practices, I must 
subordinate my mind and heart to the book if I am to enjoy it to the full.  
The author creates, in short, an image of himself and another image of his 
reader; he makes his reader, as he makes his second self, and the most 





Applying all these theoretical viewpoints on the interaction between reader and text / 
author to Lewis’s readers, particularly Booth’s idea cited above of the “agreement” 
between the two “created selves (author and reader)” accommodated by the text, their 
meeting space, we can thereby be certain of the credibility of the assertion that the 
“self” of Lewis’s reader must undergo a certain challenge in the whole process of 
being created as Lewis’s second self via his texts.  To put it in another way, when 
confronting Lewis’s literary works with their texture underpinned by the Christian 
ideas associable with Lewis’s religious belief and even apologetic enterprise, the 
willing readers will be hermeneutically provoked by the “challenge” of venturing on 
the apologetic discourse rendered by the texts of C. S. Lewis.     
 
and Answer: Forms of Dialogic Understanding, p. 213. 
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  291More specifically, in the very exercise of probing into the textual discourses of 
Lewis’s religious narratives, one of the major tasks this research engaged in 
undertaking, we probably will be faced with a series of self-inquiries: Do we share, 
for example, with the modern pilgrim in the allegory of The Pilgrim’s Regress the 
ultimate answer to the puzzle of the subjective experience of some mysteriously 
insatiable desire which cannot be satisfied until the existential self can turn away from 
all the misleading (intellectual) routes of the (modern) world to the main road that 
leads to the “reunion” with God?    And, can we really attune ourselves to the sense of 
irony regarding the existence of the devil-tempter in the context of infernal 
admonition on tempting “human animals” in The Screwtape Letters, or to the promise 
of the restorability of the hellish human souls, who can if they will be transposed from 
Hell to Heaven to enjoy the new life bestowed by the divine Redeemer, as envisioned 
in  The Great Divorce?  Also, to what extent do we feel related to the mythical 
figure’s struggle in the conflict between primitive cults of religion and her 
disintegrated selfhood in the Greek myth-refashioned novel of Till We Have Faces?   
Finally, do we find ourselves able or comfortable to digest the obstinate belief 
manifested by the grieving and doubting journal-writer’s conclusion about theodicy, 
i.e. the incontestable goodness of God even in the reality of human pain, such as the 
suffering of bereavement textualized “autobiographically” in A Grief Observed?     
The answers to these questions would probably vary from person to person as 
every individual reader, while meeting existentially with the texts concerned, has his 
or her personal response to make.    But, he or she must be a genuine reader in the first 
place via opening the mind so as to receive, that is, to enter into and converse with, 
the text.      No doubt, the receptive mindset of the reader, in Lewis’s words, “a certain 
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312 is absolutely indispensable if 
Wayne Booth’s formula for the success in both writing and reading—the readers 
becoming created “peers” of the author—is to be fulfilled.  According to Booth, 
“[t]he author makes his readers” which means a successful author makes his readers 
his peers by “mak[ing] them see what they have never seen before … mov[ing] them 
into a new order of perception and experience altogether.”
313    For the reader of C. S. 
Lewis’s religious narratives, what can this “new order of perception and experience” 
be existentially about?   
Throughout this research into the existential and apologetic meaning of Lewis’s 
texts, the vision encountered in them is ultimately a sign of hopefulness.    To be more 
specific, it is about the hope of the restoration of human self to the faith and promised 
redemption in God on the premise that the existential and willing self (re-)orients its 
heart, mind, spirit, and even body to an integrated relationship with reality of what is 
subjectively and ultimately true, i.e. the reality of human selfhood and that of the 
transcendent yet also immanent existence of God.  Of course, this vision of the 
re-integration between self and faith, or existence and reality, is not directly indicated 
by Lewis’s texts.  Rather, it is through reading / interpretation / criticism that the 
texts are seen as, in the words of Ricoeur, “manifestation of the bond between man 
and the sacred.”
314  Moreover, insofar as it is concerned with the redemption of the 
self, as promised by religious, indeed Christian, faith, the hope suggestively 
manifested in Lewis’s texts must be viewed at the same time as a sign—in the the 
religious and hermeneutic sense.    The association of “a sign” with the textual vision 
of religious promise and also with the reader’s response to this implied vision is based 
                                                 
312  Lewis, “The Language of Religion,” C. S. Lewis Essay Collection: Faith, Christianity and the 
Church, p. 266.   
313 Booth,  The Rhetoric of Fiction, p. 397-398. 
314 Ricoeur,  The Symbolism of Evil, p. 356.   
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concept of a sign.”    According to Gadamer’s pertinent observation, either “a sign” or 
the “good news” proclaimed by gospel messages is “something only given to one who 
is ready to accept it as such.”
315  Moreover, Gadamer furthers his discussion about 
religious signs in the Biblical context by highlighting the reception of signs as a 
universal hermeneutic question, rather than simply a question about religious faith.  
Most sagaciously, Gadamer points out the “universal challenge implied by the 
acceptance of the Christian message, something that Luther expressed in the formula 
pro me.”
316  In terms of Gadamer’s “hermeneutic conclusion” about the activity of 
“receiving a sign,” we may confirm that the “sign” (to be) encountered in the literary 
context of C. S. Lewis’s religious narratives must have very little to do with any 
dogmatism pertaining either to the texts or perhaps even to their author.  In other 
words, proffered by Lewis’s literary texts, the sign concerned, however strongly it 
may connote the importance of religious faith for human being’s self-integrity, must 
await a responsive reading to become something incontestably meaningful.   
In view of this, it is, therefore, inevitable to conclude that to finalize any 
“(apologetic) answer” of C. S. Lewis underlying his religious narratives about the 
problem of the existential self’s alienation from the Ultimate Reality is but a mission 
impossible.    In other words, in the process or at the end of the experience of reading, 
it is by no means likely to get any absolute answer dominated by the author’s 
preoccupation, even if the author, who happens to be a traditionalist Christian 
apologist, is preoccupied with an obstinate or anachronistic belief in Christian dogma.   
Nor does this research intend to offer and impose any exact or final answer 
particularly to the apologetic meaning embedded within Lewis’s texts, seeing that the 
                                                 
315  Gadamer, “The Aesthetic and Religious Experience,” p. 152. 
316  Gadamer, Ibid, p. 151. 
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individual reader in his or her own existential meeting with the text.    What this work 
of interpretation of Lewis’s religious narratives really pursues to achieve is to fulfill 
the “sole function” of “literary scholarship and criticism,” namely, in terms of Lewis, 
“to multiply, prolong, and safeguard experiences of good reading.”
317   To put it in 
another way, it is aimed to demonstrate an open-minded reception of Lewis’s 
works—to make certain response to the sign of hope and promise emerging from 
them, as if made by the “second self” of C. S. Lewis.   
Thus, it can be shown that this thesis has attested to the fact that ultimately a 
genuinely hermeneutical exercise can be a self-transforming and self-integrating 
process.    In the case of C. S. Lewis’s reader, at the post-critical, or post-interpretative, 
stage, i.e., after meeting and interacting with the texts created by the inter-mingling of 
literary art and religious meaning and also invested with the Lewisian 
existentialist-apologetic vision, he or she may indeed grow into a broadened and 
deepened awareness of what ironic or disintegrated subjectivity and redemptive 
supernaturality mean and how they can possibly become reunited —existentially.  In 
light of this, it is definitely sensible to revise the claim made by Kant in the early 
modernity and reinstate the pre-modern value that being dependent on the Christian 
faith in the Ultimate Reality, i.e. God, does not really cause to the self, whether a 
thinker or a reader, any betrayal or loss of subjectivity.    Rather, it may actually bring 




                                                 
317  The quotation is part of a passage in which Lewis remarks: “If literary scholarship and criticism are 
regarded as activities ancillary to literature, then their sole function is to multiply, prolong, and 
safeguard experiences of good reading.”    See An Experiment in Criticism, p. 104. 
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